Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance

The concept of 'civil society' has been rediscovered in contemporary discourses concerning the relationship between democracy and governance. This paper analyses this rediscovery in the more specific context of the European Commission's 2001 White Paper on European Governance. However, processes of transnationalisation, governmentalisation and autonomisation may compromise much of the potential of 'European civil society' as an intermediating sphere of social action. By reinforcing these processes, the White Paper undermines the normative claims made for a civil society premised upon the voluntary nature of its associative forms and its distinctive open, communicative and deliberative rationality.     

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ERA,HORIZONTAL EFFECT AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “STATE” AND “SOCIETY” IN GERMAN AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The article discusses the proposal for a “Charter of Digital Fundamental Rights of the European Union,” whose central element is a binding effect of its fundamental rights not only to state authorities, but also to powerful private internet companies, which have a potential similar to that of the state to infringe on fundamental rights in the digital era. The article outlines the traditional German approach to fundamental rights and its underlying distinction between state and society, which makes it difficult for German scholars to handle a so-called horizontal effect of fundamental rights. Finally, the article discusses the main objections to such a horizontal effect and shows some practical problems it has the potential to cause in German and European constitutional law.     

Au nom de qui? The European Court of Justice between Member States,Civil Society and Union Citizens

Abstract: How does the quest for legitimacy of the European Union relate to the view the European Court of Justice(ECJ) accords to Union citizens, civil society and to private actors? It is submitted that the ECJ is currently developing a jurisprudence under which citizens, as well as their organisations and corporate private actors, are gradually, and in almost complete disregard of the public/private distinction, being included in the matrix of rights and—a crucial point—obligations of the treaties. The ECJ incorporates civil society actors and citizens, beyond notions of representative (citizenship) and participatory (civil society) democracy, into the body of law and thereby reworks its own and the Union's identity. Two core aspects are explored: the first is the reconfiguration of Union citizenship as a norm which triggers the application of the substantive norms of the EC Treaty. The second aspect of this evolution is the creation of ‘private governance’ schemes, i.e. processes in which, as a rule, private action is regarded as action that has to meet the standards of the Treaty. The analysis shows that the court is disentangling itself from the State‐oriented Treaty situation and drawing legitimacy directly from citizens themselves so that judgments should be pronounced ‘In the Name of the Citizens of the European Union’.

1 European Court of Justice 20 September 2001, Case C‐184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‐6193, para. 31.

     

Limits of Participatory Democracy in European Governance

The Lisbon Treaty (Article 11) recognises the provision on participatory democracy as a democratic principle of the European Union (EU), thus constitutionally legitimising the involvement of civil society in European governance. However, at least three issues relating to the democratic dimension of this practice remain unresolved. First, it is not possible to specify precisely how the participation of civil society relates to democracy. Second, having established representative democracy as the founding democratic principle of the EU (Article 10), the Lisbon Treaty does not allow assessing the provision on participatory democracy as an independent source for democracy. Third, the putative democratising potential of participation would not be construed independently, not only because representative democracy is defined as the founding principle of the EU but also because participation cannot be thought of as independent from the form of the consultation regime, the constitutional framework and the managerial and technocratic styles of policy‐making.     

Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution

Abstract:  This article deals with how the Court of Justice balances fundamental rights protection and Common Market freedoms. From the particular perspective of the Charter and the ECHR, whose legal status will be upgraded upon entry into force of the European Constitution, it studies the Court of Justice's approach to fundamental rights invocations by Member States in the context of Common Market freedoms. For this purpose the judgments in Schmidberger and Omega will be discussed both in the current setting and that envisioned by the European Constitution. It will emerge that the Court of Justice's reasoning in Schmidberger and Omega can be criticised on different levels, and alternative approaches are proposed. At a later stage some further elements for refining the methodology for assessing Member States' fundamental rights invocations are addressed with a view to facilitating the Court of Justice more satisfactorily to take account of the current and likely future setting of fundamental rights protection in Union law.     

