论官僚制的实践困境

韦伯在总结官僚制发展的经验的基础上,提出了现代官僚制的合理性设计问题.但是,这个具有合理性的官僚制体制所体现出来的却是片面的形式合理性.所以,存在着理论上的悖论,而这一理论上的悖论又必然导致官僚制在公共行政实践上的困境.在20世纪官僚制的实践中,集权与授权、效率与责任、科学与价值的冲突都达到了空前的地步,特别是官僚主义的问题引致了政府结构及其运行中的诸多问题,以致于政府及其公共行政经常性地陷入困境.因此,自70年代以来,行政改革的运动提出了告别官僚制的目标.     

理性官僚制与历史官僚制的比较分析

中国古代官僚制不同于韦伯所提倡的理性官僚制,艾森斯塔德认为中国古代官僚制是一种历史官僚制,从组织和制度层面对理性官僚制与历史官僚制进行比较分析,显然后者缺乏前者所具有的理性精神和法治观念。但中国古代官僚制延续了两千多年,其精神内化在制度之中对当前我国的官僚制仍有很大影响。对西方理性官僚制与中国古代历史官僚制的比较研究有助于探索解决当前我国官僚制的发展问题。     

官僚制的救治与超越

19世纪末,威尔逊提出的政治-行政二分开启了行政学研究的大门,古德诺等人也为行政学研究做了进一步探索,更明确了政治是国家意志的表现,而行政是国家意志的执行,在威尔逊、古德诺等人为现代公共行政及科学研究确立了逻辑前提的基础上,马克斯·韦伯提出了在公共行政研究领域中具有扛鼎意义的官僚制理论,理论的诞生对当时的政府行政产生了至关重要的指导作用,但随着人们对政治生活更加理性的诉求,信息化、知识化、经济化时代的到来,官僚制在应用中不可避免地产生了许多悖论并面临着许多危机,就官僚制理论的产生及内涵、理性官僚制的悖论、官僚制的危机等问题进行梳理,并对官僚制的救治与超越进行市场化方案的反思,以及文化方案、伦理方案的阐释与论述,力求找到一条更适合当下政府行政的合理化道路与官僚制的救治方案。     

论统治视角中的官僚制

官僚制理论是由马克斯·韦伯提出并作出了深入研究的问题。在韦伯之前 ,虽然也有人对这个问题作出研究 ,但只是在他这里 ,官僚制理论才第一次作为一个系统的理论而存在。在韦伯之后 ,官僚制的问题是 2 0世纪学术思想研究中最为引人注目的问题 ,几乎所有 2 0世纪著名的思想家们都对这个问题发表过意见。但是 ,所有谈到这个问题的人 ,无论是持肯定的态度还是采用批判的眼光 ,基本上都是对官僚制作出了统治的理解。这就是官僚制理论和实践出现全面危机的根源。当前 ,一场全球性的行政改革运动正在进行 ,要想真正有所建树 ,当务之急是走出统治的视角     

理性官僚制的局限与公共部门改革的后官僚制路径

随着时代的发展,尤其是信息时代和后工业化社会的到来,理性官僚制逐渐暴露出许多问题。对官僚制的批判包括忽视了人的主体性、存在个人需要和组织目标之间的矛盾、缺乏应变力和灵活性等多个层面。这也导致20世纪70年代以来西方国家出现了以背离官僚制为取向的公共部门改革,其基本思路可以分别概括为新公共管理路径和新公共服务路径。对中国来说,面对行政管理中所存在的诸多非理性因素,需要在构建和完善理性官僚制的基础上逐步增强公共部门的能力。     

从现代官僚制到后官僚制人性预设转换的动因分析

现代官僚制是传统公共行政范式,以层级节制、非人格化为特征,是工业社会的产物.随着后工业社会的来临,以企业家精神改造公共部门的新公共管理即后官僚制范式出现了.两种范式管理理念的不同根源于人性预设不同,后官僚制以"理性经济人"取代了"人性恶"的假设.关于人性假设的不同源于行政生态环境不同.     

