An Estimator for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions

This article provides a new maximum-likelihood estimator forselection models with dichotomous dependent variables when identicalfactors affect the selection equation and the equation of interest.Such situations arise naturally in game-theoretic models whereselection is typically nonrandom and identical explanatory variablesinfluence all decisions under investigation. When identicalexplanatory variables influence selection and a subsequent outcomeof interest, the commonly used Heckman-type estimators identifyfrom distributional assumptions about the residuals alone. Whenits own identifying assumption is reasonable, the new estimatorallows the researcher to avoid the painful choice between identifyingfrom distributional assumptions alone and adding a theoreticallyunjustified variable to the selection equation in a mistakenattempt to "boost" identification. The article uses Monte Carlomethods to compare the small-sample properties of the estimatorwith those of the Heckman-type estimator and ordinary probit.     

Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions to Toleration

Why did Locke exclude Catholics and atheists from toleration? Not, I contend, because he was trapped by his context, but because his prudential approach and practical judgments led him to traditional texts. I make this argument first by outlining the connections among prudential exceptionality, practical judgments, and traditional texts. I then describe important continuities between conventional English understandings of the relationship between state and religion and Locke's writings on toleration, discuss Locke's conception of rights, and illustrate his use of prudential exceptions and distinctions. I conclude by arguing that Locke's problems are relevant to assessing contemporary liberal discussions of toleration and the separation of state and religion that lean heavily on practical justifications.     

Democratic Accountability and Retrospective Voting: A Laboratory Experiment

Understanding the incentives of politicians requires understanding the nature of voting behavior. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether voters focus on the problem of electoral selection or if they instead focus on electoral sanctioning. If voters are forward‐looking but uncertain about politicians’ unobservable characteristics, then it is rational to focus on selection. But doing so undermines democratic accountability because selection renders sanctioning an empty threat. In contrast to rational choice predictions, the experimental results indicate a strong behavioral tendency to use a retrospective voting rule. Additional experiments support the interpretation that retrospective voting is a simple heuristic that voters use to cope with a cognitively difficult inference and decision problem and, in addition, suggest that voters have a preference for accountability. The results pose a challenge for theories of electoral selection and voter learning and suggest new interpretations of empirical studies of economic and retrospective voting.     

Do All Associations Lead to Lower Levels of Ethnocentrism? A Two-Year Longitudinal Test of the Selection and Adaptation Model

Within the literature on the relation between membership in voluntary associations and tolerance, three theoretical perspectives can be distinguished. The socialization perspective assumes that the interaction within association leads to higher levels of tolerance; the self-selection perspective suggests that tolerant actors are more likely to join associations; while the selection and adaption model predicts that the group culture within an association will have a specific effect on members’ attitudes. We use a two-year panel study among Belgian adolescents to ascertain the empirical merits of these three approaches. Results show that not all associations have an effect on the reduction of prejudice, but that this effect is limited to specific associations. A structural equation model furthermore suggests that socialization effects are significantly stronger than self-selection effects. As such, this analysis of panel data lends support to the selection and adaptation model.     

Political interest and the decision to vote: a self-selection problem

ABSTRACT

Political interest is frequently considered as one of the most important driving factors of voter turnout. This article uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to investigate the causal relationship between political interest and the decision to vote. It introduces a recursive simultaneous equation model which is estimated via bivariate probit regression and thus avoids major drawbacks of the method of instrumental variables. The results suggest that the effect of political interest on the decision to vote is not causal, but rather results from self-selection.     

On the measurement of social class and its role in shaping white vote choice in the 2016 U.S. presidential election

In this paper, I assess how social class influenced white vote choice in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. I use 2016 ANES data to create a measure of class that is based on an individual's income, education, occupation, and wealth. I then use a structural equation model to show that an individual's social class both directly and indirectly shaped vote choice. I demonstrate that low class standing was a significant predictor of support for Trump in the general election. I also show that social class exerted an indirect effect. Lower class standing is associated with higher levels of racial resentment and authoritarianism, which were in turn strong predictors vote choice. I conclude that social class was one of the primary determinants of white vote choice.     

Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results

A significant majority of the world's constitutional courts publicize their decisions through direct contact with the national media. This interest in public information is puzzling in so far as constitutional judges are not directly accountable to voters. I argue that the promotion of case results is consistent with a theory of judicial behavior in which public support for courts can undermine incentives for insincere decision making. In this article, I develop a simple game theory model that identifies how case promotion is linked to judicial choice. Results of a simultaneous equations model estimating the Mexican Supreme Court's merits decisions and its choices to publicize those decisions by issuing press releases to national media outlets support an account of constitutional review in which judges believe they can influence their authority through case promotion.     

