Assuming that the Defendant Is Not Guilty: The Presumption of Innocence in the German System of Criminal Justice

The presumption of innocence is not a presumption but an assumption or legal fiction. It requires agents of the state to treat a suspect or defendant in the criminal process as if he were in fact innocent. The presumption of innocence has a limited field of application. It applies only to agents of the state, and only during the criminal process. The presumption of innocence as such does not determine the amount of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty. In spite of these limits, the presumption of innocence protects suspects and defendants from specific dangers inherent in the criminal process. German procedure law is used to show these areas.     

Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions

This review article of Stumer (The presumption of innocence: evidential and human rights perspectives. Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) explores the concept, normative foundations and institutional implications of the presumption of innocence in English law. Through critical engagement with Stumer’s methodological assumptions and normative arguments, it highlights the narrowness of common lawyers’ traditional conceptions of the presumption of innocence. Picking up the threads of previous work, it also contributes to on-going debates about the legitimacy of reverse onus clauses and their compatibility with European human rights law and general principles of criminal jurisprudence.     

Trusts for Religious Purposes and the Question of Public Benefit

It is a well‐established principle that no trust may be regarded as charitable in law unless carrying out its purposes will benefit the public. Trusts for religious purposes have traditionally been presumed by courts to be for the public benefit. However, the presumption of public benefit will be removed from the law in early 2008 when section 3(2) of the Charities Act 2006 comes into force. At that time, two questions are likely to attract interest. First, to what extent, and in what ways, has the application of a presumption of public benefit assisted courts up to now? Secondly, without the assistance of the presumption, how might courts go about ascertaining whether the public will benefit in future cases? The article takes up these two questions with respect to trusts for religious purposes.     

A Criminal Injustice System? Sex Offender Suspects and Defendants

The purpose of this paper is to open up a discussion regarding the potential shift from the presumption of innocence to a presumption of guilt regarding those suspected of or charged with sexual offending. It is acknowledged that further investigation is needed and it is hoped that this discussion is one of many. The crux of this paper therefore is that sex offender suspects and defendants potentially find themselves in a criminal injustice system. Whilst the focus is predominantly on ‘victims’ (usually female) and people suspected or charged with sexual offending (usually male) within the criminal justice system in England and Wales the concerns articulated here are not confined to this context. For example such concerns are echoed in relation to the potential injustices occurring on American campuses. This demonstrates that this is a domestic and international situation and a situation that extends beyond the criminal justice system. We argue that what is occurring at home and abroad has to be contextualised with regard to public, media and official attitudes and approaches to ‘victims’, suspects, defendants, sex, sexual consent, sexual offending and a subsequent shift from the presumption of innocence to a presumption of guilt. It is argued that not only is the presumption of innocence undermined by the presumption of guilt regarding suspects and defendants in cases of sexual offending, it is also undermined in England and Wales by the victim personal statement (VPS). The VPS contains and promotes the idea that there is a ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ before this has been legally established in a court of law. These assumptions embodied within the VPS weaken the principle and practice of the presumption of innocence. The safeguard of the presumption of innocence is potentially under threat and the result is an even greater potential for miscarriages of justice and wrongful convictions.     

无罪推定原则的意义解读——一种诉讼法哲学分析

无罪推定已经成为现代国家的一项刑事诉讼法原则乃至宪法原则。无罪推定在各国立法例中虽然有肯定式和否定式两种表述方式 ,但其基本内涵却是相同的 ,即 :任何人在没有充分证据证明并由法院判决确定有罪之前 ,应作为无罪公民对待。作为一种关于正义的规范性命题 ,无罪推定原则具有内在的基本特征和诉讼程序规则 ,具有深厚的社会哲学基础和重要的政治法律意义。在建设社会主义法治国家进程中 ,无罪推定原则的进一步发展与完善 ,成为当代中国刑事诉讼法制现代化的迫切需要和时代课题。     

Deference on Questions of Law

Contrary to the modern English position, it may be appropriate for reviewing courts to accord deference to interpretations of law rendered by administrators. There is no basis for the current strong presumption against according such deference. It is possible that the legislature intended to delegate the resolution of many questions of law to administrators, rather than to courts. Moreover, relative to administrators, courts may lack institutional competence to resolve questions of law. Courts must always police the boundaries of interpretation, in order to keep administrators in check and safeguard the rule of law, but the general presumption that the resolution of questions of law is a matter for courts should be jettisoned.     

