Are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences?

In campaigns, candidates often avoid taking positions on issues, concealing the policy preferences that would guide them if elected. This paper describes a novel explanation for ambiguity in political campaigns. It develops a model of candidate competition in which policy-motivated candidates can choose whether or not to announce their policy preferences to voters. It applies Eyster and Rabin’s (Econometrica 73(5):1623–1672, 2005) concept of cursed equilibrium, which allows for varying degrees of understanding of the connection between type (policy preference) and strategy (whether to announce). If voters updated according to Bayes’ rule, they would understand that candidates who do not announce positions are strategically concealing an unpopular policy preference. In equilibrium, only the most extreme candidates, those located furthest from the median voter’s position, would choose to take no position. However, if voters do not sufficiently appreciate the informational content of a non-announcement, unraveling will not occur and both extremists and more moderate candidates will not announce positions.     

Do voters learn? Evidence that voters respond accurately to changes in political parties’ policy positions

A premise of the mass–elite linkage at the heart of representative democracy is that voters notice changes in political parties’ policy positions and update their party perceptions accordingly. However, recent studies question the ability of voters accurately to perceive changes in parties’ positions. The study advances this literature with a two-wave panel survey design that measured voters’ perception of party positions before and after a major policy shift by parties in the government coalition in Denmark 2011–2013. Two key findings extend previous work. First, voters do indeed pay attention to parties when they visibly change policy position. Second, voters update their perceptions of the party positions much more accurately than would have been expected if they merely relied on a ‘coalition heuristic’ as a rule-of-thumb. These findings imply that under some conditions voters are better able to make meaningful political choices than previous work suggests.     

Citizen forecasting: Can UK voters see the future?

The leading approaches to election forecasting have been statistical models, prediction markets, or vote intention polls. This paper explores a different, little used approach - citizen forecasting - a method never yet tried for the case of the United Kingdom. Citizen forecasting simply asks voters in a scientific pre-election survey who they think will win. This aggregated (averaged) result is then assessed for its accuracy in forecasting the overall election outcome. This assessment is carried out on UK general elections from 1951 to 2005, and then applied to 2010. We find, among other things, that generally speaking the majority of the electorate can foretell the winner in advance.     

Transforming (but not transcending) the state system? On statist cosmopolitanism

Can states become committed and competent agents of cosmopolitan justice? The theory of ‘statist cosmopolitanism’ argues that they can: their citizens can be turned towards a commitment to cosmopolitan principles and actions by moral entrepreneurs constituting a ‘cosmopolitan avant-garde’, and can be sustained in their commitment to those principles by their pre-existing attachment to the state as a political community. Taking cosmopolitan principles as axiomatic, this paper subjects statist cosmopolitanism to critique. First, I question the scale of the transformation that a cosmopolitan avant-garde can engender given the complexity of the causal chains the avant-garde seek to elucidate, as well as the countervailing potency of the state itself which reinforces particularistic attitudes in its citizens. Second, I argue that even if, contra my preceding argument, the cosmopolitan avant-garde were to be successful, states would find it desirable to federally integrate in order to be better able to realise their cosmopolitan commitments. Such integration is compatible with statist cosmopolitanism’s motivational theory, even if not its institutional vision. Finally, I re-characterise the cosmopolitan avant-garde as agitators for the transcendence, rather than just transformation, of the state system.     

When and why does education matter? Motivation and resource effects in political efficacy

Education increases political engagement because it bolsters motivations and cognition on the one hand, and relative resources on the other. However, personality traits have recently been found to partially confound the education effect. Focusing on internal and external political efficacy allows us to disentangle the different effects of education. It is argued in this article (a) that personal dispositions confound the cognitive and motivational effect of education, which is the predominant effect of education on internal efficacy, but not resource effects which are important for external but not internal efficacy; and (b) that resource effects are context‐dependent whereas cognitive and motivational effects are not. Accordingly, the article shows that the competitive context in which individuals find themselves conditions the effect of education on external, but not on internal, efficacy.     

