Origins of party formation and new party success in advanced democracies

Which new parties entered national parliaments in advanced democracies over the last four decades and how did they perform after their national breakthrough? This article argues that distinguishing two types of party formation (that facilitate or complicate party institutionalisation) helps to explain why some entries flourish, while others vanish quickly from the national stage. New parties formed by individual entrepreneurs that cannot rely on ties to already organised groups are less likely to get reelected to parliament after breakthrough than rooted newcomers. This hypothesis is tested on a newly compiled dataset of new parties that entered parliaments in 17 advanced democracies from 1968 onwards. Applying multilevel analyses, the factors that shape newcomers' capacity to reenter parliament after breakthrough are assessed. Five factors have significant effects, yet affect party performance only in particular phases: both a party's electoral support at breakthrough and its operation in a system with a strong regional tier increase the likelihood of initial reelection. In contrast, a distinct programmatic profile, the permissiveness of the electoral system and easy access to free broadcasting increase a party's chance of repeated reelection. Only formation type significantly affects both phases and does so most strongly, substantiating the theoretical approach used in this article.     

Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family

Abstract.  This article presents a new model for explaining the emergence of the party family of extreme right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. As the old master frame of the extreme right was rendered impotent by the outcome of the Second World War, it took the innovation of a new, potent master frame before the extreme right was able to break electoral marginalization. Such a master frame – combining ethnonationalist xenophobia, based on the doctrine of ethnopluralism, with anti-political-establishment populism – evolved in the 1970s, and was made known as a successful frame in connection with the electoral breakthrough of the French Front National in 1984. This event started a process of cross-national diffusion, where embryonic extreme right-wing groups and networks elsewhere adopted the new frame. Hence, the emergence of similar parties, clustered in time (i.e., the birth of a new party family) had less to do with structural factors influencing different political systems in similar ways as with cross-national diffusion of frames. The innovation and diffusion of the new master frame was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the emergence of extreme right-wing populist parties. In order to complete the model, a short list of different political opportunity structures is added.     

Modelling the dynamics of support for a right-wing populist party: the case of UKIP

Similar to a number of other right-wing populist parties in Europe, Great Britain's United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has experienced increased public support in recent years. Using aggregate data from monthly national surveys conducted between April 2004 and April 2014, time series analyses demonstrate that the dynamics of UKIP support were influenced by a combination of spatial and valence issues. A spatial issue, Euroscepticism, was fundamental, with UKIP support moving in dynamic equilibrium with changing public attitudes towards EU membership. In addition, widespread anti-immigration sentiment and dissatisfaction with the performance of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government combined with the “oxygen of publicity” to propel UKIP's surge. The political context after the 2010 general election helped as well by enabling UKIP to benefit from valence considerations. Many voters continued to doubt the competence of the major opposition party, Labour, while the Liberal Democrats were part of the government and, hence, unavailable as a protest vehicle. Since many of the forces driving UKIP support are beyond its control, the party's prospects are highly uncertain.     

The rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands: A discursive opportunity approach

This article seeks to explain the dramatic rise of Pim Fortuyn's right-wing populist party during the campaign for the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands in 2002. Fortuyn succeeded in attracting by far the most media attention of all political actors and his new party won 17 per cent of the votes. This article analyses how this new populist party managed to mobilise so much attention and support so suddenly and so rapidly. It uses the notion of 'discursive opportunities' and argues that the public reactions to Pim Fortuyn and his party played a decisive role in his ability to further diffuse his claims in the public sphere and achieve support among the Dutch electorate. The predictions of the effects of discursive opportunities are empirically investigated with longitudinal data from newspapers and opinion polls. To study the dynamics of competition over voter support and over space in the public debate during the election campaign, an ARIMA time-series model is used as well as a negative binomial regression with lagged variables to account for the time-series structure of the data. It is found that discursive opportunities have significantly affected the degree to which Fortuyn was successful both in the competition for voter support, and regarding his ability to express his claims in the media. Combining these two results, a dynamic feedback process is identified that can explain why a stable political situation suddenly spiralled out of equilibrium. Visibility and supportive reactions of others positively affected the opinion polls. Consonance significantly increased Fortuyn's claim-making; dissonance undermined it. Furthermore, electoral support and negative claims on the issue of immigration and integration in the media by others enhanced Fortuyn's ability to further diffuse his viewpoints and to become the main political opinion-maker during the turbulent election campaign of 2002.     

