Interpreting the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Scales of Justice</Emphasis>: Architecture,Symbolism and Semiotics of the Supreme Court of India

The neutrality of the art and architecture of courtrooms and courthouses has dominated the public perception in the Indian context. The courtroom design and the visual artistic elements present within these judicial places have very often been considered to be insignificant to the notions of law and justice that they reflect. As art and architecture present certain historical narratives, reflect political allegories and have significant impact on the perceptions of their viewers, they have critical socio-political ramifications. This makes it pertinent to explore them and investigate the paradox of their deployment and interpretation in today’s increasingly mediatized world. Through an ethnographic study of the Supreme Court of India, this paper interprets its art and architecture, and, the symbolism and semiotics reflected through them. Arguing against their neutrality and insignificance, the paper demonstrates how they reflect nationalism, certain ideologies and power-space dynamics. It further argues that they act as evidence of political metaphors related to justice, power and democracy. With a conversation between law, architecture and semiotics, the paper investigates the historical and spatial dimensions of its architecture and artistic elements. Mapping the Court’s architectural elements, I examine how the visual representation of ‘justice as virtue’ finds translation in its design through transfer of certain images, including the image of the ‘scales of justice’, into it, while absenting the notion of ‘justice as struggle’—to contemplate on how legal architecture gives evidence to the vexed relationship between law and justice and also of the break from the colonial past     

The ‘Reasonable Man’, his Nineteenth‐century ‘Siblings’, and their Legacy

The reasonable man is the best known, but not the only, legal construct to be born into the nineteenth‐century common law. This article introduces the man's siblings – including those from the areas of trust law, criminal law, contract law, and intellectual property law (both patents and trademarks). The fact that some of these ‘men’ changed the law is not controversial; this research further highlights that while several of these came to life in that century, only some had a significant role into the twentieth century. Those that did are tied to the foundations of our society through their role in facilitating innovation and consumer protection. The argument is that it was the constructs’ nature and their capacity to accommodate public policy issues that enabled the vitality of the ‘reasonable person ‘ (negligence) and the ‘person skilled in the art’ (patents).     

‘Punishment’ in Non-custodial Sentences: A Critical Analysis

This paper reviews various uses of the concept of ‘punishment’ in relation to non-custodial sentences, including the frequently-made comparison between ‘punishment’ and ‘rehabilitation’. It concludes that ‘punishment’ has no stable meaning in respect of such sentences and, when utilised, often results in non-custodial penalties being found wanting by comparison with imprisonment. It is suggested that all sentences should be regarded as ‘punishments’, and that the creative development of community penalties will best be achieved by working with a threefold conceptualisation of reparation, rehabilitation and incapacitation, set within appropriate boundaries of proportionality.     

Desperately Seeking ‘Justice’ in Classical Chinese: On the Meanings of Yi

This essay sets out to search for an equivalent Chinese word to the English word ‘justice’ in classical Chinese language, through ancient Chinese philosophical texts, imperial codes and idioms. The study found that there does not seem to be a linguistic sign for ‘justice’ in classical Chinese, and further, yi resembles ‘justice’ in some ways and has been used sometimes to translate  ‘justice’, but yi is a complex concept in traditional Chinese philosophy with multiple meanings and it is dissimilar to ‘justice’ in their semantic and pragmatic meanings in Chinese and English legal culture. While ‘justice’ is a keyword and fundamental to Western law, yi is not a legal word or concept in classical Chinese in traditional China. Given its complexity, yi does not have a one-to-one equivalent in English. It sometimes carries a sense of ‘righteousness’ and occasionally ‘justice’, but yi and ‘justice’ are not equivalent. In view of these, it becomes understandable that the translations of yi in contemporary Chinese usage vary ranging from ‘friendship and justice’ to ‘greater good’, among others. The meaning of yi is still uncertain and context sensitive as it was two thousand years ago.

