The Malaise of Federalism: Comparative Reflections on Commonwealth–State Relations

The High Court's decision in the ‘Work Choices’ case expanding further the scope of the Commonwealth's enumerated powers is the latest reminder of the highly centralised nature of Australian federalism. The division of powers traditionally forming the essence of a federal system has become increasingly difficult to discern and the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of government have become entangled. While for a good part of Australia's history divided jurisdiction was deplored as an obstacle to progress in government, today the decay of the system is most likely to be lamented. Discussion of options for reform presupposes an understanding of the forces that have led to the present condition. This article examines the Australian experience in a broader comparative and historical perspective and suggests that those forces are endemic and substantial.     

Cooperative Federalism?: The Case of the Ministerial Council on Education,Employment, Training and Youth Affairs

New Federalism reforms introduced in Australia in the early 1990s were expected to improve efficiency and reduce duplication through new cooperative intergovernmental arrangements. The reforms were also an attempt to reduce the continuing trend of Commonwealth intrusion in state powers. As well as establishing the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), the reforms created the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) to promote a more coordinated and cooperative approach to the delivery of education. MCEETYA provides the quintessential example of the difficulties of establishing a national approach when the function, education, is squarely within the power of the states. This article investigates the operation of MCEETYA from its inception to 2006.     

Between Deadlock and Decentralization: Bargaining Dynamics in Federal States

A classic way to meet regionally diverse interests is to grant partial autonomy to sub-national entities, either by assigning them the right to decide upon policies (federalism), to implement policies (decentralization), or both. This article argues and formally elaborates that central governments may intentionally choose to increase decentralization in an effort to facilitate agreements that otherwise would be deadlocked. In this regard, a central government's decision to promote decentralization depends on its own relative valuation of policy change and congruence. We illustrate the empirical validity of our argument with a case study pertaining to the Swiss New Regional Policy.     

Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in multi-level states. A comparative assessment

ABSTRACT

The study of intergovernmental relations (IGR) is a classical research area in scholarship on federalism and territorial politics. However, it has largely ignored the relatively new, and recently decentralized area of immigrant integration. The aim of this Special Issue is twofold. First, it aims to analyse how governments in multi-level states coordinate on immigrant integration. Second, it wishes to explain the dynamics that shape the features of intergovernmental relations. In doing so, we focus on four multi-level states; two of which are federal (Belgium and Canada) and two that are decentralized (Italy and Spain). Whilst we engage with the established literature on intergovernmental relations to formulate hypotheses about the nature and dynamics of intergovernmental relations, we also formulate less explored hypotheses. Our overarching argument is that the scholarship on IGR benefits from in-depth comparative case studies comparing IGR not just across countries, but also across policy areas and over time.     

Improving Federalism: Drivers of Change,Repair Options and Reform Scenarios

The Academy of Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA) and the Institute of Public Administration Australia (IPAA) hosted a ‘Policy Roundtable on Federalism’ on the 17–18 May 2007 at the University of Canberra. Around 50 attended the roundtable comprising politicians, Commonwealth and state public servants, and academics. The roundtable was provided with a number of background papers including the Hollander‐Patapan article and another produced by staff of the Commonwealth Grants Commission entitled ‘Trends in Commonwealth‐State Financial Relations: a Grants Commission Perspective’. The roundtable focused not only on issues and challenges but, more practically, on options and how to make federalism work better.     

Best Practice Environmental Impact Assessment: A Model Framework for Australia

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a process that involves the identification, prediction, evaluation and mitigation of the environmental and other impacts associated with development proposals and policies, plans and programs. Australian governments were amongst the first in the world to introduce EIA in the 1970s. Since then, the federal, state and territory EIA regimes have undergone multiple changes. In recent times, the push for EIA reform has intensified as governments have sought ways to improve the cost‐effectiveness of regulatory processes. In light of the impetus for change, this article outlines principles and a framework for best practice EIA in Australia. The intention is to inform the policy development processes at the federal, state and local levels.     

The Federalism Debate

These papers examine current Australian federalism from the perspectives of an academic and a practitioner. Both acknowledge the opportunities arising from the current White Paper process, as well as challenges in the face of substantial cuts of proposed funding from the Commonwealth to the States. They insist upon the need for renewed commitment to the idea of federalism, and the importance of sustainable fiscal arrangements within the federation. Challenges in Reforming Australian federalism reminds us of the kind of federalism operative in Australia – concurrent, not coordinate – and develops reform proposals accordingly. Ten Steps to a Better Federation offers a range of ideas from a former state premier, drawing on his experience as both a participant at Council of Australian Government (COAG) and, later, Chair of the COAG Reform Council.     

Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.     

Pragmatic Federalism: Australian Federalism from Hawke to Howard

The article explores the nature of Australian federalism by examining four major themes in the period from Hawke to Howard. The investigation of these themes – Australian conceptions of federalism; the role of party in shaping federalism; the way problems and politics have influenced policy‐making and thereby federalism; and the nature of federal judicial review – suggests that Australian federalism can most accurately be characterised as pragmatic. It appears as a federalism shaped by pressing problems, specific policy agendas and the prevailing political dynamic, rather than by overarching conceptions of federalism derived from political theory or articulated in party ideology. This pragmatic federalism explains important aspects of Australian federalism, especially the trend towards centralisation of authority.     

Indian Federalism and Democracy: The Growing Salience of Diversity-claims Over Equality-claims in Comparative and Indian Perspective

This article introduces a conceptual distinction between diversity-claims and equality-claims in order to reflect critically on the relation between federalism and democracy in India, which is not adequately problematized and somewhat neglected. Federalism and democracy suggest two different problematics, but in India democracy has often played second fiddle to the claims of diversity. As a result, India's success as a federation has not been paralleled by its record as a democracy in terms of its equality functions. Since the article engages with the issue of accommodation of diversity in the wake of federation-building, and the relation between federalism and democracy, critical references are made to the relevant theoretical literature in order to point out federalism's new problematic and its pitfalls. With the Indian case as a major illustration, it is shown here that the institutional arrangements and governing practices have overwhelmingly been given priority to meet the claims of diversity to the relative neglect of equality-claims.     

Horizontal coordination in cooperative federalism: The purpose of ministerial conferences in Germany

ABSTRACT

Intergovernmental councils in Germany comprise 18 sectoral ministerial conferences and the prime ministerial conference as peak organization. They complement the Bundesrat as institutions of Intergovernmental Relations in the German system of cooperative federalism, dealing with matters of shared rule as well as self-rule. Based on expert interviews among ministerial bureaucrats, this contribution finds that contrary to conventional wisdom, vertical influence and autonomy protection are not their main purpose. Rather, they serve primarily information exchange and coordination. Still, the emphasis on either influence and autonomy protection or coordination and information as well as the directions of interaction vary across policy sectors. We further investigate constitutional allocation of power and party political composition as determinants on the specific purpose of ministerial conferences. The findings suggest that the allocation of power is more important than party political composition in explaining variation between sectoral ministerial conferences.     

Do intergovernmental transfers affect the distribution of manufacturing production across regions in federal countries? Theory and evidence for Argentina

The effect of changes in the distribution of top-to-bottom intergovernmental transfers on the location of manufacturing production is analysed using a modified version of the footloose capital model. An increase in the share of transfers received by a region increases its share of manufacturing production the larger are transaction costs; the larger is the share of transfers going directly to consumers; the larger is the share of manufacturing consumption vis-à-vis non-tradable consumption; and the easier consumers can substitute among manufacturing varieties. Using data for Argentina for 1983-2005, the empirical analysis appears to support the existence of two distinctive regimes, with smaller/poorer provinces benefiting in terms of the location of manufacturing production as a response to an increase in transfers. Also, for these provinces, the benefits are greater if they are politically aligned with the federal government, especially through the receipt of discretionary transfers. For large/rich provinces, the evidence is less conclusive.     

Comparative Climate Change Policy and Federalism: An Overview

This commentary provides an overview of the four papers in this issue of Review of Policy Research on the politics of climate change. The papers all address in one way or another aspects of how federal‐type systems are dealing with the collective action and multilevel governance issues of climate change policy. The comparative study of federal systems provides insight into how domestic authority is so often overlapping and divided when dealing with greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Federal arrangements offer a rich array of norms, institutions, and practices for tackling these problems. Federal systems grapple continuously with the kinds of issues that are the most intractable in the climate change case, such as overcoming interregional differences of interests and values. A common federal feature is competition among subnational governments and between them and national or federated governments over climate change policy, which has been especially significant in the United States and in Canada in the relative absence of national action––although soberingly, the whole is as yet nowhere near as great as the sum of the parts. More significant, but rarer is the achievement of tighter coordination in federal systems achieved through intergovernmental co‐decision, as seen in the European Community and Australia. This has been accomplished in large part due to a consensus among all intergovernmental parties on the nature of the problem and congruence with the existing international regime, characteristics missing in the North American context.     

