Lawyer Specialization–Managing the Professional Paradox

This article explores a series of paradoxes exposed by specialization within the legal profession. It will argue that while the existing literature rightly identifies specialization as posing potential challenges to coherence, legitimacy, and professional ethics, it fails to grapple with the relationship between professional competence and specialization. In exploring this relationship, three paradoxes are articulated. The first is that specialization is both a necessary element in the development of professionalism and a threat to it. The second is the normative ambiguity of specialization: specialization is capable of giving rise to both benefits and detriments. The third paradox is the profession's response to this ambiguity. It will be argued that the profession's approach is incoherent in public interest terms and can be best explained as part of a desire to protect its members' interests and its collective identity over the public interest in competence. These arguments are made in the context of a series of three empirical studies of specialists and nonspecialists in legal aid practice in England and Wales. The evidence is worrying enough to suggest significant concerns about the quality and indeed legitimacy of the professional qualification as a general warrant of competence. The implications for institutionalizing specialization within the legal profession are discussed.     

Why the Debate Between Originalists and Evolutionists Rests on a Semantic Mistake

I argue that the dispute between two leading theories of interpretation of legal texts, textual originalism and textual evolutionism, depends on the false presupposition that changes in the way a word is used necessarily require a change in the word’s meaning. Semantic externalism goes a long way towards reconciling these views by showing how a word’s semantic properties can be stable over time, even through vicissitudes of usage. I argue that temporal externalism can account for even more semantic stability, however. Temporal externalism is the theory that the content of an utterance at time t may be determined by developments in linguistic usage subsequent to t. If this semantic theory is correct, then the originalist and evolutionist positions effectively collapse. Originalism is correct in that the original meaning of the text is the meaning that is binding on jurists, but evolutionism is vindicated, as it is the current practices and standards that determine the meaning the text now has, and has always had. Objections to temporal externalism, and to its application to the interpretation of legal texts, are considered and addressed.     

The will theory of rights: A defence

Hart's will theory of rights has been subjected to at least three significant criticisms. First, it is thought unable to account for the full range of legal rights. Second, it is incoherent, for it values freedom while permitting an agent the option of alienating his or her capacity for choice. Third, any attempt to remedy the first two problems renders the theory reducible to the rival benefit theory. My aim is to address these objections. I argue that will theory has been made vulnerable due to misinterpretation. The theory has been characterized as placing great stress on liberty rights (or claim-protected liberties), whereas it is powers that are central, and hence not choice but control. My argument does, however, depend upon appealing to an extra-legal notion — the hypothetical contract — but I argue that this is consistent with the main aim of a theory of rights.     

浅论完善我国法律教育之路

在现代法治社会,法律教育越来越受到重视。在推行依法治国的今天,中国的法律教育正 酝酿着一次巨变。但要达到完善并不是一朝一夕之事。本文通过对比国外几种法律教育模式,对我国 法律教育提出几点建议。     

The Possibility and Value of Coherence

It would seem axiomatic that the law should be coherent in the sense that it should be consistent and correspond to an underlying justificatory rationale. Indeed, coherence would appear to be a good, in and of itself, and give rise to other benefits which are desirable in a legal system. In this article, I explore the value and achievability of coherence. I argue that it is largely inevitable that common law legal systems are not coherent, but that each legal system will comprise areas of coherence. I examine whether it is possible to improve coherence through legislation or adjudication but conclude that any coherence attained through the former may be temporary and achieving coherence through the latter is difficult both in principle and in practice. In looking at the value of coherence, I contend that while coherence may have various intrinsic and instrumental benefits, its value should not be overstated; many of the benefits which coherence is said to provide are present in legal systems where it is lacking; other benefits depend on the awareness of a country’s citizens and I suggest that, outside of extremes, citizens are probably unaware of the degree to which their legal system is coherent. Moreover, full coherence may lead to characteristics which are undesirable in a legal system.     

Personhood,property rights,and the permissibility of abortion

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the tactic of granting a fetus the legal status of a person will not, contrary to the expectations of opponents of abortion, provide grounds for a general prohibition on abortions. I begin by examining two arguments, one moral (J. J. Thomson's ‘A Defense of Abortion’) and the other legal (D. Regan's ‘Rewriting Roe v. Wade’), which grant the assumption that a fetus is a person and yet argue to the conclusion that abortion is permissible. However, both Thomson and Regan rely on the so-called bad samaritan principle. This principle states that a person has a right to refuse to give aid. Their reliance on this principle creates problems, both in the moral and the legal contexts, since the bad samaritan principle is intended to apply to passive refusals to aid; abortion, however, does not look like any such passive denial of aid, and so it does not seem like the sort of action covered by the bad samaritan principle. In defense of the positions outlined by Thomson and Regan, I argue that the apparent asymmetry between abortion and the usual type of case covered by the bad samaritan principle is only apparent and not a genuine problem for their analyses. I conclude with a defense of the morality of the bad samaritan principle.     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.     