The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality

This article analyses the horizontal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Horizontal effect has been an integral part of the Union's application of fundamental rights, especially in the field of equality. However, the codification of fundamental rights in the Charter raises important questions as to how horizontal effect will continue to apply in the EU, particularly in the aftermath of the Court's reticent rulings in cases such as Dominguez and Association de Médiation Sociale. This article argues that the emphasis on prior approaches to horizontal effect in recent rulings fails to address the profound constitutional issues that the horizontal effect of a fundamental rights catalogue raises, which concern the role of private responsibility within the developing constitutional order of the European Union. It therefore calls for a more systematically theorised approach towards the horizontal application of fundamental rights under the Charter framework.     

The Sinews of Peace: Rights to Solidarity in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Abstract. This article examines the provisions on social and economic rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. After a conceptual clarification of the terms “fundamental rights” and “rights to solidarity,” three main claims are made. First, not all rights to solidarity are granted the status of fundamental rights in the Charter, in contrast with the treatment of the right to private property. Second, positive law does not justify such an approach. An analysis of the sources of the Charter clearly indicates that the right to private property is not a proper fundamental right as Community law stands. Third, rights to solidarity could be construed as a repository of arguments that Member States and regions could invoke when claiming an exception to the four fundamental freedoms.     

Of Austerity,Human Rights and International Institutions

Austerity measures have led to the denial of social rights and widespread socio‐economic malaise across Europe. In the case of countries subjected to conditionality imposed by international institutions, the resultant harms have highlighted a range of responsibility gaps. Two legal developments come together to expose these gaps: Greece's argument in a series of cases under the European Social Charter that it was not responsible for the impact on rights brought about by austerity measures as it was only giving effect to its other international obligations as agreed with the Troika; and the concern to emerge from the Pringle case before the European Court of Justice that European Union (EU) institutions could do outside of the EU what they could not do within the EU ‐‐disregard the Charter of Fundamental Rights. That the Commission and the European Central Bank were in time answerable to international organisations set up to provide financial support adds an additional layer of responsibility to consider. Taking Greece as a case study, this article addresses the imperative of having international institutions respect human rights.     

Taking fundamental rights seriously in the Digital Services Act's platform liability regime

This article highlights how the EU fundamental rights framework should inform the liability regime of platforms foreseen in secondary EU law, in particular with regard to the reform of the E-commerce directive by the Digital Services Act. In order to identify all possible tensions between the liability regime of platforms on the one hand, and fundamental rights on the other hand, and in order to contribute to a well-balanced and proportionate European legal instrument, this article addresses these potential conflicts from the standpoint of users (those who share content and those who access it), platforms, regulators and other stakeholders involved. Section 2 delves into the intricate landscape of online intermediary liability, interrogating how the E-Commerce Directive and the emerging Digital Services Act grapple with the delicate equilibrium between shielding intermediaries and upholding the competing rights of other stakeholders. The article then navigates in Section 3 the fraught terrain of fundamental rights as articulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the aegis of the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter. This section poses an urgent inquiry: can the DSA's foundational principles reconcile these legal frameworks in a manner that fuels democracy rather than stifles it through inadvertent censorship? Section 4 then delves into the intricate relationship between fundamental rights and the DSA reform. This section conducts a comprehensive analysis of the key provisions of the DSA, emphasising how they underscore the importance of fundamental rights. In addition to mapping out the strengths of the framework the section also identifies existing limitations within the DSA and suggests potential pathways for further refinement and improvement. This article concludes by outlining key avenues for achieving a balanced and fundamental rights-compliant regulatory framework for platform liability within the EU.     

Tailoring Representative Democracy to the European Union: Does the European Constitution Reduce the Democratic Deficit?

