How Democratic is Civil Disobedience?

In her book, Conscience and Conviction, Kimberley Brownlee argues that there is nothing undemocratic about the robust, primary right to civil disobedience that she devotes most of her argument to defending. To the contrary, she holds that there is nothing paternalistic about civil disobedients opposing the will of democratic majorities, because, inter alia, democratic majorities cannot claim particular epistemic superiority, and because there are flaws inherent to democratic procedures that civil disobedience addresses. I hold that Brownlee’s arguments fail. In particular, her argument fails because it does not properly construe the nature of the epistemic claim that can be made either by democratic procedures or by civil disobedients, and because it illegitimately conflates the concern about permanent minorities that has been a constant thorn in the side of democratic theorists, with a concern with all outvoted minorities, whether permanent minorities or not.     

The Burdens of Conviction: Brownlee on Civil Disobedience

Kimberley Brownlee’s Conscience and Conviction offers a powerful defence of civil disobedience as a conscientious and communicative mode of protest. The overall argument of the book is important and compelling, but this critical commentary explores certain aspects of Brownlee’s view that warrant further consideration and clarification. Those aspects relate to her suggestion that civil disobedience is a dialogic mode of communication, her attempt to ground a moral right of civil disobedience in a principle of humanism, and her belief that the right establishes a defeasible moral claim against all forms of interference.     

Is <Emphasis Type="Italic">Viveka</Emphasis> a Unique <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pramāṇa</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vivekacūḍāmaṇi</Emphasis>?

This is an enquiry based on the Vivekacū?āma?i (VC), the primary focus of which is to present viveka (discrimination) along with its three catalysts, namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava as the unique pramā?a of Ultimate Knowledge. This paper discusses the significance of the six popular pramā?as of Advaita Vedānta (AV) and reiterates that as far as AV is concerned epistemologically those pramā?as have merely a provisional value (vyāvahārika). In accordance with the purport of VC this paper argues that ?ruti and tarka, culminating in anubhava (trans-empirical insight sans experience) are blind in themselves and are enthusiastically carried forward by viveka (discrimination) for the attainment of the final realisation. This paper concludes that viveka, along with its three catalysts namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava is the sole pramā?a of the trans-empirical experiential knowledge of Brahman.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣa</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dharma</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣadharma</Emphasis>

This essay asks what the terms mok?a and dharma mean in the anomalous and apparently Mahābhārata-coined compound mok?adharma, which provides the title for the ?āntiparvan’s third and most philosophical anthology; and it further asks what that title itself means. Its route to answering those questions is to look at the last four units of the Mok?adharmaparvan and their three topics—the story of ?uka, the Nārāya?īya, and a gleaner’s subtale—as marking an “artful curvature” that shapes the outcome of King Yudhi??hira’s philosophical inquiries of Bhī?ma into a ”return” to this world to take up the topic of the fourth anthology, a King’s generous giving, in the Anu?āsanaparvan’s Dānadharmaparvan. Usages of the term mok?a in the narratives in these units are considered in the light of The Laws of Manu’s usage of mok?a to define the “renunciatory asceticism of a wandering mendicant” after the fulfillment of one’s debts (Olivelle et al., in Life of the Buddha by A?vagho?a, 2008). Usages of mok?adharma are discussed in conjunction with its overlapping term niv?ittidharma. With the term dharma itself, it is a matter of finding the best contextual translation. A pitch is made that these four units, and particularly the Nārāya?īya, should no longer be thought of as “late” additions.     

