The Emotional Dimension in Legal Regulation

This article argues that the study of legal regulation can be further developed through an analysis of emotions because it can bring into sharper focus the social nature of regulation. The article illustrates this point by discussing the notion of regulatory law as an emotional process. It then suggests various ways in which an analysis of emotions can promote understanding of a key issue in legal regulation, the role of structure and agency. The article concludes with a brief discussion of how existing social science research methods can be adapted to the study of emotions.     

Relational Embeddedness and Socially Motivated Case Screening in the Practice of Law in Rural China

Based on an ethnographic study conducted in rural China, this article demonstrates that relational embeddedness—that is, concrete and durable relationships among law practitioners, clients, adversaries, and the surrounding communities—holds the key to our understandings of the legal profession's case screening. Over the past decade, legal services in rural China have been commodified significantly. Despite that, relationships with extended families, community members, and local political elites have continued to shape law practitioners’ professional decision‐making. By carefully scrutinizing multiplex relationships involved in legal services, law practitioners seek to meet the practical needs of their personal life, and more importantly, to uphold moral obligations derived from communal life. Seen in this light, the practice of law is an integral part of a moral economy in the countryside. Rather than giving rise to a more progressive form of services, the legal profession's participation in this moral economy often reinforces existing power structures in Chinese society. By introducing the concept of relational embeddedness into sociolegal research, this study unpacks the complex consequences of the recent legal reforms in China; it also enriches our theoretical understandings of related concepts, such as social capital, networking, and guanxi in the practice of law.     

Islamic Law in Action: A Historical Discussion

This review essay engages Kristen Stilt's recent book, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt (2011), in a fashion that highlights its contributions to the study of Islamic law. In particular, it underlines the methodological arguments made in the book that might help us think about Islamic legal practice in sophisticated and historically grounded ways. As elaborated in the article, these arguments have important implications for modern as well historical settings. Specifically, Stilt's discussion of “Islamic law in action” reveals the inherent flexibility of Islamic legal practice to accommodate political change. The article also discusses how further research on the topic could benefit from specific approaches and orientations.     

The Times of Law

In this essay, I situate Kunal Parker's Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900, within a broader set of intellectual currents engaged with questions of time and temporality. Although Parker's book centers on the common law and history and develops specific conceptions of time, in so doing, he invites legal historians and legal scholars to ruminate on the times of law, particularly the temporal relations that law has with itself. Placing Parker in conversation with Henri Bergson and the recent Bergsonian revival in critical theory, I suggest that law has a duration, a formulation that opens other itineraries to consider the dynamic times of law.     

Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field

Scholars from diverse fields have begun to study the intersection of emotion and law. The notion that reason and emotion are cleanly separable—and that law rightly privileges and admits only of the former—is deeply engrained. Law and emotion scholarship proceeds instead from the belief that the legal relevance of emotion is both significant and deserving of (and amenable to) close scrutiny. It is organized around six approaches, each of which is defined and discussed: emotion-centered, emotional phenomenon, emotion theory, legal doctrine, theory of law; and legal actor.Drawing on the analytic value of the proposed taxonomy, any exploration of law and emotion should strive to identify which emotion(s) it takes as its focus; distinguish implicated emotion-driven phenomena; explore relevant and competing theories of the emotions; limit itself to a particular type of legal doctrine; expose underlying theories of law; and make clear which legal actors are implicated. Directions for future research are discussed and cross-disciplinary collaboration encouraged.

Thinking like a lawyer/acting like a professional: communities of practice as a means of challenging orthodox legal education

Increasingly, there is pressure upon law schools, in Australia and elsewhere, to impress upon students the significance of the ethical and professional obligations of legal practice. The recent Carnegie Report explicitly looked to law schools “to initiate novice practitioners to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) like professionals”. Many law students, however, have little appreciation of legal ethics and any concept they may have of professionalism tends to be envisaged as applying only after graduation. In this paper, we explore the idea of a “community of practice”. Lave and Wenger, who coined the phrase, contend that “learning is conceived as a trajectory in which learners move from legitimate peripheral participant to core participant of the community of practice”. We will argue that law students should appreciate that they are entering the legal profession's community of practice and that all aspects of their conduct relevant to professionalism – not only academic integrity, but matters such as time management, teamwork, relationships with peers and staff – relate to this transition into a legal professional community. Such an approach may not only serve to impress upon students the significance of “professionalism” and ethics, but inculcate in them a sense of belonging to a professional community.     

Fazhi vs/and/or Rule of Law?: A Semiotic Venture into Chinese Law

The paper is an investigation offazhi (rule of law) in China. The studyproposes a tentative semiotic framework for theinterpretation of the rule of law as a legalconcept to be applied to China in the light ofits recent incorporation into the ChineseConstitution. The paper argues that legalconcepts such as the rule of law are triadic innature and their constituents are relative,relational and contextual in the semioticinterpretative process. The study examines howthe concept can be explicated with the thin orformal theory of the rule of law as a frame ofreference, and how the semiotic model maycontribute to the understanding of the Chineserule of law or the lack thereof. This approachalso attempts to account for the gap betweenthe legal ideal and reality in China andcanvasses cross-cultural considerations. In thefirst part of the paper, a semiotic frameworkfor legal concepts is postulated forconstructing the meaning of the rule of law,followed by its application to contemporaryChina.     

