The Intersection of Redistricting,Race, and Participation

The drawing of congressional district lines can significantly reduce political participation in U.S. House elections, according to recent work. But such studies have failed to explain which citizens’ voting rates are most susceptible to the dislocating effects of redistricting and whether the findings are generalizable to a variety of political contexts. Building on this nascent literature and work on black political participation, we show that redistricting's negative effects on participation—measured by voter roll‐off in U.S. House elections—are generally strongest among African Americans, but that black voters can be mobilized when they are redrawn into a black representative's congressional district. Our findings, based on data from 11 postredistricting elections in five states from 1992 through 2006, both expand the empirical scope of previous work and suggest that redistricting plays a previously hidden role in affecting black participation in congressional contests.     

Steering Agencies with Short-Term Authorizations

After World War II, the U.S. Congress began a process of engaging in what David Rosenbloom refers to as Congress-centered public administration. In this article, the author argues that the use of short-term authorizations by Congress facilitates congressional oversight and co-management of public programs. Using data from three case studies, the author shows that Congress is able to systematically, on a regularized basis, shape the overall goals, structures, and decision rules that govern agency activities. It can also promote research and analysis that will inform the reauthorization of a program by funding studies and requiring specific reports to be produced. The agencies are, in turn, able to implement the new legislative requirements over a given timeframe—typically four to six years—and do so in an environment that is relatively free from other congressional changes to the legislation underlying the program in question. During this time, the agency and Congress are able to determine what works and what does not work and to formulate changes that should be considered in the next reauthorization legislation.     

Earning through learning in legislatures

This inquiry applies Gary Becker’s theoretical notions of general and specific training to the experiential learning that occurs within political institutions, in particular the U.S. Congress. In the process, we isolate economic facets of these legislative experiences that influence the rental-value of human capital derived from congressional training. We identify four factors that structure legislators’ post-elective wages: pre-congressional salary, year of entry, tenure, and variables closely related to general training in Congress—specifically, assignment to powerful legislative committees, acquisition of broad skill packages, investment in expanding skill-set proficiencies, and to a lesser extent, life-cycle driven declines in such investments.     

Symposium: Policy analysis for congress. Policy analysis for congress: Lengthening the time horizon

Policy analysis for the Congress is a timely subject. Several policy initiatives have emerged recently from the “first branch.” Others have demonstrated an independent capacity for analysis that is impressive by historical standards. This article introduces a practitioner symposium of three related works on policy analysis for Congress, with appropriate commentary by a distinguished veteran. It argues that because timing is crucial in the congressional policy process, anticipation and advance preparation are central to the effective use of analysis. The other articles illustrate the stages of advance preparation—of the policy analyst, the congressional environment, and the Member for voting—in the form of case studies.     

Public support for congress

The present inquiry focuses upon recent levels and trends of public support and nonsupport of the U.S. Congress. The data are drawn from statewide surveys of Wisconsin adults in 1970–1978 and from such sources as CPS/NES, Gallup, and Harris. Measurement focuses upon four major types of public support for Congress—pure specific support (performance), pure diffuse support (including general confidence in the institution, sense of personal efficacy in relation to Congress, desire for institutional reform or maintenance and the amount of power preferred for Congress relative to other branches), and two mixed types of support, long-term performance assessments and confidence in congressional incumbents. With few exceptions, Congress has suffered a general erosion of public support over the past decade on most indicators.An earlier, longer version of this paper was presented at the XIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Moscow, USSR, August 1979.     

