Open access, social norms and publication choice

The aim of this paper is to shed light on scholarly communication and its current trajectories by examining academics’ perception of Open Access, while also providing a reference case for studying social norm change. In this respect, the issue of publication choice and the role of Open Access journals casts light on the changes affecting the scientific community and its institutional arrangements for validating and circulating new research. The empirical investigation conducted also offers a useful vantage point for gauging the importance of localised social norms in guiding and constraining behaviour.     

The proper age to marry: social norms and behavior in nineteenth-century Netherlands.

"The article compares publicly discussed norms concerning the proper age at marriage for men and women in nineteenth-century Netherlands, and the actual trends present in the empirical evidence about marriage age. Medical professionals (the hygienists) expressed the belief that marriage at too young an age was damaging both to public hygiene and the family's health; other commentators stressed the connection between young marriages and poverty. Yet such norms were put forward vaguely, allowing other influences on marriage age to come into play. Consequently, data on marital behavior suggest considerable diversity in the population, with age at marriage varying strongly by class, sex, and region. Generally, age at marriage did not begin to fall until the period 1860-1870, and even after that decade class differences remained strong."     

The impact of vendorship legislation and interprofessional competition in the market for social workers' services.

The results of this article suggest that, in the short run, vendorship legislation will not result in a large shift of social workers from organized settings into private practice. However, vendorship legislation appears to increase the number of social workers in private practice in areas that have not attracted as many psychiatrists. Thus, vendorship may have a favorable impact on the geographic distribution of mental health providers. Vendorship legislation may result in increases in private practice social workers in underserved areas. The results also suggest that social workers and psychiatrists compete in the market for mental health services. In counties with higher psychiatrist-to-population ratios, fees for social workers' services are lower. Further, in counties with higher psychiatrist-to-population ratios, the number of social workers in private practice decreased after vendorship. Finally, there is a large range of optimal practice size for social workers. Social workers with 20 or more clients per month can provide mental health services at the lowest average cost per client. Thus social workers operating either full-time or part-time practices with more than 20 clients per month can provide mental health services efficiently.     

西方发达国家劳动力市场的社会管理与公共服务研究

就业与失业问题一直以来是关系经济和社会全面发展的制约性因素。在处理和调节劳动力市场供求关系方面,西方发达国家采取了相应的社会管理政策和公共服务,为有效应对经济和社会发展中出现的矛盾和危机进行了有益的尝试。     

Aggressive reactions to social injustice by individuals and groups as a function of social norms,gender, and anonymity

Two conflicting approaches to the study of group aggression are compared: the deindividuation theory of Zimbardo (1970) and the emergent norm theory of Turner and Killian (1972). To test these two conflicting hypotheses, the frustration-aggression theory of Brown (1986) is used which assumes that individuals and groups, male or female, will react with angry aggression when important social justice norms are violated. It was hypothesized (i) that groups will be more aggressive than single individuals; (ii) males will be more aggressive than females; and (iii) that more aggression will occur when people can be easily identified than when they remain anonymous to each other. These hypotheses received some support. Unexpected interactions between these variables are discussed in some detail. Generally, more support is found for the emergent norm theory than for deindividuation theory.     

Explaining the process of change taking place in legal rules and social norms: The cases of institutional economics and new institutional economics

This paper deals with the phenomenon of institutional change and has been conceived as an attempt to answer the following question: Can we retain theimage of institutional change contained in a theory when we replace a methodological foundation on which the theory was built by a different and alternative one? For an answer to be developed, special attention is paid to the contributions made by institutional economists (IE) and those made by transaction cost—new institutional economists (NIE). The question clearly shows that it is a paper on applied methodology rather than a survey on institutional change contributions. Because of that, its main purpose is not to increase our knowledge about the characteristics of real changes in legal rules and social norms, their causes, their processes, or their effects, though several examples are given of those institutionalist and new institutionalist contributions that analyze those changes. Our purpose is to investigate the way in which these two groups of economists approach the object of analysis already mentioned. Our conclusion will be that institutionalist and new institutionalist contributions are built on two different and mutually exclusive approaches because their respective methods of analysis (holism versus methodological individualism) are different and, above all, because they build their respective analyses on some concepts that are mutually exclusive (concepts showing power or nonvoluntary influences versus concepts showing voluntary transactions). Their analyses contain different and mutually exclusiveimages of the changes taking place in legal rules-formal institutions and social norms-informal institutions. Some comments about the limitations of the holist method of analysis are made in the paper.     

Morality, social norms and the rule of law as transaction cost-saving devices: the case of ancient Athens

The importance of the institutional framework for economic development is widely accepted today and it is duly stressed in the economic literature. The protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts and an efficient legal system are the pillars of the contemporary rule of law. However, formal institutions cannot function without being internalized by the citizens and without the strong backing of social norms. Morality and social norms are the major elements of the informal institutional structure, the social capital, which is also critical for social welfare and economic development. In this paper we will discuss both the formal and the informal institutional framework of Ancient Athens, which was a free market society with economic problems similar to contemporary market societies. Athenians developed a highly sophisticated legal framework for the protection of private property, the enforcement of contracts and the efficient resolution of disputes. Such an institutional framework functioned effectively, cultivating trust and protecting the security of transactions. This entire system however was based on social norms such as reciprocity, the value of reputation and widely accepted business ethics. Conformity to social norms as well as moral behavior was fostered by social sanction mechanisms (such as stigma) and moral education. The Athenian example is a further proof of the importance of morality and social norms as transaction cost-saving devices even in quite sophisticated legal systems. Their absence or decline leads inevitably to the need for more regulation and litigation and to a growing preference for clear-cut rules instead of discretionary standards. Athenian law was pioneering in the development of rules and institutional mechanisms suitable for the reduction of transaction costs, many of them surviving in the most complex contemporary legal systems.     

The market of human experimentation

How should experiments on humans be regulated and controlled? Is it possible to create an equilibrium between the optimal protection of patients’ rights and all the other interests involved? This paper analyzes the problem from a Law and Economics point of view and tries to develop a theoretical model that would provide a way to achieve that equilibrium, both in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, a model in which the interaction between different parties can lead to a market where information is exchanged for innovation. This paper is based on work that has been done up to now by other sciences, like medicine and bioethics, treating the issue with an alternative approach in order to propose an oversight system able to give an answer to this unsolved problem. This work is mainly aimed at defining the rules of the market in Europe, including its actors and their interactions using both a normative and a positive approach. Both the behavior of rational people and that of bounded ones are analyzed, as well as the strategies that can be applied against the latter by stronger parties. Finally, the public stakeholder’s role in preventing this from happening is analyzed.     

When sanctions convey moral norms

Sanctions not only have the instrumental function of deterring people from undesired behavior but they also have the ability to convey moral norms. As such, they may create a moral motivation not to engage in the sanctioned behavior. This is desirable as this makes the success of a sanctioning system depend less on quality of enforcement. However, sanctions may not always succeed in conveying moral norms. In this paper, three conditions are highlighted that, in the psychology literature, have been empirically proven to influence whether a sanction succeeds to evoke moral norms. First, a sanction should not be regarded as a way to make up for the negative consequences of a transgression a sanction. So, they should be communicated in a retributive way rather than in a compensatory way. Second, as punishments communicate an obligatory rule and rewards communicate a voluntary rule, punishments are a better way to incur moral norms than rewards. Third, severe sanctions more strongly convey a moral norm than mild ones as long as these severe sanctions are not unreasonably severe, are installed by trustworthy authorities and in a fair way. The value of the moral expressive function of sanctions, as well as its drawbacks, are discussed.