Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party‐focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters’ ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, it is argued that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, the article shows how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. The article discusses how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.     

Partisanship as information

Intuitively, we associate different political parties with different types of policy. In contrast, this paper shows that in the absence of differential costs of membership among parties (that is, if party membership ischeap talk), party labels cannot perfectly signal the ideologies of candidates. However, under certain conditions parties can signal candidate types imperfectly. The paper therefore also provides an example of how costless communication can be effective in games of partial conflict.     

Taking Risks in Social Media Campaigning: The Early Adoption of Blogging by Candidates

This article concerns whether and how political candidates adopt social media in their election campaigns. For campaigns, the openness and interactivity of social media tools bring about risks in terms of losing control over the message. Departing from a cost‐benefit perspective, this study addresses the question as to whether certain groups of candidates – differing in incumbency status, party type, gender, generation and urbanization level of the constituency – are more prone to adopt and utilize new social media tools and practices. In order to study how candidates approach social media in an early stage when the benefits are uncertain and the risks are apparent, candidate blogging in the 2007 Finnish national elections is examined. The findings show that the candidates generally were not ready to pursue the full potential of blogs and thereby to accept the risks associated with this open, interactive and personalized way of campaigning. Rather, the candidates took a cautious approach by not engaging extensively in the social media features and practices. However, female candidates and candidates not representing major parties were more likely to utilize a broader range of social media features and practices. The study adds support to the claim that campaigns do not simply adopt and utilize novel social media tools with the purpose of being innovative; they assess risks, costs and benefits. Social media do not alter the basic need of campaigns to control the message and to avoid stress in the campaign organization.     

Political Candidates and the Energy Issue: Nuclear Power Position and Electoral Success

Members of parliament are key actors for the implementation of energy transitions, such as phasing out nuclear power. Before legislators can cast their maybe decisive vote in parliament, they need to run for office and actively strive for election. This paper assesses what political candidates oppose renewable energy transitions and questions whether the energy issue matters in national elections, and thus has consequences for the implementation of new sustainable energy sources. We analyze these questions by first describing the specific characteristics of political candidates. The paper then evaluates the relevance of the energy issue for electoral success in three national elections in Switzerland (2007, 2012, and 2015). Based on candidate data from the voting advice application smartvote.ch, we find that female candidates support ETs more than men do; that especially the French‐speaking part of the country is more in favor of a nuclear phase‐out, and that younger candidates are also more open toward restructuring the energy system than older candidates are. Our models further show that the energy issue does not matter in elections, independently from its salience in the respective election campaigns. Candidates are thus relatively free to choose their position on the issue and do not have to fear consequences at the ballot. However, candidates of center parties, in contrast to the pole parties, are sensitive to the energy issue and reflect public mood in their positions.     

Assessing the citizen – candidate model

Citizen–candidate models postulate a politics without political parties. Any citizen may become a candidate for office. A winner is chosen from among the candidates by voting with ties broken by the flip of a coin. All voters have preferences over a set of policies. The winning candidate adopts his preferred policy. It is proved on certain assumptions that there exists an equilibrium in these models and that the equilibrium is efficient. The significance of the proof is tested here with reference to the paradox of voting, the exploitation problem, the transposition of the Nash equilibrium from markets to politics, and constitutional constraints. The quest for a political equilibrium leads in the end to the recognition of a minimal rock-bottom requirement for cooperation and negotiation in democratic government.     

Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? Clientelism and Intra‐Party Conflict in Ghana

We consider the effect of legislative primaries on the electoral performance of political parties in a new democracy. While existing literature suggests that primaries may either hurt a party by selecting extremist candidates or improve performance by selecting high valence candidates or improving a party’s image, these mechanisms may not apply where clientelism is prevalent. A theory of primaries built instead on a logic of clientelism with intra‐party conflict suggests different effects of legislative primaries for ruling and opposition parties, as well as spillover effects for presidential elections. Using matching with an original dataset on Ghana, we find evidence of a primary bonus for the opposition party and a primary penalty for the ruling party in the legislative election, while legislative primaries improve performance in the presidential election in some constituencies for both parties.     

Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem

We study a citizen‐candidate‐entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively “extreme” citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates, whereas more “moderate” types never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more extreme candidates. We show that polarization increases in the costs of entry and decreases in the benefits from holding office. Moreover, when the number of citizens goes to infinity, only the very most extreme citizens, with ideal points at the boundary of the policy space, become candidates. Finally, our polarization result is robust to changes in the implementation of a default policy if no citizen runs for office and to introducing directional information about candidates’ types that is revealed via parties.     

