Glucksberg, the putative right to adequate pain relief, and death with dignity

This Article focuses on the legality of the aggressive use of analgesics and deep sedation for terminally ill patients. The author analyzes the 1997 Supreme Court decisions on physician-assisted suicide, examines the tension between controversial palliative care practices and the traditional legal framework, and explores the contours of an emerging constitutional right to avoid suffering at the end of life. In addition, the author argues that deep sedation together with withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration should be an option for dying patients suffering from severe physical or emotional pain.     

Palliative sedation in the Netherlands: starting-points and contents of a national guideline

In December 2005 the first national guideline for palliative sedation in the Netherlands was published. This guideline was developed by a committee of the Royal Dutch Medical Association, at the request of the Dutch government. The guideline defines palliative sedation as 'the intentional lowering of consciousness of a patient in the last phase of his or her life'. According to the guideline the objective of palliative sedation is to relieve suffering, and lowering consciousness is a means to achieve this. It is very important that palliative sedation is given for the right indication, proportionally, and adequately. It is the degree of symptom control, not the level to which consciousness is lowered, which determines the dose and combinations of the sedatives used and duration of treatment. The assessment and decision-making processes must focus on adequate relief of the patient's suffering, so that a peaceful and acceptable situation is created. Palliative sedation is given in the last phase of life, in the imminently dying patient. Palliative sedation raises several legal questions. In this article we describe the structure and contents of the guideline, with special attention for the main legal issues involved, like the distinction between palliative sedation and euthanasia and the process of informed consent.     

Advance directives in action in a regional palliative care service: "road testing" the provisions of the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (VIC)

In order to explore the usefulness and acceptability of the provisions of the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) for palliative care patients in a rural region in Victoria, Australia, between July and December 2004 patients were given information explaining the Act and the opportunity to discuss it with the research officer. Grounded theory methodology was used to evaluate client responses. Findings suggested that palliative care patients are willing to engage in advance care planning but they have to be well enough and need skilled, practical, face-to-face assistance to complete the required legal forms. Written materials alone are not adequate, but provide the opportunity for medical staff to have conversations about death and dying. Doctors and nurses should understand the provisions of the Act to assist patients and families. It is recommended that advance care planning, appropriate to the jurisdiction, be an integral part of the palliative care assessment process.     

Order authorizing termination of certain life support systems

An elderly, severely brain-damaged patient was being ventilated and given nutrition and antibiotics intravenously in a medical center's critical care unit. Her legal guardian requested authorization to order that the respirator be withdrawn and the administration of nutrition and antibiotics be stopped. A Missouri circuit court ruled that, while public policy, as evidenced in the state's living will statute, permitted withdrawing the respirator, it apparently precluded withholding or withdrawing nutrition, hydration, or antibiotics.     

Withholding and withdrawing of life support: a medicolegal dilemma

The developments in medicine in general and the technology of life support in particular have provided the means of maintaining organ function for prolonged periods of time. However, there are many situations where life-sustaining treatment in an intensive care unit (ICU) may lead to a death with lingering and suffering of the patient, as well as burdening their family. Although often equated, withholding and/or withdrawing life-prolonging treatments that allow the patient to die needs to be differentiated from the physician-assisted suicides and euthanasia that involve the active ending of life. There is a difference between an unintended but accepted consequence of forgoing therapy and an intended result of death from suicide or euthanasia. The present-day physicians view most patient deaths as an inevitable process secondary to disorders unresponsive to treatment and/or multiple organ dysfunction syndromes. The large majority of patients dying in ICUs today succumb not after cardiopulmonary resuscitation, but rather, after the forgoing of life-sustaining treatment. Such approach has frequently caused families, institutions, and conservators of patients to resort to judicial fiat for resolution.     

Five Words for Assisted Dying

Motivated by Lord Joffe’s Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, but with one eye on any possible future legislation, I consider the justifications that might be offered for limiting assistance in dying to those who are suffering unbearably from terminal illness. I argue that the terminal illness criterion and the unbearable suffering criterion are not morally defensible separately: that a person need be neither terminally ill (or ill at all), nor suffering unbearably (or suffering at all) to have a right to assisted dying. Indeed: I shall suggest that the unbearable suffering criterion undermines the Bill (or any proposal like it) wholesale. On the other hand, the criteria taken together are defensible, and this defence would be built on a concern for the protection of the vulnerable. However, I also claim that this implies that the law might justifiably—and maybe even properly—aim to prevent a person from gaining access to that to which they have a serious moral right. This seems paradoxical, and, towards the end of the paper, I seek to tease apart the paradox.     