Epistemic emotions in prosecutorial decision making

The article examines epistemic emotions as part of the emotive-cognitive processes of prosecutors’ knowledge seeking and decision making in preliminary investigation and court proceedings. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, and shadowing of prosecutors in Sweden, we show how emotions motivate and orient prosecutors’ inquiries and the fundamental role of the ‘certainty–doubt spiral’ for ‘doing objectivity’. In conclusion, we discuss the centrality of emotions for conscientious and well-considered decisions in legal work. The study contributes to the field of law and emotion by exploring the epistemic quality of emotions, notably the certainty–doubt spiral, in legal work.     

Judicial precedents in civil law systems: A dynamic analysis

This paper uses a simple dynamic model to describe the evolution of judicial decision making in civil law systems. Unlike the common law systems, civil law jurisdictions do not adopt a stare decisis principle in adjudication. In deciding any given legal issue, precedents serve a persuasive role. Civil law courts are expected to take past decisions into account when there is a sufficient level of consistency in case law. Generally speaking, when uniform case law develops, courts treat precedents as a source of “soft” law, taking them into account when reaching a decision. The higher the level of uniformity in past precedents, the greater the persuasive force of case law. Although civil law jurisdictions do not allow dissenting judges to attach a dissent to a majority opinion, cases that do not conform to the dominant trend serve as a signal of dissent among the judiciary. These cases influence future decisions in varying ways in different legal traditions. Judges may also be influenced by recent jurisprudential trends and fads in case law. The evolution of case law under these doctrines of precedents is modeled, considering the possibility for consolidation or corrosion of legal remedies and the permanence of unsettled case law.     

Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia

This essay articulates the contributions of Mitra Sharafi's study of Parsi legal culture to colonial legal studies. Situated at the intersection of the literature on legal pluralism and legal institutions, Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture, 1772–1947 (2014) uses a range of new legal sources and case law to recover a remarkable history of collective identity that emerged via the medium and infrastructure of law. The Parsis' active participation in colonial legal institutions not only reshaped their normative worlds but also de‐anglicized imperial law.     

Legal Judgment as Self-Mastery

Many legal theorists see legal judgment as a largely professional or technical task. This is not how law sees itself. When looked at from the perspective of the engaged judge, law requires from us that we arrive at a certain internal governance of our thoughts and emotions. Legal scholarship and legal procedure tell us that law creates true reasons that override other, personal, reasons, even those of the utmost importance to us. A philosophical understanding of law requires a distinct argument that explains how such overriding reasons can be associated with the law and how there can be a personal duty to adapt our reasoning when we make authoritative legal judgments in order to change the lives of others. The philosophy of law needs to explain how legal judgment can be a form of self-mastery.     

Legal Compliance in Street‐Level Bureaucracy: A Study of UK Housing Officers

Street‐level bureaucratic theory is now at a fairly mature stage. The focus on street‐level bureaucrats as ultimate policymakers is now as familiar as it is important. Likewise, the parallel sociolegal study of the implementation of public law in public organizations has demonstrated the inevitable gap between law‐in‐the‐books and law‐in‐action. Yet, the success of these advances comes at the potential cost of us losing sight of the importance of law itself. This article analyzes some empirical data on the decision making about one legal concept—vulnerability in UK homelessness law. Our analysis offers two main contributions. First, we argue that, when it comes to the implementation of law, the legal abilities and propensities of the bureaucrats must be taken into account. Bureaucrats' abilities to understand legal materials make a difference to the likelihood of legal compliance. Second, we must also pay attention to the character of the legal provisions. Where a provision is simple, it is more likely to facilitate legal knowledge and demands nothing of bureaucrats in terms of legal competence. Where the provision is also inoffensive and liveable, it is less likely to act as an impediment to legal conscientiousness.     

The decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on numerus clausus: A matter for Community law

This article discusses the recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on the numerus clausus issue, containing the first relevant pronouncement by the highest jurisdiction on the constitutional legality of the measures adopted so far by the Ministry. The Constitutional Court considers these measures in conformity with the Constitution to the extent that they implement Community law, and especially certain directives on the recognition of qualifications. Thus, Community law is deemed to provide the proper legal framework to adopt certain regulations, amongst which restrictions to access. This article argues that, in the context of litigation on access to university, Community law has been used improperly and that, in any event, a convenient solution to the issue could have been found in national law. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Attribution and the law

Complex theories of culpability have evolved in the law, which specify the circumstances in which an action is to be viewed as voluntary or involuntary, and justifiable or not justifiable. Legal theories also distinguish among varying degrees of responsibility for criminal acts depending, upon the mental state of the defendant. These theories have been developed, for the most part, on the basis oflogical analysis. Recently psychologists have begun toempirically study the judgmental processes used in assigning responsibility for actions. This article reviews both the legal and psychological approaches to the area and notes the potential contributions psychological research can make to our understanding of judgmental biases in the justice system. The empirical research can help indicate condition in which legal principles are ignored and replaced with common sense interpretations of the law and legal principles.Center for Criminal Justice Harvard Law School.     