无罪推定的法律效果比较研究——一种历时分析

无罪推定最初表现为一种富有人权保障价值的证据法原则。但由于产生背景和发展进路的不同,无罪推定在英美法系和大陆法系的功能定位和法律效果上有一定差别:前者将其作为审判阶段的证明规则,后者则以无罪推定的证据法内涵为基础,充分挖掘其程序法意义,将其塑造为具有多重法律效果的人权原则。二战后,无罪推定的国际化虽然推动了无罪推定法律效果限制和生效范围的一些共同基准的形成,但对各法系无罪推定法律效果的影响并不均衡。     

The Dock on Trial: Courtroom Design and the Presumption of Innocence

This article examines the place of the criminal dock in courtroom design. Challenges to the use of the dock have been based upon the inability of the defendants to hear effectively, to communicate with counsel, to maintain their dignity, and to benefit from the presumption of innocence. Increasingly courts are incorporating secure docks, where defendants are partially or completely surrounded by glass (or in some countries, metal bars). To what extent do these changes and modifications undermine the right to the presumption of innocence? We present the results of an experimental mock jury study that was designed to test whether the placement of the accused influences jurors’ perceptions. We find that jurors are more likely to convict defendants when they are located in a traditional dock or a secure dock, compared to sitting next to their counsel at the bar table. We conclude by discussing the implications for trial procedures, counsel communications, and courtroom design.     

有罪还是无罪?——相对不起诉的法律悖论与实践缺陷

刑事诉讼法一方面规定了无罪推定原则,规定任何人未经人民法院判决不得被认定有罪,另一方面又通过具体条款的规定,授予人民检察院相对不起诉的职权,而相对不起诉决定本身又以被告人的行为构成犯罪为前提,造成了刑事诉讼法的原则与具体条款之间的矛盾与悖论。同时,这种矛盾给司法实践造成了一定的困难与混乱。应当通过立法取消人民检察院相对不起诉的职权,将认定行为人的行为构成犯罪的职权完整地赋予人民法院,消除刑事诉讼法基本原则与具体条款之间的矛盾与冲突。在刑事诉讼法修改以前,应采取相应措施保障被相对不起诉人的权利。     

Law as a branch of applied psychology

Because the law for the most part consists of a system of rules for the control of human social behaviour, the law may be taken as a branch of applied psychology. However, one may well ask how good lawyers are as applied psychologists. As a partial answer to this question two well-known issues in criminal law are explored; the deterrent effect of punishment and the viability of the presumption of innocence. It is argued that lawyers, although they tend to speak in confusing ways about the deterrent effect of punishment, in practice show themselves to be pretty good applied psychologists. This is different with respect to the viability of the presumption of innocence, as they do not appear to realize that the ways in which criminal trials are commonly conducted cannot but violate this sacred principle of due process.     

论刑事被告人宪法权利的保障——从无罪推定角度所做的分析

无罪推定原则是刑事犯罪嫌疑人、被告人宪法基本权利保障的原则之一。随着我国社会主义民主与法治的发展,从立法与司法的双重视角贯彻和推行无罪推定原则,不仅有利于保障犯罪嫌疑人的人权,而且有利于推动我国的法治进程。我国应在《宪法》中明文规定无罪推定原则,立法保障犯罪嫌疑人的沉默权,进一步明确与施行非法证据排除制度。     

Who is Presumed Innocent of What by Whom?

The article analyses the components of the presumption of innocence and tries to clarify some of the conceptual and logical difficulties surrounding the notion of ‘innocence’ and the structure of legal presumptions. It is argued that all conceivable literal interpretations of the maxim make little or no sense, and that the presumptions form is, as such, devoid of original content: presumptions do not explain nor justify anything but are auxiliary norms which refer to the legal consequences spelled out in other norms. Therefore, the presumption of innocence can be used to express any kind of requirement and standard for the criminal process and the treatment of suspect citizens only in a tautological, albeit rhetorically forceful, way. This instrumental use of the presumption of innocence is theoretically without merit but can be practically beneficial as long as there is no developed system of fundamental rights and protections of individual freedoms in a given legal order. Finally, a functional understanding of the presumption of innocence is proposed which gives it an original, though limited field of application as a guarantee of the procedure itself, in particular of the openness of the outcome.     

