Election campaign resource allocation

This paper examines an electoral competition model where a candidate allocates his campaign efforts (resources) on two competing projects prior to election. A candidate is congruent if his objective is consistent with the wishes of his constituents and there is no potential political shirking. We show that a congruent candidate needs not exert any efforts towards successful implementation prior to election; however, a less than perfectly congruent candidate must exert efforts prior to election. In equilibrium, two campaign resource allocation strategies emerge; (1) concentrate resources on one project and (2) allocate resources evenly across both projects. We discuss potential inefficiencies that are resulted by these allocation strategies.     

Gender-Based Strategies on Candidate Websites

As a result of changes in the campaign landscape, candidates have several strategic options available to them, particularly when considering how to respond to voters’ gender stereotypes. The goal of this paper is to understand candidates’ use of strategies based on gender stereotypes by emphasizing either particular issues or particular traits that are commonly associated with one gender or the other. To do this, I developed hypotheses of why candidates might choose a trait or issues strategy based on gender stereotypes. I tested these hypotheses using a large-scale content analysis of candidate websites over four election cycles. I found that female candidates mostly pursued strategies that were consistent with gender stereotypes. Interestingly, female candidates were found to have different strategies on different pages of their websites. I discuss the implications of gender-based strategies for the election of female candidates and for representation.     

The Timeline of Elections: A Comparative Perspective

How do voter preferences come into focus over the electoral cycle in different countries? Do they evolve in patterned ways? Does the evolution vary across countries? This article addresses these issues. We consider differences in political institutions and how they might impact voter preferences over the course of the election cycle. We then outline an empirical analysis relating support for parties or candidates in pre‐election polls to their final vote. The analysis relies on over 26,000 vote intention polls in 45 countries since 1942, covering 312 discrete electoral cycles. Our results indicate that early polls contain substantial information about the final result but that they become increasingly informative over the election cycle. Although the degree to which this is true varies across countries in important and understandable ways given differences in political institutions, the pattern is strikingly general.     

How do candidates spend their money? Objects of campaign spending and the effectiveness of diversification

We present a novel approach to the study of campaign effectiveness using disaggregated spending returns from the 2007 Irish general election. While previous studies have focused on overall levels of expenditure as a predictor of electoral success, we consider the types of activities on which candidates spent money and the overall diversification of candidates’ campaign expenditure as predictors of electoral success. We offer a replicable framework for the measurement of campaign diversification as well as for the evaluation of its effects on electoral performance. We examine how factors such as campaign expenditure and candidates’ incumbency status condition the effects of campaign diversification. It is shown that diversification is only related to electoral success when campaigns are well-financed.     

Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party‐focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters’ ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, it is argued that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, the article shows how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. The article discusses how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.     

The frog pond beauty contest: Physical attractiveness and electoral success of the constituency candidates at the North Rhine-Westphalia state election of 2005

Abstract.  Voters usually do not know much about the biography and political agenda of the local candidates for parliament in their constituency. Since posters with photographs of these candidates are omnipresent on the streets during the election campaign, many voters are at least familiar with their facial appearance. As a consequence, the attractiveness of the constituency candidates substantially influences voter behaviour. This is shown by the example of the North Rhine-Westphalia state election of 2005. Judgments about the attractiveness of the constituency candidates were collected by means of a web survey among members of an online access panel. Respondents were confronted with portrait photographs of local candidates and asked to rate their attractiveness. According to the truth-of-consensus method, the attractiveness score of a candidate is computed by averaging across the different ratings he or she has received. Voter behaviour is captured by the real-life election results in the constituencies.     

Preemptive and reactive spending in U.S. House races

This paper examines the spending behavior of candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives. Particular attention is paid to the timing of receipts and expenditures over the complete 2-year election cycle. Incumbents raise and spend large amounts of money very early in the race, and this preemptive spending may have a great impact on the selection of challengers and therefore on electoral outcomes. In addition, a model of reactive spending is tested for the general election period. Incumbents' expenditures are a function of the underlying partisan division in the district, the strength of the challenge, and candidates' feelings of vulnerability. Incumbents are strategic actors who attempt to maximize their chances of reelection. Early in the term, they spend preemptively in an effort to influence the selection of their challengers. Later in the term, they spend in reaction to the strength of their challengers' campaign. The role of money in congressional campaigns is neither simple nor direct. More attention needs to be given to the strategic uses of money in the period leading up to the general election campaign as well as to the dynamics of receipts and expenditures over an entire election cycle.     

