The curious career of an African modernizer: South Africa's Thabo Mbeki

Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's second democratically elected president, was born into left-wing politics. In exile, he became the face of the African National Congress (ANC) and developed a reputation as a modernizer. He returned to the country and built relations, not with the ANC's internal allies, but with the country's business community. In 1996, as Mandela's deputy, Mbeki implemented a neo-liberal economic package, called GEAR, which alienated many. In office, he both failed to acknowledge the threat of HIV/AIDS to the country and refused to pressure the failing regime in Zimbabwe; but it was his bypassing of parliament that ultimately led to his failure as president.     

The rise of radical African studies

African Social Studies: A Radical Reader. Edited by Peter C. W. Gutkind and Peter Waterman. Heinemann Educational Books, 1977. Pp. ix + 481. Paper £2–90.

The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa. Edited by Peter C. W. Gutkind and lmmanuel Wallerstein. Sage Publications, 1976. Pp. 318.

Nigeria: Economy and Society. Edited by Gavin Williams. Rex Collings, 1976. Pp. 226. Hardcover £5.25.     

The African struggle continues: The awakening of North Africa

La crise de l’État moderne en Afrique prouve que cette formation historique ne constitue pas la forme achevée du nationalisme africain contemporain. L’État moderne est né d’un contexte occidental historique. Il revient aux Africains eux-mêmes de penser leur propres structures étatiques avec des éléments endogènes de conceptualisation. La structure ethnique en est un. Comment peut-on l’intégrer de manière politiquement et économiquement viable en ce siècle de génocides et de conflits interethniques? Les liens ethniques créent un cadre économique et social basé sur d’autres institutions que celles de la modernité étatique. Le pouvoir ethnique harmonise autrement les trois monopoles de l’État moderne, à savoir la violence légitime, la distribution des ressources et la représentation politique. Il est donc possible de combler l’espace publique avec d’autres loyautés que la loyauté nationale.     

The Structure of Government Intervention in African Agriculture

This article examines the determinants of various rates of agricultural subsidies (output, input, exchange rate distortions, and aggregate) using commodity-level data from eight African countries in the 1980s. Econometric results indicate that structural adjustment policies were more effective in reforming exchange rate distortions than in liberalising commodity markets. Output policies are determined within the national context while input subsidies are more responsive to commodity-specific conditions. Further-more, agricultural subsidies were strongly influenced by the degree of urbanisation and by the number of people per unit of arable land in a manner consistent with cheap food policy strategies.     

The Myth of Female Credit Discrimination in African Manufacturing

Abstract

We examine credit constraint differentials between male and female manufacturing entrepreneurs using firm data from 16 sub-Saharan Africa countries. Small enterprises owned by female entrepreneurs are less likely to be credit constrained compared to their male counterparts, while this is reversed for medium-sized enterprises. A generalised Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition shows that the gap is predominantly a pure gender effect. We argue that this finding is mainly due to female favouritism in loans to micro and small firms because the gap is reversed for medium-sized enterprises and because we find no sign of superior female entrepreneurial performance in observable indicators.     

The African Political Business Cycle: Varieties of Experience

We seek to understand both the incidence and the impact of the African political business cycle in the light of a literature which has argued that, with major extensions of democracy since the 1990s, the cycle has both become more intense and has made African political systems more fragile. With the help of country case studies, we argue, first, that the African political business cycle is not homogeneous, and occurs relatively infrequently in so-called ‘dominant-party systems’ where a pre-election stimulus confers little political advantage. Secondly, we show that, in those countries where a political cycle does occur, it does not necessarily cause institutional damage. Whether it does or not depends not so much on whether there is an electoral cycle as on whether this cycle calms or exacerbates fears of an unjust allocation of resources. In other words, the composition of the pre-election stimulus, in terms of its allocation between different categories of voter, is as important as its size.