The Prosecutor and the Presumption of Innocence

In what ways is the conduct of prosecutors constrained by the presumption of innocence? To address this question, I first develop an account of the presumption in the trial context, according to which it is a vital element in a moral assurance procedure for the justified infliction of legal punishment. Jurors must presume the factual innocence of defendants at the outset of trials and then be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the government’s evidence before they convict defendants. Prosecutors’ responsibilities to promote the integrity of this moral assurance procedure are then divided into pre-trial, during-trial, and post-trial phases. Since most charge adjudication is effected through plea bargaining, the ways in which plea procedures must be modified to conform to this moral assurance procedure, and thus honor the presumption of innocence, are also discussed.     

The Presumption of Innocence and its Role in the Criminal Process

Many international instruments proclaim that those who face criminal prosecution ought to be afforded a ‘presumption of innocence’, and the importance and central role of this presumption is recognized by legal systems throughout the world. There is, however, little agreement about its meaning and extent of application. This article considers the purposes of legal presumptions in general and explores various, sometimes contradictory, conceptions of this most famous one. It is equated by many scholars to the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, it is merely a rule of evidence (albeit an important one), with no application pre- or post-trial. The article advocates adoption of a broader, normative approach, namely that the presumption reflects the relationship which ought to exist between citizen and State when a citizen is suspected of breaching the criminal law. As such, it should be promoted as a practical attitude to be adopted by the key protagonists in the justice system, for the duration of the criminal process.     

Rethinking the presumption of innocence

This article is concerned with what constitutes interference with the presumption of innocence and what justifications there might be for such interference. It provides a defence of a theory of the presumption of innocence that suggests that the right is interfered with if the offence warrants conviction of defendants who are not the intended target of the offence. This thesis is defended against two alternative theories. It then considers what might justify interference with the presumption of innocence. It explores the idea that interference is justified if it is necessary in a democratic society and considers the presumption in relation to the aims of the criminal trial. It is concluded that no good grounds have been provided for interference with the right, and that the right should be regarded as inviolable.

A Tale of Two Presumptions

This article examines the use of presumptions of intent within the law of murder, and some of the problems of analysis to which they give rise. It is argued that much of the confusion in the modern law is caused by the failure of the courts to grasp the different functions of different kinds of presumption in the law of evidence, and that this has led to presumptions of a particular kind being used in the present context for a purpose for which they are not really suited. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Ideal of the Presumption of Innocence

This article clarifies and further defends the view that the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, protected by Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights has implications for the substantive law. It is shown that a ‘purely procedural’ conception of the presumption of innocence has absurd implications for the nature of the right. Objections to the moderate substantive view defended are considered, including the acceptability of male prohibits offences, the difficulty of ascertaining intentions of legislatures and the proper role of prosecutorial discretion.     

无罪推定原则在证据法中的体现

无罪推定是基于人生来无罪、也无犯罪基因这一常态而作出的一种假定。刑事诉讼程序是以证据为依据的动态逻辑证明过程并以证据为核心构件,因而,无罪推定原则在证据法中也具有重要意义。它在证据法中主要体现为以下具体规则：证据裁判主义、非法证据材料排除规则、无罪推定原则支配下的刑事诉讼证明与无罪推定原则下的证明责任。     

“悬疑推定”论——以我国民商法典型语境为中心的实证分析

基于典型语境作"非预设性"实证考察,应是我国"推定"研究的基础性课题。分析可见,现行法语境下,"推定"必属"推论",依形式结构可分为"分明推定"与"悬疑推定"。当前关于"悬疑推定"的主流解释,使法律理性陷入了严重困境。随着其表层、中层、深层结构的逐层揭示,"悬疑推定"在法律思维、实体、程序三方面的意涵终得显露。过错推定、无罪推定等所谓"直接推定",实属"悬疑推定"。