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Emptiness (śūnyatā) is one of the most important topics in Buddhist thought and also is one of the most perplexing. Buddhists in Tibet have
developed a sophisticated tradition of philosophical discourse on emptiness and ineffability. This paper discusses the meaning(s)
of emptiness within three prominent traditions in Tibet: the Geluk (dge lugs), Jonang (jo nang), and Nyingma (rnying ma). I give a concise presentation of each tradition’s interpretation of emptiness and show how each interpretation represents
a distinctive aspect of its meaning. Given that Buddhist traditions (1) accept an extra-linguistic reality and (2) maintain
a strong tradition of suspicion of language with the belief that language both constructs and distorts reality, this paper
responds to an issue that is not so much whether or not an inexpressible reality can be expressed, but rather how it is best articulated. 相似文献
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The buddha-nature literature has a significant place within the Indian Mahāyāna tradition and Tibetan Buddhism. While it is
usually included in the so-called Last Wheel of the Buddha’s teachings, many Tibetan thinkers began to cast doubts about the
textual significance of buddha-nature discourse in fourteenth-century Tibet. In this article, I will examine one particular
case where there is apparent tension between multiple Tibetan masters over the importance of buddha-nature teachings. This
paper primarily analyzes Dratsepa’s commentary to the Ornament (mdzes rgyan) written by his teacher, Buton. Dratsepa construes the Ornament as a work critiquing Dolpopa’s interpretation of the buddha-nature literature. He levels a barrage of criticisms against
Dolpopa by referring to Indian śāstras and sūtras that are equally important to both of them, and also by tracing his own
assessment of the tathāgata-essence teachings to early Tibetan scholars. In contradistinction to Dolpopa’s claims, Dratsepa
offers several nuanced readings of the buddha-nature literature and complicates the notion of what it means to have tathāgata-essence,
what a definitive or provisional meaning entails, and the relationship between the Middle Wheel and the Last Wheel teachings.
In brief, Dratsepa’s text sheds light on one of the earliest discourses on the tension between self-emptiness and other-emptiness
presentations. 相似文献
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Birgit Kellner 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2010,38(3):203-231
The concept of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have
already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole.
A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10)
that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect
of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s
own mental states and factors. 相似文献
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This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory
of “exclusion” (apoha), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion
of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X,
which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in this paper two strategies aiming at “breaking the circle”: (i) conceding
the precedence of a positive understanding of X, from which a negative understanding (i.e., the understanding of “non-X”)
is derived by contrast, and (ii) denying any precedence by proposing a simultaneous understanding of both X and non-X. I consider
how these two options are articulated respectively by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika cum Svavṛtti and by one of his Tibetan interpreters, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and examine the requirements for their workability. I suggest that
Sa skya Paṇḍita’s motivation to opt for an alternative solution has to do with his criticism of notions shared by his Tibetan
predecessors, an outline of which is given in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, I present the surprising use of the charge of circularity
by an early Tibetan logician against his coreligionists. 相似文献
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This paper examines the role of pramāṇa in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti’s works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the
twelfth century when Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda’s Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsaṅgika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers
a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, he cites at length Candrakīrti’s
