Organized crime and the 1960 presidential election

It has been asserted that, based on a pre-election agreement promising them favorable federal treatment, the Chicago Mob (known as the “Outfit”) was responsible for John Kennedy’s election in 1960. An examination of these claims indicates that the sources generally lack credibility and their accounts are implausible. Additionally, there is no evidence Outfit controlled wards/suburbs around Chicago or members of Outfit influenced labor unions voted unusually heavily Democratic in the 1960 presidential election. Therefore, if anything the Outfit “double crossed” the Kennedys by not delivering the promised votes, as opposed to vice-versa. “Someone forgot to tell the horse.” – An old saying in horse racing.     

New approaches to Central American organised crime

The adoption of new security policies integrating civilian and military approaches to tackle transnational criminal groups is symptomatic of the limitations of local police forces, as well as the drawbacks of relying too heavily on military interventions.     

International organized crime

He has served as a consultant to the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council, and related agencies of the U.S. government. He has written, coauthored, or edited over sixteen books on intelligence and national security.     

Protest and property crime: political use of police resources and the deterrence of crime

This article investigates the claim that the political use of police resources promotes crime. Using a panel of South Korean metropolitan areas, we show that (1) the reallocation of police resources toward the control of political protests reduces arrest rates for crime and (2) the resulting reduction in criminal arrests significantly increases the incidence of crime. Overall, the impact of the reallocation of police resources works mainly through tradeoffs with arrest rates. Our findings imply that it is not the size of the police per se, but the allocation of police resources toward crime control that deters crime.     

Special Edition on Organized Crime

This is the first edition of the Oxford Journal of Policingthat we, as General Editors, have entrusted to a guest editor.We have several such future editions planned, because we feelthis is an important way of expanding the number and varietyof voices commentating on policing. This is a key part of themission we have set ourselves—a vigorous debate     

Psychopathy,sociopathy, and crime

He is a past president of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, and in 1990 he received the American Psychological Association’s Award for Distinguished Contribution to Psychology in the Public Interest. Dr. Lykken is the author of A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector(1981) and of The Antisocial Personalities(1995).     

White supremacist groups and hate crime

Hate group activity may incite criminal behavior or serve as protection from bias-based violence. I find that the presence of one or more active white supremacist chapters is associated with higher hate crime rates. I reject the hypothesis that chapter presence and hate crimes are symptomatic of the overall level of bias-based violence. Moreover, I reject the hypothesis that white supremacist groups form in response to an increase in antiwhite hate crimes, particularly those perpetrated by nonwhites.     

A note on crime and punishment

The models developed here are intended to convince the reader that Tsebelis' results — that increased punishment leaves the equilibrium level of crime unchanged — is an example of what is possible rather than a general result. To recap the argument in words: it is true that raising the penalty on a crime may cause the enforcing agency to divert attention away to other matters, so that theexpected penalty facing the prospective criminal is not as high as it would have been had the agency not adjusted; but it is not generally true that enforcing agencies will choose to lower their probabilities of enforcement just enough to exactly offset the increased penalty, leaving the expected penalty unchanged, hence the equilibrium level of crime unchanged.⁸ this result sounds unusual when stated in words and it is when modelled using the theory of games too.This work was supported by NSF grant SES-9022882.     

Risk,power and crime prevention

This paper addresses the development of post-disciplinary ‘actuarial’ or risk-based technologies of power. Arguing against models which focus on icreased efficiency as an evolutionary criterion for emerging technologies of power, it suggests that such technologies' place and form are largely dtermined by the nature and fortunes of political programs with which they are aligned. Thus the rise of neo-conservatism and related programs have extensively modified and curtailed programs based on risk models, and expanded those based on punishment and discipline. The paper examines the nature of situational crime prevention in the light of these ideas, and moves on to consider certain broader theoretical implications.