Mergers and difference-in-difference estimator: Why firms do not increase prices?

Difference-in-difference methods are being increasingly used to analyze the impact of mergers on pricing and other market equilibrium outcomes. Using evidence from an exogenous merger between two retail gasoline companies in a specific market in Spain, this paper shows how concentration did not lead to a price increase. In fact, the conjectural variation model concludes that the existence of a collusive agreement before and after the merger accounts for this result, rather than the existence of efficient gains. This result may explain empirical evidence reported in the literature according to which mergers between firms do not have significant effects on prices.     

Hospital mergers and antitrust: an economic analysis

The hospital industry has recently experienced substantial merger activity. This paper examines several actual and proposed hospital mergers to determine the extent of competition in the affected markets and the effect these mergers may have on competition. Our focus is on mergers between hospitals in the same market. We define the relevant product and geographic market for hospitals, then develop criteria for evaluating hospital mergers and analyze several merger cases using these criteria. We conclude that these mergers threaten the competition that exists in most of the markets discussed, and that the claimed efficiency justification for mergers is not convincing.     

Applying antitrust law to nonprofit healthcare entities: arguments for a greater attention to detail

This Article begins with an antitrust primer, then analyzes the appropriate application of antitrust principles to nonprofit healthcare providers. In light of the inherent charitable character of nonprofit healthcare providers, the author contends that the government and the courts should accord some deference to nonprofit hospitals when they are seeking approval of mergers. To date, this has not generally been the case, although a few recent court decisions have rested their approval of mergers, in part, upon the nonprofit character of the merging entities. The author, in particular, believes the paradigmatic local nonprofit hospital with a community board is less likely than a for-profit hospital to abuse any market power that it may obtain through a merger; consequently, any such merger should not be analyzed solely under the traditional presumptions of antitrust jurisprudence. Rather, the premerger analysis should involve meaningful consideration of the hospital's charitable character.     

欧盟法对企业合并的规制

企业合并是当今各国优化产业结构和企业组织结构的重要手段,也是企业迅速扩张、提高规模经济效益和国际竞争力的有效手段.然而,经济力量的集中和由此导致的市场结构的改变,容易产生或加强市场支配力量,从而起到排除或限制竞争的作用.为了防止企业通过并购实现或加强市场支配地位,维护市场上的竞争秩序,对一定规模以上的企业并购交易进行反垄断审查,已成为市场经济国家设计和实施反垄断法的通行做法.目前,已有七十多个国家建立了企业并购控制机制.其中十分引人注目的是,欧盟于上世纪90年代初建立了企业合并控制机制,并于2004年进行了改革.到目前为止,欧盟竞争总司作出的并购审查决定已达两千多件,在此过程中积累了丰富的经验.拟对欧盟企业合并控制制度的建立、理论、程序及实体规则进行研究,并就中国企业合并控制制度的现状及发展提出自己的看法.     

Horizontal mergers and efficiencies; theory and anti trust practice

Horizontal mergers can be challenged by anti trust authorities under both the US and EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines. More horizontal mergers are unconditionally approved in the US than in the EU. EU merger policy toughened after 1998 but became more in line with US practices after 2004. Differences in merger policies between the US and the EU can be explained by a greater scope of the efficiency argument in the US. The paper argues that firms only want to merge in oligopoly, if they expect to realize substantial merger specific efficiency gains, which counterbalances the price increasing effect of merger.      

企业合并行为的竞争法分析

对企业合并进行控制是竞争法的基本内容,而其中最核心的问题,是评价企业合并行为所依据的实体标准。基本内容包括对合并行为的反竞争影响,及其产生的积极效果。由于企业合并主要是通过改变市场结构而影响竞争,因而在对其进行分析时,一般首先分析合并行为对所在市场集中度产生的影响,这主要通过赫芬达尔指数来反映,对于发生在指数较低的市场上,或发生在集中度较高的市场上,但并未导致指数大幅度提高的企业合并行为,认定其不会产生严重的反竞争效果,可以批准。其他的合并行为则要由竞争主管机关进一步分析,主要考察该行为的反竞争效果,包括单边效果与协调效果;然后再考察存在哪些抵消因素。经过比较后,如果积极效果大于消极效果,则予以批准。     

Does police size matter? A review of the evidence regarding restructuring police organisations

Restructuring and merging public sector organisations is often seen as a way to enhance efficiency and efficacy. There is ongoing debate about the impact of police force sizes, structures and mergers as police organisations attempt to adapt to reductions in their budgets and changes in patterns of criminality. The article reviews the evidence regarding key aspects of police reform: finding mixed evidence regarding the links between size and performance, while noting risks that mergers may impair local policing. The article discusses the impact of mergers on protective services, governance and accountability, while also discussing potential risks and opportunities associated with the merger process itself. The review finds significant gaps in the available evidence, and significant opportunities to expand the evidence base on this topic. Given current gaps in the evidence regarding size, efficacy and efficiency, it is important to give due consideration to symbolic and rhetorical aspects of mergers.     