Attitudinal dispositions to vote for a 'new' extreme right-wing party: The case of 'Vlaams Blok'

Abstract. The Vlaams Blok , a 'new' extreme right-wing party, grew substantially during the 1980s in the Flemish part of Belgium. Two alternative hypotheses about the motivation and attitudes of voters for extreme right-wing parties are examined. Is the voters' choice for such a political party inspired by substantive considerations about the programme of the party (the 'rational choice' model), or is right-wing voting mainly an expression of protest? The Flemish part of the Voters' Study relating to the 1991 General Election contains useful data for answering these questions. The likelihood of voting for the Vlaams Blok , as a function of thirteen relevant attitudinal variables, is analysed by means of logistic regression. Voting for the Vlaams Blok is determined by a negative attitude towards immigrants. Nationalist attitudes and feelings of social isolation seem to have a partial and moderate additional impact. In addition, there is some evidence that a vote for the Vlaams Blok should also be seen as a protest vote by some of the voters.     

Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures

In this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions. The model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power. We estimate the model in the case of the French départements. Our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the French départements depend on the effective political power of the majority.     

政治和谐与中国特色政党制度

中国特色政党制度和政治和谐之间具有密切的关联,二者构成互动影响。政治和谐是中国特色政党制度的目标指向,中国特色政党制度是建构政治和谐的路径选择。本文通过分析政治和谐的内涵、特征及现状,解构中国特色政党制度的结构和功能,找出中国特色政党制度和政治和谐之间的逻辑关联,从政党制度的视角提出构建政治和谐的路径选择。     

Political competition,party polarization,and government performance

Lack of party competition may impair government efficiency. If the voters are ideologically predisposed to cast their votes in favor of one political party, they may reelect an underperforming incumbent. Party polarization may magnify this effect since the median voter faces a higher cost of selecting a better, but ideologically distant incumbent. Alternatively, if the electorate is evenly divided between parties, polarization may induce parties to invest more effort in improving their election prospects. The current paper analyzes efficiency in Norwegian local governments. Efficiency has been measured by means of panel data on government service output over a 10-year period. Electoral dominance has been measured as number of elections wherein one party bloc receives at least 60 % of the votes, measured over six consecutive elections. Party polarization is defined as the ideological distance between the two party blocs, and it is measured on basis of survey data on the ideological preferences of elected politicians. Lack of party competition reduces efficiency, the effect being stronger in governments where more party polarization exists. These agency losses are larger in high-revenue municipalities.     

Subnational political opportunity structures and the success of the radical right: Evidence from the March 2004 regional elections in France

Abstract.  This article attempts to explain the impact of department-level political opportunity structures on the electoral success of the French Front National (FN) in the 2004 regional elections. The concept of 'political opportunity structure' refers to the degree of openness of a particular political system and the external institutional or socio-economic constraints and opportunities that it sets for political parties. Comparative analysis across subnational units is conducted where the 94 departments of mainland France are the units of analysis. The significance of electoral institutions (district magnitude), party competition (effective number of parties), electoral behaviour (turnout) and socioeconomic conditions (immigration and unemployment) on the ability of the FN to gather votes across the departments is assessed by means of multiple regression. The empirical results show that the subnational political opportunity structures have been of great importance for the FN. Some four out of the five independent variables are statistically significant and explain a great deal of the variance in the two dependent variables (electoral support for FN list and index of electoral success). Turnout and district magnitude are negatively correlated with the electoral fortunes of the FN, while unemployment and the effective number of party lists are positively correlated with the success of the FN in the regional elections. The variable that indicates the share of non-European immigrants does not provide additional explanatory power in a statistically significant way.     