Stuntman for the State: Loughlin's Idea of Public Law

Abstract. This paper provides a critical analysis of Martin Loughlin's pure theory of public law as developed in his more recent work. I argue that the pure theory makes a series of errors and rests on a set of assumptions that make it inappropriate to provide the legal framework for any social‐democratic polity. Specifically, the theory concedes too much latitude to the functional needs of the state and organised politics, and pays too little deference to processes of political opinion and will formation in civil society. As such, it only succeeds in establishing law's connection to the public realm, at the cost of effacing its internal relationship to the rule of law and democracy.     

论法律文本及其公布

法律文本是通过文字表达立法者意图的产物,是法治国家建立法治秩序的直接甚至惟一的依据。文本的基本要求是惟一性以及文字的清晰和严谨。在法律形成的过程中,对于法律文本中的错误,可以根据立法过程的不同阶段,以不同的方式进行修订、解释和修改。我国《宪法》和《立法法》对法律文本及其公布的规定比较简单,需要针对文本形成和公布的不同的阶段加以明确和完善。其内容包括:第一,在国家主席签署前,法律文本应当由立法机关自行撤回勘误处理或修改后按表决文本重新表决处理;第二,在国家主席签署以后,法律文本仅仅涉及一般性的文字的勘误由立法机关通过勘误程序进行修改,涉及对法条意思修改的则需要通过法律修改程序进行修改;第三,媒体公布必须要等权威机关签署公布后才能发布;第四,法律的标准文本公布后,还没有实施的,应当根据法律修改的程序进行。     

How Reflective and Critical Norm-Usage Paves the Way to the Public Power of Judgement

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Neil MacCormick’s conception of norm-usage makes it necessary to address the concept of the public power of judgement as the key concept for understanding the democratic legitimization of current law. Therefore, firstly I analyse MacCormick’s conception of norm-usage, secondly I demonstrate that it leads to the idea of the institutionalisation of judgemental–interpretative practice, and thirdly, I show that the latter paves the way to the public power of judgement. Finally, I argue that this power needs to be elaborated in terms of competencies which are broader than legal skills and legal reasoning, and, further, that these competencies condition the use of both legal skills and reasoning. Importantly, MacCormick’s contribution to understanding the public power of judgement—when further developed—may indicate the profound role of comprehending the proper significance of law in a democratic polity and its relationship to the citizenry.

     

Law and Conversational Implicatures

This essay investigates the applicability of Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures to legal interpretation, in order to highlight some of its characteristics. After introducing the notions of language and discourse, and briefly explaining the most salient aspects of Grice’s theory, I will analyse the interpretation of two types of legal acts; authoritative legal acts and acts of private autonomy. Regarding the first class, exemplified by statutes, I will argue against the applicability of Gricean theory due to the conflictual behaviour of the addressees and, above all, to the insurmountable indeterminacy of the contextual elements. As far as acts of private autonomy are concerned, exemplified by contracts, I will argue that the cooperative principle is applicable, at least in those legal systems that include the principle of bona fides among the interpretative regulations of such acts.     

Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?

In this paper, I present a new argument against inclusive legal positivism. As I show, any theory which permits morality to be a condition on legality cannot account for a core feature of legal activity, namely, that it is an activity of social planning. If the aim of a legal institution is to guide the conduct of the community through plans, it would be self-defeating if the existence of these plans could only be determined through deliberation on the merits. I also argue that, insofar as inclusive legal positivism was developed as a response to Ronald Dworkin's critique of H. L. A. Hart's theory of law, it was founded on a mistake. For once we appreciate the role that planning plays in legal regulation, we will see that Dworkin's objection is based on a flawed conception of legal obligations and rights and hence does not present an objection that inclusive legal positivists were required to answer.     