Failed hospital mergers

The spate of hospital mergers in recent years has yielded both substantial increases in market power and many divestitures. These seemingly contradictory results stem from the pressures imposed by stakeholders of merging hospitals and the inability of those stakeholders to exert control over nonprofit institutions prior to the effectuation of a merger. This Article examines several recent mergers, analyses their failures, and recommends that the judiciary and state attorneys general look carefully at merging nonprofits so as to fill the void left by the lack of market control mechanisms.     

欧美并购控制法实体标准比较研究

实体标准是整个并购控制体系的核心 ,也是反垄断法的重要内容之一。欧盟最新并购控制立法确立的“严重妨碍有效竞争”实体标准与美国奉行的“实质性减少竞争”标准一样都反映着并购控制的本质。欧美采取大同小异的并购实体标准有利于推动国际跨国并购审查结果的一致性 ,促进并购活动的发展。我国应确立“严重妨害正当竞争”实体标准并配套颁布并购评估指南 ,注重并购审查的经济分析     

20世纪90年代以来的合并控制理论探析

为了适应 20世纪 90年代以来并购活动的日益增长,规制者运用“革新市场”和“单方效果”来支持积极的反托拉斯执法活动。“革新市场”理论通过对一个合并对相关市场上的研究和发展的影响来评估技术领先企业之间的合并。“单方效果”理论根据合并企业独自对相关市场上价格产生影响的能力来评估一个合并。     

Hospital mergers: the shift from federal antitrust enforcement to state regulation

The authors examine and analyze the burgeoning merger activity in the hospital arena, as well as the nonfederal attempts made to regulate that activity. They conclude that the present, ad hoc, system of state regulation is sorely wanting and that it would be preferable if stronger antitrust enforcement and judical decisions prevented competition reducing mergers. If a merger results in a true monopoly (and nonetheless passes antitrust scrutiny), its regulation should be the responsibility of the pertinent state public utility board which, unlike the courts and state attorneys general, has sufficient expertise to adequately regulate the merged entities. Otherwise, the faults of the present system, which is easily manipulated by hospitals seeking political and legal cover for their activities, are likely to be perpetuated.     

合并控制中的向上定价压力测试法

向上定价压力测试法简称UPP测试法,是近年理论界提出的一种评估差异性产品供应商之间横向合并能否导致单边效应的新方法。UPP测试法基于对合并企业产品之间转移率的判断,通过量化合并企业之间竞争约束的减少程度,分析合并交易带来的涨价激励,从而评估合并导致单边效应的可能性。虽然目前中国还缺乏UPP测试法的适用环境,但随着立法的完善与执法的发展,该方法在中国日后肯定有适用的空间。     

Market structures,political surroundings,and merger remedies: an empirical investigation of the EC’s decisions

This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms’ characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinant factors of the Commission’s decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, no matter the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.     

The GE/Honeywell merger controversy and the path to analytical convergence in international merger assessment: A critical commentary

Globalisation, with its concomitant rise in international merger activity, allied to the proliferation of merger control regimes vetting such activity, increases the likelihood of two or more competition authorities reaching divergent decisions in the same case. This article reveals that this situation arose in the proposed merger between two US-based companies, General Electric (GE) and Honeywell, with the EU prohibiting the merger, and the US Department of Justice approving it. Further, it discusses the analytical and interpretational differences which led to those divergent outcomes. The analytical debate centres on the appropriateness of the two theoretical approaches used to assess proposed mergers, with the EU using the range effects of competitive harm approach and the US giving greater weight to an economic efficiencies merger defence. The fallout from the GE/Honeywell case has given added impetus to progress analytical convergence in relation to the vetting of international mergers. This has found expression at the multilateral level, which links to EU initiatives. The article predicts that the EU is highly likely to incorporate an economic efficiencies defence into its merger control law, bringing it into line with other key players. Of course, analytical convergence cannot guarantee that interpretational differences will not arise, as was evident in aspects of the GE/Honeywell case. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

平台扼杀式并购的反垄断法规制

全球大型数字平台通过"复制、收购与扼杀"的策略扼杀并购了大量初创企业,引发了创新赛道垄断的顾虑。初创企业并购通常不会引起显著的市场结构变化,但随着时间推移,平台"切香肠式"的扼杀式并购,在扼杀潜在竞争对手、强化自身市场支配地位的同时,更会扭曲长期创新供给,致使未来市场可竞争性丧失。而并购效率改进收益的消亡、创业者奖励作用的证伪与动态竞争约束工具的全面失灵,进一步要求反垄断执法机构应摒弃目前普遍不作为的监管做法,及时识别与规制平台扼杀式并购。对此,有必要引入内部文档调查、并购价格组成分析等并购动机过滤机制,识别出那些出于消除未来竞争威胁或扼杀潜在迭代式创新目的的初创企业并购;同时,通过引入补充性的申报门槛、设定更具针对性的审查补救措施与授权必要的事后调查,将能有效地遏制平台资本的无序扩张,为初创企业创造一个不受主导平台扼杀式并购威胁的现代化营商环境。     

USING RETAIL DATA FOR UPSTREAM MERGER ANALYSIS

The typical situation that antitrust authorities face is toanalyze a proposed manufacturer merger using scanner data atretail level. I start with a benchmark model of manufacturers'and retailers' sequential pricing behavior. Then I perform counterfactualexperiments to explore the relationship between downstream retailerpricing models and the resulting estimates of upstream mergers,in the absence of wholesale prices. Looking at scanner datafor the ground coffee category sold at several retail chainsin Germany, I find that not considering retail pricing explicitlywhen analyzing the potential consequences of an upstream mergerresults in simulated changes in welfare that are significantlydifferent given the underlying model of retail pricing behavior.These findings are relevant for competition policy, and authoritiesshould consider incorporating the role of retailers in upstreammerger analyses, especially in the presence of increasinglyconsolidated retail food markets.     