Why do parties use primaries?: Political selection versus candidate incentives

This paper contrasts empirically two possible explanations for the party decision to use primaries: desire to improve political selection (selection effect), or desire to increase political competition—and incentives—among candidates (incentive effect). Using a simple model of endogenous primaries, I show that each explanation implies a different relation between primary adoption and the strength of partisan support. I estimate this relation using the case of Latin American presidential primaries and find robust evidence that the incentive effect dominates the selection effect.     

Childhood bads,parenting goods,and the right to procreate

Abstract

Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, together with many other philosophers, think that adults’ interests in raising a child can give them a moral right to parent when they will be adequate parents. We consider whether the same interest could give such adults a moral right to procreate, as a means of acquiring a child to raise. We argue that the interest in parenting cannot support a right to procreate, because the features of childhood that make parenting uniquely valuable for adults are bad for children. Adults may have a right to procreate, but they do not have that right due to their interest in a parent–child relationship.     

Appointments to boards and committees via lottery,a pathway to fairness and diversity

• Public appointments for committees or boards can be controversial due to cronyism or pandering to demands of noisy or powerful interest groups. One relatively unexplored method for selecting committee or board members is random selection which has advantages beyond interrupting cronyism. This paper canvasses the strengths and weaknesses of an unusual selection method and makes a case for the use of a lottery as a robust process that will lend legitimacy and credibility to committee or board governance.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collective Action and Citizen Responses to Global Warming

This paper expands the relevance of the collective interest model of mass political action to explain collective-action behavior in the context of global warming and climate change. The analysis is an attempt to answer Ostrom’s call for a behavioral model of collective action that can be generalized beyond political protest to other collective-action problems. We elaborate, specify, and empirically test a collective interest model approach to citizen policy support, environmental political participation, and environmental behavior related to the issue of global warming. Key elements of the collective interest model—perceived risk, personal efficacy, and environmental values—are found to be directly, and positively, related to support of government policies and personal behaviors that affect global warming. We also discuss the links between the collective interest model and other important approaches to political behavior.

Appropriations Politics in Congress: The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies

In the topsy-turvy world of congressional budgeting, last year's analysis is often out of date this year. How, then, could a work as old as most college sophomores have any relevance today? Richard Fenno's The Power of the Purse is a classic that passes the most challenging test of all time. Despite the very significant changes that have occurred in the congressional budget and appropriations processes, more than mere historical interest is to be found in Fenno's masterful study. While there are many relevant parts of the book, the following selection is from Fenno's exploration of the interplay between agency budget officials and the appropriations subcommittees. It was a pleasure to read these chapters again and I suspect that many other readers will be surprised at how insightful and fresh the study remains.     

Nomination rules and the calculus of mobilization: Theory and evidence from Mexico

Does party organization shape candidates’ electoral mobilization efforts? I develop a novel theoretical account linking candidate selection rules to electoral mobilization. Nomination rules that require aspiring candidates to compete in electoral races, such as primary elections, create incentives for them to make considerable investments in order to win the party’s nomination. Using a decision-theoretic model, I show how these initial investments at the nomination stage shape the candidates’ mobilization expenditures in the general election. The main theoretical result establishes that primaries increase candidates’ mobilization efforts only when the general election is not expected to be competitive; when a close race is expected, candidates mobilize at the same rates regardless of how they were nominated. Analysis of an original dataset on candidate selection and electoral mobilization in Mexico provides strong support for the theory.     

Political Choice, Public Policy, and Distributional Outcomes

I address the functioning of the U.S. governing system by analyzing distributional outcomes from 1947 to 2000. The key question is whether public policy influences distributional outcomes. The macropolitics model and power resource theory suggest that left policies should equalize the distribution of income. I utilize single equation error correction models to assess the impact of policy on income inequality through two mechanisms—market conditioning and redistribution. Since nearly every government action influences markets in some way, I examine policy in the aggregate rather than focusing only on policies explicitly designed to redistribute income. The analysis indicates that policy influences inequality through both mechanisms, with left policy producing more equality. The results are consistent with power resource theory and strongly support the macropolitics model. Furthermore, I find that market conditioning is as important as, and works in tandem with, explicit redistribution.     

Introduction to Kirchheimer

Mainly through examining an essay by Iris Marion Young on policy and treatment for pregnant drug users, I compare the feminist ethic of care with the ethics of Michel Foucault, which, I argue, are founded upon the value of freedom. I find several contradictions in Young's work. She criticizes universalization, but does not avoid it herself; she espouses the value of freedom, yet wants the other to conform to her own values. I argue that the problem lies in Young's liberal-humanist understanding of freedom and its relation to ethics. Foucault's understanding of freedom is a sounder base for an ethics, and this provides needed support for the concept of caring. It also yields new perspectives on social problems such as drugs.     

