Diffusion Pathways for Electricity Deregulation

Quantitative studies of the diffusion of policy innovationsgenerally avoid cases where the appropriate governmental actoris ambiguous; this study focuses on just that context. An event-historyanalysis of U.S. electricity sector regulatory reforms involvingboth regulators and legislators between 1993 and 1999 is presentedhere. The interplay of branches and planes of government significantlyinfluences this diffusion process, suggesting that diffusionresearchers should more often focus explicitly on such dynamics.     

Deregulation and Participation: An International Survey of Participation in Electricity Regulation

Amidst the wave of privatization and "deregulation" across the globe, a new set of regulatory structures is being created. The fact that deregulation actually involves "re-regulation" has been acknowledged in the recent literature, but the tension between regulation and public participation has been understudied in these new structures. While some private markets need effective regulation to reduce transactions costs and ensure stable market rules, consumers need regulation that is responsive to, and protective of, their interests. Consumer participation, therefore, is an important component of effective regulation. Effective regulation must also consider collective national or public interests, including the well-being of corporations. Therefore, regulatory agencies need to be both independent from, and responsive to corporate, consumer, and public interests. This article will briefly examine the tension among the competing goals of regulatory independence and responsiveness, and then conduct a broad survey of the status quo of public participation in national regulatory structures for electricity in the Americas. Our case studies demonstrate a wide variety of institutional mechanisms for participation, yet we find that no existing system seems to embrace direct participation by a wide set of consumers. The problems are even more acute in developing countries. We conclude by looking at recent experiments and proposals to improve the levels of participation in regulatory decision making.     

The Political Economy of Electricity Deregulation: Appointed vs. Elected Utility Commissioners

Does the manner in which public utility commissioners are selected influence the kinds of decisions they render regarding electric rates and other factors pertaining to electricity services? This article examines the impact and implications of different methods of regulator selection and how that selection process affects protection of consumer interests as opposed to the interests of electricity suppliers (i.e., utilities).     

RAILROAD POLICY AND INTERMODALISM: Policy Choices after Deregulation

Intermodalism is widely viewed as a promising recent development in transportation. This article examines the role played by railroads in intermodal freight transportation and the framework of public policies around whic intermodal freight movement has evolved. Intermodalism emerged because of technological, organizational, and public policy developments that contributed to its rapid growth. Deregulation of the rail industry since 1980 has led to significant restructuring through mergers and direct contracts between railroads and customers. As intermodal shipments become more important to the overall transportation system in the United States, attention will need to be given to ways in which intermodal concerns are addressed in surface transportation programs.     

Free Trade: A Paradox for Democracy

Free trade and global markets are issues that have dominated for some time the political and economic agendas of both industrialized and newly developing nations. While greater prosperity for all peoples is most frequently cited as the main gain, free trade is also considered a promoter of democracy, an argument deployed in bringing China into the World Trade Organization. World peace has also been cited as one of the fruits of closer economic integration, as parochial walls between peoples are undermined, interdependence grows and is made more transparent, and mutual prosperity assured. We contest the faith upon which these assumptions rely. We argue that the theory and practice of neo-liberal free trade and neo-revisionist democracy implicate the modern democratic nation state in paradoxes that it is ill-equipped to negotiate. To exit these paradoxes, or at least to mollify the rancor they can produce, both the ideas of free trade and of democracy need to become more robust.     

Wholesaling in Electricity: Inching Along

This article discusses the incremental but increasingly assertive efforts by federal policy makers toward encouraging deregulation of the electric utility industry. Focusing on the efforts of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), we conclude that the federal government is involved in a sort of two‐sided experiment. On the one hand, efforts to deregulate the electric power industry attempt to establish a competitive market pose the question: Can government provide rational guidance in the formation of markets in a complex industry? On the other hand, it asks whether the democratic process can permit agencies such as FERC to impose and implement an economically rational design on a self‐interested pubic that is mostly interested in cheap, reliable power. In a sense, FERC is auditioning for a new role for regulatory agencies—as designers and overseers of markets. This is a dramatic shift from the traditional role of “regulator as policeman.” Whether regulators are up to the task remains to be seen.     

State Governance and Financial Market Integration: The Politics and Consequences of Interstate Banking Deregulation

This study examines the debates surrounding interstate bankingreform in the 1980sand the effect of geographic deregulationon the availability of credit in the stales. Deregulation doeshave a significant and positive impact on the amount of totalcommercial and industrial loans made by banks. The pro and conarguments about deregulation are then reconsidered in lightof this finding. The study concludes that states can help stimulateeconomic growth through regulatory policy, though the totalimpact is relatively small. This research also suggests thatthe veracity of policy arguments can be judged by the richnessof the institutional context in which they are grounded.     

