The risks of contract law

The economic analysis of law may be able to provide some reason why it is efficient to enforce wholly executory contracts, but (I submit) it has not done so.     

房屋买卖合同中的陷阱及法律救济

开发商和购房人之间的权利义务关系规定在购房合同中。由开发商单方面提供的格式合同已提前确定了本应由双方协商的合同条款。本文以某房屋买卖合同为例，指出在房屋买卖合同中常见的不公平、不舍法条款，针对房屋买卖合同中的陷阱提出法律救济途径。     

On the optimal complexity of law and legal rules harmonization

This paper analyses the determination of the complexity of legal rules in a context of harmonization between different countries. We first assume that there are no harmonization gains. We show that if the optimal complexity levels of legal rules are equal across countries, their common level will stick when legal rules are harmonized. When these levels are different, one nation-state may lose to the determination of a uniform level of complexity. However, when there are harmonization gains we show that if these harmonization gains are large enough, complex legal rules are optimal. Moreover, we show that each nation-state could gain from the determination of a uniform level of complexity, even if this level is not its preferred one.

The Chinese new Civil Code and the law of contract

China-EU Law Journal - The purpose of this contribution is to present to the readers the Chinese Civil Code which entered into force the first of January 2021, and to bring to their attention the...     

国家干预在我国劳动合同立法中的体现

劳动合同属于兼有当事人意思自治和国家干预性质的特殊合同.本文探讨了国家干预劳动合同立法的合理性和必要性,阐述了我国在劳动合同立法过程中,国家干预起到了积极的重要作用并具体地体现在了<劳动合同法>中.     

Autonomy and private ordering in contract law

This essay reviews Michael J. Trebilcock's book,The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), examining crucial and controversial social issues within the rigorous framework of the law and economics of contract. The idea that private markets are the primary institutions for the allocation of limited resources is central to any private ordering model of contract law. Yet such a premise leaves a number of fundamental questions unanswered. Trebilcock is critical of the insufficiency and ambiguity of current contract theory in addressing fundamental legal issues relating to the limits of freedom of contract. Pushing the frontiers of current legal theory, Trebilcock revisits the slippery notion of freedom of contract and tests the actual reach of economic analysis in providing a coherent answer to compelling social questions. The author pursues his ambitious task by examining the conclusions reached by competing paradigms of analysis. In spite of his declared trust in the economic approach to law, Trebilcock pays close attention to alternative analytical traditions, comparing the conclusions of various intellectual perspectives with those suggested by an economic framework of private ordering. The book objectively examines strengths and weaknesses of competing views, affording the reader a balanced position from which to conclude for herself, by illustrating the practical implications of the various approaches. In a number of instances, Trebilcock shows how different theoretical premises may indeed be conducive to similar institutional outcomes.Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University. The support of the Sarah Scaife Foundation and of the John M. Olin Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, as are the helpful comments of Jonathan C. Harris and Charles K. Rowley. Extensive remarks received from Michael J. Trebilcock prior to publication allowed me to remedy earlier omissions.     

Economic impossibility in Turkish contract law from the perspective of law and economics

We argue that the proposed introduction of the doctrine of economic impossibility in Article 137 of the reform draft of the Turkish Code of Obligations is in line with economic considerations and facilitates business transactions. This new rule gives courts the explicit power to terminate a contract and relieve the party, which owes specific performance of its obligation, without imposing any duty to pay expectation damages to the other party. We argue that a court??s decision to terminate a contract under economic impossibility should be based on three tests. First, a low-probability-event occurs between contract formation and performance. Second, this event causes an excessive increase in the costs of specific performance. Third, the concept of an excessive increase should take into due consideration the other party??s interest in specific performance. The reform draft includes explicitly the first two tests, but not the third test. We also show under which conditions an excessive performance difficulty should not lead to termination of the contract but rather to an adjustment of the agreed price. We argue that the rule of economic impossibility, if diligently adjudicated, saves the parties transactions costs in comparison to a rule under which the law insists on specific performance or damage payments. We also argue that a specific rule of economic impossibility leads to better and more business-oriented solutions to the underlying problems than the alternative, which is to solve such problems under the broad and unspecific cover of the ??good faith?? or the ??Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus?? doctrine.     

Reviewing the exclusionary principle in English contract law

The exclusionary principle in English contract law is a long established but controversial rule of contractual interpretation. This article considers the jurisprudential origins of the principle and critically analyses judicial justification of the principle. This article also puts forward a case for how the principle can be reformed in order to introduce greater fairness within the process of contractual interpretation.     

论医患关系是民事法律关系中的合同关系

本文从民法的角度全面论述了医患关系的法律性质为民事法律关系中的合同关系 ,阐述并分析了医疗合同的订立与生效以及医患双方的主要权利与义务 ,并对医疗合同的特点作了系统性地论述。     

多元与融合:国际统一合同法的现代特性

合同法历来是国际统一立法最活跃的法域,在现行立法的架构中,已呈现出立法形式多元和立法内容融合两大特性.本文首先考察了国际统一合同法从一元化立法形态到多元化立法形态的历史演进过程,并分析了多元并存的价值,进而归纳了国际统一合同法的融合途径及统一法成果所涉领域.     

论医患关系是民事法律关系中的合同关系

本文从民法的角度全面论述了医患关系的法律性质为民事法律关系中的 合同关系,阐述并分析了医疗合同的订立与生效以及医患双方的主要权利与义务,并对医疗合同的特点作了系统性地论述。     

Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law

The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.     

合同法中的预期违约制度及其缺陷

预期违约制度是英美法系合同法上的特有制度。该制度的创立对及时解决合同纠纷 ,促进交易的安全性、效益性具有重要意义。我国合同法大胆地吸收了英美法系的预期违约制度 ,同时考虑到我国一贯承袭大陆法系的立法传统 ,为保证立法体系的协调性 ,又对该制度作了一些变通 ,而这一变通设计使我国合同法的预期违约制度存在着明显的缺陷 ,即 :( 1 )适用范围不明确 ;( 2 )救济方法不够完善 ;( 3)没有规定预期违约方明示拒绝履行的撤回权。     

试论契约自由及其在我国合同法中的地位

毫无疑问,罗马法应该被视为研究契约自由的起点.正是在罗马法中,契约制度首次得到了全面规定并达到了相当的高度.而且,正是罗马法孕育了契约自由的观念和思想.契约自由从思想到原则的转变是在法国民法典中实现的,而人类进入20世纪之后,契约自由逐步受到限制.在我国合同法中,契约自由也得到了确立,它不仅是我国合同法的一项基本原则,而且也是我国合同法的最高原则.