Every Kingdom Divided Against Itself Will Be Ruined: A Reflection,a Deflection,and a Qualified Reinterpretation of the Global Jihad

Much analytical commentary implies that a generic West is the principal target of jihadist activism. This study contends that this is a misconception fostered by jihadist groups like Al Qaeda in order to accentuate their stature in the Islamic world and to obscure their true aims, which are first and foremost to secure the dominance of the Salafist interpretation of Islam. The analysis situates Al Qaeda in the tradition of Islamic reform movements and shows that a violent Sufi/Salafist conflict pervades nearly all current examples of strife within the Muslim world. In these conflicts, the role of the “West” is instrumental, not central to the struggle. Consequently, this study offers a qualification to notions of a “global jihad” and suggests this has important considerations for policymakers in determining the nature of the threat posed by Islamist militancy.     

Jihadi-Salafism in Jordan and the Syrian Conflict: Divisions Overcome Unity

Over the last decade, a rift has emerged among Jihadi-salafis in Jordan between the “Zarqawiyyun”—who see Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi as their model and concentrate on combat—and the “Maqdisiyyun”—who want more scholarly guidance, emphasize the establishment of an Islamic State and follow Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The conflict in Syria, however, offered options for both: a jihad against a reviled regime and the possibility to set up an Islamic state. It thus had the potential to unite the “Zarqawiyyun” and the “Maqdisiyyun.” This article analyzes why this did not happen.     

The “Forest Jihad”

Recent Al Qaeda threats and related jihadi propaganda potentially herald a new weapon in the terrorist arsenal: the deliberate setting of forest fires and other conflagrations both to terrorize society and wreck untold economic damage. Beyond the immense, new burdens that would be placed on emergency response personnel, these fires could also create grave environmental crises causing severe pollution from gases escaping into the atmosphere. The strategy of “Forest Jihad,” now being championed by Al Qaeda strategists, is supported and justified theologically by radical Islamic scholars. With this new weapon, the terrorists believe, maximum physical and financial damage can be inflicted to targeted countries at comparatively little risk.     

Sanctions Will Only Bolster Iranian Regime

As the US prepares new sanctions to stop Iran form obtaining a nuclear weapon, the partisans of popular sovereignty in the “green movement” continue to battle with the partisans of divine sovereignty fortified by the Revolutionary Guards. What does the “green movement” want? Will the regime be successful in crushing it? Will sanctions only bolster the clerical/military alliance instead weaken it? The first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and several top reformist scholars address these issues.     

“Martyrdom is Life”: Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas

This article analyzes the articulation of the doctrine of “Jihad of the Sword” and martyrdom by the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine, Hamas, as a central pillar of Palestinian identity and as a major source of political mobilization and national empowerment. As part of this concept Hamas presents martyrdom as the epitome of jihad and of Islamic belief. The end-goal of jihad is the destruction of Israel and the elimination of the Jews. By emphasizing the centrality of “Jihad of the Sword” Hamas's ideas reveal a certain similarity to, or inspiration by, radical Salafi-jihadist Islamic movements. While Hamas adopted a pragmatic approach on short-term tactics, these doctrines impose constraints on the scope of a profound ideological transformation it can undergo.     

Manifesto for Iran's Green Movement

As the US prepares new sanctions to stop Iran form obtaining a nuclear weapon, the partisans of popular sovereignty in the “green movement” continue to battle with the partisans of divine sovereignty fortified by the Revolutionary Guards. What does the “green movement” want? Will the regime be successful in crushing it? Will sanctions only bolster the clerical/military alliance instead weaken it? The first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and several top reformist scholars address these issues.     

Why a Manifesto?

As the US prepares new sanctions to stop Iran form obtaining a nuclear weapon, the partisans of popular sovereignty in the “green movement” continue to battle with the partisans of divine sovereignty fortified by the Revolutionary Guards. What does the “green movement” want? Will the regime be successful in crushing it? Will sanctions only bolster the clerical/military alliance instead weaken it? The first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and several top reformist scholars address these issues.     

A Harsh Crackdown Is Coming in Iran

As the US prepares new sanctions to stop Iran form obtaining a nuclear weapon, the partisans of popular sovereignty in the “green movement” continue to battle with the partisans of divine sovereignty fortified by the Revolutionary Guards. What does the “green movement” want? Will the regime be successful in crushing it? Will sanctions only bolster the clerical/military alliance instead weaken it? The first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and several top reformist scholars address these issues.     

Grasping the Syrian War,a view from Albanians in the Balkans

Reactions to the brutal Syrian War from European governments and Europe’s Muslims have been diverse and subject to many shifts over the past few years. This paper focuses on how Albanian political and Islamic religious figures living in the Balkans have come to interpret the war. I focus on discourse, the ways in which these different agents communicate with their audience, and the wider contexts they evoke. Government sources and religiously themed lectures delivered by prominent imams on the social networking site YouTube are used to assess these trends. The most obvious aspect of these debates is the ways in which these agents use the war to press their own agendas, the government to affirm their commitment to the “West” and an ethnicized view of Islam, while Islamic religious leaders use it to reconnect their audiences to a more cosmopolitan vision of their past. War thus becomes a catalyst for a resurgent contestation between different groups vying for control over what it means to be “Albanian” and “Muslim” in the twenty-first century.     

