Post‐ministerial occupation in advanced industrial democracies: Ambition,individual resources and institutional opportunity structures

The post‐office occupation of former cabinet members remains basically unexplored in both single‐case and comparative studies. Is being a minister just a career tout court, or does serving in executive office facilitate movement to other positions? This article sheds new light on this question by advancing the theoretical development and empirical understanding of the various types of post‐ministerial occupation. The analysis takes into account ex‐ministers’ ambition, political capital resources and the institutional opportunity structures that might well affect both ambition and individual resources. Additionally, given that access to executive office is profoundly gendered, the article addresses the central question of whether post‐ministerial occupations similarly present differential patterns for women and men. The empirical results of a cross‐national comparison of 23 advanced industrial democracies show that, for most departing ministers, serving in executive office is indeed a stepping stone to other positions. Post‐office trajectories are not only shaped by ex‐ministers’ political capital resources such as seniority, party office, policy expertise and type of portfolio held while in cabinet, but also by different institutional factors that present country‐specific combinations. Specifically, systemic variables shape the relevance of political capital resources and affect how ambition is constructed and towards which goals. Strong gendered post‐office patterns are not found, although some intriguing gender differences are observed.     

An Empirical Analysis on the Determinants of the Length of Ministerial Tenure in Korea, 1980–2008

ABSTRACT

The study of the length of ministerial tenure has received some attention by scholars of public management in Western countries. Responding to the lack of empirical research on ministerial duration in non-Western countries, this article empirically examines the determinants of ministerial duration based on the Korean Ministerial Database from 1980 to 2008. The empirical findings are as follows. First, being a female minister decreases the probability of stepping down by 1.78 times compared to a male minister. Second, political democratization after 1987 drastically increases the probability of ministerial stepping down by 3.46 times. Third, confirmation hearings after 2005 decrease the probability of ministerial stepping down by 0.53 times. Based on these empirical findings of the analysis, we can identify distinctive characteristics of ministerial duration in Korea. We argue that as the Korean political system shifts from military or authoritarian rule to democratic rule after 1987, a single five-year presidential term may set a political environment for frequent changes of ministers to allocate political spoils.     

MINISTERIAL ADVISERS: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE WHITLAM GOVERNMENT*

Abstract: Following the election of the Whitlam government in December 1972 changes in the composition, work and style of ministers' offices were substantial. Evaluations of the emerging pattern conflicted, often quite sharply. This paper surveys the pattern of staffing introduced by Labor and examines in particular the roles of ministerial officers as political and policy advisers. The paper also discusses recent experiences with ministerial staff in the United Kingdom and Canada, and makes brief reference to the use of ministerial staff by the Fraser government. Assessing the effectiveness of ministerial advisers is not easy. No straight forward measures of effectiveness exist. It is argued that, despite the ambitions of some ministerial staff during the Whitlam government, the role of ministerial advisers was essentially limited and confined. Ministers found them useful but few found them overwhelmingly so. While the Fraser government has reduced the number and visibility of ministerial staff it has retained the institutional underpinning of Labor's system. In the search for ways of assisting political parties to govern and to respond to changing situations, it is likely that ministerial staff with ability to advise on policy will receive further attention in the future.     

The study of Western European cabinets

Abstract. We are still relatively unfamiliar with the structures and modes of behaviour of Western European cabinets and we need first to identify the range of the differences which exist with respect to two major dimensions along which cabinet governments can be located (collective v. hierarchical decision-making and political representation v. administrative and/or specialist skills). A valuable test can be obtained by considering in detail the cases of a number of countries in which the traditions of cabinet government are known to be different from those of the British model, both because of the existence of coalitions and because of specific traditions of 'administrative' and even 'bureaucratic' government. Marked variations emerge with respect to four elements: ministerial expertise, the large autonomy of ministers, the authority of the prime minister or chancellor, and the relatively limited influence of the council of ministers as a deliberative body. Cabinet government is a flexible machinery which has given rise to a number of different models corresponding to different traditions and to different conditions in which the political system operates.     

Horizontal coordination in cooperative federalism: The purpose of ministerial conferences in Germany

ABSTRACT

Intergovernmental councils in Germany comprise 18 sectoral ministerial conferences and the prime ministerial conference as peak organization. They complement the Bundesrat as institutions of Intergovernmental Relations in the German system of cooperative federalism, dealing with matters of shared rule as well as self-rule. Based on expert interviews among ministerial bureaucrats, this contribution finds that contrary to conventional wisdom, vertical influence and autonomy protection are not their main purpose. Rather, they serve primarily information exchange and coordination. Still, the emphasis on either influence and autonomy protection or coordination and information as well as the directions of interaction vary across policy sectors. We further investigate constitutional allocation of power and party political composition as determinants on the specific purpose of ministerial conferences. The findings suggest that the allocation of power is more important than party political composition in explaining variation between sectoral ministerial conferences.     