Dutch perspectives on palliative care in the Netherlands

This study reports data gathered via extensive interviews with some of the leading authorities on the euthanasia policy that were conducted in the Netherlands. They were asked: It has been argued that the policy and practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands is the result of undeveloped palliative care. What do you think? I also mentioned the fact that there are only a few hospices in the Netherlands. The responses were different and contradictory. Many interviewees agreed with the statement. Almost all of those agreeing with it said that only during the late 1990s were people beginning to admit that there was a need to improve palliative care. Some interviewees insisted that doctors first need to explore other options for helping the patient prior to choosing the course of euthanasia. Other interviewees thought that palliative care is well developed in the Netherlands and that euthanasia has actually paved the way for calling more attention to palliative care.     

Services and treatment for disabled infants; interim model guidelines for health care providers to establish infant care review committees--HHS. Notice of opportunity to comment

These are interim model guidelines to encourage the establishment within health care facilities, especially facilities with tertiary level neonatal care units, of committees for the purposes of educating hospital personnel and families of disabled infants with life-threatening conditions, recommending institutional policies and guidelines concerning the withholding of medically indicated treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) from such infants, and offering counsel and review in cases involving disabled infants with life-threatening conditions. The publication of these interim model guidelines for public comment is required by section 124(b) of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-457.     

Withdrawal of artificial nutrition in the persistent vegetative state: a continuous controversy

The withdrawal of life support from patients in persistent vegetative state (PVS) is a controversial issue, as highlighted by a continuous public debate and recent judicial decisions. In Germany, a topic of particular interest is the abatement of artificial nutrition. First, doubts have come up whether every kind of technically delivered nutrition should be rated identically or whether a distinction between feeding tubes/gastrotomies and intravenous administration should be made. Second, the question is left open whether artificial nutrition is part of basic care and as a consequence may never be discontinued, or if it has to be regarded as life-sustaining treatment which can be refused by surrogates on behalf of the nonautonomous patient. Most recently, controversial judicial decisions have dealt with the question if substituted judgement concerning abatement of artificial nutrition by surrogates or legal guardians is permitted or if the approval of a court is necessary. Forensic evidence is provided which indicates that the withdrawal of artificial nutrition in patients in the persistent vegetative state may become a contributing causative factor or even the immediate cause of death. The legal implications with regard to the above-mentioned issues of controversy are discussed.     

The privatization of health care in Europe: an eight-country analysis

This article presents an analysis of recent changes in the public-private mix in health care in eight European countries. The leading question is to what extent a process of privatization in health care can be observed. The framework for the analysis of privatization draws on the idea that there are multiple public/private boundaries in health care. The overall picture that emerges from our analysis is diverse, but there is evidence that health care in Europe has become somewhat more private. The growth of the public fraction in health care spending has come to an end since the 1980s, and in a few countries the private fraction even increased substantially. We also found some evidence for a shift from public to private in health care provision. Furthermore, there are signs of privatization in health care management and operations, as well as investments. Specific attention is spent on the identification of factors that push privatization forward and factors that work as a barrier to privatization.     

Masked intentions: the masquerade of killing thoughts used to justify dehydrating and starving people in a "persistent vegetative state" and people with other profound neurological impairments

Denying food and water to profoundly impaired people who may not be conscious, or may only be "minimally" conscious, raises challenging ethical issues. While there is growing support for withdrawing/withholding food and water (assisted nutrition and hydration, or "AHN") from people described as being in a "persistent vegetative state" ("PVS") and people with other profound neurological impairments, such as advanced dementia, the issue remains controversial, and for many, unresolved. In this article, the author argues that if a profoundly impaired person is not imminently dying from a disease process, denying food and water causes him or her to die of dehydration and starvation. When provision of food and water does not create excessive burdens (such as extreme pain and discomfort), and if the food and water can be digested and absorbed, denying such nourishment is immoral and unethical. Under these circumstances, this denial (by commission or omission) is motivated by a real intention to cause death, whether or not that intention is explicitly recognized.     

