The Power of EU Collective Action: The Impact of EU Data Privacy Regulation on US Business Practice

Contemporary critiques of globalisation processes often focus on the potential levelling of regulatory standards and the export by the United States of neoliberal norms of deregulation and market facilitation. This paper, in contrast, examines the extra-jurisdictional impact of EU regulatory policy on the behaviour of foreign private parties, even in powerful states such as the United States. Shaffer finds that the threat of curtailing access to the EU's large market provides the EU with leverage. By acting collectively, EU Member States can magnify the impact of European policy on US business practice and enhance EU Member State clout in the negotiation of de jure and de facto foreign standards. The site of analysis is the current dispute between the United States and the European Union over the provision of 'adequate' data privacy protection in accordance with the EU Directive on data privacy. The paper explores the many ways in which the Directive affects US practice through changing the stakes of US players – including regulators, businesses, privacy advocates, lawyers and privacy service providers – and thereby shifting the playing field in the United States on which competing interest groups clash. In examining the interaction of EU law, US practice and international trade rules, the author finds that WTO law, rather than constraining the Directive's extra-jurisdictional impact, provides the EU with a shield against US retaliatory threats, thereby facilitating a trading up of data privacy standards. The paper concludes by examining the conditions under which cross-border exchange can lead to a leveraging up of social protections: the desire for firms to expand their markets, Member States' collective bargaining power buttressed by market clout, the nature of luxury goods, the externalities of foreign under-regulation legitimising EU intervention, and the constraints of supranational trade rules.     

Economic Competition between Professional Bodies: The Case of Auditing

Building on Romano's recent analysis of the United States securitiesregulatory regime, we model competition between professionalauditing associations. We show that such competition is an effectivesubstitute for government regulation, providing an efficientmeans for auditors to signal their service quality. Competitionis likely to lead to stability in the market for auditing services,with neither a "race to the top" nor a "race to the bottom."Monopoly rents are unlikely to be earned by auditors or theirprofessional organizations, and government intervention canbe limited to ensuring that the professional organization'sdisciplinary actions are costly enough to be effective.     

Prospects and Limits of Democratic Governance in the EU

The EU Treaty contains for the first time a title on democratic principles. These provisions emphasise the importance of national parliaments and the EU parliament for the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The new chapter on democratic principles does not address the central challenge of the EU polity to the traditional understanding of democratic legitimacy, the disjunction of political and economic governance as expressed by the important role of independent institutions like the Commission, the European Central Bank and agencies in EU governance . This is a consequence of the fact that the status of independent regulatory institutions in a democratic polity has not been clarified—neither in the EU nor in the Member States. However, such independent institutions exist in diverse forms in several Member States and could hence be understood as a principle of democratic governance common to the Member States. Such an understanding has not yet evolved. The central theoretical problem is that regulatory theories which explain the legitimacy of independent institutions as an alternative to traditional representation remain outside the methodology of traditional democratic theory. Economic constitutional theory, based on social contract theory and widely neglected in the legal constitutional debate, offers a methodological approach to understanding independent regulatory institutions as part of representative democratic governance.     

论欧盟金融服务法中的最低限度协调原则

在欧盟金融服务法中,最低限度协调原则是指共同体立法只对各成员国金融监管规则的基本要素进行协调.这一原则尊重了成员国的国家主权,有助于降低金融服务市场一体化的政策成本,并能够充分发挥市场机制的作用以促成最优的监管标准.<欧共体条约>中的特别协调条款是这一原则的直接依据,金融服务指令中的协调条款是其集中体现.最低限度协调原则只适用于符合共同利益的非歧视性限制措施.在其适用范围内,各成员国只能进行执行性立法.该原则的确立和推行是以相互承认为核心、以母国控制为表现形式的一体化模式成功运用的必然结果.晚近的立法实践表明,这一原则有被边缘化的危险.     

The Effectiveness of the EU's Ozone Policy

Has the EU's ozone policy been effective? In other words: What caused the 90 per cent phase-out of ozone depleting substances (ODS) within the EU? Was it due to an EU-wide regulatory approach, to national circumstances, or to the Montreal Protocol? As EU's environmental policy has not been overly successful so far, it would interesting to know why ozone policy is an area where the EU and its Member States have reached targets effectively over a relatively short time. We suggest that the effectiveness of EU's ozone policy is due to two factors that together secured this rapid phase-out. First, the ozone policy was enacted by means of an EU regulation – rather than by directives – which required all Member States and all larger ODS-generating corporations to implement a ban simultaneously. Second, with the US administration making a u-turn and the increased availability of ODS-substitute chemicals, Europe saw a political opportunity to speed up the phase-out process. A limited study of the phase-out of ODS in Spain supports this argument. While the EU's ozone policy has been effective, its success owes much to particular economic and political circumstances associated with the issue of ozone depletion.     

Cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition: the case of asylum legislation in Europe

Traditional analysis considers that the granting of protection to refugees is an international public good, and thus explains both the heterogeneousness in refugee protection in Europe and the spiral that has hardened the EU Member States’ asylum legislation from the mid-1980s onwards as the result of free riding in the provision of the good. In contrast, the paper considers that the heterogeneousness in refugee distribution is best explained by the joint product model and that the spiral of restriction is best explained by the common pool resource model and regulatory competition theory. The paper explains, and gives empirical evidence of the emergence and development of a competitive game among the EU Member States, and shows the result and the consequence of this upon cooperative attempts among States.     

European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence

Beyond the well-known discussion in regard to the Cassis de Dijon of the European Court of Justice, implying the mutual recognition of national product regulations, the topic of mutual recognition and regulatory competition has emerged again in the realm of European corporate laws (“Centros” of the ECJ in 1999). Can effective competition among European corporate laws be expected? In the US a broad discussion has developed whether the existing competition process among US corporate laws leads to permanent legal improvements by legal innovations or to a race to the bottom. Beyond this discussion a new point has been raised recently: the possibility and importance of path dependence as a potential problem for the efficacy of competition among corporate laws (lock-ins). For the analysis of this problem we apply the concept of technological paradigms and trajectories to legal rules in corporate law and introduce “legal paradigms,” which direct the search for better legal solutions in certain directions and might be stabilized by certain factors (esp. complementarities to other legal rules) leading to considerable path dependence effects. Our results show that path dependence might play a crucial role for competition among European corporate laws, even if the principle of mutual recognition would be introduced to corporate laws in the EU, implying that competition among European corporate laws might be difficult and sluggish. Consequently the question arises whether additional meta-rules should be established that might mitigate the problem of path dependence and lock-ins in regulatory competition in corporate law.     

Transcending the dilemma of “public interest”

This paper discusses the evolution and recent trends in the development of the constitutional concept of “public use” in the case-law history of the United States starting from the source of US government’s taking powers and the original meaning of the Taking Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Since the concepts of “public use” and “public interest” are extremely difficult to be defined, it is very hard for the US courts to develop a relevant operative criterion. In the United States, the safeguard of “public interest” in taking mainly lies legislative rather than judicial control. In a democratic society, legislative judgment is highly respected by the courts and the entire takeovers that conform to public use as determined by the Congress are usually deemed constitutional. In this sense, the Congress is a “public interest machine”, which automatically generates laws and decisions on behalf of public interests through the democratic representative process. The paper eventually suggests that China should divert its attention from the theoretical definition of “public interest” to institutional construction, and should make the National and Local People’s Congresses and their standing committees to play major roles in deciding taking and compensation schemes. __________ Translated from Zhongguo Faxue 中国法学 (China Law), 2005, (5): 36–45     

Reflexive Governance and European Company Law

The use of reflexive forms of governance is growing within the EU, in particular as the open method of coordination (OMC) is applied to a wider range of contexts. Reflexive approaches view diversity of laws and practices across the Member States as the basis for experimentation and mutual learning within the overall process of European integration. Company law, however, seems to be an exception to this trend: recent activity in this area has mostly taken the form of 'hard law' harmonisation through directives, coupled with the stimulation of regulatory competition through judgments of the European Court of Justice concerning freedom of movement, most notably the Centro s case. The deliberations of the European Corporate Governance Forum barely qualify as a 'company law OMC' because of the limited space allowed for 'learning from diversity'; instead, differences in the laws of the Member States are seen, in the discourse of the Forum, as 'distortions of competition'. In the area of labour law, by contrast, a degree of functional convergence and a coordinated raising of standards have recently been achieved by the dovetailing of the OMC with social policy directives. The contrasting experiences of labour law and company law suggest that reflexive or experimentalist approaches to European governance can be effective when they operate so as to complement mechanisms of harmonisation and regulatory competition, rather than being presented as alternatives to them.     

