The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences

There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of “politics” has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement.     

Partisan politics,welfare states,and environmental policy outputs in the OECD countries, 1975–2005

Building on the burgeoning literature on the association between the welfare state and the environmental state, this study empirically examines how the politics of the former has affected the development of the latter. We suggest that the size of the welfare state shapes the calculus of environmental policy costs by partisan governments. A generous welfare state lowers the costs perceived by the left‐wing government, as large redistributive spending allows the government to mitigate the adverse impact of the new environmental policy on its core supporters, industrial workers. A generous welfare state also implies diminished marginal political returns from additional welfare commitment by the left‐wing government, which lowers the opportunity costs of environmental policy expansion. To the contrary, because of lower overall regulatory and taxation pressure, a small welfare state reduces the costs of environmental policy expansion as perceived by a right‐wing government. Our theoretical narrative is supported in a dynamic panel data analysis of environmental policy outputs in 25 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development member states during the period 1975–2005.     

Flexible enforcement and fine adjustment

This paper considers the level of, and changes in, optimal noncompliance penalties under the following conditions: (i) where the regulator responsible for setting policy parameters, such as a penalty, is different from (and thus may have a different objective from) the regulator responsible for enforcing existing regulations; and (ii) where enforcement behavior changes from one in which enforcers are unresponsive to overtures on the part of firms to increase compliance to one in which enforcers are responsive to such overtures. The model developed shows that when enforcers “switch” from unresponsive to responsive enforcement, the optimal penalties for noncompliance need to be reduced. The analysis also gives insights as to what variables dictate the degree of penalty reduction.     

When risk‐based regulation aims low: Approaches and challenges

Risk‐based regulation is becoming a familiar regulatory strategy in a wide range of areas and countries. Regulatory attention tends to focus, at least initially, on high risks but low‐risk regulatees or activities tend to form the bulk of the regulated population. This article asks why regulators need to address low risks and it outlines the potential difficulties that such risks present. It then considers how regulators tend to deal with lower risks in practice. A body of literature and survey‐based research is used to develop a taxonomy of intervention strategies that may be useful in relation to low‐risk activities, and, indeed, more widely. In an article to be published in the subsequent issue of this journal, we will then develop a strategic framework for regulators to employ when choosing intervention strategies and we will assesses whether, and how, such a framework could be used by regulatory agencies in a manner that is operable, dynamic, transparent, and justifiable.     

Judicial enforcement deputies: Causes and effects of Chinese judges enforcing environmental administrative decisions

This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short‐lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment.     

Regulatory harmonization and agricultural biotechnology in Argentina and China: Critical assessment of state‐centered and decentered approaches

The international harmonization of technology‐related regulations seeks certain norms across diverse contexts. Harmonization efforts are based primarily on the promulgation of state‐centered command and control forms of regulation, though they may also be accompanied by the diffusion of more plural approaches that are decentered from the state. We contrast the ways in which the “proper” use of transgenic cotton seed technologies is understood in harmonizing regulations with the way this technology is used in practice in regions of Argentina and China. We find divergence that poses challenges for both state‐centered and decentered approaches to harmonization. While state‐centered approaches are blind to some critical processes on the ground, decentered strategies are found wanting in situations where norms remain deeply contested amongst actors situated in very uneven power relations. In both cases, we find that establishing and securing norms that are socially just and environmentally sustainable means attending much more explicitly to the political economies in which technological practices actually take root.     

External dimensions of European environmental policy: An analysis of environmental treaty ratification by third states

The European Union has become an important leader in international environmental affairs – particularly through the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) with favourable terms. In this article, EU environmental leadership is studied from a new perspective, focusing on the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. Specifically, it investigates whether the EU is also capable of motivating third states to join its preferred MEAs. It is argued that third states join the EU's preferred MEAs to signal their compliance with EU environmental standards in an effort to become eligible for various rewards that the EU could potentially offer, including a credible membership perspective, access to its lucrative markets, and aid and assistance. The argument is tested by examining the ratification behaviour of 25 non‐EU Member States with regard to all 21 MEAs negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The results provide robust support for the theory that EU rewards motivate third states to ratify these treaties. The results withstand a number of statistical tests, even when alternative explanatory factors such as trade intensities, transnational communication and geographic proximity are controlled for. The study is the first large‐scale demonstration of the EU's external influence at the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. By identifying three different channels of EU influence, the research permits a more refined understanding of the EU's role as a promoter of environmental protection standards.     