Post-secular Messianism Against the Law: Judith Butler on Walter Benjamin and ‘Sacred Life’

This essay focuses on Judith Butler’s configuration in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism (2012a) of sacred life from the mystical motifs that traverse Walter Benjamin’s writings as the pivot of an anti-identitarian ethics committed to non-violent resistance. To gain critical leverage on Butler’s post-secular stance, my analysis turns to Talal Asad’s ‘Redeeming the “Human” Through Human Rights’ chapter from Formations of the Secular (2003), where he enunciates a disparity between a ‘pre-civil state of nature’ and the notion of ‘inalienable rights’ that informs the subject’s rights under secular law. In underscoring the secular state’s inability or refusal to ascribe sacredness to ‘real living persons’ over and against ‘“the human” conceptualized abstractly, or imagined in a state of nature’ as presumed by natural law, Asad indirectly articulates what is at stake in Butler’s explication in Parting Ways of Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’. In this context, Butler unpacks Benjamin’s remarks about the sixth commandment’s non-coercive disposition and the inner struggle its provisional applicability prompts. A conception of ‘sacred life’ crystallizes through Butler’s emphasis on the open-endedness of this struggle, which encourages us to abandon a solipsistic investment in our own suffering in the process of acknowledging its eternally transient rhythm. I argue that Butler supplements this motif by drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s grounding of the political in cohabitation. My contention is that while ‘sacred life’ forms the backbone of Butler’s affirmation of civil disobedience, Arendt empowers Butler’s ethics to transcend Benjamin’s Jewish-messianic melancholy by radicalizing the passivity that refracts it.     

‘My Eyes Were Open’: Awakened Maternal Identity and Leaving Violent Relationships for the Infant/Children

A qualitative secondary analysis explored stories of mothers (n = 49) who left violent relationships (VRs) through a lens of maternal identity. Constant comparative method identified a theory of Awakened Maternal Identity (AMI) and Leaving VR for the Infant/Children. Mothers described how the VR diminished their maternal identity (DMI). Partners controlled the VR though unrealistic infant care expectations, criticisms of infant care, harsh parenting, and control over mothering decisions. DMI lowered the mother’s capacity to provide emotionally nurturing infant care. Over time, mothers experienced AMI- as their ‘eyes were opened’ they experienced a stronger sense of mothering responsibility, focused more on the infants and children, and eventually prioritized their relationship with the infants and children over the partner. AMI seemed a turning point that led to leaving the VR for the infants/children. Recommendations offered for professionals to foster AMI as potential means to initiate the leaving VRs.     

Differentiating Factitious from Malingered Symptomatology: the Development of a Psychometric Approach

Psychometric symptom validity assessment is becoming increasingly part and parcel of psychological and neuropsychological assessments. An unresolved and rarely addressed issue concerns the differentiation between factitious and malingered symptom presentations: present-day symptom validity tests can assess whether an examinee presents with noncredible symptomatology, but not why an examinee does so. We explored this issue by developing the Symptom and Disposition Interview (SDI); a symptom validity test that incorporates strategies intended to gauge internal incentives associated with factitious disorder. The merits of the SDI were explored and compared to a traditional symptom validity test (the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology) in two analogue studies, each with factitious and malingering conditions (n = 24–30 per condition) and a clinical control group (n = 34, n = 40). Overall, the results were positive: The SDI was as effective in detecting feigned symptom presentations as a traditional symptom validity test and superior in differentiating factitious from malingered symptom presentations. We conclude that the SDI is not ready for clinical use, but that psychometric approaches to the assessment of factitious symptomatology, such as the SDI, appear sufficiently promising to warrant future research.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Alice’s Adventures</Emphasis>, Abductive Reasoning and the Logic of Islamic Law

How does a Muslim jurist think the law and how, accordingly, he judges a fact? Using Alice in Wonderland as hermeneutical device to explore the logic of fiqh, this article identifies a divergence between Western and Islamic legal thinking in the application of abduction as key form of inference in the law of Islam. In particular, looking at the fact/law relation in symbolic terms, the article highlights how, while a dichotomy between fact and law characterizes Western legal thinking, fiqh upholds a connection between the “real” and the “right” (?aqq), where the effort (ijtihād) in understanding sharī‘ah postulates the actualization of the “rule” (?ukm) in God’s creation. Thus, if sharī‘ah pre-scribes the Law, not only is the rule discovered through the sources (u?ūl), but the right has to be justified through a verdict de-scribing the fact, for the law to be validly stated for the given situation. In this sense, abduction as explanatory “hypothesis” (Peirce) and “inference to the best explanation” (Harman) of sharī‘ah provides an account for the probabilistic nature of fiqh, its ramification (furū‘) through verdicts, as well as for the epistemic and narrative function of the tradition as core aspects of the logic of Islamic law. At the same time, doubts can be raised about the compatibility between this logic and the deductive logic of modern state law, as a sub-product of Western legal thinking.     

