The New World Order: A Deconstruction of the Nation-State and a Disaggregation of the “Mixed Political Economy”

The structure of the New World Order and its corresponding functions are becoming apparent. First, there will be a deconstruction of the nation-state. It will be bisected as power shifts to higher “macro-regional” levels on the one hand and lower “micro-regional” levels on the other. Second, there will be a disaggregation of the mixed political economy. It will be bifurcated as socialism is used at upper levels of human aggregation to alleviate pollution and as capitalism is used at lower levels to alleviate poverty.     

The Intersections of Class,Gender, Sexuality and ‘Race’: The Political Economy of Gendered Violence

This article focuses on rethinking the intersectional approach towards a greater framing within the new political economy and particularly concerns itself with the ways such an approach can contribute to theorising various manifestations of gendered violence. The article examines a range of different forms of violence and reflects on how an intersectional framing can inform our understanding better. Some of the intersectional dimensions to domestic violence, rape and sexual assault, honour-based crimes and trafficking are discussed.     

The Political Economy of Village Sanitation in South India: Capture or Poor Information?

Despite efforts to mandate and finance local governments' provision of environmental sanitation services, outcomes remain poor in the villages surveyed in the four South Indian states. The analysis indicates some key issues that appear to hinder improvements in sanitation. Local politicians tend to capture sanitary infrastructure and cleaning services for themselves, while also keeping major village roads reasonably well-served. Their decisions suggest, however, that they neither understand the health benefits of sanitation, nor the negative externalities to their own health if surrounding areas are poorly served. Our findings suggest that improving sanitary outcomes requires disseminating information on the public goods nature of their health benefits, as well as on the local government's responsibilities. It also requires putting public health regulations in place, along with measures to enable accountability in service provision.     

Political Economy of Modern Belarus: Going Against Mainstream?

A peculiar model of post-communist political economy has evolved in Belarus under President Aliaksandr Lukashenka. It features prioritisation of non-entrepreneurial social groups, a strong role for the state, and extensive social security provision. The model appears to be grounded on Lukashenka's understanding of his political powerbase; having no external backing for his policies, he wants to command as wide grass-roots support as possible to remain in office. By doing so, he rejects the principles of pluralist democracy and market economy, making Belarus's political economy model quite different from that envisaged in the mainstream post-communist theories of neo-liberalism and gradualism.     

The Political Economy of Crisis Management in East–Central European Countries

The financial and economic crisis in the Central and East European countries raised the profile of economic policy themes that relate to the role of taxation and state spending. The key policy differences related to public budgets and support for a demand stimulus. Responses fall broadly into two categories that we link to a social-democratic and a neo-liberal response. The distinction indicates that the policy responses were linked to the party affiliation of the government on the left–right spectrum. There were some remarkable common trends that cannot be explained by the logical requirements of the economic situation alone. There are differences in timing and in severity, but every country has at some point moved towards a policy of balancing the budget by making cuts. In all cases there were cuts in benefits for marginal groups in society and a switch towards indirect rather than direct taxes. These carry clear distributional implications.     

The Political Economy of the Provos: Inside the Finances of the Provisional IRA—A Revision

Few academically rigorous accounts exist of the financial activities that sustained the rise of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during the Northern Ireland Troubles. Through a sustained methodology this study seeks to challenge some popular preconceptions and address omissions in the limited historical record. The article explores the organization's evolving financial sophistication by analyzing PIRA's acquisition of capital rather than its arms dealings. Using a new quantitative evaluation, this investigation confronts the prevailing understanding that Irish-American funds were of unrivaled significance to PIRA. It points to an array of domestic fund-raisers that collectively provided the overwhelming bulk of revenue. The study reveals also how PIRA developed an extensive reliance on criminal gangs for its expertise in illegal fund-raising, suggesting that moneymaking schemes were perceived as a necessary but unpopular by-product of the greater political objective. Finally, this article briefly explores how the British authorities sought to interdict PIRA's funding. While the general perception is that little was done to counteract PIRA's financing initiatives in the early phases of its violent campaign, this study, nevertheless, reveals that a subtle counterfinance initiative did take place in Belfast across the 1970s. Overall, the analysis enables a more rounded comprehension of the group's financial resilience.     

