How Bureaucracies Listen to Courts: Bureaucratized Calculations and European Law

The European Court of Justice, and courts in general, were key actors in the creation of the European Union (EU). However, they cannot change major policy without political supporters to lobby and litigate for implementation. We argue that part of the resolution of this apparent paradox comes from complementing existing work on the activities of EU courts and litigants with a focus on a third actor: implementing bureaucracies, whose effect on law and politics has not been a focus of studies of EU legal development. Their calculations about whether to pay attention, lobby, and comply shape the impact of the law. Those calculations are variable and patterned; when and how bureaucracies listen to courts varies in predictable ways. We find evidence for this proposition in the case of EU health care services law, both in the secondary literature and in empirical studies of France and Spain.     

Business as Usual? Bail Decision Making and “Micro Politics” in an Australian Magistrates Court

Between the 1970s and 1990s, political scientists in the United States pursued a distinctive research program that employed ethnographic methods to study micro politics in criminal courts. This article considers the relevance of this concept for court researchers today through a case study about bail decision making in a lower criminal court in Australia. It describes business as usual in how decisions are made and the provision of pretrial services. It also looks at how traditionalists and reformers understood business as usual, and uses this as a critical concept to make visible micro politics in this court. The case study raises issues about organizational change in criminal courts since the 1990s, since there are fewer studies about plea bargaining and more about specialist or problem‐solving courts. It is suggested that we need a new international agenda that can address change and continuity in criminal courts.     

Law and American Political Development

This essay reviews the recent volume edited by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, The Supreme Court and American Political Development (2006), as well as the broader literature by law scholars interested in American Political Development (APD). The Law and APD literature has advanced our knowledge about courts by placing attention on the importance of executive and legislative actors, and by providing political context to our understanding of judicial decision making. But this knowledge would be more powerful if it would embrace the broader APD field's orientation toward the importance of state and institutional autonomy for understanding politics and political change. Law and APD scholars could go further in examining the ways in which courts and judges act institutionally, and how the legal branch as an institution impacts American politics and state-building. In doing so, Law and APD scholars would contribute not only to our understanding of judicial decision making but also to our understanding of the place and importance of courts in American politics.     

Contested Terrains and Regime Politics: Thinking about America's Trial Courts and Institutional Change

Institutional change in America's trial courts is poorly understood. Herbert Jacob in his 1982 presidential address to the Law and Society Association recommended that future research might consider intensive studies of single courts over time to trace the causal links between the courts and sociopolitical events outside the courtrooms. This essay explores Jacob's recommendation but ultimately takes a different tack. Instead of conducting natural histories of particular trial courts, this essay speculates that trial courts can be viewed as contested terrains made up of various sites. Proponents of particular ideas, interests, and institutions struggle to impose their policy preferences on these sites. These disputes, which wax and wane over time, constitute the regime politics that shape the probabilities of who wins in America's trial courts. The outlines of this perspective are sketched using the political science literature on agenda politics and on how policy ideas become institutionalized. Illustrations of this perspective are drawn from studies of civil and criminal court reforms.     

Realizing the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the American State

The implementation and enforcement of civil rights laws in the aftermath of the mid‐twentieth‐century rights revolution has been a prominent concern for a multidisciplinary group of scholars. This article reviews a recent literature that is devoted to better understanding the dynamics of judicial authority and enforcement power and, in particular, how courts are frequently empowered to enforce laws through complex interactions with an array of public and private actors. The article emphasizes new books by Charles Epp and Sean Farhang, which each examine different features of this enforcement process. In The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. (2010), Farhang explores the frequency with which Congress has chosen to enforce its civil rights statutes through incentivizing private litigation. In Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats, and the Creation of the Legalistic State (2010), Epp examines how civil rights are enforced and transformed through the relationship between administrators, activists, and lawmakers within bureaucratic organizations. Together, these books expand our understanding of the politics and processes of implementing rights in practice and, more broadly, challenge and enrich our perspective on the effectiveness of the American state in enforcing rights. The often complex series of self‐conscious legislative, judicial, and administrative choices and interactions necessary in order to deliver rights protections requires that we view policy enforcement from a broader institutional and political perspective. From that perspective, we can see that effective implementation is far from automatic.     