Robust satisficing voting: why are uncertain voters biased towards sincerity?

The modern theory of voting usually regards voters as expected utility maximizers. This implies that voters define subjective probabilities and utilities for different outcomes of the elections. In real life, these probabilities and utilities are often highly uncertain, so a robust choice, immune to erroneous assumptions, may be preferred. We show that a voter aiming to satisfice his expected utility, rather than maximize it, may present a bias for sincere voting, as opposed to strategic voting. This may explain previous results which show that strategic voting is not as prevalent as would be expected if all voters were expected utility maximizers.     

Electoral politics and monetary policy: does the Bank of Canada contribute to a political business cycle?

In this paper I apply the work of Abrams and Iossifov (Public Choice 129:249–262, 2006) to monetary policy in Canada to see if same political party affiliation is needed to produce evidence of political opportunism. After modifying their analysis to maintain the time-series consistency of their variables for Canada, I find that both an error correction model and a Taylor rule reformulation of their test generate evidence consistent with same party political opportunism, but only weakly so. On the other hand, I also find the presence of more traditional indicators of political influence. In particular, the data suggest that the election of a Liberal party government, a decrease in the degree of political competition, and to a lesser extent, the election of a minority government all positively influence the expansiveness of Canadian monetary policy.     

Public images of political parties: A necessary evil?

The debate on citizen images of political parties is long standing, but recently it has taken on added importance as the evidence of party dealignment has spread across Western democracies. This article assembles an unprecedented cross-national array of public opinion data that describe current images of political parties. Sentiments are broadly negative, and this pessimism has deepened over the past generation. Then, we demonstrate how distrust of parties decreases voting turnout, contributes to the fragmentation of contemporary party systems and the electoral base of new protest parties, and stimulates broader cynicism towards government. Although political parties are the foundation of the system of representative democracy, fewer citizens today trust political parties, and this is reshaping the nature of democratic politics.     

Partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance: the?Norwegian political business?cycle

The arcticle explores the political business cycle in Norway from the early 1980s onwards. It is shown that unemployment growth is related to uncertainty about likely parliamentary majorities, and to the level of political conflict between such majorities. Data indicate that voter expectations are formed on the basis of likely majority winners in votes, not in seats. Unemployment growth is unrelated to sudden and unpredictable changes in the composition of government. This suggests that the instruments influencing unemployment growth are within the domain of the legislative, not the executive, power.     

Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU's External Borders

In 2005 the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) was founded. Contrary to the widely used principal–agent approaches, it is more promising to analyse Frontex through the lens of experimentalist governance. This paper has two lines of argument. First, it argues that Frontex may only succeed if Frontex has a sufficient degree of organisational independence and enjoys appropriate and steady support by all member states. This is especially virulent when many member states fail to provide significant contributions in terms of material and human resources as well as time, leading to a suboptimal reduction of duration, scope and operational impact of Frontex's missions. The second argument is concerned with the accountability of Frontex. Contrary to the experimental approach, this article takes a sceptical stance, arguing that important (supra-)national actors are sidelined and relevant legal rules are ignored.     

Raising household saving: does financial education work?

This article highlights the prevalence and economic outcomes of financial illiteracy among American households, and reviews previous research that examines how improving financial literacy affects household saving. Analysis of the research literature suggests that previous financial literacy efforts have yielded mixed results. Evidence suggests that interventions provided for employees in the workplace have helped increase household saving, but estimates of the magnitude of the impact vary widely. For financial education initiatives targeted to other groups, the evidence is much more ambiguous, suggesting a need for more econometrically rigorous evaluations.     

Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter?

Gordon Tullock’s critique of the common law runs against much of the conventional wisdom in the law and economics literature. In this paper we revisit one of the most controversial aspects of Tullock’s critique. By applying Tullock’s own model of rent-seeking to litigation, we study the effect of alternative procedural rules on civil litigation. Our results provide support for Tullock’s controversial critique of the common law, revealing an evolutionary bias in the production of legal rules by courts. We extend the standard litigation model to study the effects of alternative procedural systems on the evolution of the common law.     

