Time for a change: The French elections of 1981: I. The presidency

The French presidential election of 1981 saw a collapse of the Communist vote to 15 per cent (its 1936 score) on the first ballot and partly thanks to that decline, the election of the Socialist candidate, François Mitterrand, on the second round. President Giscard lost support because of economic difficulties and because he was unable to sustain the cohesion of his own coalition. The Left thus won the presidency for the first time in the Fifth Republic; but in order to rule effectively, the chief of state needs a majority in the National Assembly. Mitterrand thus dissolved the Assembly and called elections, which the Socialists won, again for the first time since 1958.     

Alphabetic bias in partisan elections: Patterns of voting for the Spanish Senate, 1982 and 1986

Recent research has suggested that, in partisan elections, candidates derive no special advantage from being placed first or as high as possible on the ballot, and that, consequently, measures to neutralize this alphabetic or positional bias are unnecessary. We warn against these conclusions, and analyse one case of particularly clear alphabetic voting: the 1982 and 1986 Senate elections in Spain. The aggregate alphabetic advantage that candidates enjoyed over their party's next lower candidates on the ballot ranged from 1.7 to 3.7 per cent. And, in both elections, more than 10 per cent of the 188 senators elected in four-member districts can be shown to have been elected as a result of their alphabetic advantage.     

European elections: Sweden

A preliminary count of the votes of the election on 17 September 1979 gave the Social Democrats and Communists a majority in the unicameral Riksdag. But with the counting of postal votes (especially those from abroad) it soon became apparent that the three non‐Socialist parties in the Riksdag—the so‐called ‘bourgeois’ parties— would maintain their hairsbreadth parliamentary majority. The final count tipped the balance, and the bourgeois parties won a majority of a single seat (compared with one of eleven in the previous parliament). The electoral system is designed to reflect an exact proportionality of representation for parties whose support exceeds four per cent of the total vote. The turnout of around 91 per cent was slightly lower than in 1976, but remained at the high level characteristic of the 1970s.     

Misleading ballot position cue: Party voting in Korea's nonpartisan local elections

In this study, I present evidence that ballot order can provide a misleading cue to voters. In South Korea, nonpartisan municipal legislative elections were held concurrently with other partisan local elections until 2002. The ballot order of the candidates running in nonpartisan elections was randomly determined, whereas it was determined according to a party's number of seats in the national legislature for candidates running in partisan elections. Therefore, if voters are fully informed, the vote share for the candidate listed first in the nonpartisan ballot should not be correlated with the vote share for the party listed first on the partisan ballot. However, I find that the vote share for a first-listed candidate increases when the first-listed party's vote share increases. I also find that the presence of an incumbent does not significantly reduce the degree to which voters mistakenly use ballot position as a party cue.     

Pathways to power: Women's representation in the 2014 European Parliament elections

The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections produced a record proportion of women MEPs overall (37 per cent). Yet, these results vary widely across countries and parties. This article aims to explain these variations, evaluating not only who the elected representatives of the 8^th EP are, but also how they got there. Are the paths to the EP the same for women and men? Are there gender differences in terms of MEPs’ political experience? A unique dataset listing more than 700 elected MEPs and their background, party and country characteristics is used to empirically examine who makes it to the EP and through which route. The results of the analysis suggest no significant gender differences in the pathways to the EP. Yet, parties matter: more women were elected to the 8^th EP from left‐wing than from right‐wing or ‘new’ parties, and both men and (especially) women representing right‐wing parties tend to be politically more experienced than their fellow MEPs from other types of parties. Furthermore, it is found that men are more likely than women to be promoted straight from party office to the EP, suggesting that some pathways to the EP are less open to women than others.     

