On Justifying Legal Paternalism

Abstract. Paternalism, understood as coercive intervention with the behavior of a person in order to prevent her from causing harm to herself, is a highly controversial issue, because it implies a departure from the widely recognized principle of harm to others. Some conceptual differences between legal paternalism and other forms of state coercion that also depart from the principle of harm to others will be indicated. This is followed by an analysis of the arguments that are usually brought forth against legal paternalism. And finally, the possibility of determining ethically justifiable types of legal paternalism is explored.     

Soft paternalism,merit goods,and normative individualism

Paternalism is an attempt to influence individuals’ decisions for their own benefit, even if there are no third parties involved. This seems to contradict normative individualism, which provides the general orientation to our modern democracies. Soft or libertarian paternalism accepts the necessity of paternalism due to the existence of behavioural anomalies, but intends to apply only such measures that do not restrict the decision leeway of individuals. Nevertheless, the same objections that can be raised against its strong version can also be raised against soft paternalism. On the other hand, as soon as we accept that human beings are able to reflect not only about their actions but also about the preferences guiding their actions, there is no longer a necessary contradiction between paternalism and normative individualism. As far as we know today, the possibilities to successfully apply soft paternalistic measures are rather limited. On the other hand, while some criticisms are justified, others largely overshoot the mark and seem to be at least partly ideologically motivated.     

Legal Paternalism and Legal Moralism: Devlin, Hart and Ten*

Abstract
H. L. A. Hart in his Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963) defended the view that legal paternalism and legal moralism can be clearly distinguished from each other. Hart also stated that while legal moralism is always unacceptable, paternalistic laws are often justifiable. In this paper it is argued that Hart held the right view for the wrong reasons. Hart defended legal paternalism by claiming, against J. S. Mill, that for various psychological reasons individuals do not know their own interests best. It will be shown in the paper that if this view is taken, it is impossible to reject legal moralism. The fact that paternalism is sometimes justifiable while moralism is not can be more firmly founded on a distinction made by C. L. Ten (1971). Ten's point is that in matters which concern only the individuals themselves, their actions cannot be legitimately restricted by appeals to the consequences of their action alone. Paternalistic control can be justified only if the decision-making abilities of the controlled individual are temporarily diminished.     

父爱主义与“还地于民”

农村经济体制改革的进程就是一个“还地于民”的过程。因为流转上的障碍,农村土地权利并未真正物权化。流转管制背后蕴藏着父爱主义理念。父爱主义没有随着市场经济的发展而消解,反而重新抬头。但逻辑上父爱主义的预设前提并不存在,且潜伏着无效率和不自由的危险。父爱主义本质上是一种精英主义,土地管制所借助的三个正当化理由都有反思的必要。目前全球金融危机为“还地于民”提供了历史契机,摒弃父爱主义有助于实现农村土地资产彻底物权化和农民身份彻底市民化,并为克服危机提供动力。     

Libertarian Paternalism,Externalities, and the “Spirit of Liberty”: How Thaler and Sunstein Are Nudging Us toward an “Overlapping Consensus”

In their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein use research from psychology and behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from systematic cognitive biases. They propose that policy makers mitigate these biases by framing people's choices in ways that help people act in their own self‐interest. Thaler and Sunstein call this approach “libertarian paternalism,” and they market it as “the Real Third Way.” In this essay, I argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinking about policy making but that “choice architecture” is not just a solution to the problem of cognitive biases. Rather, it is a means of approaching any kind of policy making. I further argue that policy makers must take externalities into account, even when using choice architecture. Finally, I argue that libertarian paternalism can best be seen as motivated by what Sunstein has celebrated in his work on constitutional theory: a humility about the possibility of policy‐maker error embodied in Learned Hand's famous aphorism about the “spirit of liberty” and an attempt to reduce social conflicts by searching for what John Rawls called an “overlapping consensus.”     