     

Mastery Over the Time of the Other: The Death Penalty and Life in Prison Without Parole

Derrida’s seminar on the death penalty is a deconstructive reading of the debate over the abolition of the death penalty beginning in eighteenth century Europe. The main imperative of the reading is to address the limits of abolitionist discourses, which historically have been based on natural law conceptions of the right to life. Derrida’s interest in undertaking such a reading is to develop an abolitionist argument that would hold up in principle against the death penalty. However, in this paper I take Derrida’s insights into the meaning of the death penalty to explore what they reveal about political sovereignty, and in particular its relation to violence. The paper begins by addressing several relevant moments in Derrida’s reading of texts on both sides of the death penalty debate and shows how the arguments are each limited by some ‘unavowed’ interest that conditions the fundamental principles upon which they are based (Derrida, in Death penalty, Volume I. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 142; 2014). These unavowed interests relate to what Derrida describes as the ‘compromise’ on the question of cruelty in the context of the death penalty. Based on these readings, the paper develops a concept of the death penalty defined as a relation to time, specifically, a relation of mastery over the time of the life of the other. It then connects this concept to Derrida’s analysis of political sovereignty found in Rogues (2005) and ‘Force of Law’ (2002) to make two arguments. First, the conception of the death penalty as a relation to time redefines so-called ‘death penalty alternatives’, such as life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as manifestations of the death penalty through other means; and, second, changes in the appearance of the death penalty reflect changes in the institution of political sovereignty, and in turn the status of the state.     

Women’s age at last childbearing and its determinants: a case study of Antwerp (Flanders,Belgium) on the basis of the multi-source COR* historical sample

Declines in the age at last childbearing in the first demographic transition reflected conscious changes in fertility behaviour during that period, in particular efforts to limit the total number of children. Such fertility limitation behaviour was the net result of ‘cultural causal factors’ on the one hand and ‘structural and economic causal factors’ on the other hand. This paper analyses the evolution of women’s age at last childbearing by reconstructing women’s life histories based on data from the multi-source COR* historical sample for Antwerp in the period 1846–1920. The paper also assesses the causes of this evolution through a number of theoretically grounded structural/economic, cultural and life course determinants, placing these concepts in a macro-micro framework of methodological individualism. For this purpose, in the first place a Kaplan-Meier analysis is applied to 10-year birth cohorts; a proportional hazard model is also applied to three different birth cohorts (mothers born before 1840; born in the period 1840–1859; and born after 1860); and a range of cultural and life course determinants are analysed, including women’s literacy status, marriage witness characteristics, the seasonality of marriages and births, and birth histories. The analysis confirms the decline in the age at last childbearing especially in the late cohort, and also highlights inter-cohort differences caused by cultural and life course determinants.     

Minimal Semantics and Legal Interpretation

In this paper I will tackle three issues. First, I aim to briefly outline the backbone of semantic minimalism, while focusing on the idea of ‘liberal truth conditions’ developed by Emma Borg in her book ‘Minimal Semantics’. Secondly, I will provide an account of the three principal views in legal interpretation: intentionalism, textualism and purposivism. All of them are based on a common denominator labelled by lawyers ‘literal meaning’. In the paper I suggest a novel way of viewing this common denominator as almost identical to the Borgian ‘liberal truth conditions’, at least at a conceptual level. In the third section I will focus on the conceptual similarities between the two ideas. I intend to depict that, although legal theorists do not admit it explicitly, they treat literal legal meaning as minimal propositional content that can be ascribed liberal truth conditions. There are two main objections to liberal truth conditions: their under-determinacy and unintuitive character. Both objections can be applied to ‘literal meaning’. However, the idea of liberal truth conditions gives an adequate account of what lawyers call literal meaning and is helpful in explaining the mechanism of understanding of provisions and reasons leading to the necessity of statutory interpretation.     

