论个人收入差距与政府协调对策

我国经济转型期出现的个人收入差距扩大的现象日益引人关注,成为社会主义市场经济深入发展的热点问题。“十一五”规划把缩小收入差距放在经济社会发展更加突出的位置。缩小个人收入差距,是构建社会主义和谐社会和全面建设小康社会的艰巨任务,也是政府协调社会经济利益关系面临的新课题。本文在对个人收入差距现状分析的基础上,提出政府实施协调职能的对策。     

金融领域的原则性监管方式

后金融危机时代,各国监管当局都面临着如何实现有效监管的挑战,金融监管方式作为提升金融监管质量的重要组成部分,对其进行相关的研究非常必要。近年来,与传统规则性监管方式相对应的原则性监管方式日益受到金融监管当局和学界的关注。文章基于对国外原则性监管理论和实践的分析,并结合我国金融市场环境,提出原则性监管尽管存在诸多问题,但是作为一种公私融合的监管治理方式,其在监管规范的制定、监管执行、监管文化重塑等三个层面上仍值得我国的金融监管当局吸收与借鉴。     

我国离岸金融市场监管法律问题探究

离岸金融市场是金融自由化、国际化的产物，虽然它仅有不到一百年的历史，但其发展迅猛，已经成为现代金融的重要组成部分，在国际金融市场上发挥着重要的作用。与此同时，离岸金融市场也存在消极作用，它加剧了金融风险，加大了金融控制的难度。因此，离岸金融市场的建立和发展有赖于相关法律制度的健全和保障。我们应深入探究离岸金融市场监管法律问题的独特性，根据我国离岸金融市场的现状特点，找出我国离岸金融市场法制建设所面临的问题,并就如何建立和完善我国离岸金触市场法制建设进行研究。     

The impact of the general data protection regulation on innovation and the global political economy

This paper attempts to outline how the General Data Protection Regulation might be positive not only for consumers and societal well-being but also for innovation in the digital age. Situated within the highly charged debate regarding the impact of regulations on innovation, this paper examines the General Data Protection Regulation in light of the theoretical facets underpinning the contexts in which regulation has a positive effect on innovation. These are in relation to firstly, tackling concentrated market power where too much concentration leads to the hampering of competitiveness and innovation. Secondly, structural features outlined in the Porter hypothesis that a regulation should have to promote innovation and thirdly, whether the General Data Protection Regulation falls within the scope of the Brussels effect and hence, levels the competitive playing field as well as helps shape the future of the digital economy. The General Data Protection Regulation's alignment with these three dimensions is outlined with certain deviations being noted.     

The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.     

Toward a political economy of post-Fordist punishment

This article suggests some new lines of research in the field of the political economy of punishment and some possible new directions for a critical approach to contemporary social control strategies. The starting point is the transition from a Fordist economy to what can be defined as a post-Fordist system of production. I outline some tendencies in the actual capitalist dynamic (concerning the labour market, the production process, the relations between the workforce and capitalist power and between work and social citizenship), suggesting that a renewed political economy of social control has to deal with them. Two tendencies are assumed to be structural. On the one hand, the tendency of the capitalist system to make the production (and extraction) of surplus-value more and more independent of the effective working time (a tendency toward the reduction of human labour in the productive process). On the other hand, the tendency towards the massive introduction of new technologies: a tendency whose main consequences seem to be the intellectualisation of human labour and the decline of the classic distinction between manual and intellectual labour. I assume that these tendencies give rise to a new productive subject (the multitude), whose characters exceed the actual organisation of work and deepen the contradictions intrinsic to post-Fordist societies. Hence, an analysis of some new social control strategies follows, where I consider actuarialism as a technology for the control of these contradictions

Destructive sharing economy: A passage from status to contract

On the surface, the sharing economy only enables users to make the transactions of under-utilized resources over their two-sided platforms. An in-depth exploration of its sudden success reveals three distinctive features of this new business model, namely web search engine, proliferation of smart handhelds and user-generated reputation feedback mechanisms. All of these technological innovations not only inflict destructive changes to our social structure, but also lead to difficulties in an automatic inclusion of the sharing economy into the current regulatory framework. Two changes have raised particular attention. First, sharing platforms are capable of building a democratized private trust mechanism, in addition to the traditional government-monopolized public licensing system. Second, the vertical disintegration feature of the sharing economy considerably blurs the borderline between business and consumers, and between employers and employees. For the purpose of establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework for all online and offline activities, it is necessary to differentiate the sharing economy into those with offline competitors and those without offline competitors. With regard to the former, regulators are encouraged to embrace the sharing economy and meanwhile deregulate offline competitors. In relation to the latter, a three-condition analytical framework is proposed in order to strike a balance between promoting innovation and protecting the existing rights of others.     

On the political economy of the informal sector and income redistribution

In this paper we analyze a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to be employed in formal or in the informal sector. The formal sector is taxed to provide income subsidies and the level of redistribution is determined endogenously through majority voting. The model is simulated to produce qualitative results and to illustrate the differences between economies with different distributional features. We show that a distortion in the democratic rule in favor of the rich reduces transfers while the size of the informal sector may remain at high levels. Despite a greater demand for redistribution in societies where the majority has few resources (skills), we find that political systems which work in favor of a rich minority will produce little redistribution. Our results call for pro-poor measures such as free training and education programs that should be offered to those who cannot afford it.     