行政文化中价值理性对工具理性的超越与融合——基于公共行政现代性与后现代性的视角

西方公共行政现代性是现代性在公共行政领域内的产物,工具理性行政文化是西方公共行政现代性的主要特征,它表现为公共行政的科学化、专业化、效率化以及公共行政体系的科层化、行政原理的普适化、公共行政研究的实证化。虽然工具理性行政文化给公共行政带来了一定发展,但是工具理性行政文化的过度张扬掩盖了价值理性行政文化的光辉,在社会环境的日益变化不定以及全球化的大背景下,后现代性进入历史舞台,无论是在西方国家还是在中国,在公共行政领域内呼吁价值理性行政文化的回归是我们当前面临的主题,价值理性行政文化具有积极的功能,呼唤价值理性行政文化的回归具有重大的意义。     

韦伯官僚制的理性化追求及其困境

韦伯曾命题,作为现代社会的命运,官僚制体现了行政管理的理性化追求。一个要有作为的政治共同体,除了选择官僚制的行政管理体制外别无出路。但其代价是引发社会价值紧张。从否定的意义上说,这一价值紧张显示了理性化追求的矛盾困境。     

现代性与后现代性双重视角下的乡村文化振兴

经济上现代与文化上后现代并存的双重境遇,决定了乡村文化振兴的现代性与后现代性双重视角。正是由于现代性与后现代性在乡村文化的价值指向上单一与多元、内容体现上的同一性与碎片化、传承理念上的去根化与无方向感等差异,以及二者对乡村精神文化建设的漠视与悲观,造成了当前乡村文化建设的踌躇不前。对此,必须确立文化与技术相结合的价值理念,大力发展乡村经济,同时以社会主义核心价值观为导向,重构乡村精神文化,走中国特色的乡村文化振兴之路。     

中西方代表性官僚制研究的耦合性探讨北大核心

西方代表性官僚制理论的提出与蓬勃发展具有内在的促发因素及生成机理,我国与西方具有相同或相似的发生背景、生成条件、对象群体,二者具有高度的耦合性。我国人大弱位、行政权一权独大与西方的立法权衰落、行政权扩张的背景相耦合;我国关注公务员的政治性、人民利益的官僚表达模式与西方突破政治行政二分、公共管理者的委托人角色担当相耦合;我国的少数民族、农民工、女性等特殊群体与西方的少数种族、女性等特殊群体相耦合。西方的代表性官僚制在我国的本土化研究具有必要性、可行性和适用性,对于提高公务员队伍的政治合法性,保护、惠顾弱势群体的权利、利益,增强国家治理能力具有重要的指导意义。     

行政问责制:政治意蕴、现实困境与制度创新

行政问责制蕴涵着深刻丰富的政治价值与理念,是民主政治发展的逻辑必然,是改善中国政治生态的现实需要.但目前各级政府在实施行政问责制的进程中面临着问贲要素界定不合理、问责环境发育不全、问贲配套制度缺失等诸多困境,因此亟须创新其制度设计,通过合理界定优化问责要素,培育良好的问责环境,健全配套制度等途径实现行政问责制度创新,使行政问责真正走向规范化、制度化、法制化.     

官僚制：中国行政现代化的陷阱？

依据韦伯的“官僚模型”建构的传统政府,受到市场化的经济改革浪潮的强烈冲击,从70年代末起,西方各主要国家兴起了一场声势浩大的行政改革运动,并一直持续至今。面对这一全球化的运动,处于社会转型时期的中国行政改革应作何回应?在对官僚制进行梳理和剖析的基础上,并对中国自身传统与现状的深层体认之后,该文认为建构与完善现代官僚制是实现中国行政现代化的有效途径之一。     

Multiple Dimensions of Bureaucratic Discrimination: Evidence from German Welfare Offices

A growing experimental literature uses response rates to fictional requests to measure discrimination against ethnic minorities. This article argues that restricting attention to response rates can lead to faulty inferences about substantive discrimination depending on how response dummies are correlated with other response characteristics. We illustrate the relevance of this problem by means of a conjoint experiment among all German welfare offices, in which we randomly varied five traits and designed requests to allow for a substantive coding of response quality. We find that response rates are statistically indistinguishable across treatment conditions. However, putative non‐Germans receive responses of significantly lower quality, potentially deterring them from applying for benefits. We also find observational evidence suggesting that discrimination is more pronounced in welfare offices run by local governments than in those embedded in the national bureaucracy. We discuss implications for the study of equality in the public sphere.     

