The local state and urban local government in Zambia

It is argued, with reference to urban local government in Zambia, particularly in Lusaka, that recent debates on the form and functions of the national state in Africa may be used to illuminate the working of the urban local state. Available evidence on the class interests represented in the urban local state is reviewed, and these interests and their actions with respect to personal accumulation and political clientelism are found to be similar to those found at the national level. The urban local state in Zambia performs functions similar to those which have been revealed by analyses of other countries, although the nature of these functions, and the extent to which they are successfully performed, is influenced by the political and economic context, the institutional framework and especially the constraints imposed by central government on local autonomy. The changes proposed in the 1980 Local Administration Act are outlined, and a preliminary assessment made of the extent to which they are likely to change the form and functions of the urban local state.     

Public service delivery in South Africa: The political influence at local government level

This paper analyses poor service delivery at local government level, which is attributed to the politicisation of administrative components in municipalities, resulting in poor local governance. The public service delivery system has been perceived as one of the most important ways of reducing poverty through poverty alleviation programmes. As part of the South African government's cooperative system, key stakeholders in municipalities ought to adopt an integrated approach to public service delivery. An integrated approach to public service delivery demands that local municipalities, together with relevant stakeholders, integrate processes and services to ensure effective and efficient service delivery. This ultimately will result in an improved standard of living and sustainable livelihood for communities. With regard to public service delivery, local municipalities have the obligation of creating income opportunities people, especially the poor, with the sole aim of contributing towards poverty reduction and the realisation of the expectations of people, as stated in the South African government's White Paper of transforming public service delivery. The political interface in local municipalities greatly affects effective and efficient administration, as well as growth opportunities. Administrators, therefore, have the important function of ensuring that explicit assignments of objectives and administrative functions are wholly separated from the policymaking activities of government. This paper, therefore, suggests that municipalities adopt the merit system and abandon the spoils system that is highly characterised by political favours and political interferences. Political favours and interferences are dominant in local South African government, and they hinder the process of providing services equally.     

Urban local government finance in Nigeria: The case of Onitsha local government

Onitsha, located along the route that connects south-western and south-eastern Nigeria, has a very financially dynamic local government. Over one-quarter of the total revenues of this local government come from its market and motor parks. This is an unusual source for a local government that has perhaps the largest per capita revenue in Nigeria—almost N40, compared with the national average of N4.9. The procedure for collecting this revenue is regarded as highly successful since there is greater reliance on the citizens than tax officials. The volume of revenues collected has allowed the council maintain a large surplus revenue over a long period of time, which enables it to carry out important programmes of primary and adult education. It is also beginning to develop its property revenue collection system in collaboration with the Anambra State government.     

城市积水考问政府公共服务能力

城市积水处理是城市基础设施建设的一部分,也是政府公共服务的一部分,更是对政府提供公共服务的能力和水平的考问和检验,面对严竣的积水现状,我国政府唯有强化公共服务能力,完善公共服务体系,才是治理之道。     

Pork is policy: Dissipative inclusion at the local level

The article investigates the impact of local policies on human development indicators in Brazilian municipalities. This is an attempt to investigate the role of the legislative branch in reducing inequality and poverty through budget amendments, usually seen in derogatory form as pork barrel politics. We assess the effect of pork on municipalities using up‐to‐date policy evaluation techniques. Brazil is a case of extreme inequality and an active legislative branch in disbursing monies. The data set contains over 60,000 observations from all 5,500+ Brazilian municipalities for over a decade. We use matching and longitudinal data analysis techniques, treating pork as exogenous shocks, mapping how its effect reverberates on social and economic indicators in succeeding years. The results indicate a positive impact of such policies in improving local level development. However, these results are not sustainable over time, thus suggesting inclusion with a dissipative profile.     

关于提升地方政府中层管理者领导力的几点思考

随着全球化趋势和政治、经济、社会环境变化的加剧,地方政府管理者要尽快适应新的行政环境,尤其是地方政府中层管理者①的领导力越来越受到重视。但是,目前地方政府中层管理者的领导力不仅没有得到充分发挥,而且在组织文化、决策参与度、培训与开发等方面仍然存在诸多问题。基于此,提出提升地方政府中层管理者领导力的若干建议,以确保行政行为的创新、专业化与组织效能。     

政治合法性与中国地方政府创新:一项初步的经验性研究

政治合法性直接关系到政权的兴亡更替。本文简要回顾和总结了古代民本主义和近代民主主义有关政治合法性问题的基本思想,在此基础上提出了在当代中国巩固政治合法性基础的八条途径。随后,作者对2000年以来三届“中国地方政府创新奖”63个案例进行了初步的经验研究,据此回答了地方政府创新是否和通过何种途径增强了政治合法性的问题,同时分析了地方政府创新在增强政治合法性问题上的限度问题。     

The co-ordination of developmental activities at the local level

Local developmental activities involve the participation of a multiplicity of functionaries, bodies and agencies. This demands both intra-authority and inter-authority co-ordination if programme formulation and implementation are to be effective. This paper reviews the performance of the Divisional Administration system operationalized in the former East Central State of Nigeria up to 1976, from the viewpoint of interjurisdictional co-ordination. The paper identifies factors like lack of specific local development programmes, poor information flow and a de-emphasis of the human factor in the organizational setting as being responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Divisional Administration system to co-ordinate the activities of the different participating actors in local development. It is suggested that, in addition to the setting up of structures for decision-making networks like committees, attention should equally be paid to the process that would energize and sustain the structures if problems of co-ordination are to be obviated.     