Abstract Even if the institutions of representative democracy that have developed in the nation‐state context cannot be simply transposed to the European Union, for practical and normative reasons they do provide the main starting point for any reflection on the EU's ‘democratic deficit’. This article draws upon the Constitution prepared by the European Convention to reconstruct the concept of representative democracy in the EU. Drawing on the proposals put forward, it identifies two distinctive challenges that need to be overcome if the concept of representative democracy is to be successfully applied to the EU: the multilevel character of the polity and the shift of the centre of political gravity from legislative to executive politics. The article then examines the extent to which the institutional proposals contained in the Constitution go to meet these two challenges and also highlights some aspects in which these proposals fall short.     

Security,privacy and freedom and the EU legal and policy framework for biometrics

The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon and the granting to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the same legal force as the Treaty has lent a new impulse to the consideration of fundamental human rights by the European Union (EU). The question remains, however, as to how this legal discourse, centred upon human rights, is actually shaping the EU regulatory framework in specific policy domains. The aim of this paper is to critically appraise the ways that the fundamental rights of security, privacy and freedom guaranteed by the Charter are being construed in the context of EU law and policy on biometrics, an ethically and morally sensitive security technology whose development and use are being actively promoted by the EU. We conclude that the interpretation of the pertinent rights, as well as their balancing, owes a great deal to the goals of EU policies for research and development, and under the auspices of Freedom, Security and Justice, shaped largely by political and economic considerations. These considerations then tend to prevail over ethically or morally-based legal claims.     

The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides the Union with a 'more evident' (as the European Council of Cologne asked for) framework of protection of the individuals before the public authorities within the European context, after more than thirty years (since the Stauder Case ) of full confidence in the leading role played by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. This new normative catalogue of fundamental rights (included the so called 'aspirational fundamental rights') implies one more instrument of protection which has to find its own place with regard to the protection afforded by the national Constitutions and the international agreements on human rights, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights, which are already a privileged source of inspiration for Court of Justice of the European Communities. It is the main objective of the General Provisions of the Charter to clarify which is that place and the relationship with those other levels of protection as managed by their supreme interpreters (i.e., the Constitutional—or Supreme—Courts of the Member States of the Union and the European Court of Human Rights).     

“A Very Eden of the Innate Rights of Man”? A Marxist Look at the European Union Treaties and Case Law

In this paper I approach the European Union Treaties (Rome and Maastricht) and the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence from a Marxist standpoint. I argue that the treaties and case law of the European Union (EU) revolve around the rights of things (commodities), rather than of people. People primarily gain rights within the EU by demonstrating that they embody exchange value and are therefore personified commodities; people are not accorded rights merely for being human. In essence, the treaties and case law have enshrined Marx's notion of commodity fetishism, which Marx asserted to be a social mystification, into transparent law. Focusing on the grand scheme of the treaties' jurisdiction in this manner also illuminates the role of the court as it struggles to balance the demands of capital's self-valori-zation with fundamental human rights. I then consider the consequences of this balancing act for the EU integration process. I argue that this phenome'non as a whole also carries implications for EU civil society and for notions of legal equality among persons.     

参与式治理与根本政治制度的生活化——“一体多元”与国家微观民主的建设

政治制度本质上是一种关于利益和权利义务的关系组合。这种关系组合影响到人们对制度的合作或者冲突。因为观念和利益的多元化,社会成员与制度的冲突引发了高发的群体性事件。因此,解决当前公共治理问题,关键是要考虑体制改进。通过落实宪法所规定的人民代表大会制与民众直接参与式治理的结合,可以提升微观民主建设的质量,保障多元民主,为宏观民主治理提供制度基础。     

A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the Rethinking of Union and Community Law

Whilst the European Union or Community is not a state and does not possess a political constitution in the sense of a series of irrevocable norms existing prior to and above Community or Union law, the evolution of the European legal system might nonetheless be regarded as a fundamental constitutional process. In this light, primary and secondary European law, together with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, might be said to be subjectivising certain specifically European principles thus contributing to the legal creation of sometimes novel rights for European Citizens. In a legal process similar to that seen within 19th Century Germany, European law is seeking a compensate for an incomplete political constitution through the development of a – second best – European Charter for Citizens.     

