反移民因素与法国右翼民粹主义的兴起及其发展前景

法国右翼民粹主义的兴起是全球化与民族主义、全球移民流动大潮与反移民因素之间的巨大矛盾背景下的产物。右翼民粹主义以反移民为基础动因和核心诉求。20世纪后期以来全球化的加速、移民流动现象大为增加,使得右翼民粹主义的反移民主张备受欢迎。法国的主流民意认为移民已经成为一个很严重的问题,而且大多数支持限制移民。法国的移民政治议题仍然在继续发酵,马克龙政府也在进行新的移民法案改革,试图掌握移民议题的主动权。包括法国在内的欧美右翼民粹主义不会轻易消退,甚至在某些条件下还可能不断产生冲击。同时,欧美始终存在多元文化主义的强大声音和力量,其与右翼民粹主义也将产生持久的碰撞,深刻影响着右翼民粹主义的发展前景。     

中东欧激进右翼和极右民粹主义的兴起——从社会文化遗产角度的分析

冷战结束和东欧转轨以来,中东欧政治发展的最终诉求,无论从中东欧国家申请入盟(EU)的举动,抑或是欧盟国家施加监督和管控基础之上的接纳来看,应当是自由民主制的建立和存续。但是在九十年代的"黄金岁月"之后,中东欧国家的民粹主义势力出现了明显的上升,尤其是曾经作为转型排头兵的维谢格拉德集团(匈牙利、捷克、斯洛伐克以及波兰),民粹主义不仅崛起而且执政,成功进行了所谓"逆民主化"操作。与此同时,激进右翼势力在中东欧的影响也日益增强。对于二者的兴起,历来有两大解释要素:经济因素和文化因素。学界对于二者的实际作用也各有分析,但是结合中东欧冷战后政治发展的实际,社会文化因素的解释力明显更为有效。本文力图分析和概括针对中东欧民粹主义和激进右翼势力兴起的西方主要研究视角,指出其贡献和不足,以及未来可能的进一步研究的方向。     

右翼民粹主义的科学架构——以德国选择党的气候科学架构为例

在新冠疫情危机和气候危机背景下,通过建构科学框架叙事“去合法化”主流科学真相已成为当前右翼民粹主义政治传播和动员策略的重要特征。本文基于架构视角从诊断型架构、处方型架构和动机型架构三个方面对右翼民粹主义的科学叙事进行分析。在诊断型架构方面,民粹主义者对精英进行道德审判,从目的可疑性和行为伪善性两个层面揭露精英的“道德低劣性”。在处方型架构方面,民粹主义者借助于呼吁常识、科学化包装和建构阴谋论等手段建构新的科学“反知识”框架,向人民展示民粹主义版本的另类事实对于主流科学知识的可替代性。在动机型架构方面,民粹主义者通过煽动对精英和主流科学的恐惧和愤怒情绪,使民众更有动机根据自身身份认同和情感直觉对科学信息进行解读和传播。最后,本文以德国选择党的气候科学架构作为案例,探析右翼民粹主义政党如何利用气候科学框架挑战主流气候科学和政治精英,以实现自身政治诉求。对右翼民粹主义科学架构的研究,有助于为研判当前西方政治极化的发展新趋势提供新的视角。     

中东欧社会转型中的新民粹主义探析

处于第三次浪潮中的中东欧新民粹主义既具有传统民粹主义的特点,又具有新的时代特征。20世纪90年代,新民粹主义政党开始在中东欧国家出现,但并没有成为主流政治力量。进入21世纪,尤其是中东欧国家相继加入欧盟后,新民粹主义政党的影响力大增,在许多国家先后上台执政。虽然新民粹主义的活跃时期能持续多久是一个未知数,但可以肯定的是,作为中东欧国家转型过程中出现的一种新力量,它将在民主政治框架内发挥着一种晴雨表的作用,从而成为代议制政治宽容性的考验标准。     

论新认同政治与欧洲认同的逐步形成

肇始于战后的欧洲一体化进程发展到今天已经进入经济政治的全方位联盟。然而,欧洲联盟不仅仅是一个利益和目的的共同体,它还应该是一个文化和理念的共同体,为所有的欧洲公民创造一个情感归属的“精神家园”。而欧洲认同的建构是实现这一目标的唯一途径,那么如何解读并建构一种共同的欧洲认同?本文试图从欧洲认同感产生、新欧洲认同政治以及欧洲认同的逐步形成等三个方面对欧洲认同这一历史现象进行考察。     