The Significance of Shame in the Lives of Women Who Experience Male Violence

Recently there has been recognition of the cultural politics of emotion, that is, the ways in which emotions impact upon individual life experiences. Significantly, it has been shown how emotions can produce effects of power on and through the bodies of individuals. Despite this knowledge, the law and legal responses tend to minimise, obscure and deny the ways in which emotions, and in particular shame, impacts upon individuals. This article therefore argues that the lives of women who experience male violence cannot be fully understood without reference to the ways in which shame affects those experiences. It explores how shame operates as a gendered set of self-regulatory practices, which are also practices of male power in individual womens’ lives. In order to do this findings from a small scale qualitative study which used semi-structured interviews with women who have experienced violence are utilised, together with a Foucauldian theoretical framework. The article contends that an awareness and understanding of how shame affects the lives of women experience male violence can improve law and social policy responses to male violence against women.     

Topoi in Summa: Virtual Justice as Determinant for Aquinas’ Placement of Law

This study shows the spatial juxtaposition and separation of topics regarding law in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. These topics are his treatise on legal structures among morals in its part I-II, and his treatise on legal justice among virtues in its part II-II. This difference in the topics’ placements requires mediation by the virtuality of law, in order to grasp the distances and bridges between the two treatments of law.     

Hijacking Law

This essay considers the legal strategies of comparative communities in South Asian, Middle Eastern, and US history. What does it mean for a particular group to “hijack” a body of law, taking everyone on board to an unwanted destination? The piece compares the legal strategies of the Parsi community in colonial and postcolonial India to those of the German Jewish yekke population in mandate Palestine and early independent Israel, the women's movement in India in recent decades, and Protestants in contemporary America before the 2015 Obergefell decision legalizing same‐sex marriage. There are multiple ways of trying to take control of a body of law, and for multiple reasons. A group may capture a body of personal law to perpetuate its own values within the group. It may try to control a territorial legal system to impose its values on the entire population. It may work across bodies of personal law to obtain as uniform a result as possible—as if the system were a unified field, not a segmented one. Or its group members may make available their legal expertise to shore up a newly independent state's legal system. The essay suggests that taking control of a body of law does not necessarily mean hijacking it.     

Using soft skills courses to inspire law teachers: a new methodology for a more humanistic legal education

ABSTRACT

Law schools have in recent years been engaged in a process of revising their curricula, in large part adapting to rapid changes in technology, but also in a more generalised effort to improve “teaching the law”. Yet thus far, legal pedagogy seems to focus disproportionately on the traditional model of the “thinking lawyer”, when it should equally promote the model of the “feeling lawyer”, helping students to sharpen soft skills such as empathy, integrity and problem-solving. The main claim of this paper is that law professors could begin to pay more attention to the growing importance of soft skills in legal education and preparedness for legal practice. In this direction, we propose a set of pedagogical principles revolving around four axes: compassionate, attentive, reason-based and empathetic teaching (CARE). This methodology could help law professors become more effective pedagogues. Soft skills courses constitute a well-suited vehicle for introducing these principles to law school curricula in different legal systems. By systematically incorporating them, law schools can encourage law teachers to provide a more inclusive learning environment for their students. At the same time, law teachers who implement the particular methodology can hopefully rediscover fulfilment in their teaching. Overall, teaching soft skills can significantly improve students’ and teachers’ experience in legal education.     

Legal education in France and England: A comparative study*

Abstract

Despite the fact that part‐time law students comprise a significant proportion of law undergraduates, there continues to be an absence of legal research that considers the experiences and aspirations of such students as a distinct group. Against this backdrop, it is argued that these students require further research and attention for a number of reasons. First, their location allows a consideration of the extent to which broader governmental objectives for higher education are being met within law schools. Second, the extent of their presence in higher legal education places an important obligation upon law schools to explore the specific needs of this cohort and to consider the extent to which part‐time law students can be legitimately subsumed into the undergraduate cohort in terms of resources and planning. Third, the legal ambitions of many part‐time law students require a fresh consideration of the expectations of the recruiting legal profession and the legal profession's commitment to broadening social diversity within its ranks. Finally, as the experiences of part‐time and full‐time students become closer, a proper analysis of part‐time law students may provide invaluable information as to how law schools could adapt to meet the needs of all students in the future.