反思法律对社会关系对立面的强化——从知情同意权切入

信赖、合作、有成效的医患关系是一理想状态,是用以评价实际医患关系的标尺。历史上,基于理想的伦理预设,医生为患者做主,成为理所应当,这便是医疗父杈主义,而当原先的伦理预设被打破后,法律父权主义模式便得以介入,其强调知情同意这一制度,以此改变过去的医患关系模式。然而,由干专业壁垒等因素的存在,知情同意权有被医疗方"工具化"的倾向,难免会使医患双方的对立面被强化。反思这一问题,将对法律父权主义模式向理想模式靠近有积极意义。     

Assessing the Influence of Familial Paternalism on Child Neglect Sentencing Decisions

Familial responsibilities have been found to significantly reduce the severity of sentencing outcomes of defendants in the criminal court. Additional research also has suggested that this leniency might be contingent on the type of offense, with defendants who commit crimes which imply that they are unfit parents (e.g., drug offenses) not receiving a significant reduction in their likelihood of incarceration. Utilizing familial paternalism as the theoretical basis, the current study examines whether having children influences the sentences of defendants charged with forms of criminal child neglect. The findings indicate that having children does result in significantly reduced odds of incarceration for defendants charged with child neglect. These findings support the arguments set forth by familial paternalism. However, they do not support the inference that defendants convicted of child neglect are presumed to be unfit parents. Implication of these results and directions for future research are discussed.     

Autonomy,paternalism, and institutional interest: why some conflicts can't be waived

This paper asks the question of why, in some cases, a client is precluded from demanding of their lawyer that they act for them and their adversary simultaneously. We accept that in numerous instances a lawyer can act for clients whose interests may diverge (or in some cases do in fact diverge) providing informed consent has been obtained. This paper enquires as to why the line between waivable and non-waivable conflicts is drawn where it is, and examines the theoretical underpinning of the waiver rule and its boundaries. It does so by first looking at the client autonomy argument for allowing waivers. It then turns to explore the paternalistic justifications for rendering a consensual waiver of a conflict inoperative. Finally it looks at those cases where a waiver is not permitted that are left unexplained by paternalism. It argues that paternalism, properly understood, is a legitimate justification for most refusals to accept a waiver of conflict. However, a residual body of cases remain unexplained by paternalism. Those cases are best explained by the propensity of the law and the legal profession to protect its institutional values and interest.     

Serious Violent Offenses and Sentencing Decisions in China—Are There Any Gender Disparities?

Research based on data from Western countries on gender and sentencing has resulted in three competing theories: the paternalism/chivalry theory, the evil woman theory, and the family-based justice theory. Using court data from China, this study examines the characteristics of violent capital offenses and assesses the possible impact of gender on sentencing decisions. While gender did not have a significant net impact on sentencing outcomes in regression analyses, the results of the qualitative comparative analysis suggest that unique profiles of the female capital murder cases had more severe case characteristics than their male counterparts did. Case narratives further suggest that both the paternalism and evil woman theories may be applicable in the Chinese context.     

农民、就业与法律父爱主义——以《就业促进法》为例

在现代化转型的大背景下,农民就业成为涉及全局的大问题,也是相关立法必须解决的难题。如果立法中的规定强调政府主导而不注重权利保护,就可能导致法律父爱主义的倾向。《就业促进法》浓厚的法律父爱主义色彩埋下了政府裁量权过大、农民就业权受侵蚀等隐患。为此,应彰显农民的就业权利和自由,以理性、确定和比例三原则来规制政府行为,淡化甚至褪去立法的父爱主义色彩,走出价值悖论的迷宫,使该法善始善终,最终实现其促进就业的目的。     

What’s Special about the Insult of Paternalism?

Law and Philosophy - A common assumption is that paternalism generates a special, and especially grievous, insult. Identifying this distinctive insult is then presented as the key to unlocking the...     

Military genomic testing: proportionality,expected benefits,and the connection between genotypes and phenotypes

Mehlman and Li offer a framework for approaching the bioethical issues raised by the military use of genomics that is compellingly grounded in both the contemporary civilian and military ethics of medical research, arguing that military commanders must be bound by the two principles of paternalism and proportionality. I agree fully. But I argue here that this is a much higher bar than we may fully realize. Just as the principle of proportionality relies upon a thorough assessment of harms caused and military advantage gained, the use of genomic research, on Mehlman and Li''s view, will require an accurate understanding of the connection between genotypes and phenotypes – accurate enough to ameliorate the risk undertaken by our armed forces in being subject to such research. Recent conceptual work in evolutionary theory and the philosophy of biology, however, renders it doubtful that such knowledge is forthcoming. The complexity of the relationship between genotypic factors and realized traits (the so-called ‘G→P map’) makes the estimation of potential military advantage, as well as potential harm to our troops, incredibly challenging. Such fundamental conceptual challenges call into question our ability to ever satisfactorily satisfy the demands of a sufficiently rigorous ethical standard.     