The impact of electoral reform at the local level in Africa: the case of Senegal's 1996 local elections

Local electoral systems in transitional polities can play a critical role in the growth and development of democratic governance. In this study, the impact of electoral system change at the subnational level in an African nation, Senegal, is examined. Senegal recently altered the electoral system it employs for the selection of its local and municipal councils. The mixed plurality-proportional system, favors the largest parties. It clearly introduced distortions between the distribution of voter support and seats on councils. These distortions are modified by the proportional part of the vote which provides opportunities for smaller parties to obtain seats. The presence and impact of strategic entry and strategic voting, both in rural and urban areas is assessed.     

Unnatural partners: coalescence in Israeli local government

ABSTRACT

A prominent finding in coalition formation literature is that the underlying political rationale at the subnational level largely follows that of the one revealed by the classic literature on national coalitions. The Israeli political system is extremely centralized, with a local government that is highly dependent on its national counterpart. One could expect such a setting to result in local party behaviour that closely resembles the national one. However, as we show, this is far from being the case. We analyze 34 municipal coalitions in the 17 largest Israeli cities. After establishing that Israeli municipal politics fly in the face of classical coalition formation theories, we turn to explain this discrepancy with a qualitative analysis of interviews with 5 formatuers and 8 councillors. We conclude that mayors face low costs of adding surplus coalition partners, while standing to gain from wider legitimacy, weaker opposition, and constrained future competition. At the same time, municipal lists have strong resource- and policy-related incentives to join the coalition while compromise is met with low political costs. The result is an overwhelming predominance of oversized coalitions and partnerships which would be highly improbable at the national arena.     

Fiscal illusion at the local level: Empirical evidence for the Flemish municipalities

Fiscal illusion refers to a systematically biased perception of fiscal parameters, due to demand-side error/ignorance or supply-side abusive behaviour. As such it is a component of a more general tax choice framework. This paper focuses predominantly on the empirical estimation of the four major sources of fiscal illusion, namely the flypaper effect, renter illusion and the complexity and elasticity of tax systems. The results — based on a dataset of 302 Flemish municipalities — on balance suggest the existence of important illusionary effects.     

Social funds and local government: the case of Malawi

Two instruments—social funds and decentralization—are currently quite popular policy instruments being adopted in many developing countries throughout the world. Each of these instruments is currently being used or is being implemented in Malawi, Africa. While each instrument is intended to improve the flow of public services in a locality, the article discusses how each has certain potential theoretical advantages over the other. The article then goes on to describe and analyze the flow of resources to Malawian communities under the two largest social action programs, neither of which currently relies on substantial inputs, financial or human, from local governments. The data illustrates a wide disparity in the per capita amounts allocated to these demand‐driven initiatives across districts but also shows the relatively diverse set of local public services supported by the funds. The article close with a discussion of how these two initiatives might be merged within the context of the new Local Government Act 1998, under which local services are to be devolved in the near future. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bias in the formulation of local government budget problems

Government budgets are premised on forecasts of revenues and expenditures. These forecasts are subject to both stochastic error and strategic manipulation. Circumstantial evidence in the budgeting literature and in the popular media suggest that government officials routinely bias the forecasts underlying budgets. The research reported here asked three primary questions: To what extent are budget forecasts systematically biased? Why? (Are fiscal and electoral variables systematically related to the magnitude and direction of the biases?) What political and ethical difference do the biases make? From the literature and an analysis of the incentives facing politicians and bureaucrats, we developed hypotheses about budget biases. These hypotheses were tested using time series data for the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1941–1983); the City of San Diego, California (1950–1982); and the Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania) School District (1946–1983). In these locales over the periods examined, budgets were systematically pessimistic; revenues were underestimated and expenditures were overestimated. The fiscal and electoral factors hypothesized to account for this pessimism are, however, very mixed in their ability to explain the biases.     

The politics of redistribution in local government

Abstract. This paper deals with the politics of redistribution in local government. Traditionally, it has been assumed that redistributive policies are crucial in electoral competition and party politics, both in national and local political systems. From this perspective, differences in local competition and party systems are essential to an explanation of local redistributive efforts. Peterson (1981), however, claims that redistributive policies are excluded from the local agenda because they impair local economic prosperity. These policies are therefore not conceived as instruments in the vote-maximizing strategies of local political parties. In this paper, hypotheses on the impact of party competition and party politics on local redistribution are formulated and tested on data for 342 Dutch municipalities. The results show that, contrary to what would be expected from Peterson's perspective, municipal redistributive efforts were related to electoral competitiveness and the party system. The proposed model, however, proved to be unsatisfactory in accurately predicting the direction of the effects of these explanatory variables. These results suggest that, rather than abandoning the study of local redistribution as a non-issue in subnational politics, an effort should be made to develop a better theoretical understanding of the ways in which competition and party politics shape these policies.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.