The Temporal Paradox of Regions in the EU Seeking Independence: Contraction and Fragmentation versus Widening and Deepening?

This article investigates the possibility of regional entities within EU Member States to become EU Member States in their own right following their secession from their mother state. International law does not automatically allow such regions to remain EU Member States since it refers this issue back to the constituent instruments of international organisations and a reading of both the EU Treaties and the ECJ's jurisprudence seems to preclude such a ‘continued membership’. The article then further explores the legal issues which could arise during the accession process of the newly independent state. After suggesting solutions to bridge the gap between its secession and its own EU membership, it is argued that the key challenge for such a region would be to ensure a smooth transition, without the loss of prerogatives under EU law, from being an EU region to an EU Member State proper.     

The Constitution of a European Democracy and the Role of the Nation State

Starting from the presupposition that European democracy is necessary to the survival and development of the European Union, the author deals with the process which may entail a European constitution, and discusses the elements of the present legal structure of the EU which are conducive to a European Democracy. In particular, the author focuses on the incomplete, polycentric, and dynamic character of a possible EC/EU constitution, and on the duality of its legitimating principle. This claim is that these characteristics necessitate some institutional modifications of democratic principles if compared with national democracy, and that Euro-democracy is possible if we do not simply apply the standards of democracy valid for Member States, but succeed in developing criteria which are adequate to the institutional qualities of the EC/EU. Finally, the author maintains the legal character of the regulatory power of the Community, and invokes the mutual legal bonds linking the Member States and their peoples as the source of the Community.     

Crimes against water: non-enforcement of state water pollution laws

In the United States water pollution is a serious problem criminalized not only by the federal government, but by all states. These laws vary greatly in content, but are widely disobeyed and universally under-enforced. Statutes, case law, histories and journalism show “law in action” typologies of non-enforcement efficacious for analysis including: (1) jurisdiction issues like federal pre-emption, inter-state compacts, and constitutional limitations; (2) legislative issues such as failure to legislate, or legislating ineffectively; (3) agency issues, including administrative obstacles, delegation, power vacuums, procedure, and “agency capture”; (4) policing issues like apathy, under-funding/training, jurisdictional confusion, and “following the path of least resistance”; (5) prosecutorial issues, including isolation, intimidation, and ideological priority bias; (6) trial and appellate court issues, including unclear culpability, erroneous holdings, bias, and lack of judicial independence; and (7) citizen, victim, and defendant issues, including legal intellectual influence, environmentalist criminalization apathy, industry lobbying, environmental justice, reporting failures, self-policing, ethics and flight. The conclusion is non-enforcement in this area of criminal law shows that while federally there may exist a relatively consistent, content neutral enforcement system, at the state level resistance to enforcement is seen across a number of fronts. Ultimately, states can be seens as colonized frontiers servicing venture capitalism, consistent with a “race to the bottom.”     

A review of telecom markets in the EU: What did the European Commission learn or not from the past?

The EU telecom regulation relies on a market-by-market sunset approach. In order to facilitate the market review of national regulatory authorities, the European Commission has offered two successive sets of recommended markets susceptible to ex ante regulation. The inclusion or exclusion of a recommended telecom market is analyzed on its competition conditions across the EU. Beginning in 2014 the European Commission published the draft third Market Recommendation. This article aims to give a critical evaluation of those recommended markets by surveying the competition situations on every telecom market in the EU Member States. It observes that while the drafted Third Recommendation makes a reasonable assessment for most telecom markets, it may not have appropriately addressed markets such as retail fixed access, wholesale call origination, wholesale fixed and mobile call termination, wholesale high-quality access, and wholesale broadcasting transmission.     

The Fight Against Organised Crime in Europe: A Comparative Perspective

This article provides an overview of the measures and actions taken by the Member States of the European Union in their fight against organised crime and transborder crime. The Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime adopted by the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs during the Dutch EU Presidency, submitted some 30 recommendations with respect to greater harmonisation regarding the fight against organised crime in the EU Member States. The author gives a concise summary of the most relevant changes and the structural characteristics per Member State, paying attention to developments in the specific countries and the organisations involved. One of the conclusions reached is that few or no reforms within national investigative and prosecution authorities may be directly traced back to the regulatory impulses of the EU. Although the EU Action Plan has not yet realised a convergence of the systems, the European process of integration has increased the mutual transparency and knowledge of one another's systems.     