Policy voting in U.S. House primaries

ABSTRACT

This paper uses exit surveys of voters in four House primaries to ask how well voters are able to use primaries for the purpose of giving policy direction to their congressional parties. The surveys found that nearly half of voters could not recall the names of any candidate and that 11% were uncertain or could not recall for whom they had just voted. The surveys also found that nearly 40% of voters could not offer a political evaluation – that is, a like or dislike having political content – about any candidate, and that fewer than a quarter could offer political evaluations of as many as two candidates. The surveys found no evidence of policy-motivated voting in three of the four primaries, but substantial evidence of it in one. Yet even in that one race, voters split their support among three candidates sharing majority voter opinion on the key election issue and thereby opened the way for nomination of a candidate not sharing majority opinion. The paper concludes from this evidence that voters in these House primaries, and probably more widely, made little use of them for the purpose of giving policy direction to their parties.     

Demoted leaders and exiled candidates: Disentangling party and person in the voter’s mind

The debate on personalization in electoral politics is inconclusive. There is confusion about the concept of personalization. Moreover, the fact that party evaluation and person evaluation are interrelated complicates the debate. This paper focuses on the latter problem by employing counterfactual thought experiments in which voters are asked to simulate their vote with their candidate lower on the party list or nominated by another party. The results show that most voters put party above person and less than ten percent put person above party. A sizeable third category has a preference for an individual candidate as long as that candidate does not leave the party. Also, personalization is slightly more important with regard to (the leaders of) populist parties, and individual candidates are more important for voters with less education, less political knowledge and a less deeply rooted party preference.     

Candidates’ policy strategies in primary elections: does strategic voting by the primary electorate matter?

Empirical research reports conflicting conclusions about whether primary election voters strategically account for candidates’ general election prospects when casting their votes. We model the strategic calculations of office-seeking candidates facing two-stage elections beginning with a primary, and we compare candidates’ policy strategies in situations where primary voters strategically support the most viable general election candidate against candidate strategies when voters expressively support their preferred primary candidate regardless of electability. Our analyses—in which the candidates’ appeal is based on their policy positions and their campaigning skills—suggest a surprising conclusion: namely, that strategic and expressive primary voting typically support identical equilibrium configurations in candidate strategies. Our conclusions are relevant to candidates facing contested primaries, and also to political parties facing the strategic decision about whether or not to use primary elections to select their candidates—a common dilemma for Latin American (and some European) parties.     

Endogenous Credible Commitment and Party Competition over Redistribution under Alternative Electoral Institutions

Political parties competing in elections for the power to set public policy face the problem of making credible their policy promises to voters. I argue that this commitment problem crucially shapes party competition over redistribution. The model I develop shows that under majoritarian electoral rules, parties' efforts to achieve endogenous commitment to policies preferred by the middle class lead to different behavior and outcomes than suggested by existing theories, which either assume commitment or rule out endogenous commitment. Thus, left parties can have incentives to respond to rising income inequality by moving to the right in majoritarian systems but not under proportional representation. The model also generates new insights about the anti‐left electoral bias often attributed to majoritarian electoral rules, and the strategic use of parliamentary candidates as a commitment device. I find evidence for key implications of this logic using panel data on party positions in 16 parliamentary democracies.     

The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs

This paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate's policies and personal characteristics and, in this way, reduce voters' information costs. With reference to ‘transaction cost economics’, political parties offer an ‘implicit contract’ between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians. This impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties.     

Multi-level muddling: Candidate strategies to “nationalize” local elections

Comparative literature has identified how political parties at subnational levels strategically refer to the performance of parties or policy issues at national level to varying degrees. Building upon these studies on multi-level electoral dynamics, the article demonstrates how individual legislative candidates, and not just parties, selectively adopt what we call “cross-level electoral appeals”(CLEAs): campaign messages which emphasize issues, performances, and actors in levels of government other than that which the candidate or party is seeking office. Advancing existing conceptualizations of nationalization, we posit that there are mainly three types of such CLEAs, those in which local candidates: 1) praise or criticize a specific national policy or 2) performance of the national government; or 3) emphasize personal linkages to national-level parties or politicians. The article investigates the potential factors which lead to more frequent CLEAs by observing candidate manifestos for local legislative elections in Japan. We use an original dataset from a sample of prefectures differently affected by specific national policies, candidates affiliated to parties differing in organizational centralization and from districts varying in seat magnitude as well as incumbent party popularity. To test hypotheses about national and local level party popularity as well as district-level variables on the frequency of such appeals, the article analyzed the data set using the novel methodology of not just counting, but also measuring the surface area of specific appeals in candidate manifestos. Through regression analysis, we find evidence of national government party popularity leading to more frequency of local candidate CLEAs. We also find that local candidates who are more dependent on the party vote (i.e. those in smaller district magnitudes and in centralized party organizations) are more prone to certain types of CLEAs.     

