What drives public acceptance of reforms? Longitudinal evidence from a Dutch pension reform

Governments often find it hard to pursue economic reforms, even if they eventually will benefit a majority of voters. The literature remains inconclusive about the reasons for this. Some scholars, on the one hand, stress the role of distributional conflicts between different classes, for instance dividing the young and the old in the case of pay-as-you-go pensions. Others have highlighted that resistance to reform is rather broad-based owing to the public’s poor understanding of the need for reform. This paper attempts to disentangle the drivers of public acceptance of reform by means of a case study: the 2012 increase of the Dutch statutory retirement age from 65 to 67. We exploit a unique longitudinal dataset on the attitudes of Dutch households respecting pension reform in the 2003–2013 period. Our findings offer various new insights. First, we find that education, occupational status and psychological traits were the most systematic drivers of reform preferences, while age had a limited impact. Second, and significantly, we find that the year fixed effects were the main drivers of respondents’ acceptance of reform. We interpret the pattern of the year coefficients as evidence of a collective learning process whereby households gradually updated their expectations and reform preferences in light of new information.     

Community acceptance of recycled water: can we inoculate the public against scare campaigns?

Without improved water resource management, it is predicted that water shortages will affect two‐thirds of humanity by 2025. One solution that has traditionally faced fierce public resistance is recycled waste water. This study investigates the extent to which public communication strategies can influence community acceptance of recycled water, using the framework of Inoculation Theory. A four‐phase experimental design was conducted. Participants completed an initial questionnaire and were then randomly assigned to a control group, a manipulation check group or a treatment group. A final follow‐up survey measured changes in the dependent variable: stated likelihood of using recycled water for different uses. Results indicate that communication strategies based on Inoculation Theory are limited in their effectiveness for this product category. Findings do, however, identify a clear recency effect, indicating that continuous public communications are key to ensuring that community scare campaigns do not prevent implementation of water augmentation projects. This study differs from previous applications of Inoculation Theory because of the challenges associated with marketing a monopoly commodity, which is a necessity to support life. This empirical study uses fictional marketing stimuli to test the theory in a context, which is growing in global importance. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Education and training in public administration and development: what does the customer really want and are we prepared to provide it?

This article examines some of the difficulties arising from the introduction of market forces into the field of higher education.In particular it notes how the changing demands of sponsors and other key players, coupled with recent trends in teaching and learning methods, have caused providers of education and training in development to review ‘core products’ and modify the style of service delivery to accommodate the changing expectations of ‘customers.’ Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Creating critical citizens? Anti-austerity protests and public opinion

Following the Great Recession, many countries witnessed large protests against the austerity policies their governments implemented. What was their effect on public opinion? I argue that these protests can make citizens more critical of elite performance, but not more disaffected or undemocratic. Anti-austerity protests voice civil society actors instead of elites in the public debate, making that debate more relatable. Such increased relatability can make individuals more comfortable expressing their own dissatisfaction, and it can make them perceive that their voice is more valued. Taking advantage of a demonstration happening during the fieldwork of the fifth wave of the European Social Survey in Portugal, I find exposure to the protest decreased satisfaction and trust in elites. I find no evidence that the protest made individuals more disaffected from politics or more undemocratic. Supporting the argument regarding the mechanism, the protest increased the number of claims by civil society actors reported in the press and its effect was stronger for individuals worse represented by institutionalized elites. These findings highlight the democratic importance of unconventional forms of participation, and deepen our understanding of their interplay with conventional politics.     

Is private production of public services cheaper than public production? A meta‐regression analysis of solid waste and water services

Privatization of local government services is assumed to deliver cost savings, but empirical evidence for this from around the world is mixed. We conduct a meta‐regression analysis of all econometric studies examining privatization of water distribution and solid waste collection services and find no systematic support for lower costs with private production. Differences in study results are explained by differences in time period of the analyses, service characteristics, and policy environment. We do not find a genuine empirical effect of cost savings resulting from private production. The results suggest that to ensure cost savings, more attention be given to the cost characteristics of the service, the transaction costs involved, and the policy environment stimulating competition, rather than to the debate over public versus private delivery of these services. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Grammar Schools,a Policy of Social Mobility and Selection—Why?

Initially, four plausible reasons for introducing selection in secondary education are examined, three of which are irrelevant to contemporary debates about expanding grammar‐school education. These are: first, to ration education in less advanced economies; second, to increase the supply of skilled labour within an expanded national elite; third, as part of a ‘segmented’ system of education. A fourth—increasing upward social mobility—is open to two objections: first, the May government's proposals are so limited as to have little likely impact on mobility and, second, upward mobility in the twentieth century was possible only because of structural change in the British labour market, and that will probably not continue in this century. Finally, it is argued that attempts to select the ‘best’ in any activity or skill are necessarily highly imperfect, and are far less accurate than testing who does and does not meet some minimum level of competence.     