An American Looks at the European Union

Abstract: Anyone who has followed the evolution of six European nations from a simple Coal and Steel Community to the current twenty‐five Member State European Union (EU), has witnessed a truly remarkable passage. Nonetheless, the EU remains a decidedly jerrybuilt affair. Through numerous enlargements, increased competences, changes in structure and operation, the Union has been bedevilled by the fact that it is neither a simple international treaty with 25 signatories, nor a truly federal union. Rather, the EU has operated, sometimes effectively, often shakily, between these two extremes; exhibiting a sort of ‘fear of federalism’. From a US perspective, this article looks at the present state of the European Union and asks why it has met its potential in some ways, but has fallen so far short in others. Obviously, the tension between the Member States and the Community institutions is one reason. The article asks why do the states compete so much with one another, when their true competition is often with non‐European entities? Why does the European Council never seem to act in a timely manner? Why do euro‐citizens have so poor of an appreciation of what the Community does for them? Why does the Common Agricultural Policy, which contributes such a small amount to European gross domestic product, so dominate the EU budget and agenda? Can the euro, clearly the world's second currency after the US dollar, ever win over its doubters and harmonise European financial service markets? Does enlargement improve or threaten the future of the Community? And can its Common Foreign and Security Policy ever be successful if it is forced to compete with parallel politics in the Member States? All of these questions are addressed in this article with the hope that, through an external critique, the EU will live up to its potential both at home and abroad.     

Does the European Company Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?

Abstract This article analyses the history of EU company law and locates a stable ‘non‐competitive equilibrium’. This equilibrium follows from Member States that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. From the outset, Member States were determined to prevent the ‘Delaware effect’. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda‐setting in EU company law has changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as the recent enactment of the European Company has triggered discussion about competitive lawmaking in Europe.     

Crime and punishment: an expressive voting view

Incarceration rates in many countries (the US and Australia among them) have risen spectacularly over the last twenty years and are only partially explicable by increases in crime rates. Moreover, in some countries where crime rates have shown a comparable time-path, incarceration rates have not shown the same spectacular increase. The aim of this paper is to explore the politics of punishment. The claim is that the US and Australian experiences are best understood in terms of political considerations; and that this fact lends some support to the “expressive” as distinct from the “interest” approach to electoral behaviour.

The evolution of European legal integration

This article contributes to the development of theories on European integration by testing and exploring statistical models on the long-term development of legislative activity of the European Commission. Drawing on legal information gained from the European Union’s PreLex database and analyzing it with the help of statistical analyses, we map out growth patterns of EU law between 1976 and 2003. We construct time-series models and models based on non-linear regression. While the performance of models based on the traditional theoretical approaches, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, is rather poor, the analysis suggests that nonlinear dynamic models might be an interesting avenue for future conceptualizations of the EU integration process. This article is based on a paper presented at the ECPR Standing Group on the European Union Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, “Implications of a Wider Europe: Politics, Institutions and Diversity”, 24–26 June 2004, Bologna, Italy. We would like to thank the seminar participants for useful comments.     

The political-criminal nexus in the united states

Summary The 1967 Task Force Report on Organized Crime (TFR) found that “...all available data indicate that organized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted public officials.” 48 From that standpoint, neutralizing local law enforcement would appear to be central to criminal operations. That conclusion would depend on (a) how one defines “organized crime” and (b) the assumption that organized crime described by the Task Force covers all cases and species of it including what is referred to as “non-traditional” organized crime. A conclusion that seems unchallengeable in the Report is the observation that it was impossible to determine “the extent of the corruption of public officials in the United States.” The lack of information on this question was aggravated by the fact that many of those who provided information to the Task Force were themselves public officials.     

A comparison of bail amounts for hispanics, whites, and african americans: A single county analysis

Using 1996 data on defendants accused of felony offenses derived from a district court in a Midwestern jurisdiction, the authors employ bivariate and multivariate analyses to examine for significant differences between Hispanics and other racial and ethnic groups in the dependent variable, bail amount set by judge. To predict differences in the bail amount set by judges for Hispanic and other defendants, the multiple regression controls for two independent “legal” variables, prior arrest and seriousness of the instant offense, and for the “extra-legal” variables of age, gender, type of attorney, residency, and race. Our research shows that Hispanics receive higher bail amounts than White or African Americans; leading the authors to cast doubt on the tenets of “legal theory” which has gained attention as a model for explaining why members of racial or ethnic minorities receive harsher treatment at various stages of the criminal and juvenile justice system.