Revelation and Rhetoric: A Critical Model of Forensic Discourse

Over the past thirty years or so, theoretical work in such fields as legal semiotics and law and literature has argued that the legal process is profoundly rhetorical. At the same time, a number of communication-based disciplines such as semiotics, sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology have provided, particularly in interdisciplinary combination with law, a wealth of empirical evidence on, and insight into, the micro-contexts of language and communication in the legal process. However, while these invaluable nitty-gritty analyses provide empirical support for a rhetorical thesis, work in these areas has tended to ignore rhetoric as an explanatory principle. This article introduces an overarching rhetorical framework for the discursive construction and management of cases in contemporary Anglo-American legal processes. Taking ‘forensic’ as relating to the conduct of cases and ‘discourse’ as semiosis-in-practice, I argue that the practices within which forensic discourse is embedded are not, as the received legal view would have it, aimed at revealing an impartial truth but are deeply rhetorical practices aimed at persuading decision-makers to provide a remedy for a claimed wrong. By looking across forensic texts and contexts, I identify common elements of forensic discourse that can be found both in classical forensic orations and throughout the modern legal process and consider how these intersect with critical forces of agency and structure and the particularities of semiosis in situated context. An awareness of commonalities across forensic discourse can help sharpen our focus on the critical causes and consequences of individual and structural difference and point to consequential suggestions for reform.     

Meanings of terrorism

Terrorism is a notoriously plastic word, depending on user, audience, and political context. This paper focuses on shifts in its meanings since the early 1970s. As federal statutes made terrorism a criminal offense, common usage changed from a broad meaning to one that specified terrorism as a political crime. The argument is that the state shapes meaning and public discourse through law. Peircean semiotics and the semiotic philosophy of Russian linguist Vološinov provide a framework to explore relationships among politics, law, and civil life. Applied to the events of September 11, 2001 such an analysis further allows better understanding of certain interpreters of the September 11 attacks, notably Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida, and Jürgen Habermas.     

Law reform across the commonwealth: A new voice

This article examines the proviso to the ‘alternative remedies’ provision/clause in Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions. It does so from two perspectives emerging from the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in this area. In the first, exemplified by Harrikissoon v Attorney General, the applicant brings a constitutional motion for infringements of his fundamental rights or freedoms in circumstances where he may have an alternative remedy at common law or under statute. In that decision, the Privy Council delineated the scope of this proviso under the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, effectively importing an ‘alternative remedies’ clause from the use of the word ‘may’ in section 14(2) of the Constitution. This article examines, first, what Harrikissoon decided; second, whether its reasoning is acceptable given the wording of the section; and, third, the limitations accepted by subsequent decisions of the Privy Council. In the second perspective, the applicant makes a similar application for infringements of his fundamental rights or freedoms arising from or occurring during the course of proceedings already begun. The locus classicus is the decision of Chokolingo v Attorney General and forms part of the wider concern of the courts to prevent its processes being abused where the applicant makes a collateral constitutional challenge rather than pursuing an ordinary appeal. This article also aims to examine the decisions that pre‐dated Chokolingo in order to understand its jurisprudential underpinnings; to explore that decision to determine what the Privy Council in Chokolingo decided; to consider the similarities and differences between the reasoning therein and that of the Privy Council in Harrikissoon; and to consider the extent to which the principle enunciated in Chokolingo has been extended or limited in subsequent decisions of the Privy Council.     

婚姻法司法解释（三）的法理价值

2011年8月,最高人民法院公布了《关于适用〈中华人民共和国婚姻法〉若干问题的解释（三）》,该法一公布,激活了人们的法律思维,打破了人们某些固有的家庭生活规则,挑战了传统的婚姻观。呈现了许多新的亮点：规定了结婚瑕疵的救济途径;厘清了发展中的婚姻家庭关系的权利和义务;家庭财产制有了新的意蕴;明示了生育权女性做主的原则。体现了婚姻法的法理性、现实的针对性、改革开放的时代性和社会发展的前瞻性,它的发布有着深厚的理论意义和实践意义。     

Reflections on the reconfiguration of access to justice

This paper draws on a series of research studies of the last two decades of legal aid reforms to consider their wider social and political meaning. They are evaluated against a ‘master ideal’ of access to justice rather than a fictive golden age. It will be argued that despite New Labour's rhetoric of social inclusion and the positive initiatives this sometimes produced, the neo-liberal character of the reforms has eroded both social rights and access to justice. Their internal logic requires the imposition of a market and the use of least cost labour, thereby reducing the guarantee of due process to the lowest common denominator: consumption of a legal service becomes a sufficient alternative to just outcomes.     

