Public choice theory and antitrust policy

We survey the pioneering contributions of Robert Tollison to the theory and practice of antitrust law enforcement. Inspired by his period of service during Ronald Reagan’s first administration as Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, Tollison was the first scholar to apply public choice reasoning to the question why antitrust frequently fails to achieve its stated goal of protecting consumers against unwarranted exercises of market power. In supplying evidence that the outcomes of antitrust processes are shaped more by special interests than by the public’s interest, he was instrumental in launching a wholly new research program.     

Interest-group analysis in economic history and the history of economic thought

This article reviews Bob Tollison’s conjoined contributions to the scholarly literature in the closely related fields of economic history and history of economic thought, underscoring his integration of public choice and interest-group analysis into the historian’s purview. It identifies the overarching themes of his research and summarizes the major findings of his key publications.     

Interest groups, public choice and the economics of religion

This article reviews Bob Tollison’s conjoint contributions to the burgeoning area of the economics of religion, underscoring his integration of public choice and interest-group themes into the microeconomic analysis of faith-based organizational architecture, institutional decision making and doctrinal innovation. Beginning with study of the medieval Catholic Church, moving forward to the Protestant Reformation and beyond, it supplies a timeline of developments and the major findings of each phase of his research program.     

Comment on Tollison’s contributions to economic history and the history of economic thought

Abstract Robert Tollison has furthered our understanding of mercantilism and other pivotal episodes in economic history considerably and also has applied the methods of positive economics to study the development of economic thought more generally. This article traces Tollison’s intellectual interest in those topics to his liberal arts education as an undergraduate at Wofford College and supplies commentary on Ekelund and Hébert’s valuable survey of his contributions to those areas of the literature.     

Determinants of publication productivity: an empirical analysis

Academic performance is typically measured as some combination of teaching, publishing, and professional service. This paper focuses on the publication aspect of academic output, estimating the determinants of publication productivity using data for Robert D. Tollison (RDT). Robert Tollison published 433 articles and books, and collaborated with 524 coauthors while at a dozen institutions over thirty-eight years. Our findings indicate that RDT’s output is significantly correlated with several factors, including co-authorship, the diversification of his research portfolio, business cycles, and academic pay. To a lesser extent, his production pattern is influenced by non-work interests and specific institutional affiliations.     

The political economy of dissonance

Cognitive dissonance is defined as the psychological discomfort or annoyance that may exist when an individual's choice is not consistent with his values and beliefs. Dissonance may cause an individual to reconsider his values and beliefs, enter new choices with different parameters, respond to the constraints imposed, or change his individual preference function. This paper extends Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance to the work of public choice theorists and seeks to explain the incentives of the iron triangle to foment and quell dissonance. Examples are provided for specific environmental and health and safety risks. Akerlof and Dickens (1983) used cognitive dissonance to justify public sector intervention as necessary to correct what they perceived as a market failure in the choice of safety equipment by workers in hazardeus industries. Unlike Akerlof and Dickens (1983), we argue that the concept of cognitive dissonance is applicable to the analysis of public sector decisions giving rise to government failure as well as private decisions involving possible market failure. This paper views the public sector as a market-like arrangement in which dissonance may be produced and exchanged like any other commodity. Cognitive dissonance provides a useful framework for examining individual choice and also expands our understanding of the unseen elements of rent-seeking.     

Public choice and the EPA: Empirical evidence on carbon emissions violations

This study provides evidence of public choice determinants of the penalties assessed by the Environmental Protection Agency for carbon emissions violations. Following the work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Tollison (1982), and Tullock (1989), this study points out that powerful business interest groups are able to use their political influence to shape EPA environmental policy for urban areas. The statistical estimates presented here suggest that business groups have limited power (through lobbying activity) in affecting the probability of the occurrence of an EPA citation for carbon emissions violations, while they may have considerable power in influencing thedegree of an EPA citation for carbon emissions standards, once a citation occurs.     

