Capacity-building at the Headquarter Level: The Case of EU Civilian Peace Operations

Abstract

This article traces the institutional evolution of the Council Secretariat that plans and supports EU civilian peace operations. During the early days of the European Security and Defence Policy in the late 1990s competing political priorities of big EU member states and a dominance of military structures put civilian administrators at a significant disadvantage. Between 2003 and 2007, however, the rising number and complexity of civilian missions generated pressure for reform, which eventually led to the creation of a civilian headquarters. The historical analysis provides the basis for assessing the EU's current institutional capacities for civilian crisis management. While some administrative capacity deficits have been addressed, increased institutional formalization and further politically motivated reforms may increase tensions and hamper the accumulation of expertise.     

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Impartiality in New UN Peace Operations

Abstract

Set within the complex contemporary context of international interventions, UN peacekeeping operations have now evolved into peace operations. The emergence of the concepts of human security and the responsibility to protect have raised expectations that UN peace operations should deal with both macro and micro level insecurity in conflict and post-conflict situations, especially in the case of failed or collapsed states. Reflecting this development, the question of an appropriate framework in which to conceptualize peace operations has also been debated. This essay considers a conceptualization of UN peace operations from a conflict resolution perspective and analyses the case of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), using a framework of conflict transformation. It argues that the impartiality of UN operations has been reconceived in terms of the values of ‘human security’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’, making it vital to explicitly articulate the meaning and implications of ‘value-based’ impartiality.     

可量化的平安:全球平安指数及其对平安中国建设的启示

平安指数的建立可以比较全面地反映一个国家或地区平安建设的科学性,我国亟须在借鉴域外经验的基础上对平安指数进行系统研究.作为世界范围内受到广泛认可的平安指数体系,全球平安指数(GPI)对平安进行了概念化和量化,进而构建出评估各国平安状况的指标体系和权重体系.GPI包括内部和外部冲突、社会安全与保障以及军事水平3个一级指标(领域),内含23个二级指标.其指标体系历经14个版本的更迭,在数量、名称、算法和数据来源等方面不断优化,指数的精确性、简明性、匹配性、客观性和权威性不断增强.我国可以充分认识GPI的价值和局限,从宏观、中观和微观三个层面实现对平安中国指数的科学建构.     

灭绝种族罪犯罪对象的特征及其分类

灭绝种族罪的行为,必须指向特定的群体,这个群体需要具备生命性、文化性、固定性和发展可能性的特征,只有符合这个特征的群体才能够认定为属于本罪所保护的群体的范围。灭绝种族罪的对象应分为种族、民族、族裔和宗教团体四种类型,政治团体并不是该罪的犯罪对象,仅消灭或者摧毁某个团体的全部领导层的行为也不能构成该罪。     

Limitations in attributing state responsibility under the Genocide Convention

Protection from genocide has been a common denominator in state rhetoric since 1948 when the Genocide Convention was adopted. However, state accountability for this archetypical crime of the state is virtually nonexistent. This article addresses a two-pronged puzzle: namely, (1) why, no government involved in the commission of genocide has to date been held responsible for it; and (2) how legal processes of the sole court that addresses states' disputes regarding genocide, the International Court of Justice, condition and even limit the quality of decisions taken by the court with particular reference to state liability for this crime. The analysis contributes to an emerging debate on the application of state responsibility with reference to the protection from genocide by highlighting existing shortcomings pertaining to the interpretation and implementation of the Genocide Convention that, in turn, warrants a holistic revision of this treaty.     

Peace in Colombia and the ELN

The ceasefire announced between the Colombian government and the National Liberation Army (ELN), coming as the prior peace agreement with the much larger Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is being implemented, has attracted both hope and scepticism. While a viable peace agreement with the ELN would put Colombia on a path to comprehensive peace, shepherding two major agreements would tax Bogotá’s capacity and the ELN has a history of reneging on commitments to non-violence.     

Audience Costs and the Dynamics of War and Peace

We estimate audience costs and examine their substantive effects on the evolution of interstate disputes by using an infinitely repeated and dynamic game of crisis escalation. Unlike past efforts, our approach estimates country‐specific audience cost parameters without relying on proxy variables, such as democracy measures. Contrary to intuition, increases in a country's audience costs encourage it to initiate disputes in equilibrium because the costs serve as a commitment device during the subsequent crisis, incentivizing the country to stand firm and coercing its opponent to back down. Nonetheless, the results demonstrate that larger audience costs would result in more peace worldwide, as they also discourage potential opponents from initiating disputes. Beyond regime type, we find that a free press, provisions for executive appointment or removal, and historical rivalries are also important determinants of audience costs.     

Popperian Peacebuilding,Policing and the Liberal Peace

Abstract

In light of the quarrelling between advocates and critics of the liberal peacebuilding agenda, this article calls for the adoption of a ‘Popperian’ approach. This approach would be one that seeks to identify and address the greatest evils to fundamental liberal principles rather than undertaking swift and sweeping liberalization projects. Tolerance is therefore advocated in all matters that fall outside of this remit in order to temper the current zeal displayed by the liberal peacebuilding agenda. The article then considers how Popperian approaches and the ideal of tolerance were lacking in the case of peacebuilding in the security sector in Timor-Leste. In failing to ensure a clear separation of police and military forces that are apolitical, loyal to the state and professional in serving the liberal democratic polity, for example, international actors inadvertently allowed a ‘great evil’ to emerge. Rather than being distracted and diluted by a sweeping range of goals, international actors should seek to work from these fundamental concepts and be prepared to negotiate on less urgent matters.