The Girl Who Knew Her Brother Would Be Coming Home: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ārṣajñāna</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Praśastapādabhāṣya</Emphasis>, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nyāyakandalī</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vyomavatī</Emphasis>

Although seldom mentioned in the secondary literature on Vai?e?ika, the cognitive category of ār?ajñāna (??i cognition) is accepted as a distinct category of vidyā (knowledge) within both early and later Vai?e?ika texts. This article deals with how ār?ajñāna is conceptualized in Pra?astapādabhā?ya (PBh), ?rīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī (NK), and Vyoma?iva’s Vyomavatī (Vy). The main focus lies on how ??i cognition is treated in these texts and what terms are used in the process. I aim to clarify the analysis of ??i cognition apparent in the above sources and outline the implications this might have for the somewhat grander objective of a mapping of the semantic landscape of cognition and knowledge in Vai?e?ika texts. The categories of yogic perception (yogipratyak?a) and siddhic vision (siddhadar?ana) are also treated since they are included within a shared discourse.     

A Monstrous Inference called Mahāvidyānumāna and Cantor’s Diagonal Argument

A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipak?a) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.     

Police Strategies and Suspect Responses in Real-Life Serious Crime Interviews

This research focuses exclusively on real-life taped interviews with serious crime suspects and examines the strategies used and types of questions asked by police, and suspects’ responses to these. The information source was audio-tape-recorded interviews with 56 suspects. These recordings were obtained from 11 police services across England and Wales and were analysed using a specially designed coding frame. It was found that interviewers employed a range of strategies with presentation of evidence and challenge the most frequently observed. Closed questions were by far the most frequently used, and open questions, although less frequent, were found to occur more during the opening phases of the interviews. The frequency of ineffective question types (e.g. negative, repetitive, multiple) was low. A number of significant associations were observed between interviewer strategies and suspect responses. Rapport/empathy and open-type questions were associated with an increased likelihood of suspects admitting the offence whilst describing trauma, and negative questions were associated with a decreased likelihood.     

Dignāga,Kumārila and Dharmakīrti on the Potential Problem of pramāṇa and phala Having Different Objects

Following Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, PS I 9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness (svasa?vitti) is the result (phala) of a means of valid cognition (pramā?a). It has also been understood that Dignāga (in I 8cd and I 9) accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramā?aphala: in PS(V) ad I 8cd he regards the cognition of an external object (arthādhigati) as the result; in PS(V) ad I 9ab–cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the result. Dignāga’s text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. In fact Dignāga (in I 8cd and I 9cd) presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the cognition of an external object (arthādhigati) is the result. In I 9ab (svasa?vitti? phala? vātra) he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas. Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the (essentially internal) image of object. He assumes that the objects of pramā?a and phala, both being external objects, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna (not svasa?vitti) is the phala, Kumārila (?V pratyak?a 79cd) points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramā?a and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized (PV III 348b: arthātmā na d??yate) and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasa?vitti (and not bāhyārthajñāna) is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature (PV III 350c: svabhāvacintāyām), i.e. in the paramārtha level, svasa?vitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthani?caya is the phala. Thus, Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasa?vitti is the phala.     

Sāṃkhya and Yoga: Towards an Integrative Approach

Sā?khya and yoga are normally discussed either as topics in philosophy or as subjects of historical and philological inquiry. In this paper, I will attempt to demonstrate that, before separate developments appeared in the areas of both sā?khya and yoga (or perhaps at the same time as these separate developments appeared), at least some brahmins seemed to have espoused the idea that any physical exertion (tapas) or harnessing to a specific task (yoga) had to be preceded by an intellectual approach to reality and possibly by a thorough enumeration of its principles (sa?khyā). I come at this question from three different angles. I first analyze Kapila’s actions in the Sagara episode. The double presence of a yogācārya and a sā?khyācārya in certain cosmogonies provides a second approach to the question. The third angle will be a study of the significance of a coordinated emphasis on kratu and dak?a in the Vedic context. These apparently disconnected themes actually point in a single direction, and they contribute to an understanding of sā?khya and yoga as linked together as a binary pair of complementary attitudes (which, of course, does not preclude their separate development in other contexts).     