The Congress and fiscal policy

Although the common belief is that the Congress has paid little attention to fiscal policy, the same kinds of political-economic models which have been used to explain presidential budgetary policy may be used equally well to explain congressional budgetary behavior. The Congress' fiscal policy appears to be systematically sensitive to both economic and political factors. Changes in the unemployment rate have a major impact on congressional budgetary policy. As for political factors, the President's lead is followed most closely on revenue proposals and not at all on the expenditure side. The electoral cycle, in particular the off-year congressional election year, is also important; inducing larger deficits and smaller increases in revenues. When the influences on congressional fiscal behavior are compared with those on presidential behavior, the sources of the generally more expansionary congressional fiscal policy are identified. Congressional budget deficits increase in response to increased rates of unemployment but are insensitive to increases in inflation. In contrast, presidential budgets are heavily influenced by inflation and the growth in personal income — increases in each resulting in smaller proposed deficits — as well as by unemployment rates. In years in which both unemployment and inflation are increasing, the combination of the two (assuming a one percentage point change in each) implies an increase in the congressional deficit of $6.7 billion but a decrease in the president's proposed deficit of $2.5 billion. The implications of this study are a challenge to the literature which makes the President the central actor in macro-economic policy.     

Sharing Isn't Easy: When Separate Institutions Clash

There is a lively debate in the United States about how the president and Congress do and ought to relate, and about the significance of recent clashes between the two over control of the bureaucracy. This article focuses on the causes and consequences of increased congressional (and presidential) review and specification of administrative behavior. It examines congressional oversight behavior, micromanagement by Congress, struggles over control of regulations and interpretations of statutes, and efforts by the White House to increase its control over appointments to executive positions. The article concludes with an overview of the sources of tension between the two institutions and an analysis of the conditions under which they could more successfully share power.     

Money,candidates, and mayoral elections

In this paper, we extend a well-trod line of research from congressional and state-level elections—the electoral impact of campaign expenditures and candidate characteristics—to a relatively understudied context, urban mayoral elections. Using a sample of large U.S. cities, we provide evidence that mayoral elections are very similar to elections at other levels of office: there is a tremendous incumbency advantage, one that is overcome only with great effort; campaign spending is closely tied to incumbent vote share but it is challenger rather than incumbent spending that seems to drive outcomes; and challengers are hopelessly outspent. In addition, we find that the effect of local economic conditions on incumbent success is mediated by challenger spending and that incumbent candidates fare better in racially diverse settings.     

Immigration Policy and Hispanic Representation in National Elections

For the first time in U.S. history, after decades of unprecedented growth in interior immigration enforcement disproportionately impacting Latinos, ten percent of the U.S. House of Representatives is Hispanic. Using congressional district-level data on all candidates participating in general elections to the U.S. House of Representatives between 2008 and 2018, we show that intensified immigration enforcement suppressed Hispanics’ representation in congressional elections. The effect—nonexistent for other minorities, such as non-Hispanic Black candidates, as well as in primary elections—is driven by local police-based measures and diminished electoral support. Furthermore, it appears more harmful during midterm elections and in localities without a sanctuary policy.     

Partisan Discourse,Polarization, and the Politics of Military Fatalities in Iraq

Public deliberation on the costs of war is important to democratic decision-making. This article explores congressional rhetoric about military fatalities within the U.S. House of Representatives and in television news media interviews from 2004 to 2006. In the House, the results are consistent with the “ideological opportunism” model of congressional rhetoric, which suggests that politicians–particularly the president’s partisan opponents–will be highly communicative about combat deaths in an effort to express ideological perspectives on war and criticize opponents’ positions. The results also show that as local combat fatalities accumulate, the president’s partisan opponents tend to become increasingly vocal about these deaths. The results do not support the “newsworthiness” model of congressional rhetoric in TV media interviews, which expects opposition party support and presidential party criticism of the president. Politicians on the far ends of the ideological spectrum dominate discussions about the loss of troops in the House, and politicians in both the House and TV news interviews advance largely unwavering partisan positions on the conduct of war. The findings suggest members of Congress reinforce political polarization in debates over the use of force.     

