Reform, change, and continuity in Finnish health care

This article describes some essential aspects of the Finnish political and governmental system and the evolution of the basic institutional elements of the health care system. We examine the developments that gave rise to a series of health care reforms and reform proposals in the late 1980s and early 1990s and relate them to changes in health care expenditure, structure, and performance. Finally, we discuss the relationship between policy changes, reforms, and health system changes and the strength of neo-institutional theory in explaining both continuity and change. Much of the change in Finnish health care can be explained by institutional path dependency. The tradition of strong but small local authorities and the lack of legitimate democratic regional authorities as well as the coexistence of a dominant Beveridge-style health system with a marginal Bismarckian element explain the specific path of Finnish health care reform. Public responsibility for health care has been decentralized to smaller local authorities (known as municipalities) more than in any other country. Even an exceptionally deep economic recession in the early 1990s did not lead to systems change; rather, the economic imperative was met by the traditional centralized policy pattern. Some of the developments of the 1990s are, however, difficult to explain by institutional theory. Thus, there is a need for testing alternative theories as well.     

Explaining health care system change: problem pressure and the emergence of "hybrid" health care systems

In this article, we will further the explanation of the state's changing role in health care systems belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). We build on our analysis of twenty-three OECD countries, which reveals broad trends regarding governments' role in financing, service provision, and regulation. In particular, we identified increasing similarities between the three system types we delineate as National Health Service (NHS), social health insurance, and private health insurance systems. We argue that the specific health care system type is an essential contributor to these changes. We highlight that health care systems tend to feature specific, type-related deficiencies, which cannot be solved by routine mechanisms. As a consequence, non-system-specific elements and innovative policies are implemented, which leads to the emergence of "hybrid" systems and indicates a trend toward convergence, or increasing similarities. We elaborate this hypothesis in two steps. First, we describe system-specific deficits of each health care system type and provide an overview of major adaptive responses to these deficits. The adaptive responses can be considered as non-system-specific interventions that broaden the portfolio of regulatory policies. Second, we examine diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) as a common approach for financing hospitals efficiently, which are nevertheless shaped by type-specific deficiencies and reform requirements. In the United States' private insurance system, DRGs are mainly used as a means of hierarchical cost control, while their implementation in the English NHS system is to increase productivity of hospital services. In the German social health insurance system, DRGs support competition as a means to control self-regulated providers. Thus, DRGs contribute to the hybridization of health care systems because they tend to strengthen coordination mechanisms that were less developed in the existing health care systems.     

Equity,health, and health care

Equity goals, such as equal treatment for equal need or equality of access, commonly take pride of place among the aims of health policy. But do these conceptions, or others derived from more fundamental philosophical systems such as those of the utilitarians or John Rawls, successfully capture the way in which the term equity is generally used? If not, is it possible to find some interpretation that can command a greater consensus? This paper answers no to the first question and yes to the second. It is argued that the standard conceptions of equity ignore the processes by which health states are determined and hence the extent to which they arise from factors beyond individual control. An alternative conception is proposed that directly incorporates these considerations.     

The labor impacts of policy change in health care: how federal policy transformed home health organizations and their labor practices

Health care organizations are highly labor-intensive; policies designed to stimulate organizational change are likely to have labor impacts. This paper examines the labor effects of policy change in home health care. Major federal home care policy trends since 1980 have spurred the evolution of the typical home care provider toward greater organizational and market rationality. Greater managerial sophistication has introduced changes in management/labor relations. Survey data from the 1986 DRG Impact Study are used to show how the pressure of cost-containment policies has pushed agencies to cut labor costs by increasing workloads, managerial supervision, and control of the work process. Research on the effects of recent policy change in health care has to date focused primarily on potential client effects. Labor impacts are rarely examined and are poorly understood at the time that policy is made. Findings in this article suggest that these issues deserve greater, more systematic attention, because unanticipated labor impacts may prove to be significant impediments to the realization of intended policy goals.     

Medical liability and health care reform

We examine the impact of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on medical liability and the controversy over whether federal medical reform including a damages cap could make a useful contribution to health care reform. By providing guaranteed access to health care insurance at community rates, the ACA could reduce the problem of under-compensation resulting from damages caps. However, it may also exacerbate the problem of under-claiming in the malpractice system, thereby reducing incentives to invest in loss prevention activities. Shifting losses from liability insurers to health insurers could further undermine the already weak deterrent effect of the medical liability system. Republicans in Congress and physician groups both pushed for the adoption of a federal damages cap as part of health care reform. Physician support for damages caps could be explained by concerns about the insurance cycle and the consequent instability of the market. Our own study presented here suggests that there is greater insurance market stability in states with caps on non-economic damages. Republicans in Congress argued that the enactment of damages caps would reduce aggregate health care costs. The Congressional Budget Office included savings from reduced health care utilization in its estimates of cost savings that would result from the enactment of a federal damages cap. But notwithstanding recent opinions offered by the CBO, it is not clear that caps will significantly reduce health care costs or that any savings will be passed on to consumers. The ACA included funding for state level demonstration projects for promising reforms such as offer and disclosure and health courts, but at this time the benefits of these reforms are also uncertain. There is a need for further studies on these issues.     

Special report on health care reform. ERISA preemption, Traveler's and health care reform

Although S. 308 reportedly has some bipartisan support, its passage is by no means certain. ERISA has for years provided employers with the freedom to design their own benefit plans without state interference, as well as the ability to operate such plans in a uniform manner throughout the country. large employers are thus not likely to cede the advantages of ERISA preemption without a battle. When strong business interests are pitted against the states' equally strong interests in enacting health care reforms, the outcome cannot be predicted.