Prasannapadā treatment of svatantra, and so comes to comment on the locus classicus for the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction. For Jayānanda, svatantra inferences are emblematic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition, which asserts an unwarranted validity to
human cognition. As such, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy admits neither svatantra inference, nor pramāṇa (as “valid cognition”) more generally. Instead, Jayānanda argues for Nāgārjuna’s “authority” (pramāṇa) as our prime means for knowing reality. Jayānanda’s account of authority offers a helpful counterbalance to the current
trend of portraying Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka as a form of skepticism. 相似文献
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Nathan McGovern 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2012,40(1):1-23
In this paper, I argue that, by comparing certain passages from the early Buddhist sūtras and the Mahābhārata, we can find evidence of a late- to post-Vedic “Brahmanical synthesis,” centered on the conception of Brahmā as both supreme
Creator God and ultimate goal for transcending saṃsāra, that for the most part did not become a part of the Brahmanical synthesis or syntheses that came to constitute classical
Hinduism. By comparing the Buddhist response to this early conception of Brahmā with the way in which Brahmā is treated in
certain sectarian portions of the Mahābhārata, I then argue further that the Buddhist critique of Brahmā as supreme deity was in part conceded by the Brahmanical tradition,
and sectarian accounts of supreme godhead sought to reconcile pravṛtti and nivṛtti values more subtly than the crude juxtaposition offered by the earlier Brahmanical synthesis offered by Brahmā. The result
was that Brahmā was relegated to an inferior position as a fully saṃsāric demiurge, a narrative found first in certain parts of the Mahābhārata and then continued throughout most of the Purāṇas. 相似文献
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James B. Apple 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2013,41(3):263-329
Dīpa?kara?rījñāna (982–1054 c.e.), more commonly known under his honorific title of Ati?a, is a renowned figure in Tibetan Buddhist cultural memory. He is famous for coming to Tibet and revitalizing Buddhism there during the early eleventh century. Of the many works that Ati?a composed, translated, and brought to Tibet one of the most well-known was his “Entry to the Two Realities” (Satyadvayāvatāra). Recent scholarship has provided translations and Tibetan editions of this work, including Lindtner’s English translation (1981) and Ejima’s Japanese translation (1983). However, previously there was no known Indian or Tibetan commentary to this work. This article identifies for the first time a brief commentary to the Satyadvayāvatāra and discusses its content and purport in relation to early Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet, and provides an annotated translation of the work. This early Tibetan commentary on the two realities (satyadvaya) provides important insight into how late eleventh century or early twelfth centuries Tibetan followers of Ati?a understood the tenets of Buddhist philosophy, the nature of valid cognition (tshad ma), and the importance of spiritual authority. The early Tibetan commentary to Ati?a’s Satyadvayāvatāra provides direct textual evidence of the beginnings of scholasticism in Tibet and offers an early perspective on the formative developments in the intellectual history of Tibetan Madhyamaka. 相似文献
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法医临床学是法医学的重要分支学科,正处于蓬勃发展阶段。研究法医临床学的发展史,对明确其定义和实践范畴,维护司法公正,具有重要意义。本文将从“简介、历史溯源、18世纪之后的法医临床学发展、现代法医临床学、世界法医临床学司法实践现状和结语”六个部分介绍法医临床学在国外,尤其是英国的发展历史,促进我国法医临床学的学科建设和发展。 相似文献
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In the study of Buddhism it is commonly accepted that a monk or nun who commits a pārājika offence is permanently and irrevocably expelled from the Buddhist monastic order. This view is based primarily on readings
of the Pāli Vinaya. With the exception of the Pāli Vinaya, however, all other extant Buddhist monastic law codes (Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda)
contain detailed provisions for monks and nuns who commit pārājikas but nevertheless wish to remain within the saṅgha. These monastics are not expelled. Rather, they are granted a special status known as the śikṣādattaka. In this paper I explore the rules. concerning pārājika penance and the śikṣādattaka with specific regard to monastic celibacy. Given that five out of six extant law codes recognise this remarkable accommodation
to the rule of celibacy, I argue that we must look to Vinayas other than the Pāli Vinaya if we are to arrive at a nuanced and representative view of Indian Buddhist monasticism.
Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet. Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.)相似文献
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David Brick 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2010,38(1):25-38
According to their standardized treatment within the Indian legal tradition (Dharmaśāstra), ordeals (Sanskrit: divya) are supposed to occur, under certain circumstances, when one person formally accused another of some crime in a court of
law. While not disputing the general accuracy of this standardized treatment of ordeals, this article argues for the widespread
practice in pre-modern India of another—hitherto unrecognized—type of ordeal that fails to fit this basic scenario, for such
ordeals would occur when someone was widely believed to have committed some wrongdoing, but was not forced to stand trial
in a formal judicial court. In order to prove his innocence and, thereby, mitigate the damage caused by his suspected guilt,
such an individual could—and sometimes did—arrange for himself to undergo an ordeal at his own expense and independently of
any formal plaint. After establishing the practice of ordeals of this sort in pre-modern India, this article then examines
some possible explanations for their development. 相似文献
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Stacy Douglas 《Law and Critique》2011,22(2):171-187
This article explores the powers and potentialities of imaginations of political community at the site of the museum in contemporary
South Africa. Taking the District Six Museum (Cape Town) and Constitution Hill (Johannesburg) as the empirical backdrop, I
explore the ways in which memorialising practices at these sites bolster or deflate the exaltation of the post-1996 constitutional
moment. This argument aligns closely with contemporary discussions by South African constitutional theorists about the role
of monumentalism and counter-monumentalism. Indeed, I argue that memorialising techniques employed at the District Six Museum
offer a practice of memory-making that resists the fixed and limited boundaries proffered by the new South African constitutional
discourse exalted at Constitution Hill. However, my critique does not include a call for a reform of the latter. Instead,
I argue that the continuation of monumental memory practices at Constitution Hill, in juxtaposition to counter-monumental practices at District Six, serves a key role in revealing the limits of fixed notions of law and subjectivity
in imagining past and future political communities. Drawing on Antonio Negri’s concept of constituent power, I argue that
the juxtaposition of monumental and counter-monumental memorial practices exposes the illusion of the division between transcendent
Power (potestas) and immanent power (potentia). Finally, I turn to Emilios Christodoulidis’ conception of ‘strategies of rupture’ to consider ways in which this contradiction
might be made to ‘persist’ through the site of the museum. Indeed, if the goal is to illuminate the illusion of transcendent
power, the juxtaposition of memorialising practices between the two sites (a museological form of ‘tapping of contradiction’)
may serve as a platform for the truth of constituent power to be realised. 相似文献
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Anne MacDonald 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2011,39(6):677-694
The paper aims to determine the identity of an unnamed opponent in a passage of the first chapter of the Prasannapadā whose school affiliation eluded traditional Tibetan scholars and is disputed by modern scholars. The individual(s) in question,
whose fundamental ontological views are made evident in the passage’s opening objection as presented by Candrakīrti, has/have
alternatively been identified as the Mādhyamika Bhāviveka, as representatives of the Naiyāyika school and, following Stcherbatsky,
as Dignāga and/or later members of his epistemological-logical tradition. Although textual evidence adduced by authors of
recent publications has been viewed as supportive of the hypothesis that the interlocutor is Dignāga, the general nature of
this evidence and awareness of Dignāga’s ontological presuppositions suggest that the matter requires reconsideration. 相似文献
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This article consists of a tentative exploration regarding the Buddhist portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) as expressed in the Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāraḥ chapter of Bhāviveka’s 6th century Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, and its auto-commentary the Tarkajvālā; and the Jain portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection as expressed in Haribhadrasūri’s 8th century Śātravārtāsamuccaya (ŚVS) and Yogabindu. The article includes a translation of the Yogabindu, verses 444–457. 相似文献
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Sthaneshwar Timalsina 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2009,37(3):189-206
The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher
and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Manḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary
of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari
on Maṇḍana’s literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari’s writings, not only
to comprehend the philosophy of language, but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita
philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore
the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating
the role of Bhartṛhari writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, analysis this will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school
of Śaṅkara often addressed as ‘pure non-dualism’ (Kevalādvaita) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as ‘non-dualism of the word-principle’ (Śabdādvaita). 相似文献
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John Nemec 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2012,40(2):225-257
In this essay, it is argued that Abhinavagupta’s theory of error, the apūrṇakhyāti theory, synthesizes two distinguishable Pratyabhij?ā treatments of error that were developed in three phases prior to him.
The first theory was developed in two stages, initially by Somānanda in the Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚD) and subsequently by Utpaladeva in his Īśvarapratyabhij?ākārikās (ĪPK) and his short autocommentary thereon, the Īśvarapratyabhij?āvṛtti (ĪPVṛ). This theory served to explain individual acts of misperception, and it was developed with the philosophy of the Buddhist
epistemologists in mind. In a third phase, Utpaladeva developed in his Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti (ŚDVṛ) a second theory of error, one that involved the noncognition of non-duality (abhedākhyāti) and served to explain both the appearance and perception of multiplicity, despite the strict monism to which all Pratyabhij?ā
authors subscribe. Abhinavagupta’s treatment of error, then, is significant not only because it was meant to explain all the
various theories of error offered by opposing philosophical schools, as Rastogi has shown, but more importantly because it
synthesized the thinking of his predecessors on the matter in a single, elegant account of error. 相似文献