义务冲突——艾滋病防治中的伦理法律难题

随着艾滋病预防对策的深入研究,新的伦理难题——义务冲突凸显出来。一方面,放弃艾滋病患者的隐私将其患病实情告之其性伴侣以保护其生命权、健康权还是保护艾滋病患者的隐私而漠视其性伴侣的人身权利？同时,鉴于当前艾滋病人犯罪已成为一种新型、危害性比较大的犯罪形式,是保护病人自主、保障艾滋病患者的隐私,还是维护公共健康、放弃艾滋病患者的隐私权？利益权衡中,只能取救死扶伤的道德、法律义务而舍弃保护患者隐私的法律义务,取公共健康而放弃个人权利。     

Restraint in order to feed: justifying a lawful policy for the UK

In the UK, restraining medical patients in order to provide care is widely considered to be outmoded and difficult to justify. The prevailing clinical intuition that restraining patients is generally wrong (even when restraint is essential in order to provide artificial nutrition and hydration) has prompted us to develop a policy that is compatible with common law, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Human Rights Act 1998. The nature and scope of the problem are illustrated with clinical cases. These, in turn, serve to demonstrate the tension that arises between article 2, article 3 and article 8 rights, when incompetent patients are restrained in order to feed.     

The permanently unconscious patient, non-feeding and euthanasia

Some sources condemn judicial decisions which authorize the withdrawal of artificial nutrition from permanently unconscious patients. These critics assert that withdrawal of nutrition from a preservable unconscious patient amounts to intentional killing of a helpless human being. Grave implications are seen for helpless patients. This article confronts these critics and their assertions. The author contends that the judicial approach which allows withdrawal of artificial nutrition is fully consistent with traditional medico-legal doctrines. The article articulates a standard--respect for human dignity--which justifies withdrawal of artificial nutrition from a permanently unconscious patient. The implications of this formula for other incompetent patients facing a protracted dying process is discussed. Finally, the article explains why active euthanasia can and ought to be distinguished from withdrawal of life-preserving medical intervention.     

Private thoughts of public representatives: assisted death, voluntary euthanasia and politicians

Assisted death and voluntary euthanasia have received significant and sustained media attention in recent years. High-profile cases of people seeking assistance to end their lives have raised, at least in the popular press, debate about whether individuals should be able to seek such assistance at a time when they consider their suffering to be unbearable or their quality of life unsatisfactory. Other recent developments include a number of attempts to legislate on the issue by the minor parties in Australia and the successful enactment of legislation in a few overseas jurisdictions. However, despite all of the recent attention that has focused on assisted death and voluntary euthanasia, a discussion of the adequacy of existing laws has not made it onto the political agenda of any of the Australian State or Territory governments. This is in spite of the fact that the private views of the majority of our elected Members of Parliament may be supportive of reform. This article explores the role of politicians' views and, as a case study, considers the opinions expressed by a number of Queensland Members of Parliament. In light of the views of these politicians and those of members of the public, as well as considerations arising from current medical practice, the article argues that there is a need for open political debate on assisted death and voluntary euthanasia. The article also suggests ways that such a debate may be achieved while minimising any political impact on governments that are prepared at least to consider this issue.     

The Dutch experience

Euthanasia has been legally sanctioned in the Netherlands by a series of court decisions going back to the 1970s. The author discusses the cultural and historical factors that may have contributed to this development. In the past decade, studies sanctioned by the Dutch government reveal that guidelines established for the regulation of euthanasia--a voluntary, well-considered, persistent request, intolerable suffering that cannot be relieved, consultation with a colleague, and reporting of cases--are consistently violated. Of greatest concern is the number of patients who are put to death without their consent--there are more involuntary than voluntary cases. Euthanasia intended originally for the exceptional case has become an accepted way of dealing with the physical and mental distress of serious or terminal illness. In the process palliative care has become one of the casualties while hospice care lags behind that of other countries. Case examples are given.     