The Political Economy of Child Mortality Decline in Tanzania and Uganda, 1995–2007

This article identifies political economy factors that help explain dramatic differences in the pace of child mortality reduction between Tanzania and Uganda from 1995 to 2007. The existing literature largely explains divergence in basic health outcomes with reference to economic variables such as GDP per capita. However, these factors cannot explain recent divergence across African countries with similar levels of GDP per capita, rates of economic growth, and levels of health funding. I argue that institutional and governance divergences between Tanzania and Uganda can be linked directly to differing coverage levels of key child health interventions (especially related to malaria control), and thus to differing child health outcomes. These institutional differences can be explained in part by historical factors, but more relevant causes can be found in recent political events. In Tanzania, there was an unusually effective project of institution building in the health sector, while in Uganda, by contrast, there was a negative political shock to the health system. This was driven by the repatrimonialization of the Ugandan state after President Yoweri Museveni??s decision to eliminate term limits in the 2001?C2006 period. This repatrimonialization process reversed previous health sector institutional gains and had particularly negative effects on child health service delivery in Uganda over the period in question.     

Hezbollah's Strategy of “Walking on the Edge”: Between Political Game and Political Violence

Since entering Lebanese politics in the 1990s, Hezbollah has defined itself as a political party that plays by the rules. Simultaneously, it has continued to use social assistance to win over Lebanon's Shi’ites while using violence to eliminate rivals. Through this strategy of “walking on the edge,” Hezbollah has metamorphosed from an illegitimate terrorist organization into a legitimate political party heading Lebanon's government. An International Tribunal's recent indictment of four senior Hezbollah officials for involvement in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri provides an opportunity to understand how Hezbollah maintains this canny—and successful—balancing act.     

The Political Economy of Improving Health Care for the Poor in Rural Africa: Institutional Solutions to the Principal–Agent Problem

Both governments and private for-profit markets have been disappointing in meeting the needs of the African poor for health care. NGO services provide a much more attractive alternative for this clientele, despite the fees they charge. They do so because they represent an institutional solution to the ‘imperfect information’ problem in health care. Through simulations based on data from Cameroon, we demonstrate that if fee-charging NGOs replace the highly subsidised but poorly managed facilities operated by African governments the poor would be better off. Those NGOs that are decentralised in their financial and personnel management are most effective. The politics of making the recommended changes are assessed.     

Post-Soviet Developmentalism and the Political Economy of Russia’s Electricity Sector Liberalization

Observers of Russian state market relations typically consider the state as an entity engaged in creating rent-seeking opportunities for bureaucrats or powerful economic interests. The trajectory and outcomes of electricity sector reforms demonstrate the limits of this perspective and serve to highlight a developmental strand in Russian economic policy, which I call post-Soviet developmentalism. I found that post-Soviet developmentalism is key to understanding the patterns of market institutions that have emerged in the newly liberalized electricity sector and that they cannot be adequately explained if the state is largely seen as a predator or as captured by oligarchic interests. A close analysis of the institutional underpinnings of new electricity markets suggests that they were shaped in political bargains, in which the government sought to enlist Russia’s oligarchic conglomerates for its modernization agenda and developmental priorities. The paper links this discussion to three sets of theoretical literatures: It speaks to the debates on the post-Soviet transition, more broadly to the political economy of market reform, and finally, it addresses the developmental state literature.     

The Institutional Foundations of China’s Unbalanced Economy

China has become a fast-growing economy with an unbalanced economic structure. Economic policies, especially fiscal and financial policies, contribute to the current growth model by depressing household disposable income and reducing the social services provided by the government. Laws that have been used by the government to subsidise investment and production by distorting factor markets are also to blame. Finally, rebalancing China’s growth pattern has proven to be extremely difficult due to political obstacles, including pressure from interest groups, gridlock caused by factional politics, and ideological discrimination against private entrepreneurs.