The 2019 Portuguese general elections

Abstract

The 2019 Portuguese general elections have led to the formation of another minority government of the Socialist Party. Right-wing parties suffered a resounding defeat. The election had two key consequences. First, after four years of contract parliamentarism with an extreme-left party, the Socialists returned to their historical position of pivotal party in the system. Socialist leader Costa refused to replicate alliances with parties to his left. Second, the 2019 election witnessed the emergence of three new parties, Chega, Iniciativa Liberal and Livre. The election of Chega marks a watershed moment in Portuguese democratic history, as for the first time an extreme-right populist party has gained representation in the country.     

Party-related primacy effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from a natural experiment in Polish local elections

We study the primacy effects that occur when voters cast their votes because a candidate or party is listed first on a ballot. In the elections that we analyzed, there are three potential types of such effects that might occur when voters vote for (1) the first candidate listed on the ballot in single-member district (SMD) elections (candidate primacy); (2) the first party listed on the ballot in open-list proportional representation (OLPR) elections (party primacy); or (3) the first candidate on a party list in OLPR elections (list primacy). We estimated the party primacy effect (2) and established that there was no interaction between (2) and (3). A party primacy effect is especially difficult to estimate because parties’ positions on ballots are typically fixed in all multi-member districts (MMDs) and it is impossible to separate the first-position “bonus” from a party’s normal electoral performance. A rare natural experiment allowed us to estimate the primacy party bonus between 6.02 and 8.52% of all votes cast for the 2014 Polish local elections. We attribute the large size of such bonus to the great complexity of voting in the OLPR elections, especially the much longer ballots, voting in many simultaneous elections, and ballot design as a booklet rather than a sheet.

     

The 2015 parliamentary elections in Egypt

The Egyptian parliamentary election, the third stage of the three-tiered plan created after the ouster of President Mursi, was held in two phases in late 2015. Egyptians cast their votes in the first phase on October 17 and 18, and in the second phase on December 1 and 2. The overall turnout rate was 28.3 percent. A total of 560 candidates secured seats–322 independent and 238 party-affiliated. The remaining 28 candidates were appointed by President Sisi. Traditionally, majority parties have ruled the parliament; however, in this election, independent candidates secured the majority of the seats. Most of the parliamentary seats were obtained by the supporters of Sisi. The only positive aspect of this election was the rise of previously sidelined groups: 87 women and 36 Christian Copts secured seats.     

Proportional Representation in the Welsh Assembly

The proposed rule for electing members to the Welsh Assembly gives each voter two votes, to cast at the Parliamentary constituency level, and at the bigger European constituency level. Half of the members are to be elected for the Assembly by a form of proportional representation, where party support is calculated by aggregating the two votes. The voters will be allowed to cast the second vote for a different party than the one for which they voted at the parliamentary level. This additional degree of freedom can frustrate the objective of obtaining better correspondence between party support and the number ofseats.     

The 2019 Greek parliamentary election: retour à la normale

Abstract

The July 2019 parliamentary election was the first national election since Greece officially exited the eight-year bailout programmes in August 2018. It was preceded by three ballots on European Parliament, regional and municipal elections in May 2019, which served as a decompression valve for the electorate to punish the incumbent government and indicate a clear will for governmental change, since the conservative party ND won by a landslide. Whereas ND’s victory in the parliamentary election was anticipated, it was its scale that would define the shape of the new government. Increasing its score by 11.76 points since September 2015, ND won 39.85% of the vote, securing a comfortable majority of 158 out of 300 seats. This is the first majority government in Greece since 2011, marking the return of the country to a new normality. Even if SYRIZA failed to deliver the anti-bailout programme which had initially brought the party to the centre of electoral competition, it still gathered 31.53% of the vote, losing just 3.93 points since its last victory in 2015, hence securing its place as one of the two key actors in the new two-partyism. Party fragmentation was limited to six parliamentary parties instead of eight, with the neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, having lost its parliamentary representation.     