Employer Liability for Employee Sexual Harassment: A Judicial Policy-Making Study

Since 1964 and 1972 when Congress passed key legislation concerning sex discrimination, the courts have been left to fashion policies on sexual harassment in employment. In 1998, the Supreme Court issued four major decisions in this area, one dealing with suits against school districts, one involving same-sex discrimination, and two pertaining to the application of common law to employer liability in sexual harassment cases. The ruling in the first case is at odds with the others, suggesting that Congress may need to intervene. The other three pose a series of complex issues that could benefit from congressional action and administrative guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Court's rulings have answered some legal questions, but posed others that will produce extensive litigation in coming years.     

Does the Ideological Proximity Between Candidates and Voters Affect Voting in U.S. House Elections?

Do citizens hold congressional candidates accountable for their policy positions? Recent studies reach different conclusions on this important question. In line with the predictions of spatial voting theory, a number of recent survey-based studies have found reassuring evidence that voters choose the candidate with the most spatially proximate policy positions. In contrast, most electoral studies find that candidates’ ideological moderation has only a small association with vote margins, especially in the modern, polarized Congress. We bring clarity to these discordant findings using the largest dataset to date of voting behavior in congressional elections. We find that the ideological positions of congressional candidates have only a small association with citizens’ voting behavior. Instead, citizens cast their votes “as if” based on proximity to parties rather than individual candidates. The modest degree of candidate-centered spatial voting in recent Congressional elections may help explain the polarization and lack of responsiveness in the contemporary Congress.     

Real Reform or Change for Chumps: Earmark Policy Developments, 2006–2010

In response to widespread perceptions of problems associated with congressional earmarks, reform efforts began in late 2006 and continued through 2010. This essay summarizes those problems, explains the distribution of earmarks within Congress, and documents their rise and relative fall between 1991 and 2010 using government and public interest group databases. The author explains and critiques earmark reform policies, including congressional rules, initiatives taken by the congressional appropriations committees, and reforms pursued by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Congressional rules and committee‐initiated reforms have been most effective, resulting in significant improvements in earmark transparency and accountability. The number and dollar value of earmarks first dropped noticeably in fiscal year 2007 after an earmark moratorium, and then stabilized as reforms were implemented. It is premature to conclude that these levels will continue or that reforms will alter the policy content of earmarks or their distribution among members of Congress.     

The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on Congressional Approval

Partisan divisions in American politics have been increasing since the 1970s following a period where scholars thought parties were in decline. This polarization is observed most frequently within the debates and deliberation across issues within Congress. Given that most studies of public opinion place the behavior of elites at the center of public attitudes, surprisingly little research examines the effect of partisan conflict on the mass public. This research examines quarterly congressional approval data from 1974 to 2000 to determine the consequences, if any, of party conflict on the dynamics of congressional approval. The findings indicate that over-time changes in partisan conflict within Congress have a direct and lasting effect on how citizens think about Congress.     

An ACIR Perspective on Intergovernmental Institutional Development

This article traces the creation and demise of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and assesses the prospects for restoring an ACIR‐like capability to the federal system. Recent initiatives by the National Academy of Public Administration, the Big 7 state and local government official associations, and Congress are summarized, and the facilitating and inhibiting factors associated with intergovernmental institutional development are examined. At least three ingredients in the formula that gave birth to the ACIR in 1959 will need to be present more than 50 years later: (1) support from congressional champions, the president, and public interest groups; (2) visibility and urgency of intergovernmental fiscal and management issues and the need for a permanent intergovernmental presence to address them; and (3) “homework and spadework” to enlist potential conservative and liberal interest group and think tank backers.     

The U.S. Congress Responds to Online Communication Needs

Abstract

The U.S. Congress, after a relatively slow start in the 1990s, is now making some progress in meeting the demands of online communications. Fueled by the growing use of e-mail by constituents and the development of online grassroots efforts, Congress has been inundated with e-mail. By using filtering systems, better software and hardware, and, most of all, better management techniques, many offices are now equipped to handle the great increase in electronic mail. While several steps behind the private sector, through fits and starts, Congress is attempting to catch up and meet the rising demand and volume of electronic communication. In some offices, there has been considerable progress in developing effective, interactive Web sites. These exceptional Web sites should serve as models of dynamic online communications, but for most congressional Web sites, there is a long way to go. Much depends on the attitudes and priorities set by lawmakers and their senior Staff.     