Human Dignity in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Interpretation Before the European Court of Justice

This article argues that the EU Charter’s dignity provisions must be given a specific, expansive European meaning that underpins the importance the EU places on fundamental rights protection as a principle EU value. To this end, the article examines the EU Charter provisions on dignity and critically analyses the case law before the EU Charter had full legal effect and after it did. It finishes with looking at three areas in which the potential for an expansive interpretation of dignity could help bring the EU closer to its people and fully respect and protect dignity: asylum, criminal justice and sexual orientation.     

The transformative nature of the EU Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles: Replacing the old paradigm (normative equivalency of rights)

In December 2022 the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union jointly signed the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles, a document aiming to steer the EU digital agenda upon EU constitutional values and fundamental rights. Digital constitutionalism scholars regard the Declaration as a positive step forward within the process of constitutionalization of the digital environment in Europe. The Declaration includes both traditional rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and digital principles. Some of these principles have progressively underpinned the EU digital policy framework while others have been expanded in the Declaration or are of completely new formulation. In this contribution, we assess the Declaration's value in terms of relevance and novelty within the landscape of protection of online needs and interests in the EU. By assessing the Declaration's normative approach and using Lawrence Lessig's distinction between codifying and transformative constitutional regimes, we evaluate the Declaration's progressive and transformative character under a constitutional perspective.     

The Law beneath Rights' Feet. Preliminary Investigation for a Study of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

This article is meant as a philosophical preface to the study of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In particular, attention is focused on a particular legal positivistic reading of legislation as a political moment which would not allow for transcendental rights. This view is rejected by pointing out how much the notion of citizenship and consequently of fundamental rights is central for the democratic, and in some case even for the legal positivistic, celebration of legislation. In the last section a few conclusions are drawn as far as the scope of the Charter is concerned. In particular, any interpretation of it in the framework of the so–called regulatory paradigm (which gives up the democratic connection between deliberation and representation) is considered incoherent and self–defeating. In addition the principle of indivisibility of rights is evoked in defence of the validity of social rights within the Charter.     

Towards a common standard of protection of the right to housing in Europe through the charter of fundamental rights

The trend towards the financialisation of housing since the 1980s and the global financial crisis exposed a dramatic lacuna in the legal protection of the right to housing. Yet, the right to housing features not only in national and international human rights instruments, but also in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Charter rights are increasingly finding expression in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In particular, drawing on the Charter, the CJEU's interpretation of EU consumer law is moving towards a recognition of housing rights as inherent components of consumer protection. On the basis of such developments, this article examines whether there is scope to extend this human rights approach to new areas – namely, to the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014) – a major EU harmonising measure – and to the work of EU institutions now responsible for banking supervision. The article concludes that, if guided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the case law of the CJEU and the practice of supranational banking supervision could significantly enhance the protection of the right to housing, both at EU and Member State level.     

Union Citizenship—Metaphor or Source of Rights?

After nearly ten years of introducing Union Citizenship as a concept into Community law it seems time to draw a preliminary evaluation of its importance in reshaping the legal and social positions of citizens living in the EU, more precisely in its Member States. The balance sheet is however mixed: On the one hand, the prevalent position in legal doctrine seems to be that Union citizenship is merely a derived condition of nationality, while on the other side certain fundamental rights are based on criteria other than citizenship/nationality alone. The European Charter on Fundamental Rights will not overcome this dilemma. This can be shown in conflictual areas which are in the centre of discusion in the paper, namely the (limited!) use of the concept of citizenship to extend existing free movement rights in the new case law of the Court of Justice, the resistance towards granting 'quasi-citizenship' rights to third country nationals lawfully resident in the Union for a longer period of time, and the yet unsolved problem of imposing 'implied duties' based on a doctrine of ' abus de droit ' upon citizens paralleling the rights granted to them. As a conclusion the author is of the opinion that the question asked for in the title can be answered in the positive only to a limited extent. Citizenship appears to be a sleeping fairy princess still be be kissed awake by the direct effect of Community law.