Movement Litigation and Unilateral Disarmament: Abortion and the Right to Die

Detractors have long criticized the use of courts to achieve social change because judicial victories tend to provoke counterproductive political backlashes. Backlash arguments typically assert or imply that if movement litigators had relied on democratic rather than judicial politics, their policy victories would have been better insulated from opposition. We argue that these accounts wrongly assume that the unilateral decision by a group of movement advocates to eschew litigation will lead to a reduced role for courts in resolving the relevant policy and political conflicts. To the contrary, such decisions will often result in a policy field with judges every bit as active, but with the legal challenges initiated and framed by the advocates' opponents. We document this claim and explore its implications for constitutional politics via a counterfactual thought experiment rooted in historical case studies of litigation involving abortion and the right to die.     

法院政治功能的学理疏释

现代的法院制度与古代的相比,其区别主要不在于法院纯司法功能的变化,而在于司法与政治关系发生了实质性的嬗变。法院作为国家政治权力架构中的重要一环、法治得以实现的基本机关、民主制度的维持者与裁决者以及人民的法院,就必然要与政治发生关系,具有相应的政治功能,从而在权力分立的政治架构中,通过个案的审理与相关政治行为的判定,发挥着制约其他国家权力,规范权力运行秩序并维护宪政制度的功效。     

The Structure of American Legal Institutions and the Diffusion of Wrongful‐Discharge Laws, 1978–1999

This article evaluates how the social structure of American legal institutions influenced the diffusion of wrongful‐discharge laws over the period 1978–1999, and it assesses whether economic or political variables influenced the diffusion process. The results are surprising and quite striking. Precedents by other courts within the same federal circuit region were generally more influential in the diffusion process than precedents by courts in neighboring states or by courts within the same census or West legal reporting region, even though the precedents were on matters of state law rather than federal law and the decisions were usually made by state courts rather than federal courts. There is some limited evidence that political variables may also have been a factor, but economic variables were not statistically significant, even though the new employment laws may have had important economic consequences.     

Charter rights & health care funding: a typology of Canadian health rights litigation

Canadian health consumers have increasingly relied on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to demand certain therapies and reasonably timely access to care. Organizing these cases into a 5-part typology, we examine how a rights-based discourse affects allocation of health care resources. First, successful Charter challenges can, in theory, lead to courts granting and enforcing positive rights to therapies or to timely care. Second, courts may grant a right to certain health services; however, subsequently government fails to deliver on this right. Third, successful litigation may create negative rights, i.e. rights to access care or private health insurance without government interference. Fourth, consumers can fail in their legal pursuit of a right but galvanize public support in the process, ultimately effecting the desired policy changes. Lastly, a failed lawsuit can stifle an entire advocacy campaign for the sought-after therapies. The typology illustrates the need to examine both legal and policy outcomes of health right litigation. This broader analysis reveals that the pursuit of health rights seems to have caused largely a regressive rather than progressive impact on Canadian Medicare.     

Safety,Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context

The relationship between tort and regulation is dense and complicated. This paper examines diverse approaches to one small element of this relationship: the relationship between regulatory norms and the standard of care in personal injury cases. The lack of clear rules governing that interaction is not surprising: we would never expect the courts to give up the authority (or abdicate the responsibility) to generate private law norms; on the other hand, nor would we expect them to ignore the potential authority and legitimacy of external norms. The strength of external standards is best identified by close scrutiny of the regulation itself. The varying authority of external norms in a private law forum requires engagement with the process by which the external norms were reached. Who and what determined the ‘ought’ of regulation will provide greater insight into the ways in which it should inform the ‘ought’ of tort.     