International Technology Cooperation: The Problem of Commercial Rivalry

International technology cooperation promises to help countries exploit the potential of new innovations, but commercial rivalry between companies and governments raises obstacles to it. In this article, I present and solve a model of international technology cooperation. The formal analysis shows that a technology agreement must address two issues. First, governments must be able to induce companies to innovate. Second, governments must credibly commit to penalizing companies for failing to share new information produced through research. Based on these observations, I show that the potential for technology cooperation is maximized in symmetric settings between equally capable governments and companies. In practice, this observation warrants a policy focus on countries and industries that are already on a level playing ground. I also consider extensions to multinational companies and adverse selection problems. The formal analysis provides a solid foundation for practical policy implementation.     

Rent-seeking and the behavior of regulators: An empirical analysis

The main contribution of this paper is to describe empirically how the rent-seeking process takes place in a regulated industry through the consistency in Board decisions. Evidence provided by discrete-choice decision models of regulators confirms that the conventional rent-seeking view of regulation is correct, namely to distribute wealth between various groups differently from what market forces would do. First of all, the structure of the rent-seeking activities in the Quebec regulated trucking industry is well explained. There exist behavioral uniformities (Russell and Shelton, 1974) in decisions taken by the Quebec Transport Commission, given its wide range of choice provided by the absence of detailed regulatory standards by the Quebec legislature. Secondly, trucking firms and large shippers are the interest groups seeking to extract artificially contrived rents. The capture theory of regulation is not a dominant political strategy and therefore does not analytically explain various trades taking place among interest groups when a permit authority is requested. So logrolling by regulators is clearly essential to maintain their non-transferable investment of time and talent and protect their political afterlife. Thirdly, large firms are more successful, at the margin, than small firms in their expansion because of their political effectiveness. The regulatory agency gives more rents to those who offer relatively strong electoral support to its party. Finally, appointed regulators do not achieve other positive payoffs from the regulatory process than those which may result from the agency problem. So the regulatory agency does not promote its own policy agenda, but rather that of the elected politicians, given the organizational and control problem between these two.I am indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support, to Gérard Bélanger, Jean-Luc Migué for helpful comments and to Sylvain Veillette, Pascal Migué, Marc Leduc for valuable research assistance. I benefitted from useful comments by the editor of this journal. All the remaining errors are mine.     

Do Animals Have an Interest in Liberty?

Proponents of justice for animals often argue that non-human animals have an interest in liberty. Furthermore, they usually claim that this animal interest in liberty is intrinsic rather than instrumental; that is to say, liberty is regarded to be good for animals in itself, irrespective of its contribution to the achievement of other goods, such as pleasure. For this reason they argue that legislating to improve welfare standards in zoos, circuses, laboratories and agriculture is inadequate. Instead, they claim that such practices are analogous to human slavery, necessarily harmful and must be abolished. In this article I refute this assertion and claim that for most animals, their interest in liberty can only ever be instrumental. In doing so I outline and reject two different arguments in favour of an intrinsic animal interest in liberty: first, that liberty is an intrinsic interest of animals because they possess preference autonomy; and second, that it is good for animals to be free, where freedom is defined as the ability to exercise one's natural functionings. I conclude that most animals do not possess an intrinsic interest in liberty because they are not autonomous in the relevant sense; that is, they cannot frame, revise and pursue their own conception of the good. If my conclusion is correct, this would have important effects on our obligations to non-human animals. I end the article by introducing some of these possible implications. Specifically, I propose that for most animals, our obligations do not consist of liberating them, and that it might be permissible to use and interfere with animals more often than other proponents of justice for animals have suggested. If this is the case, not all of the ways we keep and use animals need to be abolished. Nevertheless, many need to be reformed to improve welfare standards.     

The decision to lobby bureaucrats

Despite a good deal of interest in lobbyists?? tactics, virtually no research has been published examining the conditions under which interest groups lobby the bureaucracy rather than or in addition to the legislature. Using two comprehensive datasets, I show that lobbying increases in both branches when conflict is higher and when the lobbyist has professional or political connections to that venue. In addition, certain conditions cause lobbyists to specialize in one branch or a particular branch only, depending on the issue area being lobbied, the interest group type being represented, the lobbyist??s resources, and other factors.     

Costly,Regressive, and Ineffective: How Sensitive Is Public Support for the Mortgage Interest Deduction in the United States?

ABSTRACT

Although the mortgage interest deduction enjoys broad public support, critics argue that the policy disproportionately benefits wealthy households, fails to expand homeownership opportunities to households on the margins, and costs the federal government an extraordinary amount of money in foregone tax revenue. Drawing on data collected through an online experiment, this analysis tests the sensitivity of public support to these critiques. The findings reveal that support for the mortgage interest deduction declines when respondents are presented with information about the cost, effectiveness, or distribution of benefits associated with the deduction. Support among renters is more sensitive to framing effects than that among homeowners. Republicans are less sensitive to framing effects than Democrats when the deduction is framed as distributing benefits unequally, but more sensitive to these effects when the issue is framed as costly. However, all groups register their lowest level of support when told that the mortgage interest deduction is not an effective tool for expanding ownership opportunities.