More ‘Europe’, less Democracy? European integration does not erode satisfaction with democracy

The process of European integration, through institutions such as the European Union, the Eurozone, or Schengen, implies a shift in political decision-making away from the national governments and towards international institutions. This gradual shift in the balance of power, furthermore, is increasingly debated by citizens. As a result, European integration might lead to an erosion of satisfaction with democracy in European countries. By means of a longitudinal analysis of the determinants of satisfaction with democracy in European countries, we test this expectation. We find no indication that the shift in the balance of power, and the trend towards more European integration indeed have eroded satisfaction with the functioning of (national) democracy.     

Ethnic minority voters in the UK 2015 general election: A breakthrough for the Conservative party?

It was widely reported that the 2015 UK general election represented a breakthrough election for the Conservative party among ethnic minority voters – specifically that their vote share among minorities increased, and overtook that of Labour for the first time among some groups. I show that analysis using more representative data yields markedly different results. Looking at (i) party preference from 2010 to 2015, and (ii) reported vote shares from a nationally representative probability survey, I show that the Conservatives increased their support among Hindus - but the Labour party gained in support elsewhere. This is due to movement away from the Liberal Democrats, 2010 minority supporters of the Liberal Democrats moved to supporting Labour rather than the Conservatives in 2015 at a ratio of 2:1. There is also considerable individual-level volatility in party support among ethnic minorities, which is masked by a high level of stability at the aggregate level.     

“Pioneers but not guinea pigs”: experimenting with climate change adaptation in French coastal areas

Uncertainty surrounding climate change has encouraged policy makers to engage in flexible and exploratory policies and forms of policy making. The article examines the potential of experimentation in devising coastal adaptation policies, taking into account its political dimensions. We analysed a multi-level experiment, funded by the French Ministry for the Environment from 2012 to 2015, where coastal municipalities volunteered to simulate the implementation of planned retreat as an adaptation strategy. Using insights from discursive institutionalism, we tracked developments throughout the experiment period. We highlight a combined process of governance experiment, allowing social innovation at local and regional scales, and a more strategic tool for the state, governing and steering local coastal policy with new instruments. We shed light on a particular policy entrepreneur (a public organization dealing with coastal management) playing at the intersection of these two forms, and in the interplay of policy scales. Although the experiment contributed to the innovation of legal and economic instruments and produced policy feedbacks in local planning and governance, learning capacities of the multi-scale architecture are still moderate to make planned retreat a reality in the near future. The conclusion considers performative and interpretive effects of policy experiments as further research questions to explore.     

Politically valued resources and preferred outcomes: Does the political context matter?

Previous research has concluded that ownership of economic resources that are politically valued leads to preferential outcomes during interactions with government officials. However, how the political context, and specifically the roles of the government actors involved, influences the relationship between political valued resources (PVRs) and desired outcomes has to date been relatively unexplored. In our paper, we argue that in interactions with elected legislators, PVRs are much more likely to lead to preferential outcomes. Conversely, due to the lack of power these resources have with bureaucrats in charge of regulatory enforcement, PVRs are less likely to lead to preferential outcomes. We provide some support for our arguments by looking for shifting patterns of effects in outcome variables that typically fall under the jurisdiction of each political role type. We find that large firms, export firms, and technology firms largely report having favorable influence over laws and regulations due to lobbying and increased foreign ownership, while also spending more days in inspections and more managerial time dealing with regulations.     

Change in Dutch political culture: A silent or a silenced revolution?

Dutch political culture is often regarded as an important example of the rise and spread of ‘New Politics’ since the late 1960s. Recently, some authors have argued that such expectations about changes in political values, political interest, political participation, and the party system would not survive empirical testing. However, by taking rates of change rather than absolute levels, by re‐examining the evidence in the light of more recent data, and by distinguishing short‐term period effects from a long‐term trend, it is shown that tremendous changes in Dutch political culture have taken place, and are still taking place.