Why Steve Bannon Is Not a Fascist

Steve Bannon has often been accused of fascism by his opponents. His real intellectual affiliation, however, is with the first generation of American neo-conservatives of the 1960s, people like Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol. Like them he criticizes immoral elites and an amoral version of capitalism in the name of traditional values. His criticism is a symptom of the long-running battle between Mind and Money, the war between intellectuals and capitalism.     

Managing Networks: Propositions on What Managers Do and Why They Do It

Measuring management in networks is difficult because the allocation of managerial resources in network structures is fluid—that is, the utilization of management behaviors varies across time and space within a given program or project. As a means of focusing the network management research agenda, propositions based in contingency logic are suggested to test ideas regarding when, why, and how network managers undertake these behaviors. The propositions are intended to identify the vast inventory of network management behaviors and, most importantly, determine how the manager strategically matches behaviors with the governing context. Suggestions are also offered to help us understand how and why managerial resources are re allocated over time and space. The proposed research agenda is offered as a guide to help us determine which choices are most likely to be effective.     

Public-Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do

The familiar market-failure model remains quite useful for issues of price efficiency and traditional utilitarianism, but it has many shortcomings as a standard for public-value aspects of public policy and management. In a public-value-failure model, I present criteria for diagnosing values problems that are not easily addressed by market-failure models. Public-value failure occurs when: (1) mechanisms for values articulation and aggregation have broken down; (2) "imperfect monopolies" occur; (3) benefit hoarding occurs; (4) there is a scarcity of providers of public value; (5) a short time horizon threatens public value; (6) a focus on substitutability of assets threatens conservation of public resources; and (7) market transactions threaten fundamental human subsistence. After providing examples for diagnosis of public-values failure, including an extended example concerning the market for human organs, I introduce a "public-failure grid" to facilitate values choices in policy and public management.     

Why Village Election Has Not Much Improved Village Governance

Journal of Chinese Political Science - Village elections have been implemented throughout China for more than a decade. Much improvement has been made in the institutionalization of village...     

Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others

This article attempts to show that future players and future stakes—two factors generally ignored by political scientists—strongly influence government decisions to cooperate or fight at least against ethnic minorities seeking self-determination. Data on all separatist movements between 1956 and 2002 reveals that governments are significantly less likely to accommodate one challenge if the number of ethnic groups in a country and the combined value of the land that may come under dispute in the future is high. Governments that refused to accommodate one challenger were also significantly less likely to face a second or third challenge down the road. This provides some of the first systematic evidence that governments invest in reputation building a least in the domain of domestic ethnic relations.     

Long–Serving City Managers: Why Do They Stay?

The literature on council–manager government often mentions the political difficulties that city managers face with their elected officials and constituent groups. In addition, the generally accepted route to success for city managers is to move to larger and better–paying cities. As a result of these push–and–pull factors, the average tenure of city managers is short. There are, however, a relatively small number of city managers who enjoy long tenure in single cities. The authors identified the 146 city managers who are serving and have served for at least 20 years the same city and sought to determine the factors leading to their long service. The survey indicates that long–serving city managers are more likely to be found in smaller cities that are homogeneous and politically stable. The majority of these city managers are white males with above–average educational levels, strong support from elected officials, and personal commitments to the cities they serve.     

Why Overcoming Prejudice is Not Enough: A Rejoinder to Richard Rorty

Abstract

Misrecognition, taken seriously as unjust social subordination, cannot be remedied by eliminating prejudice alone. In this rejoinder to Richard Rorty, it is argued that a politics of recognition and a politics of redistribution can and should be combined. However, an identity politics that displaces redistribution and reifies group differences is deeply flawed. Here, instead, an alternative ‘status’ model of recognition politics is offered that encourages struggles to overcome status subordination and fosters parity of participation. Integrating this politics of recognition with redistribution enables a coherent Left vision that could redress injustices of culture and of political economy simultaneously.     

Measuring the Financial Position of Municipalities: Numbers Do Not Speak for Themselves

There are several challenges facing someone who wants to know if a city's revenue structure is fair and reasonable. There are few generally accepted standards to use as benchmarks of financial condition, and there is no generally accepted methodology to assess relative financial position. This article reviews literature on financial position and condition, and then develops a methodological approach that creates a cohort of similar cities for benchmarking financial position, and then forming a basis for assessing financial condition. Based on a study of the financial position of a medium-sized city, the article offers lessons for practitioners and scholars.     

Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience–Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment

Institutions constrain political choices and thus commit the future path of policy. Well–designed institutions square the circle of generating commitment that is both credible and flexible. This article develops an audience–cost theory of flexible commitment that addresses some vexing questions. Where does institutional commitment come from? Why is institutional commitment feasible when policy commitment is not? How can an institution achieve credible and flexible commitment without flexibility undermining credibility by opening the back door to defections? How does partial commitment work, or how is it possible for defections to occur in an equilibrium with credible commitment? Why do policy–makers sometimes respect institutional constraints and other times defect on institutional commitments? Why are some defections punished severely, while others are instantly forgiven and forgotten?     

Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: the Cases of Italy and Nepal

Federalism has been discussed as a potential system of governance in many countries, but in some it has failed to take shape. This has been the case in Nepal and, to a certain extent, in Italy. In fact, in Italy the federal option was rejected at the time of Risorgimento, and constitutional reforms in the 2000s never transformed the country into a federation as desired by political actors such as the Northern League despite some decentralization. In Nepal, the 2007 interim constitution specified that the country would be federal, but the first Constituent Assembly elected to write a new constitution was unable to produce a federal map acceptable to the major political parties and the second is wrestling with the same issue. In both cases, federal structuring was attacked by political actors who argued that it could promote disunity, undermine solidarity, and possibly lead to disintegration. This article argues that the idea of federalism held by prominent political actors as promoting division and conflict played strongly against its implementation.