Water policy and environmental sustainability: the case of post‐colonial Namibia

In semi‐arid countries, particularly in Africa, governments have evolved water policies oriented toward ‘techno‐giantist,’ grand‐scale schemes that have generally accelerated the depletion of national water tables. In Namibia, such a techno‐giantist water management strategy was utilized to reinforce the privileges of white minority farmers prior to independence, and was subsequently expanded to provide modern water facilities to the black African majority in the post‐independence period. The government has pursued not only the construction of a massive new system of pipelines and boreholes, but also the development of giant dam‐building and river canal schemes that are likely to result in watershed depletion over the long term. This reflects state leaders' belief in the imagery of political potency projected by the government's ability to build macro‐scale water systems. However, a water supply approach focused on more micro‐level extraction techniques through which aquifer recharge is prioritized is more likely to assure both local‐level water access and water table sustainability. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulatory Commitment to Negotiated Agreements: Evidence from the United States, Germany, The Netherlands, and France

Negotiated Agreements (NAs) are arrangements between firms and regulators in which firms voluntarily agree to reduce their pollution. This article analyzes the institutional features that facilitate or hamper the implementation of NAs. We illustrate the analysis with case studies on the implementation of NAs in the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and France. We find that NAs are implemented when regulators are able to commit credibly to the objectives of NAs. Institutional environments marked by fragmentation of power and open access in policymaking reduce regulatory credibility and thus hamper the implementation of NAs.     

Defining Environmental Justice Communities for Regulatory Enforcement: Implications from a Block‐Group‐Level Analysis of New York State

The absence of a clear definition of environmental justice areas has been cited as one of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's major deficiencies in managing federal environmental justice programs. Several states have explicitly defined potential environmental justice areas and integrated targeted efforts into the policy‐making process. At the block‐group level, this study evaluates the effects of New York State's environmental justice policy, which defines communities of concern in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics as well as mandates supplemental regulatory enforcement activities for these neighborhoods, on the agency's policy implementation practices under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. The empirical findings suggest that there is inconclusive evidence regarding race/ethnicity‐ and class‐based environmental inequity. Also, the state's policy intervention is not universally effective. Moreover, task environments of a given community are a consistent determinant of the agency's regulatory compliance monitoring and assurance activities. This study then derives broader implications regarding the adoption of a policy instrument that defines and screens potential environmental justice communities.     

The importance of industry compliance in improving advertising self‐regulatory processes

As the most visible element of the marketing communications mix, advertising has had its critics and, given the choice, developed countries usually select a self‐regulatory approach to deal with unacceptable advertising. The recent breakdown of one of the world's longest established advertising self‐regulatory programmes in Australia has reopened the 20‐year old debate that has taken place in the leading academic and business journals concerned with enhancing understanding of such regulatory systems. This paper focuses on the activity of code enforcement in improving the effectiveness of advertising self‐regulatory frameworks. The key findings of an Australian study, where its scheme has recently failed, are presented and discussed in this context and a key concept is developed. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

The politics of de‐delegation: Regulatory (in)dependence in Turkey

This essay explores the rise and decline of regulatory independence in Turkey. Framing the ongoing process of limiting independence of these agencies as the politics of de‐delegation, it raises the question of why Turkish regulatory agencies have become subject to increasing political intervention. Contending that institutional legacies and mounting illiberal predispositions of the Turkish state facilitate the politics of de‐delegation, the essay focuses on centralization, executive discretion, and politicization of bureaucracy as the major institutional legacies. Then it briefly discusses formal and informal mechanisms of political intervention, which have impaired the independence of the regulatory agencies.     

How networks among frontline offices influence regulatory enforcement: Diffusion and justification of interpretation of risk

Street-level interpretation and enforcement are critical to defining the meaning of law. To understand street-level regulatory decisions, prior studies have highlighted internal office conditions, neglecting the influence that peer offices can have. This study examines the role of horizontal inter-office interaction among frontline offices and illustrates how and under what conditions it shapes the meaning of law. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative data on Japan's Soil Contamination Countermeasures Act, this study reveals that inter-office interaction occurs within fixed groups and comes to shape shared interpretations of law that regulators believe are legally valid. This implies that under legal ambiguity, inter-office interactions develop institutionalized notions of appropriateness and reinforce the perception of legal consistency, which bolster the legitimacy of enforcement. Although peer office networks encourage convergence on the interpretation of law, because of their clustered structure, legal meanings develop differently across various groups.     

Special Interests,Regulatory Quality,and the Pesticides Overload

Pesticides overuse is a serious threat to ecosystems and wildlife, human health, and agricultural sustainability. So far, however, social scientists have not produced systematic evidence on the political–economic determinants of pesticides overuse. We argue that the agrochemical industry, as a profit‐motivated interest group, will only mobilize politically to avoid reductions in pesticides use when regulatory institutions are potentially capable of correcting a market failure. If regulatory institutions are weakened by corruption or other factors, pesticides overuse occurs with or without the influence of the agrochemical industry. We test this interactive theory systematically against quantitative data on pesticides use in 24 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries, 1991–2003. Using corruption and other indicators to capture bureaucratic quality, we find substantively large and statistically robust interactive effects. The agrochemical industry is a crucial determinant of pesticides use in nations with low corruption, whereas the agrochemical industry has no effect on pesticides use under corrupt regulatory institutions. Troublingly, these results imply that reduced corruption may not improve actual regulatory effectiveness unless political institutions can somehow constrain the influence of special interests.     

