刑事人身辨认证据种类辨析及相关证据规则的适用

2012年3月14日,全国人大通过了经过全面修改的《刑事诉讼法》,在新《刑事诉讼法》中,辨认笔录第一次以法定证据的形式出现在了我国的刑事立法中.随后出台的配套司法解释以《刑事诉讼法》为依据,构建了较为完备的人身辨认证据规则体系,这改变了长期以来辨认笔录作为证据于法无据、作为侦查线索运用混乱的失范局面,是一个显著的进步.但规范层面的概念界定并没有完全消除理论上对于人身辨认证据种类方面的争论,人身辨认在证明对象、心理机制和证明方式上与相关言词证据千丝万缕的联系为人身辨认证据规则的适用增加了困难.因此,有必要从人身辨认证据种类界定入手,探究辨认证据在证据规则适用上的特殊问题,力图强化辨认证据的审查判断,以降低错误辨认的可能性及其对案件实体结果的不利影响.     

A comparison of Chinese judges' and US judges' knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony

Abstract

We surveyed 170 Chinese judges about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of 160 US judges. Although the Chinese judges were less knowledgeable than the US judges, both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony, including for such important issues as whether lay people can distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. Unlike the US judges, greater knowledge of eyewitness factors for the Chinese judges was not related to beliefs that may be necessary to reduce eyewitness error. Compared to the US judges, the Chinese judges were much less likely to believe that they needed additional eyewitness training and that they knew more about eyewitness testimony than lay persons. We also discuss the impact of culture, legal systems, investigative procedures, and judges' function on the Chinese judges' responses, and the legal reforms that China may need to implement to reduce eyewitness error.     

Attribution of crime motives biases eyewitnesses’ memory and sentencing decisions

In court, the basic expectation is that eyewitness accounts are solely based on what the witness saw. Research on post-event influences has shown that this is not always the case and memory distortions are quite common. However, potential effects of an eyewitness’ attributions regarding a perpetrator’s crime motives have been widely neglected in this domain. In this paper, we present two experiments (N?=?209) in which eyewitnesses were led to conclude that a perpetrator’s motives for a crime were either dispositional or situational. As expected, misinformation consistent with an eyewitness’ attribution of crime motives was typically falsely recognised as true whereas inconsistent misinformation was correctly rejected. Furthermore, a dispositional vs. situational attribution of crime motives resulted in more severe (mock) sentencing supporting previous research. The findings are discussed in the context of schema-consistent biases and the effect of attributions about character in a legal setting.     

Opinions of attorneys and law enforcement personnel on the accuracy of eyewitnes identifications

A survey was conducted to obtain the opinions of attorneys and law enforcement personnel regarding several important aspects of eyewitness evidence: (1) legal procedures concerning eyewitness evidence; (2) estimated frequency of mistaken eyewitness identification; (3) the effects of certain witness/ suspect characteristics on identification accuracy; (4) the amount of emphasis placed on eyewitness evidence by judges and juries; (5) the relationship between a witness' identification accuracy and certainty; and (6) the effect of stress and arousal on identification accuracy. The questionnaire was sent to a sample of defense and prosecuting attorneys in each of Florida's 20 Judicial Circuits, to each of the 67 county Sheriff's Departments in Florida, and to 100 randomly sampled Police Departments in Florida. Prosecuting attorneys and law enforcement officers indicated that they regard eyewitness identification as relatively accurate and that judges and juries appropriately emphasize its importance. Defense attorneys, on the other hand, felt that eyewitness identifications are often inaccurate and are overemphasized by triers of fact. The implications of these findings for the criminal justice system and their possible applications within the legal system are discussed.     

The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence and Judicial Instruction on Juror Ability to Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony

It has been argued that psychologists should provide expert evidence to help jurors discriminate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifications. In this article we compare the effects of judicial instruction with expert evidence that is either congruent or incongruent with the ground truth, focusing on juror ability to evaluate “real” eyewitness evidence. In contrast to studies which have employed “fictional” eyewitness designs, we found no appreciable effect of either congruent or incongruent expert evidence on participant-juror sensitivity to eyewitness accuracy. We discuss the role of methodology on the inferences and conclusions that can be made regarding the impact of eyewitness expert evidence.     

Ten years in the life of an expert witness

American Courts are experiencing increased use of expert testimony based upon psychological research. Ten years ago, I began testifying about my own research on human perception, recollection, and eyewitness accounts. The growing acceptance of this testimony percipitated a backlash from some psychologists. This essay describes the chronology of these events, and their relevance for the more general use of psychological research as evidence in court.     

Effects of Experiencing the Eyewitness Identification Procedure on Juror Decisions

Mistaken eyewitness identifications are believed to contribute to a preponderance of wrongful convictions, underscoring the need to identify methods to help decrease the likelihood of false convictions based on eyewitness testimony. The present study tested the hypothesis that providing jurors with first-hand experience with eyewitness identification procedures could help further sensitize them to the limitations of eyewitness testimony. Eighty college students watched a videotaped mock trial in which the prosecution’s sole evidence was eyewitness testimony. In a 2 × 2 randomized factorial design, we manipulated whether participants heard expert psychological testimony (henceforth referred to as expert testimony) on the limitations of eyewitness identification and whether they experienced an eyewitness identification procedure. As predicted, experiencing the eyewitness identification procedure had a significant impact on juror decisions, suggesting that this procedure could further help reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions.     

When Children are the Least Vulnerable to False Memories: A True Report or a Case of Autosuggestion?