How the spending patterns of cities change: Budgetary incrementalism reexamined

Do city governments generally behave in keeping with the assumptions underlying the incremental model when they allocate their resources among competing activities? That is to say, do they try to maintain everyone's historical “fair share” of the budget in order to minimize disputes among rival participants in the decision process? Earlier studies have lacked sufficient data to address this question. However, with data from 105 West German cities, the present study is able to provide an answer. The resource allocation behavior of many of those cities seems to conform with the incremental model's assumptions. Yet for other cities, major changes in expenditure patterns from one year to the next are common. The differences in the variability of expenditure patterns across the cities studied are far from random. They are systematically associated with certain characteristics of the municipal environment. These associations, in turn, offer plausible hints about the process that leads to change in cities' spending patterns.     

Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections

We examine the factors that improve the candidates’ likelihood of winning an election by drawing on information from campaign resources used by candidates running in the 2002 French parliamentary election. The main effects that we wish to analyze are the candidates’ gender, political affiliation and possible incumbency. We find that the contributions the candidates received and their political affiliations determine their acceding to the second round of the elections. But surprisingly once they make it to the second round, the contributions cease to be relevant; only the candidates’ gender, incumbency and the actual spending rather than the contribution levels matter.     

The voluntary provision of a pure public good with diminishing marginal returns

In experiments investigating the voluntary provision of a pure public good, participants consistently allocate resources to this good when the Nash prediction is to allocate nothing. This paper explores the robustness of this result when the Nash prediction calls for a division of resources between the private and public goods. We consider how a change in individual resource endowments and supplemental earnings information affect allocations to the public good. Results indicate that, under both the high and low endowment conditions, groups continue to allocate more resources than the Nash prediction. However, providing participants with detailed instructions that describe the declining marginal benefit to the public good leads to a significant decrease in allocations to the public good.     

Candidate appearance in campaign advertisements

Many scholars have examined the nature of campaign advertising strategy across differing contexts in U.S. elections. Little attention has been devoted to exploring the incentives that candidates face to appear — or not — in their own advertisements. We argue that candidates should seek to distance themselves from potential backlash stemming from more negative messages by not appearing in negative ads. We also expect that candidates should be more likely to appear in advertisements aired during primary elections relative to general elections because candidates should use ads in this election stage to introduce themselves to voters. Furthermore, incumbents should be less likely to appear in ads than other candidates because their constituents should not need to be introduced to them. Data on candidate-sponsored television advertisements collected across four years for four different offices provides support for our expectations and suggests that candidates make strategic decisions about when to appear in advertisements.     

How campaigns promote the legitimacy of elections

Why do people see elections as fair or unfair? In prior accounts, evaluations of the election depend on people's candidate preferences, where supporters of the winning candidate tend to call the election fair while those on the losing side feel it was unfair. I argue that perceptions of election fairness reflect not just the election outcome, but also the campaign process. Using a set of multilevel models and data from the 1996–2004 American National Election Studies, I explore the consequences of campaign experiences in shaping people's evaluations of the fairness of a presidential election. I find that as campaign competition increases, people are less likely to translate their feelings about the candidates into their evaluations of the election. Rather than alienating citizens, competitive campaigns mitigate the effects of prior preferences in a way that promotes the legitimacy of elections.     

Manifesto functions: How party candidates view and use their party's central policy document

Electoral manifestos play a crucial role in visions of party democracy and political science analyses of party competition. While research has focused on the contents of manifestos, we know much less about how parties produce manifestos and the roles they take in campaigns. This paper identifies three campaign-related functions of manifestos: they provide a compendium of valid party positions, streamline the campaign, and are used as campaign material. Based on the characteristics of the candidates, the parties and the campaign, the paper then derives expectations of how party candidates may differ in attributing importance to their party's manifesto. Based on a candidate survey after the 2013 Austrian general election, the paper shows that the key user-group of parliamentary candidates considers manifestos generally important and useful documents. Candidates' policy-centred campaigning and left–right distance from their own party are important in explaining individual differences. While the manifesto's service functions of providing a summary of valid party positions for the candidates and as a campaign means to be handed out to voters are widely appreciated, campaign streamlining is more divisive when it results in constraining candidates.     