Mueller on European Federation: A Reply from the Perspective of Australian Federalism

Dennis Mueller has recently made a significant contribution tounderstanding issues of federalism and confederalism in theEuropean Union – from a particular public choice point of view. Hefurnishes an important and provocative discussion of therelationship between the decision-making rules embodied in aconstitutional convention (or other means of drafting a form ofunion for constituent states) and the decision-making rules whichwill be contained in the constitution which is the outcome of thatconvention. However, Mueller's veiled preference for a certainideal form of federalism for Europe tends to reduce the parametersof his discussion, and gives his article an unrealistic and narrowfocus, despite its ambitious scope. The present article exploressome of the latent complexities in the public choice analysis anddesign of European integration, particularly by drawing on thewider experience of working federations and theory of federalism,using the unique and synthesizing Australian experience as a pointof departure. It argues that Mueller's analysis is biased towardsthe reduction of decision-making costs of European governance, andthus undervalues the external costs that may be imposed throughexcessive central government.     

Remembering Vincent Ostrom: unhorsing a dominant paradigm

This essay is a memorial piece about Vincent Ostrom (September 25, 1919–June 29, 2012). I start by reviewing his academic history and then turn to Professor Ostrom’s major intellectual legacy—his effort to overturn the dominant paradigm in public administration and political science on metropolitan government reform. The three most important contributions of his work are discussed, including the introduction of public goods theory into the study of public administration and his work on quasimarkets and the Tiebout model. Three controversies or conundrums raised by his work are then discussed. Finally, the essay considers whether Professor Ostrom was ultimately successful in his effort to overthrow the traditional approach to the production and delivery of public goods at the city government level.     

A Critical Evaluation of Virtual Local Government in Australia

The vigorous debate surrounding local government amalgamation in Australia remains unresolved. In an attempt to break the current stalemate Percy Allan (2001) has proposed a model of 'virtual local government' that seeks to combine the service appropriateness and effectiveness purportedly associated with demographically small councils with the service efficiency of large municipalities. This paper attempts to place his model in the context of the literature on the theory of public sector policy reform. It then goes on to examine virtual local government in the light of new institutional economics, public choice theory and the characteristics of Australian local government.     

On Sen's Liberal Paradox and its Reception within Political Theory and Welfare Economics

In this article, Amartya Sen's seminal proof of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal is briefly reviewed. I then discuss the reception of this alleged 'liberal paradox' within the fields of political theory and welfare economics. In particular, I examine the criticisms made by Brian Barry, and their wider implications for the field of social choice theory. It is argued that the various criticisms made on Sen's characterisation of liberty are fundamental, and that Sen's subsequent defence of his position is unconvincing. Moreover, there remain some wider doubts as to the usefulness of social choice theory's SWF approach to individual rights and freedoms.     

Cultural Pluralism: A Response to Seglow's Critique

I examine Seglow's critique (Politics 17(3) 1997) of my assessment of Parekh's theory of operative public values (Politics 16(3) 1996). This examination has four main stages: (a) the rejection of crucial aspects of Seglow's interpretation of my argument, (b) the rejection of his claim that my argument is logically committed to certain other specific positions which I do not support, (c) the rejection of his claim that I my argumentative strategies are misleading, (d) the consideration of possible similarities and disagreements between our respective positive positions on cultural pluralism.     

Choice in Public Services: Crying 'Wolf' in the School Choice Debate

Choice, diversity and personalisation have been key to the New Labour project in public services. With the emergence of a reinvigorated Conservative party as a credible electoral threat, and the end of the Blair era, it seems appropriate to consider the continuing viability and longevity of the New Labour public service project. In this article, I approach the issue of choice in public services through an examination of the long-running controversy over choice in the English secondary school system. I argue that the opponents of choice have been reluctant to engage with the notion of choice in public services due to concerns over the supposed negative effect that consumer choice has on the equity and quality of service provision. This paper aims to challenge the claim that any element of choice in education necessarily has deleterious effects on social justice. I argue that the case against school choice has not been decisively made and that school choice can, in principle, form part of a socially progressive educational project by redistributing power to service users and helping to maintain popular support for public provision of education.     