Representatives of the public? Public opinion and interest group activity

Although scholars have long speculated about how organised interests link the public to decision makers, there has actually been little empirical research on this important element of democratic theory. This important gap in the literature is addressed in this article by examining, in addition to other supply‐side and demand‐side factors, whether groups mobilise on issues in policy areas that are regarded as salient by the public. Based on an analysis of 4,501 contributions in 142 European Commission online consultations, it is found that organised interests potentially can act as a transmission belt between the public and decision makers. Although the results vary to some degree by issues, higher rates of mobilisation are found on those issues that fall within policy areas that are regarded as salient by the general public and those with consequences for budgetary spending.     

Water privatization,hegemony and civil society: What Motivates Individuals to Protest About Water Privatization?

The article takes the case of protest against water privatization in Ireland to show that protestors with high levels of instrumental motivation as opposed to ideological motivation are more likely to protest. In order to explain this we uniquely combine Klandermans’ social psychology of protest with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. By bridging these two bodies of theory, we provide an interdisciplinary account of the reason why protestors serve to uphold the exact power structures they intend to challenge. We argue that for water movements to be successful they must focus equally on both their instrumental and ideological motivations to ensure that power structures are confronted. This would enable movements to devise a coherent counter-hegemonic discourse, which is essential to contest the dominant global hegemony of water marketization.     

Left High and Dry? Climate Change,Common‐Pool Resource Theory,and the Adaptability of Western Water Compacts

Efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are falling far short of what a consensus of scientists argues is necessary to avoid potentially catastrophic increases in the mean global temperature. Increasingly, attention is devoted to understanding the vulnerability and adaptability of social and ecological systems to climate change in particular areas of the world. In the Western United States and other semi‐arid regions of the world, possibly the most immediate, direct impacts of climate change involve the availability of water resources. Scientific evidence suggests that the West is likely to become hotter and drier and will experience greater variability in precipitation. These changes will affect tens of millions of residents in Western states, and nearly every sector of the economy, especially agriculture. The logic of common‐pool resource theory is applied in this Theory to Practice essay to assess the vulnerability and adaptability to climate change of interstate river compacts and to offer recommendations for coping with climate change. Future areas of research on this critical topic are also outlined. Expert e‐commentaries by Richard Kashmanian and Roger Gorke of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and by Elisabeth Graffy of the U.S. Geological Survey, can be found on the PAR website (go to aspanet.org , click on the link to PAR, and then on the Theory to Practice link).     

From Corporatism to Lobbyism? — Parliaments,Executives, and Organized Interests in Denmark and Norway

The integration of organized interests into the formation and implementation of public policies is a core institutional trait of the Scandinavian countries. However, significant changes have taken place in the relations between organized interests and public authorities in Denmark and Norway during the last two decades. The use of traditional corporatist structures of interest intermediation has been reduced in favor of a corresponding increase in lobbyism. At the same time a marked increase in the frequency and intensity of contacts between organized interests and parliamentary actors has taken place. The shift in focus mirrors the increasing role played by the two parliaments in public policy formation and a less positive assessment of the outcomes of strongly institutionalized corporatist policy making by administrative decision makers.     

Compared to what? Media-guided reference points and relative economic voting

The idea of the relative economy, or benchmarking economic voting, has been around for a long time. However, the choice of international benchmark(s) remains underspecified, especially in cross-national and time-series studies. This paper argues that the selection process of benchmark(s) should be guided by the theory suggesting that voters benchmark countries that are similar, familiar, and connected, and that media guide voters to appreciate these reference points. Using domestic media coverage from Lexis-Nexis spanning 22 languages, 29 democracies, and over 30 years, this research identifies the unique reference points across time and space. Analysis of this novel dataset shows that voters react strongly to relative economic performance when they make vote choices. Moreover, the benchmarking effects become more pronounced with highly educated populations, but are not affected by clarity of responsibility.     