Foreword: can Glucksberg survive Lawrence? Another look at the end of life and personal autonomy

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined to find a right to physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") in the Constitution. Not a single Justice dissented. One would expect such a ruling to be quite secure. But Lawrence v. Texas, holding that a state cannot make consensual homosexual conduct a crime, is not easy to reconcile with Glucksberg. Lawrence certainly takes a much more expansive view of substantive due process than did Glucksberg. It is conceivable that the five Justices who made up the Lawrence majority--all of whom still sit on the Court--might overrule Glucksberg. For various reasons, however, this seems improbable. Unlike the situation with respect to the pre-Lawrence era, Glucksberg does not stigmatize any politically vulnerable group. When there is no democratic defect in the political process, there is much to be said for courts deferring to reasonable legislative judgments. Moreover, unlike the developments preceding Lawrence, there has been no emerging awareness of a right or liberty to enlist the assistance of a physician in committing suicide. No state supreme court has found a right to PAS in its own state constitution. Nor, in the decade since Glucksberg, has any state legislature legalized PAS. And attempts have been made to do so in some twenty states. In addition, various considerations might cause a court to balk at constitutionalizing PAS for the terminally ill. Such a right is not easily cabined. If personal autonomy extends to the time and manner of one's death, why doesn't it also apply whenever a competent person believes that death is better than continued life? Once the right to PAS is grounded on self-determination or personal autonomy in controlling ones own life and death, it no longer seems plausible to limit it to the terminally ill. Why should people who have to endure pain, suffering, or indignity for a much longer time than the terminally ill (often defined as those with six months or less to live) be denied this right? The argument made by many proponents of PAS that the right to forgo medical treatment and the right to PAS are merely subcategories of the same broad right is not convincing. Most of the two million people who die every year in this country do so in hospitals and long-term care institutions and do so after a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment has been made. If medical treatment could not be rejected, vast numbers of patients would be at the mercy of every technological advance. (For example, Nancy Cruzan could have been kept alive in her persistent vegetative state for thirty years.) Allowing a patient to die at some point is a practical condition upon the successful operation of medicine. The same can hardly be said of PAS.     

Treatment Decisions for Critically Ill Infants: The Abrogation of the Best Interests Standard

The issue of withholding or withdrawing medical treatment from seriously ill newborns first gained the attention of the American public in 1982 when Baby Doe was allowed to die without surgery. Since that time, the predominant ethical, medical, and legal approach has been one that allows informed parents to make a reasonable medical treatment decision in the best interests of their infant with the concurrence of the health care providers. There has always been a minority that believes every infant should receive full medical treatment without regard to pain and suffering, until that infant dies a natural death. This viewpoint is reflected in recent judicial and legislative proceedings that have either already drastically changed the prevailing standard of care or threaten do so. This article reviews the significance of these changes.     

Sudden death in hemodialysis patients

Hemodialysis patients may die suddenly and unexpectedly from a number of causes. These may be divided into those deaths due directly to and occurring during hemodialysis, those deaths occurring while the patient is not undergoing dialysis, and those deaths that may occur at any time. The first group includes brain herniation, air embolism, acute hemorrhage as a result of machine malfunction or fistula rupture, electrocution, cardiac arrhythmia caused by hypokalemia, complications of subclavian intravenous catheter insertion, third-degree heart block as a result of triglyceride emulsion, and disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) or hyperkalemia caused by overheated dialysate. The second group includes deaths due to pericardial tamponade because of effusion and suicidal causes of death (exsanguination, electrolyte imbalance as a result of excessive intake of salt, fluid, or potassium) as well as more conventional methods of suicide. The last category includes people dying of arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, and internal hemorrhage. Investigation of these deaths, including pertinent historical, laboratory, and autopsy data and investigation of dialysis equipment, is discussed.     

Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyers' Duty to Balance News Coverage of Their Clients

As the 20th century began its final decade, litigation public relations was more rigorously condemned than condoned. By the end of the decade, the proliferation of the practice and the failure of the bar and bench to forbid it had made the criticism virtually moot. This article considers whether there is a basis for making the right to practice litigation public relations an obligation to do so. The article concludes that the right properly belongs to clients and not their attorneys, and finds a basis in contract and malpractice law for requiring attorneys to tend to their clients' interests in the court of public opinion as zealously as they do in courts of law.