Islam,ethnicity and the state: contested spaces of legitimacy and power in the Kurdish-Turkish public sphere

ABSTRACT

The pro-Kurdish nationalist mobilization in Turkey was mostly built on the right to self-determination aligned with the Marxist-Leninist ideology for the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the early 1980s and ethnic minority rights for the secular-leftist pro-Kurdish legal parties in the 1990s. The Turkish state mostly framed the legal and illegal pro-Kurdish mobilization as ‘the enemy of the state’ and ‘the enemy of Islam’ in its counter-insurgency efforts. However, in the 2000s, the PKK and the pro-Kurdish legal parties became more tolerant and inclusive toward Islamic Kurdish identity by mobilizing their sympathizers in events such as ‘Civic Friday Prayers’ and a ‘Democratic Islamic Congress’. This move aimed to function as an antidote to the rising popularity of the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Kurdish Hizbullah in the early 2000s. In other words, Islam and pious Muslim identity has increasingly become contested among Turkish Islamists, Kurdish Islamists, and the secular Kurdish nationalists. This article seeks to unpack why, how, and under what conditions such competing actors and mechanisms shape the discursive and power relationships in the Kurdish-Turkish public sphere.     

Political culture,state elites and regional security in West Africa

This article analyses the dominant patterns of political culture among West Africa's state elites in an attempt to understand what standards, beliefs and principles they cherish. We suggest that although there are significant differences across the region's states, the dominant political culture can be characterised as neopatrimonial, that is, systems based on personalised structures of authority where patron–client relationships operate behind a façade of ostensibly rational state bureaucracy. In order to explore these issues the article proceeds in four parts. After providing a definition of political culture and why it is an important topic of analysis, we examine the central characteristics of the political culture held by state elites in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. The section ‘The Nigerian factor’ briefly discusses some of the malign effects that this culture has had upon governance and political economy issues in the regional giant, Nigeria. The final section explores whether the region's elites are living up to their own claims that they are embarking upon a serious attempt to engage in state reconstruction or are instead simply searching for alternative ways to sell their more traditional concern with regime protection. We conclude that, without a fundamental recasting of the political culture guiding the region's elites, a security culture that prioritises democracy and human security is unlikely to emerge within ECOWAS.     

Living in the Marikana world: The state,capital and society

Abstract

The ‘Marikana massacre’ that happened on 16 August 2012 at Lonmin mine near Rustenburg in the North-West province of South Africa, in which the South African police shot dead 34 mineworkers for protesting against low wages and other unbearable employment and/or living conditions, cannot be understood as merely an accidental event. It may therefore be useful to view the massacre as one of those tragedies that dramatises, in visible ways, the generally hellish conditions which the peoples of the non-Western world have come to endure ever since the advent of Western modernity. The ‘voyages of discovery’ undertaken by figures such as Christopher Columbus after 1492 marked the commencement of a world system characterised by a Western-centred modernity whose ‘darker side’ inflicted hellish conditions on the non-Western subject, while its ‘brighter side’ in the West saw positive developments – from the 16^th-century ‘rights of people’ to the 18^th-century ‘rights of man’, up to the late-20^th-century ‘human rights’. This article is a decolonial critique on the Marikana massacre and seeks to explain how the modern world system has, since its advent in 1492 as global power structure, been producing a series of ‘Marikana-like’ conditions and events on the part of the non-Western subject that underlies its hierarchical arrangement. The article's point of departure is that rather than understand the Marikana massacre as a unique event or accident, it can better be characterised as a sign of the non-Western subject's subjection to Western-centred modernity. The article explicates how the modern South African state and capital are part of the same ‘colonial power matrix’ (Quijano 2000a), hence the two were bound to be on the same side against labour during the Marikana massacre.     

The state and the rebel: Online nationalisms in Niger

The advent of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) – particularly the internet and associated networks – have made it possible to express previously repressed nationalist sentiments, forbidden languages, ethnic loyalties, and new identities free from the control exerted between the boundaries of the state. New forms of nationalistic conflicts (that take place in what Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996, 2001) call ‘netwars’) are now being waged along the lines of multiple forms of loyalties (civic, state-induced, or ethnic or subversive). Since the advent of democracy in Francophone Africa, the state has lost its monopoly over the media and now cannot control actors (particularly diasporic communities scattered around the world) who are disputing its hegemony and legitimacy. Citizens who no longer live in the national territory are fighting back against divisive and subversive tendencies in the name of national cohesion, unity, territorial integrity, and democratic governance. For example, in Niger since the beginning of 2007, two rebel movements led by Tuareg insurgents have been fighting the government on both the military and the virtual fronts. They have invaded existing virtual networks such as discussion forums and online media websites and created their own websites and chat rooms. In the name of national unity and peaceful development, they are being countered by the state as well as other citizens of the diaspora.

This article analyses how Tuareg identity has been framed over time by colonial anthropologists and administrators in Niger and how this identity is now being expressed online by current Nigerien Tuareg rebels in the context of conflicting nationalisms involving the state and its opponents. The discussion argues that, contrary to the deterministic role attributed to ICTs, it is the ‘external’ social and political conditions that determine the online contours of nationalistic expressions and conflicts. This article falls within the framework of the ‘structuralist-constructivist’ theory devised by Bourdieu; consequently, it approaches such conflicting nationalisms as ‘symbolic struggles over the power to produce and to impose a legitimate vision of the world’ (Bourdieu 1989, 20).

The topic here is limited to the Nigerien Tuareg movements and does not address in any way the Malian Tuareg movements or the pan-Amazigh movement. Where necessary, however, references will be made to the one or the other for the purpose of clarifying issues related to Nigerien Tuareg movements.     

The security culture of the ECOWAS: origins,development and the challenge of child trafficking

This article explores the relationship between the security culture of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and how it has responded to transnational challenges in West Africa. To do so, it provides an overview of how the ideas, norms and principles that constitute the embryonic security culture of ECOWAS have evolved historically. Against this backdrop the article focuses on how the regional organisation has dealt with a specific contemporary security challenge: child trafficking. The concluding part of the article seeks to explain ECOWAS's collective action on child trafficking with reference to the region's different threat perceptions and security priorities. This article argues that although the decisions and policies of ECOWAS on child trafficking are influenced by certain shared ideas, norms and principles, a breakdown of collective political will and continuing differences on the key security referents and appropriate approaches to the security of individuals have led ECOWAS member states to fail in effectively addressing this particular transnational security challenge.