Limits of Devolution: Localism,Economics and Post‐democracy

This article challenges the narrowly founded but untroubled consensus about the alleged benefits of the Conservative government's devolution programme. It suggests that too much attention has been paid to purported benefits and too little regard to the potential risks, and draws attention to international evidence that suggests that the distribution of the benefits of devolution is crucially dependent on its design. It critically examines the case for the currently offered model of devolution and finds the underpinning economic model and limited forms of democratic accountability are likely to produce regressive social outcomes and the reinforcement of existing local elites. It calls for a wider public debate and fuller democratic scrutiny of the model of devolution on offer.     

Devolution and Local Government

Devolution was introduced amid a rhetoric of democratic renewaland promised the active engagement of local government. Localgovernment has responded in different ways in different partsof the United Kingdom. In Scotland and Wales local authoritieshave built on their advocacy of devolution before 1997 to realizea close partnership with devolved government. In London, too,local authorities have come to engage closely with regionalgovernment. In the rest of England local authorities were atbest ambivalent about the possibility of regional government,preferring to work in a national context with UK governmentinstitutions. Northern Ireland local government is parochialand appears suspicious of engagement with devolved government.These differences express some of the wider relationships ofthe component societies of the United Kingdom to the UK stateand have helped to embed continued centralized government inEngland.     

Between Globalism and Localism,Italian Style

Survey and historical evidence reveal that Italians have emerged as the European masters of multiple loyalties, balancing relatively weak levels of state nationalism with strong affinities for sub-state, continental and global identities and institutions. These distinctive patterns can be traced to elite opinion leadership, the perceived material and psychological benefits derived from the European movement, and the legacy of the First Republic's party system.     

Devolution and Electoral Politics in Scotland and Wales

In this article we examine the impact of devolution on electoralpolitics in Scotland and Wales. After reviewing the electoralhistory of the two territories, we set out the result for the1999 and 2003 devolved elections, noting the substantial differencesbetween voting patterns in these elections from those for theUK parliament. We then go on to consider the main reasons whyvoting patterns differ across the two types of poll. The paperconcludes by summarizing the main findings and then consideringboth the implications of the findings for future devolved electionsand the potential contribution of the study of such electionsto broader theories of voting behavior.     

Devolution and Celtic nationalism in the UK

Other than the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices, the UK is exceptional in lacking a uniform level of government or administration between central and local government. There have been various attempts to fill this gap. The most important arose because of an upsurge of Celtic nationalism in the early 1960s which resulted in the Scotland and Wales Acts of 1978. Neither was implemented, however, and both were rescinded in 1979. Whether this issue will return is problematic: the British political tradition is indelibly unitary as is its socio‐economic structure. In addition, moderate Celtic aspirations may have been met by unobtrusive devolutionary changes such as language concessions, the strengthening of the Offices and various symbolic changes in the field of sport.     

The Welsh Devolution Referendum

This article seeks to place the 1997 referendum on the Labour government's plans to establish an elected Welsh Assembly into the context of the debate on devolution as it has developed in Wales since 1979, when broadly similar proposals were overwhelmingly rejected by the Welsh electorate. The authors argue that given the belated decision to hold the referendum, the particular difficulties created by the Welsh political landscape, and the fact that there was no real attempt to develop a broad-based consensus behind the proposals before the 1997 general election, the fact that the proposals were finally approved – albeit by the narrowest of margins – represents a substantial achievement for the pro-devolutionists.     

Devolution Paradox and the US South

There is an inherent trade-off in federalism regarding representation and equity. With the devolution of responsibilities to regional governments offering increased representation, there comes the inequity of services provided by some governments and not others. However, citizens in these federations may want the best of both worlds—desiring regional control but without the regional policy variation. This tension, dubbed ‘the devolution paradox’ in a study of federal countries in Europe, was less apparent in one key group of regions—those with historic ties through language, culture, or experience. This article examines US respondents to identify whether the devolution paradox is evident in this country and looks specifically at the South, a region with long-standing distinctiveness. We find that there is evidence of the devolution paradox among the American public and that the South is indeed different.     

Deficits and Devolution in the 104th Congress

Deficit reduction was an important impetus for the devolutioninitiatives thai moved through the 104th Congress, but it wasnot the only cause. Other objectives, notably building an alliancewith Republican governors and transforming the American welfarestate, also helped to drive devolution. Although the Republicandeficit and devolution agendas appeared mutually reinforcingat first, arguments over the terms of devolution (e.g., entitlementstatus, program mandates, and funding formulas) helped to slowdown and build opposition to those agendas. The use of omnibuslegislation helped to gel Republican proposals through the Congressin 1995, but packaging together popular and highly unpopularprovisions in a single bill ultimately provided President BillClinton with political cover to veto the legislation. The unpopularityof Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Clinton'spledge to "end welfare as we know it" propelled a more limiteddevolution agenda focused on AFDC in the lead-up to the 1996presidential election. Devolution ofMedicaid was dropped, however,while Food Stamps and child nutrition programs experienced budgetcuts but little devolution.     

Evaluating the Devolution Revolution1

This article provides an evaluation of the impact of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. The evidence clearly shows that PRWORA has had a major impact on the poverty population and the welfare system. The data analyzed identify those policy areas in which positive changes can be identified, along with implementation and design problems that need reform. The data also show that while some states have made considerable progress in implementing the law, many are lagging.