Face to Face (II): Semiotics of Interactivity

Faces challenge the sender-receiver model as the major scheme of thought for appropriately understanding interaction between human individuals. The openness and indeterminacy of faces lead to establish a semiotically relevant distinction between interaction and interactivity. The latter is our proposed articulation of the dynamic energy that thrives through the existence of signs and the uses of a semiotics. Facial expressions sustain and express the vital dynamism of making meaning in life. This often occurs at a bewildering distance to legal life and discourses established by legal terminologies.     

Law of Denial

Law’s claim of mastery over past political violence is frequently undermined by reversals of that relationship of mastery, so that the violence of the law, and especially its symbolic violence, becomes easily incorporated into longues durées of political violence, rather than mastering them, settling them, or providing closure. Doing justice to the past, therefore, requires a political and theoretical attunement to the ways in which law, in purportedly attempting to address past political violence, inscribes itself into contemporary contexts of violence. While this may be limited to an analysis of how law is an effect of and affects the political, theoretically this attunement can be further refined by means of a critique of dynamics that are internal to law itself and that have to do with how law understands its own historicity, as well as its relationship to history and historiography. This article aims to pursue such a critique, taking as its immediate focus the ECHR case of Perinçek v Switzerland, with occasional forays into debates around the criminalisation of Armenian genocide denialism in France. The Perinçek case concerned Switzerland’s criminalisation of the denial of the Armenian genocide, and concluded in 2015 after producing two judgments, first by the Second Chamber, and then by the Grand Chamber of the ECHR. However, although they both found for the applicant, the two benches had very different lines of reasoning, and notably different conceptions regarding the relationship between law and history. I proceed by tracing the shifting status of ‘history’ and ‘historians’ in these two judgments, and paying attention to the deferrals, disclaimers and ellipses that structure law’s relation to history. This close reading offers the opportunity for a critical reappraisal of the relationship between law, denial and violence: I propose that the symbolic violence of the law operative in memory laws is a product of that which remains unresolved in law’s understanding of historicity (including its own), its self-understanding vis-à-vis the task of historiography, and its inability to respond to historical violence without inscribing itself into a history of violence, a process regarding which it remains in denial.

     

Standing for the client: on the interactional becoming of the criminal defence attorney1

In this essay, I explore the meaning of the legal profession (the defence attorney). I carry out my investigation in the interactional register. I suggest that we examine the profession of defence attorney as a professional identity in becoming. I localize the event of becoming in the first attorney-client interview. I propose that it is during the first encounter that the attorney comes to stand for the client as a legal counsel. I further propose that the analogy of ‘standing for’ be accessed empirically through an analysis of a recorded episode from the first attorney-client conference. For my methods I use a combination of frame analysis and conversation analysis. The two analyses show how the attorney becomes to stand for the client as a legal figure moulded in a series of interactional moves. By reformulating and reframing the ordinary talk that is introduced as an entry mode into an institutional relationship, the attorney and the client alter their discursive positions until the attorney assumes his professional identity, that is, becomes to stand for the client in legal action.     

Reducing Homelessness or Re‐ordering the Deckchairs?

The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 has come into force trumpeting nothing less than the need for a ‘culture change’ among local housing authorities implementing it. Although it aims to reduce homelessness, it is more likely to hide long‐term systemic issues in the housing system. It is argued that the 2017 Act's significant alterations are likely to result in a re‐ordering of the deckchairs on the Titanic of housing policy. Following a biography and critique of the homelessness legislation as being out of time and place, as well as a discussion of the 2017 Act itself, three central points are made: the 2017 Act has ushered in a form of neo‐liberal government of the homeless; the understanding of the household seeking assistance has fundamentally altered, from passive applicant to active citizen; the private rented market provides the sole mechanism for performing the duties but remains problematic.     

