Transitioning policy: co-production of a new strategic framework for energy innovation policy in the Netherlands

This article describes policy–science interactions in a transition process in which we were involved as scientists. We describe the interactions that occurred in a project for the fourth National Environmental Policy Plan in the Netherlands. The project was successful in that it produced a new concept and set of principles for policy to deal with persistent problems such as global climate change, which were used in the national policy plan. The new concept was that of transition and the principles were: policy integration, long-term thinking for short-term action, keeping multiple options open and learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning. Retrospectively, we ask ourselves: what factors facilitated the acceptance of the first ideas about transition management? Reconstructing the events and drawing on interviews with key individuals involved, we have tried to find the key factors for the adoption of the ideas developed in the project. Finally, we reflect upon our role as scientists-advisors and the role of others in the development of a new story line and set of principles for policy. Our own assessment, 8 years later, is that we were engaged in boundary work.     

Economic concerns in Italian electoral behavior: Toward a rational electorate?

The current paradigm in the study of Italian electoral behavior finds in the ideological attachment and identification with political parties the basic determinants of voting. The relationship between economic conditions and electoral outcomes has not been the object of intense study, since it was assumed that the very predominance of the ideological dimension made any consideration of economic concerns among the electorate irrelevant. Recent research, employing both aggregate and survey data, shows, however, that economic conditions seem to exert an impact on electoral outcomes. Moreover, the emergence of a more rational and secular electorate might further increase the importance of economic voting.     

The effect of misperception on strategic behavior in legislative settings: Social psychology meets rational choice

This paper is about the conditions under which simple social psychological processes can affect collective decisions. In rational choice theory, social psychological effects are said to cancel out, be randomized, or be corrected by communication. Yet as Janis and Mann (1977) argued, there are generally recurring conditions in which such factors influence individual decisions. The question is, Under what conditions can we expect these factors to affect collective decisions? This paper suggests a general approach to identifying the effects of strategic misperception, illustrates it with an example of a social psychological process that affects player perceptions, and describes the preference distributions in which this simple process would change majority voting outcomes. The general conclusion is that strategic misperception may affect majority decisions under so many distributions of preferences that decisions cannot be predicted from knowledge of actors' preferences alone.     

Conceptualizing community economic development strategic framework for poverty alleviation: The case of Raymond Mhlaba Local Municipality

Economic regeneration is a segment of neighbourhood renewal that boosts community economics and sustains certain principles of sustainable urbanization. The community economic development framework for poverty reduction, the implementation loop for stakeholder collaboration, and the Neo‐Marxist community economic development strategy for local economic freedom are imperative for sustaining and renewing the idealism of shared prosperity, which is the basis of collectivism and community economic development in relation to community development. Because, where there is poor economic vivacity; it is difficult, if not impossible for such community to galvanize towards the realisation of the sustainable development agenda, is tied to economic vivacity of an area. It is on this ground that this paper develops a neighbourhood regeneration model or the community economic development strategic framework for poverty alleviation for the Raymond Mhlaba Local Municipality. Data were sorted from Statistics South Africa, ScienceDirect, EBSCOHost, Proquest, and Scopus among others, and the data were cushioned with substantial qualitative analysis. Triangulation, content, and theme analysis were used to analysis the data and propose the models for the paper. It must be noted that an understanding and appreciation of this paper is dependent on the understanding of the earlier papers advanced in this series. Finding demonstrates the suitability and the need for models in empowering those at the rural areas in South Africa.     

The constitutional court in Italian politics

The Italian constitutional court was established as an extra‐political guardian of the constitution, but it has assumed an important role in policy‐making which is far removed from its original, intended functions. This article describes the political background to its development and analyses the variety of ways in which the court has to take decisions of considerable political sensitivity with increasing frequency. The court is most in the public eye when it carries out its functions in the referendum procedures, but its involvement is more continuous, more creative and more positive than this might suggest. The article concludes that the court has to take action in areas for which it lacks the proper instruments, and that us relationship with other institutions in the policy‐making process is worthy of more attention than such relationships often receive.     

The Italian elections of 1996

European Journal of Political Research -     

The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism

In this paper, the problem of the Paretian liberal is cast as a preference revelation game whose outcome function satisfies Gibbard's libertarian condition and strong Pareto optimality. Strategic consistency requires that the equilibrium of the game agree with the sincere outcome. It is shown that, whether viewed in a cooperative or non-cooperative context, the liberal social choice function is strategically inconsistent. This result suggests that, from a strategic standpoint, a different resolution of the liberal paradox is desirable.     

Public resource allocation,strategic behavior,and status quo bias in choice experiments

Public Choice - Choice experiments, a survey methodology in which consumers face a series of choice tasks requiring them to indicate their most preferred option from a choice set containing two or...     

The Scotish National Party and the Italian

Abstract. As European regional autonomy parties, the Scottish National Party and the Italian Lega Nord present important similarities in the way they appeal to voters. Both parties, too, have recently been favoured by very similar social and political changes. Yet, of the two parties' recent electoral advances, that of the Lega has been by far the more striking. This can be explained in terms of the relative inability of the Lega 's main rival, the Democrazia Cristiana , to adapt to its challenge. The Scottish National Party's main rival, the Labour Party, is better able to adapt owing to the long-standing institutionalisation of regional conflict in Britain.     

The strategic determinants of legislative malapportionment in new democracies

When the number of seats to be elected in the districts of an electoral system is not proportional to their population, the cost of seats in raw votes tends to vary across districts. Malapportionment generates partisan bias when some parties do better (worse) in the districts where seats are cheaper (costlier) than in other districts. While existing research has focused on the exogenous determinants of malapportionment, in this article we argue that malapportionment also derives from the strategic decisions of ruling elites to maximize their legislative representation. The degree of malapportionment in newly democratized countries increases when ruling policymakers have reliable ex ante information about the geographical distribution of partisan support, and the authoritarian incumbent, at the moment of democratic transition, is strong. Our arguments are tested with original data from 60 third and fourth-wave democracies at national and district levels.