Electoral behaviour in a two-vote system: Incentives for ticket splitting in German Bundestag elections

Abstract. The ballot structure of German Bundestag elections allows two votes: one for a constituency candidate and the second for a party list. About one-fifth of the voters usually split their ticket. Several hypotheses are derived about incentives for ticket splitting and tested with survey data from a 1998 pre-election poll. We argue that an explanation of split tickets in the German system has to take into account both party rankings and coalition preferences. One of the most important incentives is a preference or top ranking of a minor party like the FDP or Greens, if it is combined with a preference for a coalition with either the CDU/CSU or SPD. Contrary to this finding, the hypothesis of threshold insurance voting of CDU/CSU or SPD supporters choosing the party list of their prospective minor coalition partner is rejected for the 1998 election.     

Party over Policy? Scottish Nationalism and the Politics of Independence

The Scottish National Party (SNP) won control of Scotland's devolved government in the 2007 election yet opinion polls show no majority for its objective of independence in Europe. While the party is adept at exploiting short‐term political opportunity structures in the wider British context, as well as appealing to the ‘opinion electorate’, it appears less successful at persuading a majority of Scottish voters to agree with its core ideology. Helpful parallels can be drawn between 2007 and the last time the party polled over 30 per cent of the popular vote in Scotland at the 1974 (October) British General Election—then, as now, the Scottish voter appears to be willing to distinguish between party and policy.     

Regional elections in Portugal the Azores and Madeira: Persistence of non-alternation and absence of non-statewide parties

ABSTRACT

The ruling parties were elected into office again after the recent regional elections held in Madeira (29 March 2015) and in Azores (16 October 2016): the social-democrats (PSD – Partido Social Democrata) in Madeira and the socialists (PS – Partido Socialista) in Azores. Despite forty years of regional elections in Portugal a pattern of non-alternation in executive government (Madeira) and the same party being in office for a long time (Azores) still has not been broken. The most notable difference is that turnout registered the lowest scores since the first regional elections were held in the 1970s. Just a bit more than 50% of voters showed up at the ballot box.     

Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections

ADA scores and Nominate scores are used for the first time to examine the influence of spatial voting records on which candidate wins the party’s presidential nomination and on which nominee wins the general election. We find that the most conservative Republican candidate and moderately liberal Democrats were most likely to win their party’s nomination. For general elections we find that the candidate’s spatial record has nearly as much impact on the outcome as economic growth, which has been the focus of most past empirical research. The nominee whose voting record is more moderate is more likely to be elected.     

Presidential elections in Finland: A plea for approval voting

The Finnish President is elected by an indirect method-the people elect special electors who carry out the final election. A proposal for a reform aiming at direct elections is, however, presently being considered. This paper agrees with this proposal and suggests that approval voting is a proper method for direct elections. Several properties of the approval voting system are discussed and the method is demonstrated to be superior to the plurality runoff method in presidential elections. It is argued that the approval voting system chooses a candidate who has overall support in the electorate and that the system therefore promotes the position of the President as a neutral and moderating political force.     

A Divided Nation? The 2014 Belgian Federal Elections

The critical 2010 federal elections left the Flemish nationalists (N-VA) the dominant political party in the north and the francophone Socialists (PS) in the south of the country, unable to find common ground on the issue of devolution. It took no fewer than 541 days – a world record – to form a government rallying Christian Democrats (CD&V and cdH), Liberals (Open VLD and MR), and Socialists (sp.a and PS). The 2014 federal elections marked a change in tone, being fought on socio-economic terms, but confirmed the stalemate nonetheless. The N-VA made further inroads, winning 29.8 per cent of the vote in the Dutch-speaking community. The governing parties held firm, however; the PS in particular remained the largest political formation in the south, winning 31.0 per cent of the vote in the French-speaking community. Moreover, on 25 May 2014 federal elections, regional elections in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels (and the German-speaking community), and European elections were held simultaneously, further raising the stakes in the complex, interconnected, government formation.     