认同政治与利益政治的双建构——波兰、匈牙利和捷克民粹主义政党的崛起

目前,学术界对于民粹主义崛起的原因分析大多基于认同政治的视角。波兰、匈牙利和捷克民粹主义政党的案例表明,认同政治和利益政治共同建构了民粹主义政党的崛起。从认同政治的角度看,民粹主义政党淡化意识形态的左右之分,不断地强化身份"认同",区别"自我"和"他者",把自己装扮成一个民族主义和文化排外主义的政党。从利益政治的角度看,民粹主义政党尽管不再以阶级动员为主要手段,甚至尽力回避"阶级""阶层"等词语,但"人民"与"精英"的区分使其成功吸引了社会转型中的受害者。选举结果表明,中下收入者是民粹主义政党的主要支持者,2008年国际金融危机加剧的无产阶级贫困化和中产阶级的无产阶级化趋势为它们提供了丰沃的社会土壤。正是通过认同政治和利益政治的双建构,波兰、匈牙利和捷克民粹主义政党强化了底层民众的民族、宗教和文化认同,把草根性的政治参与转换成自己的认同基础。     

文化认同理论与欧洲一体化

文化认同是欧洲一体化中的一个重要理论概念。增强对欧洲这一特定地理区域和文化政治实体的认同意识 ,不仅为欧洲公民接受政治经济统一的现实奠定了心理和文化基础 ,也影响和制约着欧洲一体化的未来进展。然而在民族国家观念依然盛行的今天 ,文化认同更多地指向民族层面 ,以欧洲为价值核心和基础的文化认同感相对较为薄弱。为此 ,应当从欧洲文化的同一性入手 ,通过发掘和强调欧洲文化的共性以及加强欧洲范围的文化交流与合作 ,建构超越民族的欧洲文化认同 ,使欧洲朝向更为紧密的统一体发展。     

绿党的欧洲化与欧洲民主:功能与局限

基于传统的民主与政党政治理论可以在适当调整后应用于欧盟政治研究的方法论假定,文章对正在形成与发展中的欧洲政党之一的欧洲绿党进行了个例研究。在对其政治纲领、组织结构和政治参与等的量化分析后认为,欧洲绿党已经在相当程度上演变成为一个欧洲政党,但这更多是其成员绿党适应日益制度化的欧盟政治比如欧洲议会选举而不断欧洲化的结果,它在欧盟政体民主转型中的促动性角色依然相当有限。     

试析欧洲认同与民族认同的关系

欧洲认同的形成是一体化深入发展的需要。但是一体化进程中也存在一种要求尊重、维护成员国民族认同的观点。因此一体化的发展需要处理正在形成中的欧洲认同和现有的民族认同之间的关系。在这个问题上,欧盟一直存在超国家主义、国家中心主义和多元主义三种不同的观点。超国家主义认为欧洲认同必然取代民族认同;国家中心主义则站在民族主义立场上对欧洲认同的发展持悲观态度;多元主义则宣扬欧洲认同和民族认同相互依存、相互补充的观点。对欧盟公民的社会调查结果表明,国家主义的观点仍然得到许多民众的支持,但是多元主义正在逐渐深入人心。特别是一种民族认同+欧洲认同的多元主义方式,正在为越来越多的欧盟民众所接受,这为欧洲一体化的发展奠定了一定的社会基础。     

论欧洲电视跨文化传播与欧洲一体化

8 0年代初卫星电视的大量出现给欧洲一体化的进一步发展提供了新机遇 ,欧洲政治家和公共电视工作者试图以电视跨国传播作为培育欧洲文化认同、进而政治上整合欧洲的重要工具。欧洲电视跨国传播大致经历了酝酿和实验期 ( 1984年前 )、初步运作期 ( 1984— 1988年 )和成熟运行期 ( 1989年以来 )三个阶段 ,并在推动欧洲媒介联合、建立内部节目市场以及维护欧洲多元文化方面取得了一定成效 ,但是对于培育欧洲文化认同、推进欧洲政治一体化却收效甚微。在社会现实中 ,它遇到了来自欧洲外部、内部以及语言文化差异上的重重阻力 ;在理论逻辑上 ,它也受到一些学者的质疑。欧洲电视跨国传播的效应有限 ,没能达到预期效果 ,培养欧洲文化认同 ,还有很长的路要走。     

Leader Effects and Voting for the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe

Charismatic leaders are often assumed to drive the electoral success of populist radical right parties. Yet, little attention is given to how voter evaluations of leaders influence individual voting behavior. To our knowledge, no systematic and comparative tests of this empirical question exist. In this paper, we test to what extent voters’ support for populist radical right parties is fueled by leaders' appreciation. In order to examine leader effects on the populist radical right vote, we rely on an original dataset pooling 29 National Election Studies from ten established West European parliamentary democracies (1985‐2018). Our analysis finds that: (1) voters’ evaluation of party leaders is significantly associated with voting for populist radical right parties; (2) leader evaluations are more important than left‐right self‐placement when it comes to voting for the populist radical right, and (3) leader effects are more important for populist radical right voters than for other voters.     