Ideational Dimensions of the Boko Haram Phenomenon

This article draws on frame theory to explore the ideational dimensions of the Boko Haram phenomenon. Speech acts by Boko Haram's leaders are analyzed to interrogate how the organization conducts its three core framing tasks. The article argues that Boko Haram deploys three major master frames. These are the return to true Islam frame, the injustice frame, and the war against the infidel frame. Boko Haram's framing strategies draw on the social conditions and cultural reservoir in its domain of operations. This includes antipathy toward the West and Western education, patriarchal beliefs about gender roles and the “place” of women, and the contours of a widely popular Islamic movement that emerged in the early 1800s. Boko Haram's framing approach is also shaped by state repression and the post-9/11 cosmic war discourse. Overall, the article contributes to the limited literature on nonstructural aspects of Boko Haram's terrorist activities.     

The Spiritual Teacher and His Truants: The Influence and Relevance of Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi

Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi is one of the most important spiritual fathers of the ideology and movement that has come to be known as Salafi-jihadism. Based on primary source materials produced by al-Maqdisi and other important relevant actors at different times and places, this article shows how he developed the ideas that have influenced his disciples and protégés, most prominently Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq and “godfather” of the Islamic State, and Turki al-Binali, the Islamic State's current Grand Mufti. It also explains how and why, in later years, his disciples turned against him and, despite his repeated efforts, refused to allow him to play the role of the “critical friend,” much less regain control of the movement. The article seeks to expose the intra-jihadist frictions and debates involving al-Maqdisi during different times and contexts, especially the more recent ones between him and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Indeed, it becomes obvious how al-Maqdisi has been trying to regain his lost influence and relevance among the most radical strands within his chosen movement for years. What this shows is that, amidst the fast-changing environment in which Salafi-jihadism has evolved, praxis trumps theory, and a reputation of steadfastness, zealousness, and unwavering convictions matter more to prospective radicals than a reputation of religious knowledge and scholarship.     

Spain as an Object of Jihadist Propaganda

The purpose of this article is to look at the importance and treatment that Spain receives in jihadist propaganda. This study offers a series of empirical observations based on a content analysis of a sample of propaganda produced by jihadist groups between January 1994 and September 2008. The analysis of this material, the context in which it was spread, and a comparison with other Western countries leads to the conclusion that the role played by this country in jihadist propaganda can only be understood by taking into account “structural factors” that have little to do with a greater or lesser level of interference in “Islamic affairs.”     

Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution

The inner organizational structure of Al Qaeda within the expanded framework of the “Global Jihad movement” has been a subject of much debate between scholars. As will be elaborated later, the “Global Jihad movement” is composed of several elements that possess radical Islamic ideology and conduct operational activity in different regions in the world under the banner of Jihad. The dominant factor within the “Global Jihad movement” is by no doubt Al Qaeda. The purpose of this article is to focus solely on Al Qaeda and present the formal internal structure of the organization. The article argues that Al Qaeda is first and foremost, an infrastructural organization with a formal echelon, hierarchy, sub-departmental division, and duties distribution reflecting characteristics of a guerilla and terrorist organization. The article portrays the formal layout of Al Qaeda, composed of the main command apparatus, and names the different personalities who fill the more important positions within Al Qaeda's hierarchy from its days of inception until today.     

Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations

Extreme religious interpretations of the Quran and the movement of Islamic Revivalism influence the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Islamic “terrorists” are able to legitimize their movement as an act of violent Jihad permitted by the Quran essentially because of religious sanctions that permit the use of violence as an act of defense and to preserve the will of God in Islamic communities. The Quran systematizes this use and relates it to other aspects of the Shariat through its discourse on revivalism. Based on the Quranic principle of ijtihad, terrorists emphasize the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism in their religious interpretations and present it as a legitimate premise for the use of excessive aggression. According to ijtihad Muslims can interpret and determine the extent of their Islamic practices individually as long as these are directed toward ensuring the will of God in an Islamic community. Thus terrorists use ijtihad to emphasize Quranic clauses that sanction the use of violent Jihad as a method ordained by God to preserve the Shariat in an Islamic community. The manner in which terrorists use ijtihad to contextualize geopolitical factors as a cause for violent Jihad is determined by their extreme interpretations of the Quran. These interpretations also determine the extent of violence used in a Jihad for religious amelioration. The religious legitimacy of this violence prevails until the cause and course of violent Jihad correlates with the Quran's discourse on violence and revivalism. In contemporary times an extreme interpretation of the movement of Revivalism ¹ 1. Refers to the contemporary movement of Islamic Revivalism. that is inspired by “revivalism” also provides an organized premise for Islamic terrorism. When implemented, this causes variations within specific geopolitical conditions and in different Jihadi groups. However a common understanding of religious doctrines determines the extent of Revivalism in Islamic communities because this movement relies heavily on the Quranic discourse for its existence. Thus, the religious basis for Islamic terrorism is primarily found when extreme interpretations of the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism are directed toward obtaining an equally radical version of Revivalism in specific geopolitical conditions. In this manner, extreme Quranic and Revivalist interpretations ensure the ideological persistence of Islamic terrorism as a religious effort to preserve the will of God in an Islamic community. The aim of this article is to show the manner in which religion can cause the emergence of Islamic violence as it is known today. The discourse on Islamic violence and counterterrorism needs to be urgently studied given the numerous instances of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Many writings on Islamic violence and statements released after an act of Islamic violence allude to the impact of religion on violent Jihad, but they rarely explore it or present a premise for its existence. This exploration will be conducted based on research of the author's on the Kashmir crisis and the insurgency in it. Thus, examples from insurgency in Kashmir will be used on occasion to illustratively develop this argument. In his book The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington states that a theory must be causal and simple. Using the words of Thomas Kuhn, he explains that “to be accepted as a paradigm [it] must seem better than its competitors but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” ² 2. Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1996), p. 30. Furthering such simplicity and exploration, will be the central effort of this discourse. The sources for this exploration will be mainly derived from theoretical and practical understandings of terrorism, Islamic religion and theology, and the movement of Islamic Revivalism. A comparison between Islam and other religions will not be presented when evaluating the impact of Islam on violent Jihad. It will essentially present religious premises for violent Jihad from a Muslim rather than non-Muslim or “Western” perspective; although it is accepted that parallels in the understanding of “violence” do exist in the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Non-Muslim perspectives on violence and terrorism are relevant and known to the author. However a perpetual emphasis on these factors or a failure to acknowledge them limits the scope of the study of Islamic terrorism itself. The aim will be to present an Islamic perspective on violent Jihad. Then, it is accepted that a complex interplay between religious understandings and geopolitical events influence the emergence of Islamic violence in contemporary times. Thereafter, it must be stated that extreme psychological and sociological factors intrinsic to the Jihadis influence the religious choices that cause violent Jihad. An analysis of these factors is outside the realm of this discourse, which remains political in its scope. Further, on occasion a lack of empirical data and non-circumstantial evidence is encountered to substantiate some contentions mentioned ahead. As it has been suggested previously ³ 3. Nancy C. Biggo, The Rationality of the Use of Terrorism by Secular and Religious Groups available at (http://www.dissertations.com), 2002. this is mainly because there is a dearth of such data and reliable evidence pertaining to religious terrorism. At certain points, it becomes difficult to validate external opinions mainly because of the right to individual interpretations vested by the Quran in all Muslims. The validity of these opinions is vested in the fact that they are taken from informed Muslims who practice moderate and radical interpretations of Islam. Any reader may be expected to believe that any kind of terrorism is unjustifiable. However, in order to address these movements effectively, they must be studied from all possible dimensions and especially from the cultural contexts from which they arise.     

Let's Play a Video Game: Jihadi Propaganda in the World of Electronic Entertainment

This article argues that video games have become a valid and increasingly significant means of jihadist digital propaganda. “Gaming jihad” has recently shown interesting alterations, mostly due to actions undertaken by the so called Islamic State and its cyber-partisans, which have discovered new ways of using this flexible and immersive medium. Similar to more conventional forms of its online propaganda, which have been imitated by other Islamist terrorist groups for years, the “Caliphate's” exploitation of electronic entertainment software may be a forerunner for the increased interest of other violent extremist organizations in this medium.     

What Does the “Terrorist” Label Really Do? Measuring and Explaining the Effects of the “Terrorist” and “Islamist” Categories

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labeling groups or individuals as “terrorists” does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a “terrorist label effect”? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present article evaluates whether or not the terrorist label—as well as the “Islamist” one—really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (N = 481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labeling the author of the violence with a different category (“terrorist”/“shooter”/“Islamist”). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the “terrorist” and “Islamist” categories on each dimension. These effects are analyzed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers' lexical choices when reporting on political violence.     

Who Fought the Algerian War? Political Identity and Conflict in French-Ruled Algeria

Why did settlers, natives, and metropolitan agents fight each other as “French” and “Algerian” during the famously brutal Algerian War of the 1950s? While scholars identify key factors in launching and escalating the war, they take for granted that it was fought between “the French” and “the Algerians” when evidence shows that those terms were also a source of struggle among the parties involved in the war. Drawing on insights from the fields of colonial studies and collective action, along with archival sources, the article explains why this particular set of terms framed the war, in other words, why the categories “French” and “Algerian” predominated in the political discourse, and why they were so opposed to each other. It contends that punctuated political conflicts among state authorities and social-movement organizations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, rather than indigenous cultural or social structural factors, played a key role in constructing this identity framework. The article concludes by challenging our basic definitions of the war and the prevailing theories about its course and outcomes.