In this case report, a legal case revolving around the reliability of statements given by a 6‐year‐old girl is described. She claimed to have witnessed her mother being murdered by her father. Two psychological experts provided diametrically opposed opinions about the reliability of her statements. One expert, a clinician, opined that the girl's statements were based on autosuggestion whereas the other expert, a memory researcher, stated that autosuggestion was unlikely to have played a role. This case and the analysis of the experts' opinions illustrate what may happen when experts in court are unaware of the recent literature on (false) memory. That is, recent studies show that autosuggestion is less likely to occur in young children than in older children and adults. The current case stresses the importance and implications of relying on memory experts in cases concerning the reliability of eyewitness statements.     

Two conjectures about the issue of expert testimony

This article responds to concerns about expert testimony in experimental psychology by conjectur that disagreements about the propriety of the testimony are camouflaged arguments about the strength of psychological knowledge. Differences between proponents and opponents of expert testimony are about the state of psychological knowledge and certainty, rather than about the proper standard for psychologists to use when deciding whether to testify. A second conjecture is stimulated by the assumption that laypersons generally overvalue eyewitness testimony and that expert psychological testimony is a required corrective. The truth of this assumption rests on the debatable assertions that eyewitness identifications, without more, are potent sole determinants of trial outcome, and that lay juries need instruction from experimental psychologists about aspects of human behavior of which the jurors are definitive producers and consumers. One need not resolve these debates in order to understand that psychologists should not rely on the legal community to set the psychologists' standards for expert testimony. And psychologists, in considering their role as courtroom experts, should guard against a self-serving critique of the acumen of lay juries.     

Effects of expert psychological advice on human performance in judging the validity of eyewitness testimony

A review is made of recent experimental research regarding how well human observers can judge the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. It is concluded that people: (a) may be overwilling to believe in the accuracy of eyewitnesses' memory; (b) rely too heavily on the confidence of eyewitnesses in judging the validity of testimony; (c) fail to adequately account for witnessing conditions across crimes; and (d) cannot discriminate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses within crimes. New data are reported from an experiment designed to test the effects that expert psychological advice has on subject-jurors' performance with regard to these four deficiencies. The results showed that expert advice served to eliminate the overbelief bias and greatly reduced subject-jurors' reliance on the confidence of the witnesses. Expert, advice did not improve the extent to which subject-jurors took account of the witnessing conditions across crimes nor their ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses within crimes.     

A NATIONAL SURVEY OF US POLICE ON PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF IDENTIFICATION LINEUPS

A great deal of research has been aimed at identifying the factors that produce errors in eyewitness identification. However, most of this work has been conducted in laboratory environments using undergraduates and naive lay persons as research participants. Little information is available on what police officers do in the course of their identification activities. The present research investigated the procedures that police officers report employing when constructing and administering eyewitness identification lineups. We developed a survey that addresses a number of these issues, including experience, sources of lineup foils, lineup formation and display, lineup fairness evaluation, presence of suspect's attorney, witness instructions, historical records, and legal challenges. Surveys were sent to 500 US police jurisdictions; 220 were returned. Several survey items showed results consistent with previous laboratory research, however police officers reported using some procedures that are different from those established as most effective in the research literature. This paper summarizes the results of our survey and discusses the implications for future research and forensic procedures.     

Social science in court

This article discusses the role of social science in legal proceedings with special attention to the ethical situation of the expert psychologist asked to testify about the reliability of an eyewitness identification. It argues that in this area as in others one cannot discuss the ethics of expert psychological testimony without attending to the quality of the research and theory on which the testimony is based. It also identifies as considerations that bear on the propriety of such testimony the information the fact finder is likely to receive in its absence and the factual guilt of the defendant. The paper goes on to discuss the relationship between law and social science more generally. It argues that ultimately courts do and should have the last word regarding the place of social science in legal proceedings.     

Psychological factors in eyewitness identifications

It has been suggested that incorrect eyewitness identifications have led to more miscarriages of justice than all other factors combined. Several issues which are likely to affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications are discussed. Research on the impact of race on identifications has illustrated an “own-race bias” in identification accuracy, but it is not yet clear to what extent this bias is related to racial prejudice or amount of cross-racial experience. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that eyewitnesses who are more certain of their identifications are more likely to be correct, research on this issue has yielded mixed results. Because of its fallible nature, some writers have argued that eyewitness evidence should be used sparingly or not at all in the judicial process. Other suggestions highlight procedures for minimizing bias and providing legal safeguards for the suspect during the identification process, or educating jurors about the potential fallibility of eyewitness evidence by means of judge's cautionary jury instructions or by the use of researchers as expert witnesses. Controversial issues concerning researchers as expert witnesses are discussed.     

Can experts help jurors to evaluate eyewitness evidence? A review of eyewitness expert effects

Courts occasionally permit psychologists to present expert evidence in an attempt to help jurors evaluate eyewitness identification evidence. This paper reviews research assessing the impact of this expert evidence, which we argue should aim to increase jurors' ability to discriminate accurate from inaccurate identifications. With this in mind we identify three different research designs, two indirectly measuring the expert's impact on juror discrimination accuracy and one which directly assesses its effect on this measure. Across a total of 24 experiments, three have used the superior direct methodology, only one of which provides evidence that expert testimony can improve jurors' ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifications.     

Courtroom testimony by psychologists on eyewitness identification issues

This article makes two major points in regard to expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. First, the attention devoted by psychologists to eyewitness identification issues is far out of proportion to the incidence of trials involving eyewitness identifications of criminal defendants; furthermore, the often-expressed concern over wrongful convictions is probably misplaced. Second, the experimental methods used in studies of eyewitness performance are fundamentally unsuited for drawing conclusions about actual witnesses. Hence, there is not an adequate scientific foundation for expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. Archival research is perhaps the most promising approach to the study of the criminal justice system.