The political economy of regional integration in East Asia

A widely held consensus view claims that East Asia has been shifting recently from a market-led to an institution-based form of regional economic integration, primarily as a result of the 1997–1998 financial crisis. Next to post-crisis financial cooperation schemes under the ASEAN+3, the surge of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) involving East Asian countries is thought by some to further substantiate this claim. The objective of the paper is to question the validity of this claim. By examining the current state of play of economic cooperation, in the financial and monetary areas as well as in the trade sphere, the paper highlights the limitations of the formal regional integration movement in East Asia to date, as well as the vastly different dynamics underlying the financial and trade developments. It also explores the changing nature of intra-regional trade and investment linkages and concludes that this new form of interdependence may be instrumental in changing the trade-offs of formal regional economic schemes.     

Global financial governance and the informal: limits to the regulation of money

The list of predicate crimes for the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has evolved and grown over its twenty-five year existence. The evolution of this list reflects shifting concerns among the central actors in the organisation, as well as representing a response to any ‘displacement’ activity undertaken by those seeking to avoid these forms of governance. When the scope for cooperation and compliance with the FATF Forty Recommendations was extended beyond the organisation’s membership this governance regime encountered business sectors and financial practices not readily amenable to its objectives. This paper considers the causes and consequences for the situation, as developing economy states attempt to comply with the global governance expectations of the FATF when a significant portion of the domestic economy operates ‘informally’. A frame of reference is provided, with a definition for the informal economy and the concept of displacement as used in research on criminal activity. The focus here is with the nature of the cash economy operating beyond the scope of financial surveillance with implications for the comprehensive effectiveness of the global financial governance regime. The context of informal financial practice and its separation from the regulatory structures of the state leads to a conclusion that global financial governance is limited in practice to the domain of the formal economy.     

Simple rules for a complex regulatory world: the case of financial regulation

European Journal of Law and Economics - Twenty-five years ago Richard Epstein published Simple Rules for a Complex World, which would go on to become one of Epstein’s most influential works....     

Making the rules and breaking the rules: the political origins of corporate corruption in the new economy

Recent scandals at companies like Enron and WorldCom have pointed to the systemic origins of many corporate frauds. This paper advances the argument that behind those scandals were strategic political actions that changed the regulatory and legal environment in which those firms operated and created criminogenic institutional frameworks that facilitated acts of corporate corruption. Three case studies involving (1) the California energy crisis of the late 1990's, (2) the regulation of energy derivatives, and (3) accounting treatments of stock options, are presented to illustrate how markets and the rules that govern them are the products of political processes and how they can create motivations and opportunities for corporate fraud. The implications these case studies have for the study of corporate crime and corruption are discussed.     

Reconstructing ‘conflict of interest’ in financial markets: Private management, public challenges, future prospects

Following widespread criticism of financial market (self-)regulation, there is a shift in regulatory mood, explored here with reference to evolving conceptions of conflict of interest. The pre-crisis distinction between conflict of interest (normal, manageable) and its exploitation (unacceptable, legally actionable) has become somewhat eroded, as exemplified by the SEC’s 2010 civil fraud action against investment bank Goldman Sachs. However the settlement of that case on the basis of ‘mistake’ left many questions unanswered: about the meaning(s) of conflict of interest, about managerial mistake versus exploitative intent in administrative/civil cases and equally about the potential for action under criminal law. Looking forward, a judgement of the European Court of Justice on insider trading – concerning a rebuttable assumption of intent – could be taken as a template for ‘drawing the line’ on conflict of interest. Acting on the basis of informational asymmetry could be taken as an indicator of intent and serious wrongdoing unless financial market actors can demonstrate otherwise.     

The political economy of the green technology sector: A study about institutions, diffusion and efficiency

This paper discusses aspects related to the green technology sector (GT sector) in Germany. In a first step institutional reforms enabling diffusion of green technologies are analyzed. Cost arguments are also taken into account. In a second step a theoretical model developed by Tanguay et al. (Public Choice 120:1–27, 2004) is modified in order to evaluate the efficiency of the institutional setting in a political economy framework. The model is able to show that command and control policies (CCPs) are accompanied by cost-inefficiencies depending on the political weight of technology related interests groups. We further come to the result that relatively high marginal production costs may generate suboptimal high diffusion of a certain GT j. For relatively low marginal production costs policy induced demand may also be too low.     

Financial intermediation in the securities markets law and economics of conduct of business regulation

The economic theory explains the role performed by intermediaries in financial markets. In securities markets, in particular, intermediaries act as facilitators of the financial exchange. In this context, conduct of business regulation is justified on the basis of structural problems of asymmetric information affecting the relationship between securities professionals and the individual investor.In this paper, two major conduct of business rules are analysed in the light of the kind of market imperfections they should be intended to address: the suitability and the anti-churning rules. From a functional perspective, the analysis merges major insights of financial theory with a comparative discussion of the legal rules in both the U.S. and the European Union. Law and economics approach to the matter leads to a much broader and more economically sound interpretation of the “churning” problem. This is related to an agency-based explanation of one of the most topical puzzles under debate in financial economics: the problem of noise trading.     

日本的市场经济模式与宏观调控法论析

日本的宏观调控法在西方市场经济国家中最具特色,这种特色的形成深受其政府主导型市场经济模式的影响.以强有力的经济计划导向和卓有成效的产业政策调控为特征的市场经济模式直接决定了日本以计划法和产业政策法为主导的宏观调控法体系.本文旨在通过考察日本的市场经济模式与宏观调控法来揭示二者之间存在的密切关系.