The Color of Devolution: Race, Federalism, and the Politics of Social Control

In this article, we seek to advance scholarship on the origins and consequences of policy devolution by analyzing state decisions to give local authorities control over welfare policy. The first part of our analysis explores the political forces that systematically influence state decisions to cede policy control to lower-level jurisdictions. In this context, we propose a general Racial Classification Model of how race influences social policy choice. Our findings support this model as well as social control perspectives on welfare provision. Building on these results, we then show how modest but consistent racial effects on policy choices concatenate to produce large disparities in the overall policy regimes that racial groups encounter in the federal system. The empirical findings illuminate the fundamental role that federalism plays in the production of contemporary racial disparities and in the recent turn toward neoliberal and paternalist policies in American poverty governance.     

Federalism and Institutional Design: The Perils and Politics of a Triple-E Senate in Canada

Since the proposal was put forward by a subcommittee of theAlberta legislature, most western Canadian political leadershave advocated a U.S.-style Triple-E (elected, effective, andequal) Senate. Superficially compatible with western Canada'sstated constitutional and public policy agenda, the Triple-Eproposal has broad elite and popular appeal in the West. However,such an institution will be unlikely to satisfy western demandsfor more effective representation in the federal Parliament,and will prove antithetical to another key western objective:significant reduction of public spending in Ottawa. Insteadof pursuing a Triple-E Senate, the West's constitutional andpolicy objectives could focus on seeking greater devolutionof power to the provinces. Such a strategy would have the addedadvantage of facilitating a constitutional alliance with theprovince of Quebec, thereby enhancing the likelihood of success.     

Federalism and The Politics of Tobacco

Late in 1998, the United States acquired a new regime of tobaccocontrol engineered by the states' attorneys general. Nearlyall of them had filed lawsuits against the major cigarette manufacturers,allegedly with the aim of recouping Medicaid costs attributableto smoking. Despite latent differences of culture and interestin regard to tobacco control, all of the states eventually joinedin settlements with the industry that exacted large paymentsand restricted the industry's advertising and marketing practices.This article explains how it was possible for many differentpolities to agree on the settlement terms, and asks what thecase shows about the impact of federalism on tobacco policymaking.It concludes that tobacco policymaking in the 30 years priorto the lawsuits (1964–1994) was more consonant with constitutionalprinciples and not ineffective in achieving control.     

Public Sector Politics, Modernization, and Federalism: The Canadian and American Experiences

The focus of this analysis is an attempt to compare Canadianand American federalism in terms of Samuel Beer's modernizationtheory. In Canada, it is argued that modernization had led tothe enhancement of provincial power rather than the centralizationof the federal system. The Westminster model of parliamentarygovernment contributed to these developments, although the wayin which power is organized in government has been even moreimportant in determining the directions taken by Canadian federalism.     

The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era

During the period of the Bush Presidency, the federal governmentproceeded to centralize and nationalize policy in major areasformerly controlled by states and localities. The extensionof federal goals and standards to such areas as education testing,sales tax collection, emergency management, infrastructure,and elections administration were among the areas of significantmandates and preemptions. The continuation of policy centralizationin areas under a conservative and unified political regime showshow strong and deep the roots are for centralizing policy actionsin our intergovernmental system.     

Politics, Altruism, and the Definition of Poverty

The history of poverty lines suggests that they are determined jointly with poverty policy in the same political game. If the definition of poverty is endogenous, however, why do altruistic voters allow poverty to persist indefinitely, as seems to be the case in real life? A simple redistribution model shows that the persistence of poverty imposes fairly strong restrictions on the nature of voter altruism. Specifically, a voter's compassion for the poor must rise as the defined severity of the poverty problem worsens. Given such preferences, political actors face incentives to define poverty as a severe problem and then to use redistribution to reduce it significantly. There is no direct incentive to eliminate poverty, however; indeed, voters may prefer a state in which policy always attacks poverty vigorously and yet never defeats it. It follows that social policy should not be judged by its success in eliminating poverty, which may be directly counter to voter interests and therefore practically impossible. Rather, we should ask whether poverty policy provides enough help to people whom voters currently consider to be poor.     

TEA-21: Transportation Policy, Pork Barrel Politics, and American Federalism

This article examines ISTEA's impact on intergovernmental relationsin transportation policy over the past six years and providesan overview of the political maneuvering that took place duringits reauthorization. ISTEA had a significant, decentralizingimpact on transportation policy, but its 1997–1998 reauthorizationwas driven by electoral concerns that transcended congressionalviews on American federalism. These electoral concerns helpto explain why ISTEA's reauthorization process took so long,why the decentralization in transportation policy that tookplace in 1991 was not broadened by TEA-21, and why it is unlikelythat transportation policy will ever be fully devolved to thestates and localities.     

The Institutional Basis of Secessionist Politics: Federalism and Secession in the United States

According to the literature on secession, the most importantdeterminant of secessionist sentiment is a high level of grievanceexperienced by the would-be secessionist group. However, therationale behind using secession (as opposed to another strategy)as a grievance-amelioration strategy remains almost completelyunexplained. This article contends that the institutional settingin which political conflict and grievance are experienced playsa crucial role in whether secession is conceived of as a viableoption. This contention is tested by examining the institutionalenvironment of federalism and the role it played in secessionin the United States in 1860 and 1861. The United States wasuniquely vulnerable to secessionist pressures—as are allfederal states, potentially—because of institutional structuresthat gave constituent states a high level of institutional authorityand capacity; this, in turn, contributed to a discourse of states'rights that included the contested right to secede.     

The Politics of Indian Gaming: Tribe/State Relations and American Federalism

Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988,gambling on reservations has become a multibillion dollar industry.The act, however, has led to jurisdictional conflicts betweentribes and states. These conflicts are redefining the positionand role of Indian tribes in American federalism. As the tribeshave gained autonomy, states have lost jurisdictional powerand control. The federal government has become the arbiter inthe disputes and, as such, has continued to maintain its positionof supremacy and power over both tribes and states.     

Intergovernmental Relations and the Advocacy Coalition Framework: The Operation of Federalism in Denver Water Politics

The relationship between intergovernmental relations and theformulation and implementation of public policies is not wellunderstood by scholars. Borrowing from the advocacy coalitionframework, this study contends that public policies reflectthe strategic choices of federal, state, and local actors operatingwithin policy subsystems. The success of various governmentalpolicy strategies is dependent on the autonomy of each actorand the level of policy fragmentation within the subsystem.These variables are defined, operationalized, and examined withinthe context of intergovernmental relations in Denver water politics.