The political affiliation effect on state credit risk

Past research largely has ignored the effects of political parties on states’ default risks. This paper addresses that question by analyzing the response of credit spreads to weekly polling data from 17 gubernatorial elections between 2009 and 2012, during the 6 months prior to Election Day. The findings are that political affiliation has a significant effect on states’ default risks. The estimated effect of electing a Republican governor is a 6% reduction in the credit spread of the state. The effect prevails regardless of the party in control of the state legislature, and it is larger when gubernatorial elections are contested closely. Set in the context of case law, the paper links higher tax levels to greater credit risk. Moreover, an analysis of the candidates’ campaign promises suggests that stronger positions against tax increases are associated with less default risks. The results of the paper are therefore consistent with the empirical evidence suggesting that Republicans prefer lower taxes.     

Long-Term Performance of Political Parties

Abstract

Whilst politicians can “buy” votes in the short-term, most political parties are more interested in maintaining power over a period of years in order to implement their policies. This paper explores whether political parties can be considered to possess long-term competitive resources that sustain their competitive advantages. It employs the well-established strategic management concept of the Resource-Based View of strategy development for this purpose. Because such a concept has not previously been applied to political parties, the paper begins by considering the nature of the competition that exists between political parties and the role of resources in developing superior political performance. A series of theoretical propositions about why some parties maintain political power and influence for lengthy periods is then developed. We argue that the competitive resources of a political party such as its policies, leadership, organisational and communications skills require long-term investment and development, rejecting the notion that long-term electoral success is based primarily on the promises and resources deployed in the final election campaign.     

Issues and the presidential primary voter

Most agree that voting in presidential general elections is largely contingent on the evaluations of the candidates, issues, and parties. Yet inpresidential primary elections the determinants of voter choices are less clear. Partisanship is inconsequential, information about candidate personalities and policy positions is scarce, and a fourth factor, expectations, may influence voters. In this paper, we reconsider the influence ofpolitical issues in presidential primaries. We argue that past work has not adequately considered how issues matter in primary elections. Primaries are intraparty affairs, and the political issues that typically divide the parties are not very relevant in primaries. Instead, we focus on the policy issues each candidate chooses to emphasize in their quest for the nomination, which we call policy priorities. With data gathered about media coverage of the presidential contenders in the 1988 primaries, and using exit poll data from the 1988 Super Tuesday primaries, we show that issues, as policy priorities, do matter in presidential primary elections. This research also implies that primary campaigns matter, since information concerning the policy priorities of the candidates reaches the intended audience.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 1992.     

You have to pay to play: Candidate and party responses to the high cost of elections in Japan

What effect does the financial cost of running for office have on candidate entry decisions, and does it differ depending on a candidate's motivations for running? We use a regression discontinuity design and panel data analysis to estimate the causal effect of campaign costs on candidate entry in Japan, where the amount of money required as a deposit for ballot access increased periodically to become one of the highest in the world, and a considerable part of campaign costs. We find that candidates from the major office-seeking parties were likely to be replaced after losing the deposit, and that these parties nominated fewer candidates following increases in the deposit amount. However, we find no such deterrent effect for fringe candidates. This finding calls into question the effectiveness of the deposit at fulfilling its supposed purpose, and sheds light on the differences between the financial and strategic coordination incentives that influence the nomination decisions of parties.     

An Analysis of Political Ambition in Britain

Representative democracies require sufficient numbers of citizens to put themselves forward as candidates for political office. Existing studies have shown that political institutions are not representative of the population as a whole, suggesting that political ambition is not evenly distributed across all potential candidates. We discuss evidence from the first systematic study of political ambition in Britain, examining the question of who is interested in putting themselves forward for political office. We find patterns in the distribution of political ambition that help to explain why British political institutions do not look like the British people as a whole and include a gender gap, a social class gap, an education gap, a north–south divide, and a personality gap. We discuss the implications of our findings for political parties, arguing that they need to adjust practices of candidate recruitment in such a way that minimises the effects of these biases.     

Selecting women candidates: obstacles to the feminisation of the House of Commons

Abstract. Despite concern by the major British political parties to increase the number of women at Westminster, progress has been slow, yielding only just over 5 per cent of women MPs. This article presents the results of an investigation of party selection procedures designed to determine whether selection practices were themselves the explanation for the poor showing of women. The study consisted of interviews with party officials and a survey of the candidates in the 1987 General Election. It was found that selection procedures were in a process of change which included efforts by central leaderships to promote women's candidacies. But local selectorates were not always cooperative. Although women did not appear to be selected in the proportions in which they were coming forward, no evidence of direct discrimination against aspirant women candidates was found. But indirect discrimination may have taken place. Both the way in which the role of a candidate is defined and the qualities selectorates seek produce ideal candidate profiles which may penalise many women. The article concludes that if women are to be better represented at Westminster, parties must go beyond procedural change and the introduction of positive action to a reconsideration of the criteria for choosing candidates.