THE PROHIBITION OF THE PROPOSED SPRINGER-PROSIEBENSAT.1 MERGER: HOW MUCH ECONOMICS IN GERMAN MERGER CONTROL?

We review the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office Germany)decision on the proposed merger between Springer and ProSiebenSat.1from an economic point of view. In doing so, it is not our goalto analyze whether the controversial decision by the Bundeskartellamthas been correct or flawed from a legal point of view. Instead,we analyze whether the economic reasoning in the decision documentreflects state-of-the-art economic theory on conglomerate mergers.Regarding such types of mergers, anticompetitive effects eitherdo not occur regularly or are more often than not overcompensatedby efficiency gains, so that a standard welfare perspectivedemands reluctance concerning antitrust interventions. Thisis particularly true if two-sided markets, like media markets,are involved. However, anticompetitive conglomerate mergersare not impossible, in particular in neighboring markets wherethere is some relationship between the products of the mergingcompanies. In line with the more-economic approach in Europeanmerger control, a particular thorough line of argumentation,backed with particularly convincing economic evidence, is necessaryto justify a prohibition of a conglomerate merger from an economicpoint of view. Against this background, we do not find the reasoningof the Bundeskartellamt entirely convincing and sufficientlystrong to justify a prohibition of the proposed combinationfrom an economic perspective. The reasons are that (i) the Bundeskartellamtfails to continuously consider consumer and customer welfareas the relevant standards, (ii) positive efficiency and welfareeffects of cross-media strategies are neglected, (iii) in contrast,the competition agency sometimes appears to view profitabilityof post-merger strategy options to be per se anticompetitive(efficiency offence), (iv) the incontestability of the relevantmarkets is not sufficiently substantiated, (v) inconsistenciesoccur regarding the symmetry of the TV advertising market duopolyversus the unique role of the Bild-Zeitung and (vi) the employmentof modern economic instruments appears to be underdeveloped.Thus, we conclude that the Bundeskartellamt has not embracedthe European more-economic approach in the analyzed decision.However, one can discuss whether economic effects are overcompensatedin this case by concerns about a reduction in diversity of opinionand threats to free speech. Similar to the Bundeskartellamt,we do not consider these concerns in our analysis.     

Defending hospital mergers after the FTC's unorthodox challenge to the Evanston Northwestern--Highland Park transaction

Examining the Federal Trade Commission's retrospective challenge of a hospital merger in Illinois, the author provides an insightful analysis of one of the agency's major antitrust enforcement initiatives in health care in the last several years. Because the case produced several departures from antitrust orthodoxy, these departures may affect the trials of future hospital mergers that are challenged. The author reviews the methodology and evidence of the case, and he identifies theories and best practices that are important for administrators and legal practitioners to implement in future mergers.     

New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control

Abstract:  This article examines two new directions of EC competition law, by taking the example of Merger Control. The first is factual, since the Commission has accepted an increased role for economic analysis under the new Regulation. The second examines the role that EC competition law could play in the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy objectives. At present, both directions interact with one another, as the importance and the aims of competition rules depend to a large extent on the economic theory when applying legal rules. Traditionally, the EU has rejected the creation of an industrial policy that is considered to be inefficient. But the intensification of international competition has to induce the EU to open up the debate in relation to the meaning to be attributed to a 'European industrial strategy'. To accomplish a 'dynamic and competitive' European economy, current policies, mainly competition policy, should consider taking into account international competitiveness by resolving the question of the economic theoretical context used to review mergers.     

THE POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT INACCURACIES IN MERGER SIMULATION MODELS

This paper considers the role that merger simulation modelsshould play in European merger control. The use of these models,as off-the-shelf instruments to assess the economic effectsof mergers, has become increasingly widespread in recent years.However, contrary to some claims, merger simulation models donot allow investigators to avoid much of the competitive effectsanalysis relating to the relevant economic market, nor do theynecessarily provide more precision to merger control. Withoutunderstanding the limitations of such models and the circumstancesunder which they can and should be usefully applied, they maynot just be useless, but dangerous in the sense of providingpossibly spurious results with spurious claimed accuracy. Thispaper argues that any merger simulation models used should be"bespoke" models, rather than off-the-shelf models, but cautionsthat even bespoke models will frequently not be as useful asis often claimed. This is not to deny that there are occasionswhen well-constructed bespoke models are genuinely useful anddo offer genuine improvements in merger control.