Exploring the Determinants of the Entry and Exit of Ministers in Korea: 1980–2008

The entry and exit of ministers has been of primary interest to students of political science and public management in Western countries. Responding to the lack of research on the entry and exit of ministers in non‐Western countries, this article examined determinants of both the entrance and exit of ministers in Korea from the life cycle point of view based on the Korean Ministerial Database from 1980 to 2008. We argued that as the Korean presidency shifts from an imperialistic to a democratic presidency, ministerial appointments in Korea also seem to shift from an expertise‐focused to a politics‐focused approach. Likewise, the primary resignation reason also shifts from policy failure to political reasons. We also argued that Korean presidents use their power to reshuffle cabinet ministers too often for their political interests. As a result, Korean ministers spend too little time in post; average tenure is now down to about one year. These short terms in office dilute a minister's ability to dictate departmental policy.     

Political Leadership and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Effects of Agencification

Previous studies have shown that agencification tends to reduce political control within a government portfolio. However, doubts have been raised as regards to the robustness of these findings. In this article we document that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding holds when we control for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas, and officials' rank. Simultaneously we observe that the three control variables all have an independent effect on officials' attentiveness to a steer from above. In addition we find that the more organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. We apply large-N questionnaire data at three points in time, spanning two decades and shifting administrative doctrines.     

Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers

Abstract. Delegation from cabinet to ministers is complicated because the cabinet consists of the same ministers that are supposed to act as its agents. In the extreme case ministers are completely autonomous within their portfolio. This paper argues that the resulting potential for agency loss is limited, but not negated, by both hierarchy and collective decision–making in cabinet, or by establishing direct delegation relationships between legislative committees or political parties and ministers, bypassing the government. Appointments to ministerial office are the prevailing exception to ministerial autonomy. To the extent that ministerial preferences are not stable and exogenous, screening before appointments is an ineffective control, and ministerial identification with departmental interests is the most probable source of agency loss.     

Too Many or Too Few? The Increase in Federal Ministerial Advisers 1972–1999

This paper examines recently published figures that show the increase in ministerial staff between 1972 and 1996 (Dunn 1997). A careful examination of the table in Dunn's book reveals it gives a misleading impression of the number of ministerial staff; the number of advisory staff to ministers; and the growth in advisory resources over the Hawke–Keating period. By re-analysing the figures the paper reveals the reality of the growth in advisory staff to ministers in 1972–1999. It provides an account of the number of staff providing policy and political advice to ministers in ministerial offices, rather than total staff numbers. It reveals advisory resources to ministers have grown significantly since the introduction of ministerial advisers in 1972. However, the growth in adviser numbers over the Hawke–Keating period was more modest than is suggested by Dunn's table. The paper provides the base data needed for a discussion of the increase in ministerial staff and whether there are too few or too many federal ministerial advisers.     

MINISTERIAL STAFF IN AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT

Abstract: This study examines the ministerial staff in Australian commonwealth government to discover what they do and how they assist ministers in achieving political control of departments. The data consist of interviews with ministers, departmental secretaries and ministerial staff. The study finds that ministerial staff offer policy advice in much the same way as found by James Walter in his study almost a decade before this one. But there does appear to be more emphasis on monitoring departmental implementation of policy and brokering positions within government than was the case in the earlier study. The study concludes that the relationship between ministers and their offices and the departmental secretaries is characterised by a conditionally cooperative approach, which is similar to that recommended by several public administration scholars.     

MINISTERIAL STAFF UNDER HAWKE

Abstract: The establishment by the present Labor government of an advisory panel on ministerial staff appointments is discussed. It is suggested that this procedure had political benefits, but did not significantly influence the composition of the ministerial staff group. The ministerial staff of the ALP government are described and compared with those of the previous ALP government 1972-75, and of the Liberal-National Party coalition government 1975-83. It is found that there has been a weakening of the bureaucratic element in this government's private offices compared with both the coalition government and the previous Labor government. The ascendance of "political types" is matched by a commitment to the party program and a high estimate among staffers of their contribution to the policy-making process. In other respects this group shares with its predecessors the characteristics of being mostly male, relatively young, highly educated and disproportionately from non-government schools. About half are from inside and half from outside the public service.     

Ministerial Advisers and the Politics of Policy‐Making: Bureaucratic Permanence and Popular Control

The advent of ministerial advisers of the partisan variety – a third element interposing itself into Westminster's bilateral monopoly – has been acknowledged as a significant development in a number of jurisdictions. While there are commonalities across contexts, the New Zealand experience provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which the advent of ministerial advisers is consistent with rational choice accounts of relations between political and administrative actors in executive government. Public administration reform in New Zealand since the mid 1980s – and in particular machinery of government design – was quite explicitly informed by rational choice accounts, and normative Public Choice in particular. This article reflects on the role of ministerial advisers in the policy‐making process and, on the basis of assessments by a variety of political and policy actors, examines the extent to which the institutional and relational aspects of executive government are indeed consistent with rational choice accounts of the ‘politics of policy‐making’. The reader is offered a new perspective through which to view the advent, and the contribution of ministerial advisers to policy‐making in executive government.     