Law's Allure and an Interbranch Perspective on Law and Politics

This essay views Gordon Silverstein's book Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (2009) from the perspective of the burgeoning interbranch literature on law and courts, which seeks to place judicial decision making within the context of ongoing political and policy-making processes. It argues that Law's Allure reflects the strengths and weaknesses of this literature. On the plus side, it compellingly reinterprets the concept of legal precedent in political terms, showing how the content of judicial decisions serves as an iterative framing mechanism within and across various policy areas. On the downside, it struggles to provide a rigorous framework for analyzing the risks of the juridification of American politics. Despite any weaknesses, its attempt to map different pathways of legalistic court-based policy development in diverse settings represents a useful step for those interested in bringing the study of law and courts back into the core of analyzing American politics and policy making.     

Cost-effectiveness analysis in the courts: recent trends and future prospects

This article provides an initial look at how managed care organizations (MCOs) might incorporate cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) into their decision-making process and how the courts might respond. Because so few medical liability cases directly involve CEA, we must look at other areas of the law to assess potential MCO liability for applying CEA. In general negligence cases, courts rely on a risk-benefit test to determine customary practice. Likewise, in product liability cases, courts use a risk-utility calculus to determine liability for product design defects. And in challenges to government regulation, courts examine how agencies use CEA to set regulatory policy. The results have been mixed. In product liability cases, CEA has led to some punitive damage awards against automobile manufacturers. But courts have integrated it in negligence cases without generating juror antipathy, and generally defer to agency expertise in how to incorporate CEA. The article discusses the implications of these cases for MCO use of CEA and outlines various options for setting the standard of care in the managed care era.     

Congress and the political expansion of the U.S. districts courts

Expanding the number of U.S. district judgeships is often justifiedas a response to expanding caseloads. Increasing judgeshipsduring unified government, however, allows Congress and thePresident to engage in political (patronage and ideological)control of the federal district courts. This paper examinesempirically the relative importance of caseload pressure andpolitical motives for Congress to expand the number of federaldistrict judgeships. We demonstrate that politics dominatesthe timing of judgeship expansion in the U.S. District Courts.We also show that both politics and caseload affect the actualsize of those timed expansions. In particular, we find thatbefore 1970, Congress seemed to have strong political motivationsfor the size of an expansion. After 1970, Congress became muchmore attentive to caseload considerations.     

Popular Constitutionalism's Hard When You're Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to Courts

Through a case study of the early American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), this article examines the empirical ramifications of constitutional scholars' recent exhortations to "take the Constitution away from the courts" in order to promote democratic deliberation about constitutional meaning. While it is now one of the most prominent examples of a litigation-based interest group, the ACLU began its existence demonstrating a commitment to constitutionalism outside the courts. Through coding a decade's worth of meeting minutes and examining archival sources, I demonstrate that the ACLU's mounting unpopularity rendered extrajudicial politics impossible, precipitating the ACLU's shift toward litigation. The ACLU's move toward litigation, despite its early devotion to political activism outside the courts, suggests that it is not always possible for political actors to make constitutional arguments without courts. Furthermore, the ACLU's use of courts to publicize and dramatize its constitutional arguments demonstrates that litigation may actually promote popular deliberation about constitutional meaning. These political realities both highlight and contradict two empirical assumptions underlying arguments about the normative desirability of restricting courts' involvement in constitutional politics. First, the state is not a neutral arena in which all political actors are equally free to pursue their constitutional visions through majoritarian processes. Second, courts may facilitate (rather than hinder) popular deliberation about constitutional questions.     

Policy, Politics, and the Criminal Courts

This case study of criminal process in a middle-sized western city in the United States employs quantitative data, interviews, and library research to explore the politics of criminal process and its impact on the operative policies of the criminal courts from I964 through 1980. The research reveals significant policy change but a very elusive relationship between politics and policy. Judges and prosecutors preserve a significant measure of autonomy for dealing with the bulk of their caseload by giving up much of their independence in those cases that are inescapably politicized. Both judges and prosecutors use this partial political insulation to advance their own versions of criminological wisdom. On the other hand, they are constrained by the prevailing ethos and by institutional limitations to operate well within conventional definitions of crime and criminality—even when those conventional views run counter to their own practical experience.     