Truman defeats Dewey: The effect of campaign visits on election outcomes

Political science research suggests that campaign visits by presidential candidates produce small and short-lived effects, consistent with mixed findings of their influence on election returns. We argue that existing studies are constrained by two issues: most studies rely on state-level data, rather than more localized data, and do not incorporate differentiation in the quality of campaign appearances in their assessment of visit effects. To incorporate these concerns in a study of campaign visit effects on election outcomes, we study the 1948 presidential election, during which Harry Truman engaged in a major whistle-stop train tour and won a surprise victory over his opponent, Thomas Dewey. Using data on campaign stops gathered from archival sources, we estimate the effect of campaign appearances on candidate vote share at the county level. We find that Truman, on average, gained 3.06 percentage points of the overall vote share in counties that he visited. Consistent with contemporary judgments of the “quality” of the two candidates' campaign stops, we find no effect of Dewey's appearances on his performance. Our results provide strong evidence that candidate visits can influence electoral returns, rather than merely affect short-term public opinion. In counterfactual simulations, we show that Truman's extensive campaign tour likely won him the state of Ohio, highlighting the importance of strategic campaign decisions and campaign effects in close elections.     

Strategic campaigning, closeness, and voter mobilization in U.S. Presidential elections

The scholarly literature on voter mobilization is ambivalent regarding the effects of closeness on turnout. Economic analyses of turnout (i.e. the classic calculus of voting) contend that as elections become closer, voters perceive their participation as more valuable because there is a greater chance that they will cast the deciding vote. Other work argues that voters do not take closeness into account because the probability that their vote uniquely changes the outcome of an election is quite small even in close elections. Still, this second perspective maintains that closeness may increase turnout because elites distribute campaign resources to places where election results could be affected by mobilizing additional supporters. While the latter perspective is theoretically well-developed, empirical support for the notion that elite activity (rather than citizen perceptions) connects closeness and turnout is limited. Using improved measures of closeness and campaign activities, we test for citizen perception and elite mobilization effects on turnout in the context of U.S. Presidential elections. Results show that while closeness has no direct effect on turnout, elites indeed target campaign activities on close states and the asymmetric distribution of resources across states results in higher turnout in battleground states.     

Candidates' policy platforms and election outcomes: The three faces of policy representation

Abstract.   Recent empirical studies by Alvarez and Nagler, Erikson and Romero, and others conclude that candidates' and parties' policy platforms only modestly affect their electoral support. This suggests that candidates/parties can win elections even when their policies differ sharply from the policy beliefs of the constituencies that elect them. This raises the question: How can voters exercise control over government policies via elections? We report applications to American and French presidential election data that suggest three paradoxical conclusions. On the one hand, we find that presidential candidates can moderate their policies with at most a modest change in vote share, but if they move by the same amount to a more extreme position, they face severe vote losses that could cripple their election prospects. Alternatively, movement by both candidates in the same direction or a policy shift by the voters may have a major effect on the outcome.     

Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending

Much work on the apparent ineffectiveness on incumbent spending in congressional elections has hypothesized that the productivity of incumbent spending is low because incumbents operate on the “flat part” of their election returns function. Differences in campaign spending associated with state campaign finance laws allows for a test of this hypothesis because restrictions on campaign contributions tend to reduce campaign spending. Exploiting cross-state variation in campaign finance laws, this study tests whether campaign expenditures by state House candidates are more productive when candidates are subject to contribution limits. The results show that campaign expenditures by incumbents and challengers are more productive when candidates run in states with campaign contribution limits, as opposed to in states without limits. In states with contribution limits, incumbent spending and challenger spending are equally productive, and spending by both candidates is quantitatively important in increasing their vote shares.     

Certainty or Accessibility: Attitude Strength in Candidate Evaluations

Attitude strength is an important, but contested, subject in social psychology. Political scientists often rely on measures of attitude strength such as attitude importance, accessibility, or certainty in their work while ignoring the politically meaningful differences across types of strength. This omission is particularly relevant in the discussion of the formation of candidate evaluations. The research reported here indicates that accessibility is not the relevant type of attitude strength when describing how voters use issues in evaluating candidates. Instead, voters' reliance on issues when evaluating candidates depends on the voter's certainty about where the candidates stand. Given the different antecedents of certainty and accessibility, this result suggests that that citizens are able to more carefully process and use information available to them during an election campaign than would be expected by the prevailing theories of attitude formation .     

The effect of relative economic performance on the outcome of gubernational elections

This study finds that one of the most important determinants of election outcomes in gubernatorial elections is the voter's familiarity with the candidates. When an incumbent governor seeks re-election, his party's share of the vote increases by about 7.3 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Likewise, when a former candidate represents the opposition party, the incumbent party's share of the vote decreases by about three percentage points, ceteris paribus. The electoral history of the state also has a significant effect on the share of the vote received by the incumbent party.The major finding of this study is that state economic conditions exert only a weak influence on the outcome of gubernatorial elections. Assuming that voters are rational, a major implication of this finding is that voters do not view a governor as being able to substantially influence a state's economy. If, during a gubernatorial campaign, voters view the candidates as having little or no control over the state economy they will evaluate candidates on the basis of non-economic positions.