The inverted postnational constellation: Identitarian populism in context

As exemplified by the pan‐European ‘Identitarian movement’ (IM), contemporary far‐right populism defies the habitual matrix within which right‐wing radicalism has been criticised as a negation of liberal cosmopolitanism. The IM's political stance amalgamates features of cultural liberalism and racialist xenophobia into a defence of ‘European way of life.’ We offer an alternative decoding of the phenomenon by drawing on Jürgen Habermas's ‘postnational constellation.’ It casts the IM's protectionist qua chauvinistic populism as ‘inverted’ postnationalism, engendered through territorial and ethnic appropriation of universal political values. As such, inclusionary ideals of cosmopolitan liberalism and democracy purporting humanistic postnationalism have been transformed by Identitarians into elements of a privileged civilisational life‐style to be protected from ‘intruders.’ Remaining within the remit of the grammar of the postnational constellation, trans‐European chauvinism, we contend, is susceptible to inclusive articulation. Foregrounding radical emancipatory social transformation would however require not more democracy, but a principled critique of capitalism.     

Regulatory Domain and Regulatory Dexterity: Critiquing the UK Governance of ‘Fracking’

This article provides a critique of the UK government's regulatory response to ‘fracking’. It shows how government has adopted two distinct schemas of regulation, which may usefully be classified under the headings ‘regulatory domain’ and ‘regulatory dexterity’. These schemas rely on very different interpretive conventions and are in many ways contradictory. Yet, government uses both ‘domain’ and ‘dexterity’ arguments simultaneously in order to advance its policy in favour of fracking. The article explains how two seemingly different regulatory approaches work together towards the same policy goal, and highlights the role of law in facilitating technological development.     

‘Authorizing the Peril’: Mythologies of (Settler) Law at the End of Time

The promised paradises of colonial capitalism and neoliberalism are set in a perpetually elusive future (Fitzpatrick 1992). This future is not a set destination, but an endless linear journey set to the thrum of ‘progress’ and ‘development’. This paper considers, in the context of recent cases relating to development in the Athabasca tar sands region, what the law of the Canadian settler state does when it is faced with interruptions and ruptures in its timescape. Drawing on Fitzpatrick’s seminal work, The Mythology of Modern Law, I argue that a conceptualisation of law’s behaviour in these contexts as functionally mythological highlights some of the elusive ways that settler law maintains a stranglehold over legal imaginaries of oil and gas developments: by distorting and flattening the pasts and presents of Indigenous societies that pre-dated (and continue to co-exist with) the settler state on ‘Canadian’ land, by mediating between the ‘origin’ of the settler state and the daily rhythms of colonial time through ‘Eternal Objects’ such as property and economic development, and by asserting a general ‘objectivity’ of law to evade any direct grappling with the stark possibilities of the ‘end of the world’ created by the climate crisis. I conclude, drawing on Indigenous scholarship and the work of de Goede and Randalls, that a meaningful response to the climate crisis requires re-enchanted attachments to life that necessitate a departure from the one-dimensional temporality of the mythologies of settler law.

     

The Semiotics of Civil Rights in Consumer Society: Race,Law, and Food

Cooking and constitutionalism. Food and racial equity. I intend the juxtaposition to be jarring, even humorous. I would like to view it as a subtle indication of a historical trend in which central aspects of legal memory have been repressed from contemporary civic practice and important intellectual questions, concerning semiotics in consumer society, have been neglected in mainstream legal scholarship. As I will explain, the story of Ollie's barbecue suggests not only that cooking and constitutionalism are intricately linked, but also that the expansion of postwar economic life formed a material basis for this hidden bond. Considering the history of Ollie's thus can both illuminate the deep historical meaning of the Civil Rights Act, and also point the way toward a more general field of research, the development of what might be called a legal semiotics of consumption.