A losing gamble. How mainstream parties facilitate anti-immigrant party success

The emergence of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe has provoked very different responses from mainstream parties. Some have tried to counter the anti-immigrant parties while others have tried to recapture lost voters by taking a tougher stance on immigration. Country comparative studies have tried to determine the effectiveness of different strategies, but systematic testing has been impaired by small-n problems. This paper therefore exploits sub-national variation in 290 Swedish municipalities to investigate the effect of mainstream party strategy on anti-immigrant electoral success. The paper finds that a tougher stance on immigration on the part of mainstream parties is correlated with more anti-immigrant party support, even when controlling for a large number of socio-economic, historical and regional factors. This result indicates that mainstream parties legitimize anti-immigrant parties by taking a tougher position on immigration. However, the results presented in the paper show that it is not sufficient for one mainstream party to take a tougher position; it is only when the entire political mainstream is tougher on immigration that the anti-immigrant party benefits. What is more, the toughness of the parties on the left seems to be more legitimizing than the toughness of the parties on the right.     

Sub-state diplomacy: Understanding the international opportunity structures

Developing explanations for how sub-state governments are active internationally is central to understanding their unexpected growth as international actors. Building upon Lecours’ work [2002, Paradiplomacy: reflections on the foreign policy and international relations of regions, International Negotiation, Vol.7, pp.91–114], this article develops an expanded historical institutionalist analysis of the international agency of sub-state governments. Its original empirical contribution is utilizing this approach to examine within case variation across four contrasting policy domains in a case study of Wales. Reflecting the European Union sub-state mobilization literature, levels of constitutional powers are constrained in their capacity to account for Welsh sub-state international agency. Instead, the article highlights strong variation in the opportunity structures shaping sub-state diplomacy across policy domains. The article argues that institutional continuity and change, the prevalence of ‘path dependence’, can differ significantly between policy domains in sub-state diplomacy, argues for an expanded multi-level framework recognizing the impact of non-governmental organizations and international institutional opportunity structures and confirms historical institutionalism’s ability to enrich understanding of agency-structure relationships.     

Appearing moderate or radical? Radical left party success and the two-dimensional political space

Abstract

Challenger parties’ electoral successes have attracted increasing scholarly attention. Based on the example of West European radical left parties, this article investigates whether and how centripetal and centrifugal positional movements on different conflict dimensions influence the election results of these parties. Depending on parties’ issue-linkages, these strategies will have a different effect for the economic and the non-economic issue dimension. Due to radical left parties’ long-term commitment and a strong party-issue linkage on economic issues, more moderate positions will play to their electoral advantage. In contrast, far-left parties compete with social democratic and green-libertarian parties for party-issue linkages on the non-economic issue dimension. Here, they benefit from promoting centrifugal strategies. Based on time-series cross-section analyses for 25 West European far-left parties between 1990 and 2017, the empirical results show that the success of radical left parties’ positional strategies varies with the conflict dimension in question and that this effect is only partly moderated by the positions of competing mainstream left parties.     

Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia,the Philippines and Thailand

Abstract

This article analyses the Kim Dae-jung government's industrial realignment (‘Big Deals’) policy in post-crisis Korea, which offers a valuable insight into the state's role in managing the transition from a developmental state to a free-market economy and into the changing nature of government–business relations. Although Kim was committed to creating a free-market economy in Korea, as the ‘Big Deals’ got under way critics accused him of violating market principles and employing tactics of intervention and coercion used by previous authoritarian regimes. The ‘Big Deals’ experience suggests a further stage in the evolution of the Korean developmental state; the dismantling of state powers and the implementation of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s had led to the emergence of a ‘transformative state’ in which the state acted as ‘senior partner’ rather than ‘commander-in-chief’. The transitional state charged with the task of rebuilding the economy after 1997 regained some of its lost powers and used some familiar methods of achieving its ends. However, it also demonstrated by the nature and scope of its interventions that it was gradually evolving and adapting to meet the changing economic environment. Although Kim's actions prompted allegations from the chaebol and their conservative allies of a return to autocratic economic management by the government, it was clear that the developmental state had not been resurrected. Rather, these criticisms serve to highlight the continuing antagonism in the state–business relationship; neither side had developed new strategies for dealing with each other and their relations were still characterized by mutual mistrust and staunch chaebol resistance to key reforms demanded by the government. Although suspicions of a permanent return to extensive state intervention were unfounded, they nevertheless diminished the prospects for the creation of a cooperative relationship between the state and big business that would be a crucial factor in revitalizing the Korean economy.     