The Welfare Agenda of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: Combining Welfare Chauvinism,Producerism and Populism*

Recent scholarship on the populist radical right tends to imprecisely describe the welfare agenda of this party family with reference to its key ideological characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. We propose an alternative analytical framework that considers the multidimensionality of welfare state positions and the “deservingness criteria” that underlie ideas about welfare entitlement. Applying this framework to a sample of four European populist radical right parties, we conclude that three interrelated frames inform their welfare agenda. These parties, we argue, advocate social closure not only on the basis of the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism), but also on criteria of control, attitude, and reciprocity (welfare producerism) and on an antagonism between the people and the establishment (welfare populism). Understanding the welfare agenda of the populist radical right requires us to move beyond welfare chauvinism and to reconsider the concept of welfare producerism and its interaction with welfare chauvinism.     

“欧洲化”进程与中东欧国家的政党政治变迁

随着欧盟因素的介入,中东欧各国在政治经济和社会生活方面发生了许多重要变化,即出现了学界所称的欧洲化现象,中东欧国家政党也不可避免地受到了欧洲化进程的影响。作为一种超越国家层面的政治社会化过程,欧洲化促使中东欧国家的政党做出调整和改变,以适应新的定位和功能。同时,在欧洲化深入的过程中,中东欧国家的政党政治也面临着巨大的困难和挑战。     

It's not Economic Interventionism,Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right‐wing Populist Parties

This paper engages in a comparative analysis of the economic positions of radical right‐wing populist parties in Western Europe. Following Ennser‐Jedenastik ( 2016 ), we argue that those parties’ political economy is best captured in terms of the nativist, populist and authoritarian features of their core ideology, each of which produces a specific set of economic policies independent from the issue of government intervention in the economy. On basis of an analysis of the election manifestos of seven radical right‐wing populist parties in Western Europe in the period 2005‐2015, we argue that those parties share similarities in their economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism, whilst their positions on the traditional role of the state in the economy are more diverse. The findings indicate also a unified ‘nativist’ response to the global financial crisis both in terms of welfare chauvinism and economic protectionism. We discuss the role of internal and external factors in explaining the economic profile of radical right‐wing populist parties.     

Voting for Movement Parties in Southern Europe: The Role of Protest and Digital Information

In recent years ‘movement parties’ such as Syriza in Greece, the Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, Podemos in Spain and—to a lesser extent—Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal shook national party systems, breaking the consolidated dynamics of political competition. Despite growing interest in movement parties, there has been scant attention to the role of citizens adopting unconventional forms of action and using digital media in accounting for their electoral performance. To fill this gap, four original internet-based post-electoral surveys are employed showing that protesters and digital media users are more likely to vote for these parties, despite important country differences.     

The Class Basis of Switzerland's Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right

This article argues that a full grown cleavage has surfaced in Swiss politics, separating a libertarian‐universalistic (the New Left) from a traditionalist‐communitarian camp (the Populist Right). Based on survey data of Switzerland's parliamentary election 2007, it examines the cleavage's micro‐foundations and shows that the class constituencies of the New Left (the Social‐Democratic and Green Parties) and the Populist Right (the Swiss People's Party) present the almost exact mirror image of each other. The former draws disproportionate support from the salaried middle class, notably socio‐cultural professionals, whereas the latter is rallied by small business owners, production and service workers. Although anchored in the employment structure, this divide is not primarily about the economy and resources, but about culture and identity. It thus strongly correlates with opposing cultural attitudes. While small business owners and workers prefer cultural demarcation and defend national traditions, salaried professionals strongly favour international integration and multi‐culturalism.     

The Individual-Level Determinants of Exiting German Parties

With respect to explaining declining party membership, the question who leaves political parties and why has so far been neglected. This article aims to fill this gap by applying Hirschman’s theory of “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” to both current and former party members, and at combining it with the resource model of political participation. We find that neither individual resources nor reasons for discontent are sufficient to explain the different reactions to discontent, but that the exit-voice-loyalty model has a certain explanatory power.     

The Unexpected Effect of the 2001 Crisis: The Revival of Right-Wing Mobilisation in Argentina

The mass protests of December 2001 were a turning point in Argentine politics. However, their effects in the mid- to long term have been less clear. This article argues that the 2001 crisis had two distinct consequences. The first, which was expected and immediate, was the stimulus given to left-wing grassroots organisations. The other, unexpected and deferred, was the revitalisation of right-wing collectives in subsequent years. The article uses a multiple technique approach.     

东南亚与西欧闽籍华人地缘性社团的比较

基于东南亚与西欧闽籍华人群体的不同特点,两地的闽籍华人地缘性社团在创建的时代背景、面对的社会 环境、结社宗旨与目的、组织结构、功能作用等方面都有所不同。通过两者的比较,我们能更深刻、全面地认识海外华人 社会的变迁。