Gordon Tullock and Public Choice

Gordon Tullock is one of the founders of the field of public choice, of the Public Choice Society, and of the Public Choice Center. He is a coauthor with James M. Buchanan of one of the true classics in the public choice field—The Calculus of Consent. He has been one of the field’s most prolific scholars, with his research spanning virtually all dimensions of the public choice field. This article surveys his major contributions.     

Regulation by litigation: Not so bad?

This is a review essay concerning the book Regulation by Litigation. Utilizing public choice theory as the basis of its analysis, the book presents three case studies designed to demonstrate that regulation by litigation does not serve the public interest. This review essay attempts to show that public choice theory does not explain the decision to use litigation in these cases, that the alleged failure of litigation in these cases might not be failures at all, and that regulation by litigation is not the unmitigated evil the authors of the book suggest.     

Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results

A significant majority of the world's constitutional courts publicize their decisions through direct contact with the national media. This interest in public information is puzzling in so far as constitutional judges are not directly accountable to voters. I argue that the promotion of case results is consistent with a theory of judicial behavior in which public support for courts can undermine incentives for insincere decision making. In this article, I develop a simple game theory model that identifies how case promotion is linked to judicial choice. Results of a simultaneous equations model estimating the Mexican Supreme Court's merits decisions and its choices to publicize those decisions by issuing press releases to national media outlets support an account of constitutional review in which judges believe they can influence their authority through case promotion.     

The intellectual legacy of Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock is one of the world’s leading economists. Even more so than Chicago’s Gary Becker, Tullock has extended the rational choice model into areas previously judged to lie outside the realm of economics. This essay identifies Tullock’s contributions to constitutional political economy, public choice, bureaucracy, the law, and bio-economics. The essay focuses attention most especially on Tullock’s pioneering contributions to public choice, including his twenty-year editorship of Public Choice.     

Incremental Thinking: "Toward a Theory of Budgeting"

Editor's Note: V.O. Key's article bemoaning "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory" was reprinted in the previous issue of Public Budgeting & Finance. The problems identified by Key are normative; they go to the basic values arid purposes of society and, hence, cannot be resolved by budgetary solutions alone. But a dozen years after Key wrote, Verne Lewis sought to anchor a theory of budgeting in marginal analysis, His article, printed here by permission of the American Society for Public Administration, first appeared in the Public Administration Review in 1952, Rather than seeking a full-blown political philosophy. Lewis thought that budgetary choice could be rationalized at the margins, by comparing the marginal costs and benefits of competing claims on public resources, While his hopes for a theory of budgeting have not been fulfilled, Lewis laid the groundwork for forms of marginal analysis introduced by PPB and ZBB in later decades. Indeed, there is a remarkable affinity between the budgetary structure proposed by Lewis and the one used by zero-base budgeting in the 1970s.     

Remembering Bill Niskanen: pursuing economics as a public science in the service of liberty

This short essay is a memorial piece about William A. Niskanen (13 March 1933–26 October 2011). The essay starts with his time at the University of Chicago in the mid-1950s, and gives most attention to his contributions to public choice. Especial attention is paid to his Bureaucracy and Representative Government, which opened vast territory for subsequent analytical exploration. A good deal of attention is also paid to his Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government because this work both conveys his interest in comparative constitutional analysis and is useful for illustrating the strengths and weaknesses of his approach to this material.     

Candidate Qualities through a Partisan Lens: A Theory of Trait Ownership

Using Petrocik's (1996) theory of issue ownership as a point of departure, I develop and test a theory of "trait ownership" that provides an explanation for the origins of candidate trait perceptions and illustrates an important way that candidates affect voters. Specifically, I argue for a direct connection between the issues owned by a political party and evaluations of the personal attributes of its candidates. As a result, the American public views Republicans as stronger leaders and more moral, while Democrats hold advantages on compassion and empathy. I also draw on "expectations gap" arguments from psychology and political science to demonstrate how a candidate may gain an electoral advantage by successfully "trespassing" on his opponent's trait territory. National Election Studies data from the 1980–2004 presidential elections are used to demonstrate the existence, durability, and effects of trait ownership in contemporary American political campaigns.