Donald Trump and right-wing populists in comparative perspective

ABSTRACT

We compare sources of Donald Trump’s appeal in the 2016 US presidential campaign to the appeal of right-populists from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. We compare the appeal of right-populist to center-right candidates in each case (as measured with feeling thermometers) and test hypotheses about how the appeal of right-populists differs from that of center-right candidates. Standard predictors of affect toward right-of-center candidates were generally less relevant as a basis of affect toward right-populist candidates. This comparative perspective demonstrates that Trump’s appeal was based on racial resentment, anti-immigration sentiments and anxiety. Affect toward Trump and other right-populists from these Anglo-democracies fits patterns previously observed in Europe, a pattern that appears to be world-wide.     

Income inequality and voting for radical right-wing parties

Using a multilevel analysis method, this article tests different hypotheses for how income inequality affects voter support for radical right-wing parties (RRPs) in Western Europe. Specifically, the article shows how this ‘income inequality effect’ encourages poor people to vote for RRPs, while it concurrently discourages rich people from doing so. This finding supports the social identity hypothesis, which states that social identity (a micro-level factor) intermediates income inequality effect (a macro-level factor) on voter support for RRPs. The article's results suggest, further, that income inequality has different effects between the main supporters of RRPs with dissimilar occupations (e.g., manual workers and the petty bourgeoisie) because they belong to different income groups; and that country-level factors may have different effects on people regarding their support for RRPs.     

Religious fundamentalism and the extreme right-wing camp in Israel

Over the last ten years, a sizeable body of social science research has been devoted to two troubling phenomena—right-wing extremism and religious fundamentalism—both of which have seen a recrudescence in the last two decades. While the first is largely a secular phenomenon, the latter is, by definition, religious in orientation. Although most literature has treated these phenomena separately, in Israel the overlap between the two is so extensive that it could very well serve as the basis for a generating hypothesis. Utilizing features of both European right-wing extremism and characteristics of fundamentalism, Bermanis, Canetti-Nisim and Pedahzur attempt to demonstrate how the extreme right, with its secular underpinnings, has withdrawn from the larger picture, and how a new, complex and more extremist approach, based on fundamentalist ideals, has taken its place.     

The inferential opportunity of specificity: theory and empirical causality in American Political Development

Public Choice - The context-specificity of the research field of American Political Development (APD) can make it an especially fertile ground for empirical assessment of causal explanations of...     

Citizens,politicians, and party cartellization: Political representation and state failure in post-industrial democracies

Abstract. This paper critiques what can be interpreted as an application of the literature on state failure in current political economy and political science to the changing role of political parties in advanced post–industrial democracies, Katz and Mair's theory of cartel parties . It develops an alternative set of hypotheses about the dynamics of parties and party systems with the objective to clarify empirical terms according to which rival propositions can be tested. Specifically, the paper rejects three propositions in the theory of cartel parties and advances the following alternatives. First, party leaders are not divorced from their members and voting constituencies, but become ever more sensitive to their preferences. Second, inter–party cooperation generates a prisoner's dilemma in the competitive arena that ultimately prevents the emergence of cartels. Ideological convergence of rival parties has causes external to the competitive arena, not internal to it. Third, conventional parties cannot marginalize or coopt new challengers, but must adjust to their demands and electoral appeals. The age of cartel parties, if it ever existed, is not at its beginning, but its end.     

Pariahs in their midst: Belgian and Norwegian parties react to extremist threats

In a country where neocorporatist patterns are not well developed in the labour sector, the major French teachers' union, the Fédération de l'Education Nationale (FEN), enjoys unusual advantages of mass membership, extensive delegated administrative powers and established access to a sympathetic government. And yet French education under socialist leadership has been marked by intense conflict. The experience of the FEN illustrates some of the conditions of neocorporatism. Hampered by its internal divisions over interests and ideology, by external competition from private schools and rival groups at the secondary and university levels, and by its own fears of co‐optation, the FEN has been more effective at retarding than at shaping educational reform.