Heavy Traffic: Trucking Deregulation, Federalism, and Canadian-U.S. Trade

Trucking deregulation, in the interest of competition and efficiency,removes rate controls and grants free entry to the market. Whenthe United States deregulated trucking in 1980, it opened theinterstate market to Canadian carriers. Heavy volumes of tradeby trucking between the two countries make entry conditionsan important bilateral issue. Deregulatory symmetry betweenthe two countries would produce a de facto regime of free tradein trucking services. In 1987 the Canadian federal governmentadopted deregulatory measures similar to those of the UnitedStates, but with more complex and problematic results. The reasons,broadly characteristic of the evolution of Canadian federalism,lie in the ability of the provinces to thwart federal initiatives.Trucking regulation is under provincial control, and to achievea practical effect, the federal government depends upon theprovinces to bring their practices into accord with its policy.Because of differing provincial views about deregulation andpressures from Canadian truckers for continued protection fromAmerican competition, much diversity and contention have delayedand compromised the federal governments purpose. Regulatoryreciprocity is also a question of the provinces and states,with a mixture of strict and easy entry policies complicatingthe achievement of bilateral balance and equity. The largerimplications of deregulation and transborder trucking for Canadalie in the ability of a decentralized federal system to pursuenecessary initiatives coherently.     

Trust Your Compatriots, but Count Your Change: The Roles of Trust, Mistrust and Distrust in Democracy

Although trust is clearly central to human relations of all kinds, it is less clear whether there is a role for trust in democratic politics. In this article, I argue that trust is central to democratic institutions as well as to democratic political participation, and that arguments which make distrust the central element of democracy fail. First, I argue for the centrality of trust to the democratic process. The voluntary compliance that is central to democracies relies on trust, along two dimensions: citizens must trust their legislators to have the national interest in mind and citizens must trust each other to abide by democratically established laws. Second, I refute arguments that place distrust at the centre of democratic institutions. I argue, instead, that citizens must be vigilant with respect to their legislators and fellow citizens; that is, they must be willing to ensure that the institutions are working fairly and that people continue to abide by shared regulations. This vigilance – which is reflected both in a set of institutions as well as an active citizenry – is motivated by an attitude termed 'mistrust'. Mistrust is a cautious attitude that propels citizens to maintain a watchful eye on the political and social happenings within their communities. Moreover, mistrust depends on trust: we trust fellow citizens to monitor for abuses of our own rights and privileges just as we monitor for abuses of their rights and privileges. Finally, I argue that distrust is inimical to democracy. We are, consequently, right to worry about widespread reports of trust's decline. Just as distrust is harmful to human relations of all kinds, and just as trust is central to positive human relations of all kinds, so is distrust inimical to democracy and trust central to its flourishing.     

Making Something Out of Nothing: Welfare Reform and a New Race to the Bottom

The 1996 welfare-reform law has been characterized as a significantact of devolution. For some, this devolution will free statesto become "laboratories of democracy" that develop better welfarepolicies; for others, it will provoke a debilitating "race tothe bottom" where states will reduce benefits out of fear ofbecoming "welfare magnets" that attract recipients from otherstates. This article suggests that neither "laboratories ofdemocracy" nor "race to the bottom" does justice to the complexitiesof the 1996 reforms. In the case of the former, new federalmandates limit state action and states face informal pressuresto "keep up" with one another in developing new restrictionsso that they can avoid becoming "welfare magnets." In the caseof the latter, we find limited empirical support for the existenceof welfare migration that is supposed to be provoking a "raceto the bottom." We find that there is limited welfare migrationbecause the real value of welfare benefits to recipients doesnot vary nearly as much as common portrayals suggest. Giventhese realities, welfare reform may produce a procedural raceto the bottom that turns the myth of migration into a self-fulfillingprophesy.     

And the Beat Goes On: Intergovernmental Mandates and Preemption in an Era of Deregulation

For state and local governments, the 101st Congress (1989–1990)compiled a mixed record of intergovernmental regulation andpreemption. Costly and intrusive mandates were enacted to combatair pollution, protect the rights of disabled persons, and providemedical assistance to the poor. At the same time, new restrictionswere defeated in legislation affecting oil-spill liability andchild care. This article reviews the issues and politics surroundingthese enactments, and places them within the broader contextof intergovernmental regulatory trends during the 1980s. Thepast decade was characterized by increasing regulatory burdensimposed on states and localities, punctuated by occasional examplesof regulatory relief and deferral.     

Cash at Your Fingertips: Biometric Technology for Transfers in Developing Countries*

In recent years, interest has soared in the development potential of well‐designed cash transfer programs. One particular application is the use of transfers by resource‐rich countries (as recently initiated by Iran) to distribute rents across their populations. An emerging body of research suggests that the development impact of such programs tends to be positive and that, especially when received by poor individuals or households, they can unlock constraints on economic activities, allowing a further increase in income. This paper considers the use of biometric technology to underpin transfer programs and how new technology is opening up possibilities for effective transfer programs that, up to now, have only been a theoretical option in the institutional conditions that prevail in many developing countries. Once implemented, biometric identification systems can be used to support a wide range of other development initiatives including banking, voting, health care, and general identification systems. The paper reviews some of the programs using these technologies and how it is enabling poor countries to leapfrog rich ones in the area of identity, much as the cellphone revolution did in the area of communications.