Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition

I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding “persistent recognition” to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding “transitory recognition”. Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of “active” bargainers; and individual’s incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents, while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition.     

Private operation with public supervision: evidence of hybrid modes of governance in prisons

Received theories suggest a possible cost-quality tradeoff when private outsourcing arrangements are used in public services. Using data from Brazilian prisons, our study provides evidence that contradicts this prediction: the prisons not only run at a lower cost, but also show similar or improved performance on a range of quality indicators. The attenuation of the cost-quality dilemma in our context is due to the hybrid management, which allocates control rights to a state-appointed public supervisor. We also discuss conditions in which the public supervisor may refrain from colluding with the private agent, therefore guaranteeing an effective monitoring of service quality.     

The Greek General Election of 2009: PASOK – The Third Generation

The policy networks model recently has become a more frequent analytical tool of EU policy analysts. In a recent article, Hussein Kassim offers a sceptical view about its applicability to the EU. Kassim fails to make explicit the key variables — or internal characteristics of policy networks ‐ which help to explain policy outcomes. However, his own analysis echoes many of the assumptions of the model: that policy networks are rife in the EU because they facilitate informal bargaining amid fluid policy processes, that networks provide order amid extreme institutional complexity and frequent change, and that the hard work involved in identifying EU policy networks is worth the effort. The policy networks model requires further testing and refinement at the EU level, but it remains the most analytically powerful approach on offer.     

The progress of the betting in a baseball game: A comment

In their article in the current issue of this journal, Sauer et al. compare the evolution of prices of in-game betting markets of baseball games to an empirical model of scoring based on the probability of various game events occurring. The authors correctly suggest this in-game betting market provides an opportunity to examine the efficiency of gambling markets, as the value of the security being examined can be known with a greater degree of precision than the fundamental value of securities being traded in general financial markets. While we appreciate the progress that has occurred, we believe that with some fairly simple changes, the authors may be able to improve the precision of their model to the point where a more powerful commentary on potential market efficiency could be developed. We offer suggestions on more precisely matching of the two sources of data, timing of the events, and dealing with games in which there is a clear pre-game favorite. We close with suggestions for extensions.     

The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror

This paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries, as does the recipient country’s level of education. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. They suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education.     

The curious commentary on the citation practices of Avner Greif

Rowley’s (Public Choice 140:275–285, 2009) claim that I have “expropriated” (p. 276) intellectual property rights from Professor Landa by insufficiently citing her works is vacuous. It failed, among other faults, to recognize the substantive distinction between the lines of research pursued by Professor Landa and myself. Her analysis of trust is preferences-based while my analysis is beliefs-based. We talk about similar issues but what we say is very different.     

Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects

Politicians bias public policies to favor particular election districts. According to the traditional common pool model, districts facing low tax shares should receive relatively large government projects. We suggest a swing-voter model where the number of voters on the ideological cut point, lack of party identification and number of district representatives per voter determine project sizes. We analyze the allocation of state road investments in Norway from 1973–1997 exploiting unique data on characteristics of voters, legislative representation and tax prices in 19 election districts. Geographical representation to parliament is biased, mostly due to an ancient constitution. Shares of swing voters and legislative over-representation lead to higher levels of road investments, while high levels of party identification reduce investments.     

Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol

Abstract

This article analyses the gap between government ambitions and actual outcomes in the case of European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. Specifically, it investigates why Europol has not managed to live up to its tasks despite outspoken government support. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, the study suggests why bureaucrats might be motivated to resist calls for international cooperation. By examining the process by which Europol has developed as an actor in the counter terrorism field, this article shows how development in the field of intelligence cooperation is not exclusively the reflection of government preferences. It concludes by suggesting that scholars could gain greater insight from a less state centric approach to the study of intelligence. In addition, the article suggests that policy makers cultivate a greater familiarity with bureaucratic factors and that they continually work with those factors in mind.     

Regions with regionalism? The rescaling of interest groups in six European states

In many European countries a regional or meso level of government has emerged, with significant policy responsibilities. It has been suggested that the representation of social and economic interests has not followed, so that policy communities remain state‐wide, giving ‘regions without regionalism’. This study of interest groups in six European states examines their adaptation to devolution, focusing on organisation, cognitive change and relationships. It finds there has been a regionalisation of interest representation, but it is uneven, depending on the strength of regional government, territorial identities and the interests of social actors. Business, trades unions, farmer organisations and environmental groups are all cross‐pressured on the regional question. The region is emerging in some cases as a site of interest intermediation. Territorial policy communities are emerging in some regions, but in most cases these supplement, rather than replace, state‐wide policy communities.     

Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding

We consider a situation in which two groups contest group-specific public goods. Each member of the group may have a different valuation of the prize. Our model can be interpreted as the contestants’ cost of lobbying efforts being non-linear, or the returns to their efforts being decreasing. We show that the level of free-riding depends on the return of the investment. We consider the situation under which one group initiates a contest to which different individuals and/or groups can be added. The question we pose is what is the optimal structure of additional groups?     

The prison in economics: private and public incarceration in Ancient Greece

Recent histories of Ancient Greece describe a transition from customary law to public criminal justice between 800 and 400 B.C. This narrative contains three pieces of evidence against the presumption that prisons are a public good and government must provide incarcerations. First, before the rise of a formal government, Ancient Greece had a functioning system of criminal law enforcement. Second, the timeline surrounding the rise of government institutions in Ancient Greece originated with Solon’s penal reforms. Lastly, the rise of a government system was more the result of private rather than public interest.     

The Perils of Terrorism: Chinese Whispers,Kevin Bacon and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia – A review essay

This review examines the scholarship on Islamic terrorism and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia, arguing that three factors undermine the academic credibility of much of this scholarship. Two points relate to the extensive reliance on interviews with various anonymous ‘security personnel’, or media reports of such statements. Firstly, these sources are in themselves problematic in that they cannot be independently checked or verified. In such circumstances, factual errors undermine the credibility of the argument. Secondly, many researchers using these sources appear to take them at face value, without interrogating their reliability and political motives. The third point relates to the way in which different types of source are utilized and, in particular, how tentative allegations are transmuted into established facts. The review concludes that such studies would benefit from greater contextualization within the domestic politics of the countries in question, rather than their current focus on specific individuals, organizations and networks.     

Interest-group analysis in economic history and the history of economic thought

This article reviews Bob Tollison’s conjoined contributions to the scholarly literature in the closely related fields of economic history and history of economic thought, underscoring his integration of public choice and interest-group analysis into the historian’s purview. It identifies the overarching themes of his research and summarizes the major findings of his key publications.     

Dilatory or anticipatory? Voting on the Journal in the House of Representatives

In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the Journal, and its implications for legislative business. In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that such votes are more than simply pro forma motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Considering the 102nd–107th Congresses, I show that votes on the Journal’s approval are just as frequently requested by the majority party as by members of the minority party. Furthermore, I find that votes recorded on days on which a vote was also recorded on the House Journal were more likely to be close and more likely to be party-line votes than those recorded on other days.     

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

In the classic Hotelling–Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters’ preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distributions. In addition, the equilibria have the following features: (1) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (2) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; and (3) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.     

They Come over Here … 300 Years of Xenophobic Propaganda in England

England's rulers, merchants, and organized labor in the early modern period (from the 16th to the 18th centuries) were all actively using what today we would call propaganda. Each group appreciated the need to get popular opinion on its side, or at the least to convince other groups it was in the public interest to act in a particular way. This study focuses on the use of xenophobic narratives by these actors in order to further their political, economic, or cultural objectives. The targets were economic rivals including the Dutch, but most particularly ethnic and religious outgroups, including Roman Catholics, Muslims, and Jews. Although there were public relations win-wins for anyone who was able successfully to demonize foreigners, racist and xenophobic propaganda was often more pernicious than the tellers realized, in many cases extending its influence over several generations. In addition, it is clear that many narratives failed to engage with public opinion, for reasons that were not always clear to the groups responsible for them.     

The invisible hand plays dice: multiple equilibria in sects markets

Religious participation is much more widespread in the United States than in Europe, while Europeans tend to view sects more suspiciously than Americans. We propose an explanation for these patterns without assuming differences in preferences or market fundamentals. We study a religious market where both demand and supply of spiritual services are endogenous. Such markets may have multiple equilibria. Further, equilibria with more sects result in higher welfare and lower membership costs, as secular societies tend to host on average more demanding sects.