What is the Harm Principle For?

In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between ‘the harms’ and ‘the wrongs’ of the authors’ title. I begin by comparing the authors’ version of the Harm and Offence Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the (considerable) role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors’ account of ‘harm’ is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness- or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one’s character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another. What really drives the authors’ account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence.     

The Anatomy of Civic Integration

Recent legislation on migration and citizenship in Europe and the EU framework on integration require migrants to meet integration requirements in order to enter, reside, reunite with their families and naturalise in the host country. Mandatory language course attendance and examination tests are viewed as means of enhancing integration, which is now framed as a ‘two way’ process or a contractual agreement between migrants and the host society. Despite the deployment of the notion of a contract, integration is, in reality, a one way process aimed at procuring conformity, discipline and migration control. Civic integration rests on an artificial homogenisation and displays the same elements of paternalism and ethnocentricity that characterised past initiatives. The civic integration paradigm is a crucial feature of a renewed, albeit old‐fashioned, nationpolitics used by political elites to provide answers to a wide range of issues and to elicit support for a controlling state in the first decade of the 21^st century.     

Theories of Criminalization

In this article, I comment on Simester and von Hirsch’s theory of criminalization and discuss general principles of criminalization. After some brief comments on punishment theories and the role of moral wrongdoing, I examine main lines of contemporary criminalization theories which tend to focus on the issues of harm, offense, paternalism and side-constraints. One of the points of disagreement with Simester and von Hirsch concerns the role of the harm principle. I rely on a straightforward normative concept of “rights of others,” not in the sense of rights granted in positive law but in the sense of rights which are to be justified in political philosophy. With a rights-centered rather than a harm-centered approach, a prima facie reason for criminalization is the violation of others’ rights. It is unnecessary to develop a separate category of “offense to others,” and paternalistic interventions can be criticized straightforwardly because rights can be waived.     

Mrs. John Marshall Harlan's Memories: Hierarchies of Gender and Race in the Household and the Polity

While legal papers and case decisions have been the traditional focus of judicial biography, the family papers of Justice John Marshall Harlan the Elder demonstrate the importance for understanding a judge's conception of the polity of shifting our sights to the household. Historians of the 19th century have overestimated the distance between the private and the public spheres. The memoirs of Harlan's wife Malvina offer us unparalleled, and hitherto neglected, testimony. Her depiction of the antebellum Harlan household shows its two hierarchies based on assumptions of fundamental differences—those of gender and of race—and both positing a benevolent white male paternalist at their apex. Malvina Harlan's memoirs indicate the lifelong persistence of this paternalism in her own relationship with Justice Harlan and in his relationship with a black servant. These patterns of hierachy, separation, and mutual devotion were essential to Harlan's understanding of his family identity and personal duty. His famous dissents in favor of black civil rights protections and his lapses from his color-blind rule have their roots in this paternalism even as Harlan came to embrace the racial egalitarianism of the Civil War amendments.     

Secularization and Tolerance

In this paper, starting from Condorcet's discussion on progress, the author analyzes the relationship between the decline of religions, the end of State paternalism and tolerance. The author underlines how history shows a different course with respect to illuminist previsions.     

自我决定权与刑法家长主义

作为公民的基本人权,自我决定权的解释力辐射到被害人同意、被害人自陷风险、诈骗罪中的被害人怀疑与错误、自诉以及刑事和解等诸多刑事法领域。家长主义是自我决定权在刑法上的对立者与保护神。现代语境下,自我决定权与刑法家长主义的关系呈现出既有正向排斥又有逆向制约、既要积极保障又要拒绝溺爱性保护的复调结构。这种二元互动的理论框架,能够向下在微观层面为具体的被害人教义学问题提供思想支撑;在更抽象的层面上,则取决于解释者的价值立场在自由主义与保守主义之间的倾向。     

The Rationality Paradox of Nudge: Rational Tools of Government in a World of Bounded Rationality

Nudge and the wider behavioral economics approach has become increasingly dominant in contemporary political and policy discourse. While much attention has been paid to the attractions and criticisms of nudge (such as liberal paternalism), this article argues that nudge is based on a rationality paradox in that it represents an approach that despite its emphasis on bounded rationality, does not reflect on its own limits to rationality. The article considers the implications of this paradox by considering mechanisms that influence government decision making and mechanisms that lead to unintended consequences in the context of policy interventions.