The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

Unilateral presidential actions, such as executive orders, are widely cited as a key strategic tool for presidential power. However, is unilateral action evidence of unilateralism or might it represent executive acquiescence? We answer this by (1) specifying three competing models, each with a different presidential discretion assumption and generating alternative hypotheses; (2) extending the canonical item‐response model to best measure executive‐order significance; and (3) comparing competing theoretical models to data for 1947–2002. Theoretically, we show that legislative preferences may impact unilateral actions differently than previously thought and indicate how parties may be influential. Empirically, a model where the president is responsive to the chamber's majority‐party median fits the data better than models assuming responsiveness to the chamber median or no presidential acquiescence. Unilateral action appears not tantamount to presidential power, as evidence implies that legislative parties, or the judicial actors enforcing their will, are key conditioning factors.     

The Power of Smears in Two American Presidential Campaigns

This article compares the two main cases of deceitful negative campaigning that characterized the American presidential campaigns of 2004 and 2008. These are, respectively, the attacks led by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth against the military career and the subsequent pacifist turn of John Kerry and the smear, initially spread around the web, that claimed that Barack Obama was Muslim. This research describes the origins, developments, and outcomes of the two smear campaigns, focusing on the differences and similarities between them in terms of their content and their communication strategies. It then investigates the role played by the different media platforms employed by the negative campaigners, the importance of a prompt answer by the recipients of the accusations, and the response of public opinion. Finally, the comparison of the cases allows pointing out some conditions for the success or failure of mudslinging in contemporary American political communication.     

Presidential Power over Supreme Court Decisions

I calculate U.S. presidents’ power and power use concerning the ideological direction of U.S. Supreme Court decisions through their ability to appoint replacements to the Court, over the period 1946 through 2001. I test hypotheses concerning factors affecting appointment power and power use, and examine their effect on Senate confirmation votes. Of nine presidents, four have had the ability to affect the direction of more than 25 percent of Court decisions for sustained periods of time. Strongly ideological power use in appointment is found for four also. Senate confirmation votes have tended to be more favorable when the president has more appointment power.     

Presidential Bureaucratic Power and Supreme Court Justice Voting

Presidency scholars suggest that the federal bureaucracy has become presidentialized and that the federal agencies have become a primary tool for presidential policy implementation. However, in its review of federal agency litigation, the Supreme Court stands as an important monitor of executive bureaucratic action. Here, the conditions under which Supreme Court justices choose to facilitate executive bureaucratic action are assessed. This study tests the proposition that Supreme Court justices' voting decisions to support the president's bureaucratic agents are conditioned upon theoretically interesting extra-legal factors. Logistic regression analysis was conducted on justices' votes from Supreme Court cases involving cabinet and independent agencies during the years 1953–1995. The results indicate that Supreme Court justices' voting decisions to favorably review bureaucratic actions are influenced by extra-legal factors including attitudinal, political, and external concerns.     

The Impoundment Control Act of 1974: Restraining or Reviving Presidential Power?

The power to impound allows the president to cancel or postpone the spending of appropriated funds. Over the years Congress has struggled with the challenge of maintaining some control over impoundment actions while still allowing sufficient discretion for the president during budget implementation. This article examines the events leading up to the passage of the Impoundment Control Act as Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, and the framework established by the law. It provides some analysis of data on rescissions and deferrals in the period from 1975–1995 and reviews efforts to grant the president expanded impoundment authority, culminating in the passage of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. On April 10, 1997, the new law was found unconstitutional by a district court, but on June 26 the Supreme Court set aside that earlier decision on jurisdictional grounds, ruling that the plaintiffs (six members of Congress) lacked proper legal standing to bring the case ( Raines v. Byrd , 96–1671). However, the Supreme Court decision was confined to this technical issue and did not address the underlying constitutional questions. Whatever the further legal developments relating to the Line Item Veto Act, the article suggests that the issue of restraining or reviving presidential impoundment power will remain unsettled.     

The 2000 American Presidential Election

Abstract

The 2000 Presidential election was one of the longest, most expensive and closest in American history. It was the Presidential election that exposed the flaws (or genius) of the electoral college system, demonstrated the imperfections of media dependency on exit polls and quick election calling, and showed how a third party candidate with just two percent of the popular vote could make the difference in the crucial state of Florida. Democrats lost states they should have won; Republicans lost every big city and most of their suburbs; and the Florida election came down to a five-to-four muddled decision by the Supreme Court. Americans collectively learned a great civics lesson: that even in a bitter, controversial contest, our candidates accept defeat graciously; the simple act of voting is not so simple; and that for all its shortcomings, the electoral college did work.