Environmental liability under uncertain causation

Recently, the European Commission has issued the “Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental liability”. The Directive extends liability that usually refers to personal injuries and private property to harm where private property does not exist (e.g. biodiversity and endangered species). In these cases, problems with multiple causation and uncertain causation tend to be even more severe than for cases where solely private property is affected. Nevertheless, the otherwise very ambitious Directive remains silent about how to deal with these problems. We focus on uncertain causation and analyze second best optimal standards of proof in a model where benefits of risky activities are private information, and where the firm’s care level chosen to avoid the damage is only imperfectly observable. We derive three results: first, we characterize the factors determining the second best standards. Second, and conversely to the previous literature, high standards of proof such as proof beyond reasonable doubt can be second best optimal even though they lead to inefficiently low care levels. Third, legislators should leave discretionary power to courts which allows them to choose the standard of proof conditional on factors such as the degree of uncertainty over causation or the information quality about care levels as taken by injurers.     

美国司法政治变迁的内在逻辑——从“罗伊案”说开去

美国的司法政治是司法与政治交互作用的产物。随着司法权的扩张,联邦最高法院突破"政治问题不审查"之传统,主动或被动地介入政治争议;随着政党对峙的尖锐,政治力量乐于将棘手的政治争议交由司法裁断;藉此,司法政治演变为常态政治,司法判例成为经久不衰的政治争点。自上个世纪70年代以来,围绕罗伊案半个多世纪的争议,不仅客观地暴露了美国司法政治发展的内在逻辑,而且也充分地展示出司法政治在美国的作用方式和涵摄空间。     

Competitive pricing and the challenge of cost control in medicare

The Medicare program faces a serious challenge: it must find ways to control costs but must do so through a system of congressional oversight that necessarily limits its choices. We look at one approach to prudent purchasing - competitive pricing - that Medicare has attempted many times and in various ways since the beginning of the program, and in all but one case unsuccessfully due to the politics of provider opposition working through Congress and the courts. We look at some related efforts to change Medicare pricing to explore when the program has been successful in making dramatic changes in how it pays for health care. A set of recommendations emerges for ways to respond to the impediments of law and politics that have obstructed change to more efficient payment methods. Except in unusual cases, competitive pricing threatens too many stakeholders in too many ways for key political actors to support it. But an unusual case may arise in the coming Medicare fiscal crisis, a crisis related in part to the prices Medicare pays. At that point, competitive pricing may look less like a problem and more like a solution coming at a time when the system badly needs one.     

‘Playing the Judicial Card’: Litigation Strategies during the Process of Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

During the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a number of constitutional jurisdictions were activated by political actors. In playing ‘the judicial card’, opponents of ratification decided to seek political goals through judicial means, and thus they were obliged to develop litigation strategies. This article explores such strategies and the responses that courts gave them. It shows that constitutional proceedings with regards to the Lisbon Treaty became a political battleground governed by legal logics, in which the interpretation of European clauses, the democratic deficit of the Union and the tensions underlying the European judicial dialogue were privileged objects of discussion between claimants and courts in which law and politics intertwined.     

Claiming the Right to Health in Brazilian Courts: The Exclusion of the Already Excluded?

The aim of this article is to test a widespread belief among Brazilian legal scholars in the area of social rights, namely, the claim that courts are an alternative institutional voice for the poor, who are usually marginalized from the political process. According to this belief, social rights litigation would be a means (supposedly “a better means”) of realizing rights such as the right to health care, since supposedly both the wealthy and the poor have equal access to the courts. To probe the consistency of this belief, we analyzed the socioeconomic profiles of plaintiffs in the city of Sao Paulo (Brazil) who were granted access to specific medications or medical treatments by judicial decisions. In this study, the justiciability of social rights has not proven to be a means of rendering certain public services more democratic and accessible.