政府规模扩张:成因及启示

政府规模的决定因素是公共管理前沿研究问题之一.实践层面上,自改革开放以来机构精简一直是国政府改革的一个重点.然而,精简后再膨胀的问题一直无法解决.本文尝试回答如下问题:政府规模扩张是否有一些系统性的因素起作用?基于面板数据分析,用随机效应、固定效应模型和广义矩估计法研究政府规模扩张的决定因素.计量分析结果表明,瓦格纳定律(随着经济发展政府规模将扩张)在中国是不成立的,经济越不发达的行政区域,政府规模反而越大.财政收入端或开支端分权与政府规模存在显著的正相关关系,而县均人口、开放度及外商直接投资与政府规模呈显著的负相关关系.基于实证研究的结果,本文认为,地方政府的考录制度仍然有缺陷;当前的财政分权(支出端分权、收入端集权)很有可能助长了地方政府扩张规模;合并县域或许有助于政府精简.     

Cooking the books: Bureaucratic politicization and policy knowledge

Accurate knowledge about societal conditions and public policies is an important public good in any polity, yet governments across the world differ dramatically in the extent to which they collect and publish such knowledge. This article develops and tests the argument that this variation to some extent can be traced to the degree of bureaucratic politicization in a polity. A politicized bureaucracy offers politicians greater opportunities to demand from bureaucrats—and raises incentives for bureaucrats to supply—public policy knowledge that is strategically biased or suppressed in a manner that benefits incumbents reputationally. Due to electoral competition, we suggest that the link between bureaucratic politicization and politicized policy knowledge will be stronger in democracies than in autocracies. A case analysis of Argentina's statistical agency lends credence to the underlying causal mechanism. Time‐series cross‐sectional analyses confirm the broader validity of the expectations and show that the relationship is present only in democracies.     

Bureaucratic Roles: Political Loyalty and Professional Autonomy*

Political leaders in many countries have experienced growing problems of capacity in the postwar period, a development leading to an increase in the delegation of authority to public administration and civil servants. This delegation of authority creates a significant potential for discretionary decision-making authority on the part of public bureaucrats. One way of studying how bureaucrats handle this situation is to focus upon bureaucratic roles. Bureaucratic roles traditionally contain both political and professional norms. This article discusses how these political and professional considerations can be defined and how these norms are balanced given the potential for conflict which is present. The discussion is illustrated by measuring the perception of bureaucratic norms and role enactment among civil servants in Norwegian ministries. Results indicate that civil servants appear to have few problems in attending to and balancing both political and professional role norms.     

The Bureaucratic Approach to the Financial Revolution: Japan's Ministry of Finance and Financial System Reform

While all industrialized countries have enacted financial reforms over the past decade, Japan's Ministry of Finance (MoF) officials have crafted a distinctive approach to reform. They have managed to pursue their own agenda while at the same time responding to international market pressures and domestic political demands. This article examines Japan's "financial system reform," the process by which the MoF has recast the regulatory barriers between different types of financial institutions, such as banks and securities houses. Financial system reform represents an extreme case of a common Japanese policy pattern—the bureaucratic-led bargain—in which Japan's bureaucrats, rather than its politicians, organize the bargains that eventually emerge as policy. Two ministry policy councils deliberated for seven years before the Diet passed comprehensive reform legislation in 1992, and the ministry continues to redefine the reform at the stage of implementation today. While MoF officials have been forced to make concessions to industry groups and to adjust to unforeseen developments along the way, they have maintained overall control of the reform process. In fact, this article suggests that they have been remarkably successful in promoting their own peculiar interpretation of the public interest and in preserving and, in some cases, enhancing their own power.     

Political Leadership and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Effects of Agencification

Previous studies have shown that agencification tends to reduce political control within a government portfolio. However, doubts have been raised as regards to the robustness of these findings. In this article we document that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding holds when we control for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas, and officials' rank. Simultaneously we observe that the three control variables all have an independent effect on officials' attentiveness to a steer from above. In addition we find that the more organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. We apply large-N questionnaire data at three points in time, spanning two decades and shifting administrative doctrines.