Ph.D. programs in policy sciences: Who,when, where,what, and why?

Policy sciences is compared to other new disciplines. Its independent methodological base, research structure, and education objectives are discussed with respect to multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and disciplinary stages of development. The interrelationship of teaching and research and of application and theory as well as the continual development required from a changing domain of application suggest that policy sciences will always be a new developing, interdisciplinary field. Such features present policy sciences with both the key to its potential long-term viability and the major impediments to its introduction into the university system. The present desirability of a few highly experimental doctorate programs, with the highest level faculty, students, and financial support, is considered. Exploratory and operational research modes are described with respect to type of project, individual goals and attitudes, and organizational requirements. The suitability of formal education and exploratory research to the university and of research in the operational mode to research institutes suggests an informally structured para-academic entity which spans the university boundary. Organizational, financial, and education strategies are discussed. Suggestions for implementing the personal and organizational renewal required of an incompletely defined and continuously changing field are offered.The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Rockefeller University or any sponsoring organizations.     

Who gains,who loses from changing U.S. child support policies?

This article examines the empirical and theoretical research on child support policies to assess the effects of recent changes on the well-being of women, men, and children. In addition to considering the intra-family and inter-family distributional effects of child support payments across gender, race, and income categories, the essay explores several criteria central to a feminist cost-benefit analysis. Thus, recent changes in child support policies are analyzed in relation to the prevention of poverty, the reduction of women's economic dependence on men, and the reduction of gender inequalities in income and leisure time.     

Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993

When do politicians resort to corrupt practices? This article distinguishes between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). Looting generally involves a politician “selling” influence while cheating involves a politician “buying” votes. Individual‐level analyses of new data on financial scandals and election law violations in Japan show that the determinants of cheating differ from the determinants of looting. Most notably, political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating.     

Policy entrepreneurship and institutional change: Who,how, and why?

In the past three decades, “policy entrepreneurship” has emerged as a key analytical concept helping to explain institutional and policy change. Despite this, however, the literature on policy entrepreneurship remains theoretically vexed, producing limited theoretical knowledge or explanatory models able to draw firm conclusions. Theory building on policy and institutional change, for example, how policy entrepreneurs institute and navigate change agendas, using what tools, strategies, resources, and capacities remains opaque. This is especially the case in developing country contexts, where most analytical investigation of policy entrepreneurship has addressed “first world” case examples. This special issue seeks to address this analytical gap in the literature, focusing on cases specific to developing country contexts, deepening our empirical knowledge of policy entrepreneurship in developing countries, but also exploring theoretical and conceptual debates as they relate to developing countries.     

Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences

This article explores individual differences in citizens’ reliance on cues and values in political thinking. It uses experimental evidence to identify which citizens are likely to engage in heuristic processing and which citizens are likely to engage in systematic processing in developing opinions about a novel issue. The evidence suggests that political awareness crisply distinguishes between heuristic and systematic processors. The less politically aware rely on party cues and not on an issue-relevant value. As political awareness increases, reliance on party cues drops and reliance on an issue-relevant value rises. Need for cognition fails to yield clear results. The results suggest two routes to opinion formation: heuristic processing and systematic processing. Political awareness, not need for cognition, predicts which route citizens will take.     

Who Is Helping the Homeless? Local, State, and Federal Responses

This article examines the sources of support for services forthe homeless. It delineates the extensive role of the privatesector in both funding and actually delivering shelter, meal,and other services for the homeless. It also indicates the extentto which certain states are providing financial support forhomeless services, and the relation of new federal efforts throughprograms funded by the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless AssistanceAct to state and private activities.     

Regulating Finance: Who Rules,Whose Rules?

This project has embedded in it an explanation of the structural and relational power transmission process stemming from “micro-actions” in global financial relations. This paper is about domestic policy adaptation in international and domestic finance and how it occurs. The fundamental contention of this paper is that the way to understand power in global finance is to provide an answer to the question: Who makes the rules in finance—state actors or nonstate actors? The answer to this question is problematic in the IPE literature because of both the enormous influence of finance in the councils of the industrial democracies and the information asymmetries that favor power in finance. Finance, it is argued, has the determining influence on the rules governing its industry. The dependent variable in this analysis is the policy output—the regulation and liberalization decisions of states. The behaviors of the state and of other policy actors in the policy process are the independent variables.     

What do Australian Foundations Do – Who Knows and Who Cares?

This article explores governance and accountability demands on foundations in Australia and compares these with requirements in the US. The article begins by discussing the meaning of, and rise of concern with, governance and accountability, the nature and variety of foundations and their status as organisations in the public domain. The second and third sections compare the formal and informal requirements relating to governance and accountability of foundations in the US and Australia. It is suggested that US foundations are both more closely regulated and more concerned with issues of governance and accountability than Australian foundations. The fourth section identifies the drivers of demand for better governance and accountability of foundations in the US and their relevance in Australia. Finally, some possible explanations of the relative lack of concern with foundation governance in Australia are considered.     

The Who,When, and Where of Executive Nominations: Integrating Agency Independence and Appointee Ideology

In recent years, scholars have expended considerable efforts to understand the executive appointment process and the forces influencing the choices made by the president and the Senate. However, some factors integral to theoretical models have not been well integrated empirically, and other relevant factors have not been incorporated much at all. Here, we focus on one determinant corresponding to the former critique—nominee ideology—and another corresponding to the latter—the independence of decision makers in the targeted agencies. We examine a series of theoretically driven hypotheses regarding the effects of both ideology and independence on who gets nominated and if and when nominees are eventually confirmed. Results show nominee ideology and decision maker independence matter a great deal and factor into presidential strategic choices and senatorial responses in ways according to expectations. Our findings have important ramifications for understanding appointments empirically and for future theoretical development.     

The Incidental Pundit: Who Talks Politics with Whom,and Why?

Informal discussion plays a crucial role in democracy, yet much of its value depends on diversity. We describe two models of political discussion. The purposive model holds that people typically select discussants who are knowledgeable and politically similar to them. The incidental model suggests that people talk politics for mostly idiosyncratic reasons, as by-products of nonpolitical social processes. To adjudicate between these accounts, we draw on a unique, multisite, panel data set of whole networks, with information about many social relationships, attitudes, and demographics. This evidence permits a stronger foundation for inferences than more common egocentric methods. We find that incidental processes shape discussion networks much more powerfully than purposive ones. Respondents tended to report discussants with whom they share other relationships and characteristics, rather than based on expertise or political similarity, suggesting that stimulating discussion outside of echo chambers may be easier than previously thought.     

Who benefits? Intergovernmental transfers,subnational politics and local spending in Ecuador

ABSTRACT

This paper looks at the intervening role that local political elites play to translate government transfers into effective public spending. We want to know whether mayors spend IGTs to provide basic public services or infrastructure works, and whether such investments are instrumental to secure their advantage as incumbents. To test these arguments, we use a combined dataset of local public finances between 2001 and 2015 and electoral results for the 2009 and 2014 municipal elections in Ecuador. We find that mayors do respond to political incentives and make strategic spending decisions to invest on public services and visible infrastructure projects. However, we find selective spending was insufficient to secure incumbency advantage in the 2014 election. We argue that the executive intervened to block or limit the impact of spending decisions at the local level, thus creating an incumbency disadvantage for mayors. Further research is needed to explain this.