Effects of Mental Strength Training for Police Officers: a Three-Wave Quasi-experimental Study

Police officers are frequently confronted with various stressors that may affect their mental health. Psychological resilience may protect against these effects. For this purpose, a Mental Strength Training (MST) was developed by the Dutch Police Academy aimed at psychological resilience enhancement. The present three-wave study examined efficacy of this training using a quasi-experimental study design among police officers (N ^Total ?=?305, n ^Experimenal ?=?138, n ^Comparison ?=?167). Additionally, we compared between officers in the experimental and comparison group recently confronted with a potentially traumatic event (N ^Total ?=?170, n ^Experimenal ?=?74, n ^Comparison ?=?96). Questionnaires on resilience (Mental Toughness Questionnaire-48 (MTQ-48) and Resilience Scale-nl (RS-nl)), mental health disturbances (Symptoms CheckList 90-R (SCL-90-R) and Self-Rating Inventory for PTSD (SRIP)), were administered pre-training, and about 3 and 9 months post-training. Mixed-effects models showed training effects on Interpersonal Confidence. Similar analyses among officers with recent potentially traumatic event experience showed significant training effects for the RS-nl subscale of Acceptance of Self and Life, MTQ-48 total score, and the MTQ-48 subscale of Interpersonal Confidence. However, all effects yielded small effect sizes according to Cohen’s d, and are therefore of limited practical relevance. Officer’s appraisal of training benefits on resilience enhancement was largely negative. We found no indications that 4-day training substantially improved officer’s psychological resilience or mental health.     

Associations Between Police Work Stressors and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms: Examining the Moderating Effects of Coping

The role of coping in the association between stress and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is not clear. We investigated the effects of active and passive coping strategies on the associations between police stress (administrative and organization pressure, physical and psychological threats, and lack of support) and PTSD symptoms in 342 police officers. Linear regression model was used in the analyses. The association between physical and psychological stress and PTSD symptoms was stronger in officers who used lower active coping (B?=?4.34, p?<?0.001) compared to those who utilized higher active coping (p_-interaction?=?0.027) (B?=?1.79, p?≤?0.003). A similar result was found between lack of support and PTSD symptoms (p_-interaction?=?0.016) (lower active coping, B?=?5.70, p?<?0.001; higher active coping, B?=?3.33, p?<?0.001), but was not significantly different comparing the two groups regarding the association between administrative and organizational pressure and PTSD symptoms (p_-interaction?=?0.376). Associations of total stress, administrative and organizational pressure, and physical and psychological stressors with PTSD symptoms were significantly stronger in officers who utilized higher passive coping (p_-interaction?=?0.011, 0.030, and 0.023, respectively). In conclusion, low active or high passive coping methods may exacerbate the effect of work stress on PTSD symptoms.     

Reducing Intimate Partner Violence Among Latinas Through the Moms’ Empowerment Program: an Efficacy Trial

Although intimate partner violence (IPV) is a particularly prevalent public health concern among Latina populations, the evidence-based treatment options for Latinas who experience IPV are limited. The present study tested the efficacy of the Moms’ Empowerment Program (MEP), an intervention for Spanish-speaking Latina mothers who had recently experienced IPV. Participants (N?=?95) were assigned to a Treatment (n?=?55) or a waitlist Control (n?=?40) condition, and those in the Treatment group completed a 10-week intervention designed to address the problems associated with IPV. Intent-to-treat analyses using multiple regression revealed that Latinas’ participation in the MEP was associated with reductions in IPV exposure. These findings provide preliminary evidence that the MEP may reduce exposure to physical violence among Spanish-speaking Latinas.