Can Turkey's state–religion relationship serve as a role model for emerging Arab regimes? A critical assessment

One of the most pressing issues facing Arab societies, in view of the large-scale political transitions taking place in the Middle East, is the status of religion in the state. In this regard, Turkey, a Muslim democratic state, is often offered as a model to follow. The current piece demonstrates that despite the seeming appeal of the Turkish model, it is inadequate for Middle Eastern societies, in which religion plays a significant social role and is a core ingredient of individual and collective identity. This is because the foundations of the Turkish model were artificially imported from the Western experience, and forced from above onto the Turkish populace without much-needed contextual adjustment. This assertion is true not only for the original state-religion model in Turkey, but also for its modified present-day version, which bears to a large extent the burdens of the past. The article concludes by outlining some points that might serve emergent Arab democracies aiming to design a constructive and authentic model of religion and the state.     

War and state formation in Lebanon: can Tilly be applied to the developing world?

State formation in the developing world can be explained as growing centralisation and institutionalisation. To understand why some states struggle with state formation, or the processes of centralisation, the model provided by Charles Tilly, in his analysis of state formation in Western Europe, is applied to Lebanon, starting at the onset of the 1975 civil war and concluding with an analysis of the post-Syrian occupation environment. With the appropriate conditions it is possible to use Tilly’s model of war making and the state to measure state formation, or the lack thereof, in the developing world. Conclusively, in the case of Lebanon, it is evident that progress towards strong state formation has been made because of processes of war that are similar to those Tilly outlines in his historical analysis of Western Europe.     

Stable instability: the Syrian conflict and the postponement of the 2013 Lebanese parliamentary elections

Given the morass of the Syrian civil war and Lebanon’s exposure to the consequences, this article seeks to explore how the intersecting dynamics of Lebanese domestic conflicts and the multiple implications of the bloodbath in Syria have influenced the behaviour of Lebanese political parties in their ongoing struggle over the formulation of a new electoral law, leading to a broad consensus among the country’s parties to postpone the 2013 parliamentary elections. The article argues that, while the usual attempts to profit at the expense of other groups in society are still present and external patrons still wield great influence, the decision to postpone the elections also demonstrates a degree of pragmatism and political development since, despite dire predictions to the contrary, Lebanon has not succumbed to the return of its own civil war. Instead a complex mixture of pragmatism, elision of interests and external influence, combined with local agency, has led Lebanon into a situation of stable instability.     

Can Democratic Governance Be Achieved in Egypt?

This article contributes to our understanding of whether democratic governance can be achieved in post-revolution Egypt. It explores the status of three key pillars of democratic governance in the context of the January 2011 People’s Revolution and subsequent political developments through August 2013: (1) inclusive participation, (2) responsive institutions, and (3) adherence to international practices and principles. Available evidence suggests that none of the democratic governance pillars has been realized so far as a result of political instability in Egypt. The article argues that the current political environment is not favorable to achieving democratic governance in Egypt.     

Asymmetric alliances and high polarity: evaluating regional security complexes in the Middle East and Horn of Africa

Abstract

The Middle East and the Horn of Africa exist in two distinct regional security complexes (RSCs), groupings of states exhibiting intense security interdependence within a distinct region, but rarely between regions. Recent geopolitical changes and related analyses, however, point to either a subsuming or a joining of the two RSCs, potentially leading to a high degree of uncertainty in two conflict-prone regions. Given the importance of such developments, we question this theory of RSC expansion by offering a concise review of recent security interactions between the two RSCs as well as quantitatively and qualitatively measuring the material power capabilities of relevant states. Borrowing from and contributing to RSC theory, we also identify and analyse concepts and indicators such as threat perception and sub-regional alliances. Our findings demonstrate the Middle East RSC is not expanding to include that of the Horn of Africa. The two remain distinct and under internal consolidation, despite the current discourse. Rather, high polarity in the Middle East coupled with often-congruent interests in Horn of Africa states best explains the current pattern of their interaction, particularly as Middle East states pursue strategies that further their own security interests at the expense of rival states within their own RSC.