Can private governance boost public policy? Insights from public–private governance interactions in the fisheries and electricity sectors

Based on the inductive analysis of two parallel cases of private environmental governance – private, market-driven fisheries governance and private, market-driven governance for electricity decarbonization – this paper uncovers a trigger for positive public policy spillovers from private environmental governance. It identifies circumstances that prompt groups of business actors working as private regulators to also take on a role as public policy advocates and supporters, revealing a potential for private governance initiatives that are targeted at a particular environmental problem to serve as a bolster for the public regulatory governance of that problem as well. Both private governance cases at the basis of this analysis feature groups of business actors seeking to meet voluntary sustainability goals through the tools of private governance (specifically, through flexing buyer power and private authority in an effort to reform environmentally problematic practices among particular groups of suppliers). In both cases, the business's inability to attain private sustainability goals though private governance means alone has given rise to business demand for facilitative public environmental policy and regulation. The analysis presented in this paper thus points to the occurrence of a particular and intriguing pattern of complementarity between private authority and public policy – one where public policy is called on to fill gaps left by private environmental governance and authority. And it identifies key conditions for such private-governance-driven recentering of public policy to occur, namely the presence of private supply chain greening goals and commitments that are economically, reputationally, and/or competitively critical for businesses to attain, combined with shortfalls in the capacity of businesses' private authority to bring about such attainment. The two case analysis further suggests the importance of ENGOs in identifying and activating some of the opportunities for leveraging shortfalls in private environmental governance to the advantage of public environmental policy and regulation.     

Institutional influences on business power: how ‘privileged’ is the Business Council of Australia?

• This paper explores the institutional and political dynamics of the Business Council of Australia (BCA), a unique form of big business association which relies on the active involvement of its one hundred or so CEO members. The paper argues that associations such as the BCA confront a range of serious institutional problems in their attempts to wield political power, or more modestly perhaps, policy influence. First, they confront a disconnect between ‘structural’ and ‘instrumentalist’ articulations of business power. The key source of business power resides in business control over the economy and the investment process, a form of power wielded at the company level not at the level of business associations. When engaged in instrumentalist or overt forms of political activism, the BCA also confronts serious collective action problems. It is also argued that the influence of the BCA seems to have declined over time and that this can partly be traced back to declining CEO commitment rooted in changing institutional and structural dynamics in the corporate world.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lobbying in the sunshine—hiding behind transparency?

Lobbying in Israel was unregulated for 60 years. Scholars have decried the fact that high value is attached to the written decree, but implementation does not necessarily follow: quite a few laws have remained at symbolic level in Israel. There were two unsuccessful bills submitted to legislate lobbying regulation: first by Knesset Member (MK) Merom in 1993 and the second one by MK Naot in 2001. The bill submitted by MKs Yechimovich and Sa'ar in 2007 resulted in passing the Israeli lobbying regulations in 2008, but the Lobbyist Law displayed unexpected characteristics, and there was a 500% growth in lobbyist numbers. In 2012, a scandal shook the Israeli lobbying world as a crew from the Israeli Channel 2's investigative show Uvda (‘Fact’) infiltrated the training program of the Gilad Government Relations & Lobbying firm. Following the Channel 2 exposé, the Speaker of the Knesset MK Rivlin instructed Knesset employees to immediately forbid the entrance of all lobbyists to areas heavily used by MKs. These steps, taken almost 4 years after that the Knesset had passed a weak Lobbyist Law, scoring 28 points according to the Center of Public Integrity score, did not create more transparency but only set certain restrictions on the lobbyists' movements in the Knesset building. In 2013, MK Koll submitted a bill to further regulate the lobbying followed by another bill by MKs Yechimovich and Tsur in 2014. However, these bills were thrashed as the Knesset was dispersed in December 2014. This paper would analyze the bills from 1993, 2001, 2007, 2013, and 2014 by measuring their strength according to the Center of Public Integrity Index in order to explore the path that resulted in passing the Lobbyist Law in 2008 and in the following developments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do crises go to waste? Fiscal austerity and public service reform

In the tight budgetary conditions following the 2008 financial crisis, governments have proposed saving money by reforming public services. This paper argues that tight budget constraints make reform harder by introducing an information problem. Governments are uncertain about bureaucratic departments’ effectiveness. Normally, effective departments can be identified by increasing their budget, since they can use the increase to produce more than ineffective departments can. When budgets must be cut, however, ineffective departments can mimic effective ones by reducing their output. Budget cuts thus harm both short-run productive efficiency, and long-run allocative efficiency. I confirm these predictions in a US dataset. Low marginal productivity bureaucracies reduce output by more than expected in response to a budget cut, and budget setters respond less to observed short-run marginal productivity after cutback years.     

No news is good news? Press coverage and corporate public affairs management

• Being in the public eye puts pressure on an organization's Public Affairs (PA) function. This study finds that firms more closely covered by the press tend to be more forceful in promoting their own position on social issues (social buffering). Press coverage is not associated with greater corporate efforts to comply with societal expectation (social bridging). Overall, press coverage is weakly associated with lowered perceived corporate public affairs performance.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.