An Intellectual Crisis in American Federalism: The Meaning of Garcia

In National League of Cities v. Usery (1976), the U.S. SupremeCourt found that the Tenth Amendment requires the existenceof a set of essential state powers that remains beyond the reachof congressional regulation or preemption. The Court reverseditself in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority(1985), holding that the Tenth Amendment provides the Courtno basis on which to limit the Congress in the exercise of itscommerce powers. We argue that, although contradictory, bothholdings can be inferred validly from the U.S. Constitution.This absurd result reveals profound inconsistencies in the constitutionaldesign of federalism, requiring a constitutional solution. Thearticle concludes with a discussion of a variety of constitutionalremedies, including constitutional amendments.     

The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy

A major focus of judicial politics research has been the extent to which ideological divergence between the Court and Congress can explain variation in Supreme Court decision making. However, conflicting theoretical and empirical findings have given rise to a significant discrepancy in the scholarship. Building on evidence from interviews with Supreme Court justices and former law clerks, I develop a formal model of judicial-congressional relations that incorporates judicial preferences for institutional legitimacy and the role of public opinion in congressional hostility towards the Supreme Court. An original dataset identifying all Court-curbing legislation proposed between 1877 and 2006 is then used to assess the influence of congressional hostility on the Court's use of judicial review. The evidence indicates that public discontent with the Court, as mediated through congressional hostility, creates an incentive for the Court to exercise self-restraint. When Congress is hostile, the Court uses judicial review to invalidate Acts of Congress less frequently than when Congress is not hostile towards the Court.     

Federal Preemption and State Regulation of Transportation and Telecommunications

Transportation and telecommunications are two of the most importantinfrastructural industries in the American economy. As theseindustries are so vital and because they exhibit characteristicsthat have frequently rendered them quasi-monopolistic, theirgrowth has been accompanied by state and federal regulation.We document how the imposition of regulation has led to continualconflicts over the extent to which federal regulation shouldtake precedence over state regulation. We illustrate how thejustifications for federal preemption have been applied notonly to the regulation, but also to the recent deregulation,of railroads, trucking, and telecommunications. We contend thatpolitical factors, such as congressional support, precedent-settingcourt rulings, and, most important, political pressure fromaffected interest groups that is related to the revenues stillgenerated within states by these industries, ultimately determinethe form of preemption that emerges from the Congress.     

Congress, the Deficit, and Budget Reconciliation

President Clinton's veto of the 1995 reconciliation bill, the largest and most ambitious such legislation ever passed by Congress, was the first time a reconciliation bill was ever rejected by a president. It was also the first reconciliation bill in two decades to include a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. The fate of this bill, and its scope and contents, suggest the need to assess the evolution of reconciliation within the congressional budget process. In the early 1980s, Congress altered budget reconciliation procedures, putting in place a powerful new capability for deficit reduction. Reconciliation became the primary means within the budget process of restraining entitlement spending and increasing taxes as part of congressional efforts to reduce the deficit. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings magnified certain problems Congress encountered in using reconciliation to control entitlements, producing increased pressure to cut discretionary spending. While the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 included new authority to use reconciliation to restrain entitlements, congressional spending priorities combined with the Peace Dividend to maintain the relative sanctuary entitlement programs have enjoyed. The limits of reconciliation as a deficit reduction tool, both in terms of increasing revenues and curtailing entitlements, are detailed. The inherent procedural advantages accorded to entitlements are contrasted with the treatment of discretionary programs, explaining in part the widening gulf between these two categories of spending. Congress has attempted, without success, to find alternatives to reconciliation. The failure of the seven-year, deficit-eliminating reconciliation bill of 1995 may indicate that certain Limits on the use of reconciliation may have been reached.