Information disclosure and environmental regulation: Green lights and gray areas

This research examines the potential of information disclosure for environmental regulation. The research attempts to answer questions of what impact information disclosure has on corporate environmental practices and what interferes with its effective use. A case study of Indonesia's pioneering informational environmental regulation reveals (i) both indirect (e.g. anticipation of external pressure) and direct (e.g. internal learning support) informational effects that enhance environmental awareness at the top management level and stimulate changes in production processes and (ii) detrimental effects of disclosed information that maintain or strengthen the extant power of regulated firms over environmental groups and local communities affected. Regulatory efforts can be leveraged by public disclosure of information regarding firms' environmental performance, especially where the state monitoring and enforcement capacities are weak. However, the introduction of policies of this kind without consideration of different market conditions and political and administrative culture may impede the effectiveness of this potentially useful regulatory method.     

The authoritarian logic of regulatory pluralism: Understanding China's new environmental actors

Over the last decade, Chinese citizens, judges, and prosecutors have started to take action against industrial pollution, pluralizing a regulatory landscape originally occupied by administrative agencies. Regulatory pluralism here has an authoritarian logic, occurring without the retreat of party‐state control. Under such logic, the party‐state both needs and fears new actors for their positive and negative roles in controlling risk and maintaining stability. Consequently, the regime's relation to regulatory pluralism is ambivalent, shifting between support and restriction. This prevents a development of a regulatory society that could bypass the regulatory state. Theoretically, this special edition argues for a subjective definition of regulation in a context of pluralism. Moreover, it finds that regulatory pluralism need not coincide with a decentring of regulation. Finally, it highlights how entry onto the regulatory landscape affects the non‐regulatory roles of new actors, creating unintended consequences for regulatory pluralism.     

When doctors shape policy: The impact of self‐regulation on governing human biotechnology

This paper investigates the development and adoption of governance modes in the field of human biotechnology. As the field of human biotechnology is relatively new, voluntary professional self‐regulation constituted the initial governing mode. In the meantime, with the exception of Ireland, all Western European countries have moved toward greater state intervention. Nevertheless, they have done so in contrasting ways and the resulting governance modes for assisted reproductive technology and embryonic stem‐cell research vary greatly. Instead of imposing their steering capacity in a “top‐down” fashion, governments have taken pre‐existing self‐regulatory arrangements in the field into account and built up governance mechanisms in conjunction with private actors and pre‐existing modes of private governance. Our analysis demonstrates that the form and content of the initial self‐regulation explain why the self‐steering capacity of the medical profession was largely or at least partially preserved through hybrid governance systems in Britain and Germany, while in France the self‐regulation was entirely replaced by governmental intervention.     

The culture of risk regulation: Responses to environmental disasters

Disasters challenge the equilibrium of regulatory regimes and make policy shifts more likely. Using an institutional theory of cultural biases and the concept of cultural “surprise”, this article analyses the direction and intensity of media argumentation in respect of policy shifts. Instead of assuming a demand for greater State intervention after dramatic focusing events, as suggested by other theoretical frames, cultural theory opens a variety of options that range from embracing regulatory responses from different cultural biases to the radicalization of current, but failing, instruments. The analysis of media reaction to the environmental disasters caused by the oil spills of Exxon Valdez (United States), Erika (France) and Prestige (Spain) shows that the demand for more hierarchy does not monopolize the overall argumentation. The change demanded often implies a radicalization of a particular prevalent view where the associated institutional setting is failing its supporters.     

Wheat from chaff: Third‐party monitoring and FEC enforcement actions

Regulatory theory suggests that providing agencies with multiple sanctioning options allows them to dispose promptly of less serious matters and thereby conserve resources to pursue serious offenders. However, agencies dependent on third‐party monitoring may have their enforcement agendas skewed toward more trivial violations. We consider these competing expectations by analyzing enforcement actions at the US Federal Election Commission (FEC) from 1999 to 2004 . The FEC – an agency heavily dependent on third‐party monitoring – expanded its enforcement options in 2000 by creating two new programs to pursue low‐level offenders, while leaving its monitoring strategy unchanged. We hypothesized that more sanctioning options would allow the FEC to allocate its resources more efficiently, and thus deal more effectively with the skew created by third‐party monitoring. We found instead that although the FEC disposed more promptly of low‐level infractions, it was no more effective at focusing on serious violations. Our results suggest that for many agencies, expanding enforcement options without addressing monitoring has limited ability to resolve enforcement problems.