Creating Peer Sexual Harassment: Mobilizing Schools to Throw the Book at Themselves

This paper describes how peer-to-peer sexual harassment rapidly was transformed from an unremarkable reality of secondary school life into a serious social and legal problem. First, it shows how organizations and professionals served as an entry point for social change and legal mobilization. I argue that schools were quick to address peer sexual harassment because activists framed it as a moral and pedagogical issue that resonated with educators' deeply held professional values. Second, the paper shows how law and organizations developed endogenously. Without any legal mandate, schools created and institutionalized harassment policies. Courts then looked to these organizational practices to determine the content and scope of Title IX. In this way, schools literally "enacted" the law through their practices. This finding goes beyond previous work on endogeneity in that school policies influenced law at the level of doctrine, not simply at the level of meaning, enforcement, or application.     

The Indirect Influence of Politics on Tort Liability of Public Authorities in English Law

The scope of negligence liability of public authorities in English law has undergone significant changes in the Post‐World War II period, first expanding and then, from the mid‐1980s, retracting. This article tries to explain why this happened not by focusing, as is common in most commentary on this area of law, on changing doctrinal “tests,” but rather by tying it to changes in the background political ideology. My main contention is that political change has brought about a change in the law, but that it did so by affecting the scope of the political domain, and by implication, also the scope of the legal one. More specifically, I argue that Britain's Post‐War consensus on the welfare state has enabled the courts to expand state liability in accordance with emerging notions of the welfare state without seeming to take the law into controversial territory. When Thatcher came to power, the welfare state was no longer in consensus, thus making further development of legal doctrines on welfarist lines appear politically contentious. The courts therefore reverted back to older doctrines that seemed less politically charged in the new political atmosphere of the 1980s.     

Standing for the client: on the interactional becoming of the criminal defence attorney1

In this essay, I explore the meaning of the legal profession (the defence attorney). I carry out my investigation in the interactional register. I suggest that we examine the profession of defence attorney as a professional identity in becoming. I localize the event of becoming in the first attorney-client interview. I propose that it is during the first encounter that the attorney comes to stand for the client as a legal counsel. I further propose that the analogy of ‘standing for’ be accessed empirically through an analysis of a recorded episode from the first attorney-client conference. For my methods I use a combination of frame analysis and conversation analysis. The two analyses show how the attorney becomes to stand for the client as a legal figure moulded in a series of interactional moves. By reformulating and reframing the ordinary talk that is introduced as an entry mode into an institutional relationship, the attorney and the client alter their discursive positions until the attorney assumes his professional identity, that is, becomes to stand for the client in legal action.     

美国制定法解释方法向文本主义的回睚

作为美国制定法解释方法的文本主义经历了平白意义规则和新文本主义两个发展阶段。以斯卡利亚为代表的新文本主义对在制定法解释领域长期占据正统地位的意图主义解释方法进行了批判,并对早期平白意义规则进行了扬弃,将文本重新置于制定法解释的中心位置,强调制定法语词的通常、自然与客观意义,并认为文本通常意义的确定无需借助于立法者意图或立法史等文本外材料,而只须根据“普通说英语者标准”,运用词典、语法、解释准则等语言学方面的工具并考虑制定法文本的语境、结构与整体等语义性背景即可确定。     

Justificatory Liberalism and Same‐Sex Marriage

Supporters of Justificatory Liberalism (JL)—such as John Rawls and Gerard Gaus—typically maintain that the state may not coerce its citizens on matters of constitutional essentials unless it can provide public justification that the coerced citizens would be irrational in rejecting. The state, in other words, may not coerce citizens whose rejection of the coercion is based on their reasonable comprehensive doctrines (i.e., worldviews). Proponents of the legal recognition of same‐sex marriage (SSM) usually offer some version of JL as the most fundmental reason why laws that recognize marriage only if it is a union between one man and one woman are unjust. In this article I argue that the application of JL in support of legal recognition of SSM does not succeed because the issue under scrutiny—the nature of marriage—is deeply embedded in, and in most cases integral to, many (if not most) citizens’ reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Thus, I argue that because of the effects and consequences of the legal recognition of SSM, it results (or will result) in a violation of JL against dissenting citizens.     

论期待可能性理论的合理性——基于言伴语境理论的考察

只有在特定语境下才能达成对文本的理解和解释，言伴语境对意义生成具有重要作用。法律解释的言伴语境是当下案件事实。法官处理案件时在其前见的指引下根据法律规定选择、建构案件事实，根据案件事实赋予法律文本以语用意义，并且在语境和文本、案件事实和法律文本之间的多次循环往复中实现解释者和文本的视域融合，使法律文本的意义不断丰富和完善。刑法未规定期待可能性，但对其适用体现了言伴语境对文本意义的作用，因而其存在具有合理性。适用该理论不会打破法律的安定性和灵活性之间的平衡，法官因此而行使自由裁量权不违背现代法治精神。