Approval voting,Condorcet's principle,and runoff elections

Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in an election but not cast more than one vote for each candidate of whom he approves. If there is a strict Condorcet candidate — a candidate who defeats all others in pairwise contests — approval voting is shown to be the only nonranked voting system that is always able to elect the strict Condorcet candidate when voters use sincere admissible strategies. Moreover, if a strict Condorcet candidate must be elected under ordinary plurality voting when voters use admissible strategies, then he must also be elected under approval voting when voters use admissible strategies, but the converse does not hold. The widely used plurality runoff method can also elect a strict Condorcet candidate when voters use admissible strategies on the first ballot, but some of these may have to be insincere to get the strict Condorcet candidate onto the runoff ballot. Furthermore, there is no case in which the strict Condorcet candidate is invariably elected under the plurality runoff method when voters use admissible first-ballot strategies. Thus, approval voting is superior to the plurality runoff method with respect to the Condorcet principle in its ability to elect the strict Condorcet candidate by sincere voting and in its ability to guarantee the election of the strict Condorcet candidate when voters use admissible strategies. In addition, approval voting is more efficient since it requires only one election and is probably less subject to strategic manipulation.     

The 1979 Local Elections in Norway

The result of the 1979 local elections in Norway showed that a strong Conservative wind was blowing over the country. The Conservative Party (Høyre) made an average progress of 8.5 per cent, compared with the previous local election results in 1975. The big loser was the Centre Party, which suffered a decrease of 2.8 per cent as an unweighted average. The governing party of Norway, the Labour Party, experienced only minor changes compared with the 1975 results, but compared with the last Storting election in 1977, the party's vote dropped from 42.2 to 36.1 per cent. Besides the Conservatives, gains were registered by the Liberal Party (Venstre) and the right-wing Progress Party (Fremskrittspariet, formerly Anders Langes Parti). A local election in Norway has traditionally seen a good many local non-partisan election lists. In this election, however, such lists won only 2.3 per cent of the vote, thus confirming a decline in their strength and a process of politicization that have been observed during all elections in the 1970s.     

The single transferable vote and ethnic conflict: The evidence from Northern Ireland

There has been a long-running debate amongst constitutional engineers between those who favour the proportional representation of parties (usually via PR-Closed List systems) and post-election power-sharing (Lijphart) and those who favour attempting to induce pre-election inter-ethnic ‘vote-pooling’ (Horowitz) as a more effective and stable method of governing divided societies. Less attention has been paid to the fact that other options are available. A leading candidate amongst these is the Single Transferable Vote (STV), a non-categorical ordinal ballot system that may be capable of combining the essential ‘fairness’ of proportionality with the centripetal benefits of some inter-ethnic vote-pooling. Northern Ireland is the only divided society with extensive experience of STV elections. This paper examines the empirical evidence before and after the 1998 Belfast Agreement by examining the operation of the electoral system at the Northern Ireland Assembly elections of 1982, 1998, 2003, 2007 and 2011. The main findings are that prior to the 1998 Agreement inter-ethnic vote-pooling in Northern Ireland was very close to zero. Afterwards (1998–2007) terminal transfers from the moderate unionist UUP to the moderate nationalist SDLP averaged 32 per cent (and 13 per cent in the opposite direction). Although most transfers clearly remain within ethnic blocs, these inter-ethnic terminal transfers are a change with the past and suggest that STV may be an appropriate electoral system choice for some divided societies.     

Information and party voting in “semipartisan” judicial elections

Research on the relationship between the quantity of information that voters possess and their party voting behavior in partisan elections has produced mixed and confusing empirical results. In an effort to provide a broader perspective, this paper explores that relationship in nonpartisan elections contested by candidates of opposing parties. The paper analyzes survey data on two 1984 contests for seats on the Ohio Supreme Court, using the presidential race for comparison. Despite a highly partisan campaign, party defections by voters were far more common in the supreme court races than in the presidential race, reflecting the importance of party designations on the ballot as a source of information on candidates' party affiliations. At the individual level, levels of information had differing effects in the two supreme court races and for Democratic and Republican voters; this finding suggests that the impact of imformation levels on voters' choices is conditioned by the content of information in particular campaigns.