Disentangling Concepts of Ministerial Responsibility

Debates on ministerial responsibility have too often gone around in circles. The application of the principle is related to the incidence of resignations; analysis considers the reasons given for resignation or, rather more often, the reasons given for not resigning. The usual conclusions are that ministers resign occasionally when their personal involvement is unquestioned and when the prime minister determines that the political costs are less to let the minister go. But the ideas remain at a broad level because they relate to all the ministerial activities. This article seeks to disentangle these concepts, developing the ideas in Thompson and Tillotsen's article in this symposium, to see if a different set of concepts can better define this old notion.     

Ministerial Leadership and Endorsement of Bureaucrats: Experimental Evidence from Presidential Governments

Scholars have debated what constitutes effective ministerial leadership with respect to administrative competence versus political influence. The authors contribute experimental evidence to this debate through a unique survey design of endorsement experiments. Using original data from 949 national civil servants in South Korea, this article examines civil servants’ assessments of ministerial leadership in three central dimensions of public management: internal management, interbranch coordination, and policy formulation/implementation. Further, existing variation in the characteristics of agencies is used to test whether such variation induces systematic differences in civil servants’ responses. Findings show that that civil servants’ attitudes toward ministerial leadership are asymmetric in nature. Ministers with civil service backgrounds are endorsed in all three dimensions, whereas ministers with legislative backgrounds receive increased support only for interbranch coordination skills. The levels of support for ministers with different backgrounds also vary across agency types. This analysis has implications for public management practice and agency control in presidential governments.     

Responsibility attribution in coalition governments: Evidence from Germany

Models of coalition governance suggest that political parties pursue the interests of their electorate through the ministerial control of policy in their portfolios. Yet, little is known whether voters reward or punish coalition parties for policy performance in their portfolios. This study investigates voters’ evaluations of the policy priorities of coalition parties and their responsibility attribution in twenty policy areas using survey data from Germany. Specifically, we investigate whether voters attribute policy responsibility equally across coalition parties, along the jurisdictional lines of ministerial portfolios, or to the dominant party in the coalition. Our findings suggest that party size, prime minister status, and ministerial portfolios are decisive for responsibility attribution.     

The Push and Pull of Ministerial Resignations in Germany, 1969–2005

When and why are cabinet ministers forced out of office? We argue that ministerial resignations cannot be understood as mechanistic consequences of serious personal or departmental errors as the classical responsibility hypothesis implies. Rather, they follow a systematic political logic. Cabinet ministers have to resign whenever the prime minister perceives the political costs of a minister staying in office to be higher than the benefits of keeping the status quo. We test this argument with resignation events in Germany in the period 1969 to 2005. Based on detailed data collection, we find 111 resignation events, i.e. serious public discussions about a cabinet minister's future, 14 of which ended in resignation. These data are analysed employing statistical as well as Qualitative Comparative Analysis based on Boolean algebra to detect patterns of ministerial resignations.     

Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives

According to the literature on parliamentary government, legislatures provide political parties with veto and amendment rights, which counterbalance executive power. This institutional feature is also said to help overcome ministerial “drift” within coalition governments. While this literature has focused on the situation of an unconstrained environment of parliamentary government, the European Union’s Member States continuously delegate policy competencies to Brussels, whose directives must in turn be transposed into national law to take effect. Because the minister in charge enjoys informational advantages and has the sole right to begin the process of implementing directives, he can completely control the agenda in this constrained environment. We evaluate the empirical implications of a ministerial gatekeeping model by investigating the (in)activities of 15 countries with respect to 2,756 EU directives adopted between December 1978 and November 2009. Our findings show that partisan ministerial approval is necessary to start the implementation process which conditions the counterbalancing response of parliaments. Accordingly, the delegation of policy competencies to the European Union changes the power relationship in parliamentary governments and increases the risk of partisan ministerial drift.     

Accuracy and Bias in Perceptions of Political Knowledge

Learning through social communication is promoted when citizens are able to identify which of their associates is likely to possess the necessary political information. This paper examines the factors that influence individuals’ evaluations of political expertise. Actual political expertise plays a large role in perceived expertise, but mistakes are made. These are largely the result of assuming that those engaged in politics must also be knowledgeable about politics. This paper uses the 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study and the 2000 National Election Study to identify factors that bias levels of perceived political knowledge. The paper concludes by demonstrating that perceived expertise plays a larger role than actual expertise in the social influence process.