Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions

A growing body of research argues that anticorruption efforts fail because of a flawed theoretical foundation, where collective action theory is said to be a better lens for understanding corruption than the dominant principal–agent theory. We unpack this critique and advance several new arguments. First, the application of collective action theory to the issue of corruption has been, thus far, incomplete. Second, a collective action theory‐based approach to corruption is in fact complementary to a principal–agent approach, rather than contradictory as is claimed. Third, applications of both theories have failed to recognize that corruption persists because it functions to provide solutions to problems. We conclude by arguing that anticorruption effectiveness is difficult to achieve because it requires insights from all three perspectives—principal–agent theory, collective action theory, and corruption as serving functions—which allows us to better understand how to harness the political will needed to fight corruption.     

From “New Institutionalism” to “Institutional Processualism”: Advancing Knowledge about Public Management Policy Change

Research on public management reform has taken a decidedly disciplinary turn. Since the late 1990s, analytical issues are less often framed in terms of the New Public Management. As part of the disciplinary turn, much recent research on public management reform is highly influenced by the three new institutionalisms. However, these studies have implicitly been challenged by a competing research program on public management reform that is emphatically processual in its theoretical foundations. This article develops the challenge in a more explicit fashion. It provides a theoretical restatement of the competing “institutional processualist” research program and compares its substantive findings with those drawn from the neoinstitutionalisms. The implications of this debate about public management reform for comparative historical analysis and neoinstitutional theories are discussed.     

“Carve‐outs” from the workers' compensation system

Decentralized regulation has become increasingly important in many areas; examples range from school vouchers to workplace safety committees to alternative dispute resolution procedures replacing courts. Consistent with this trend, in 1993 California permitted construction unions and employers to “carve out” their own workers' compensation system. This study examines California's early experience with carve‐outs by analyzing two case studies, a survey of all carve‐outs in existence during the study period, and preliminary data on costs and dispute frequency at one carve‐out. Overall, carve‐outs do not appear to harm employees, and sometimes they help. At the same time, data analysis of one carve‐out showed it had no effect on costs and dispute rates. Moreover, the low involvement of union officials and the many issues that overlap other parts of workplace regulation raise concerns about decentralizing workers' compensation. Lessons can be learned for other spheres of regulation. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The class as case: “Reinventing” the classroom

New approaches to public management provide principles by which to organize the classroom as a case. In teaching public management one can enhance learning for practice by modeling, experimenting with, and reflecting upon the principles that one is teaching the students. The principles from the new ideas about public management that can be used to organize the classroom as well are strength through diversity, continuous improvement, teamwork, and empowerment. They represent changes in governing relations across the country and globe within which the new approaches to public management rest; each of these principles has a role in the “reinvented” classroom. Such practices require institutional support of various kinds as well. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

“Grabbing Hand” or “Helping Hand”?: Corruption and the Economic Role of the State

This article seeks to disentangle which features of government intervention are linked to corruption and which are not, by distinguishing between the government roles of regulator, entrepreneur, and consumer. It finds that the degree of regulation of private business activity is the strongest predictor of corruption, and that high levels of public spending are related to low levels of corruption. There is no evidence of direct government involvement in production having any bearing on corruption. It is concluded that advanced welfare capitalist systems, which leave business relatively free from interference while intervening strongly in the distribution of wealth and the provision of key services, combine the most “virtuous” features of “big” and “small” government. This suggests that anti‐corruption campaigners should be relaxed about state intervention in the economy in general, but should specifically target corruption‐inducing regulatory systems.     

“Acceptable risk”: The case of nuclear power

The key policy question in managing hazardous technologies is often some variant of: “How safe is safe enough?” A typical response of regulatory agencies has been to lay down minimum requirements for how hazardous facilities should be built and operated, without specifying the level of safety that it is hoping to achieve. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, charged with regulating safety in nuclear power plants, has recently tackled the safety question directly, by adopting “safety goals” that facilities must meet. The NRC's approach proves to be sophisticated in some respects, incomplete in others. More generally, it points up the inherent difficulties that exist with the concept of “acceptable risk” and with any attempt to build policy instruments around it. Lessons from the NRC case apply to other hazardous technologies, as well as to public policies unrelated to safety.     

The Impact of Incentives to Recruit and Retain Teachers in “Hard‐to‐Staff” Subjects

We investigate the effects of a statewide program designed to increase the supply of teachers in designated “hard‐to‐staff” areas, such as special education, math, and science. Employing a difference‐in‐difference estimator we find that the loan forgiveness component of the program was effective, reducing mean attrition rates for middle and high school math and science teachers by 10.4 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively. We also find that the impact of loan forgiveness varied with the generosity of payments; when fully funded, the program reduced attrition of special education teachers by 12.3 percent, but did not have a statistically significant impact when funding was substantially reduced. A triple‐difference estimate indicates that a one‐time bonus program also had large effects, reducing the likelihood of teachers’ exit by as much as 32 percent in the short run. A back‐of‐the‐envelope cost‐benefit analysis suggests that both the loan forgiveness and the bonus program were cost effective.     

On the Meaning of Survey Reports of Roll‐Call “Votes”

Contemporary efforts to evaluate representation often compare survey measures of how citizens say they would vote on legislation to what elected officials do in office. These comparisons generally suggest poor representation. We argue here that this common design is unlikely to effectively evaluate representation because responses to survey questions differ in important aspects from voting in legislatures. Measurement error and construct validity undermine the comparison. Three survey experiments show that providing partisan and nonpartisan information readily available to legislators materially changes respondents' expressed preferences on roll‐call votes. With information, expressed policy positions are both less centrist and more closely matched to legislator behavior in their preferred party. Respondents also appear aware of their own lack of knowledge in evaluating roll‐call policy votes. The treatment effect of information decreases in confidence judging policy in that area. We show similar patterns for respondent opinions on Supreme Court decisions.     

Problems of Budgeting During “The Great Transformation”

The budget system of Lithuania, one of the nations that recently emerged from the former Soviet Union, is examined. The analysis draws a contrast between the present budget practices and those during the Soviet period, points out the problems that the Soviet budgeting legacy presents to a nation seeking transformation into an independent, market-based political economy, and discusses other budgeting and financial dilemmas brought on by the bedrock reforms taking place in Lithuania and throughout the former USSR.