Beyond the Blame Game: Political Strategies for State Funding Reform

There is growing concern that intergovernmental financial relations in the Australian federation are becoming increasingly acrimonious and dysfunctional. This paper argues that it is necessary to analyse State funding as a whole, including the critical relationship between State‐level taxation and its reform and the broader Commonwealth Grants Commission regime, if we are to establish a system of State funding which is financially sustainable, promotes economic efficiency and is broadly congruent with established norms of Australian federalism. Above all, based on international experience, we argue Commonwealth leadership is required to achieve this goal. We conclude with a case study concerning resource taxation which demonstrates how the Commonwealth could provide leadership using a ‘bundled’ approach to policy reform. It is argued that such an approach has the potential to alleviate wider intergovernmental conflicts which currently afflict Australian federalism.     

Differences That Matter: Overcoming Methodological Nationalism in Comparative Social Policy Research

Abstract

Welfare states are often discussed as if they were territorially homogeneous state-wide institutions measurable by state-wide expenditure averages and explained by country-level variables. It is rare in comparative policy studies to investigate the role of territorial politics in the outcomes of even federal countries. This article argues, using social policy examples in the UK and US, that the impact of intergovernmental finance and division of labour profoundly shapes social investment and redistribution – producing almost as much expenditure variance within the US as within the OECD. The findings show the importance of incorporating territorial politics and intergovernmental arrangements into comparative welfare state and policy analysis.     

Intergovernmental councils and centralization in Australian federalism

ABSTRACT

This paper explores how a high level of vertical intergovernmentalism and a low level of horizontal intergovernmentalism reflect as well as contribute to a high degree of centralization in Australian federalism and in the role and activity of intergovernmental councils (IGCs). Pre-eminent among the latter is the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), which sits at the apex of a system of ministerial councils and attendant agencies. Policy coordination is the principal motivation behind the Commonwealth’s use of COAG. The States established their own horizontal body in 2006 but that faded quickly in an experience that confirmed the underlying realities of Australian federalism.     

Intergovernmental councils in the United States

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on intergovernmental councils (IGCs) in the United States in which prominent state-level executive politicians, that is, governors, play a leadership role. In the US case, these IGCs developed out of a desire to facilitate interstate information exchanges and a need for state governments to join forces to protect their autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government. In this latter role, the councils function as lobbyists for state government interests. The research question driving the analysis has to do with impact: what difference do executive-led IGCs make, either vertically or horizontally, in the US federal system? The question of impact is particularly relevant because growing partisan polarization in contemporary federal and state political institutions complicates collective action by states.     

The centralization vs decentralization tug of war and the emerging narrative of fiscal federalism for social policy in India

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relationship between fiscal federalism and social policy in India through an analysis of the effects of a recent effort to increase fiscal decentralization to state governments on the nature of social policy investment at the sub-national level. Through its analysis, this paper highlights the persistence of a strong centralisation bias in India’s fiscal architecture for social policy. We trace this centralisation bias to the political and administrative dynamics of the federal bargain. The peculiar dynamics of this bargain have created a context where the core goal of centralization – to ensure equity – is undermined while the expectation of decentralization – greater accountability through alignment of expenditure with local needs and preferences, fails to take root. India is thus likely to continue to witness significant regional variation in social policy outcomes, despite a centralised financing architecture.     

Federalism in Africa: Origins,Operation and (In)Significance

Abstract

Recent years have seen major advances in the comparative study of federalism and a growing literature on decentralization in Africa, but there has been surprisingly little systematic comparison of African federalism. This article explains several commonalities in the origins and operation of Africa's three main federal states: Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Each country used ‘holding-together’ federalism in order to accommodate ethnic pluralism. Each country—especially Ethiopia and South Africa—also experienced several key centripetal forces: dominant governing parties, top-down state administration and high degrees of fiscal centralism. Federalism mattered in offering accommodative decentralization, but in its operation subnational governments have limited autonomy because of these interlocking centralizing features. This African variant of federalism can have certain salutary features, even as it precludes the possibility of many of the theorized advantages of federalism that are predicated on real subnational autonomy.     

Ethnic Decentralization and the Challenges of Inclusive Governance in Multiethnic Cities: The Case of Dire Dawa,Ethiopia

Abstract

Ethnic decentralization which could emerge in the form of autonomy and/or federalism has become an important way of responding to the challenges of ethno-nationalist conflicts. Since 1991, Ethiopia has adopted an ethnic federal structure which provides territorial autonomy to its various ethnic groups. This approach to autonomy, however, has brought challenges to multiethnic cities and ethnic borderlands where different ethnic groups coexist. By examining the experience of Dire Dawa, the second largest city in Ethiopia, this article shows how federalism and territorial autonomy by themselves are not enough to address problems of participatory governance in multiethnic cities. The article finally underscores the need for policy innovations that would ensure power-sharing in multiethnic cities.