Lingua franca and linguistic territoriality. Why they both matter to justice and why justice matters for both

The bottom line of my book Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World (Oxford University Press, 2011, paperback 2015) can roughly be captured in the combination of two recommendations: that the democratization of competence English as a lingua franca should be fostered in Europe and elsewhere and that language communities should be allowed to protect their language against the invasion of English and other powerful languages by imposing their own language in public communication and public education within some territorial boundaries. Most of my critics attack one or the other of these recommendations and some question some of the presuppositions of my whole approach. In this response, I try to refute some of these critiques by clarifying my claims or spelling out my arguments, and I make whatever concessions I believe are required.     

Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile

How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in national and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics.     

Economic justice and economic power: An inquiry into distributive justice and political stability

We characterize and study the relationship between income redistributions that are just and stable. We assume that for a given economy there exists a set of possible income redistributions, the constitution of the economy. The choice of redistribution is in the hands of the agents, who decide by majority vote. A stable redistribution is one that majority vote cannot alter when each agent tries to maximize his income. A just redistribution is defined thus: in the set of all possible redistributions it is the one that leads to an income distribution which, when viewed as a lottery, optimizes the expected von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the agents of the economy. We assume that all agents have the same utility function, that is, the same attitude toward risk. We postulate a trade-off between efficiency and egalitarianism and derive and analyze conditions for just and stable redistributions. We look for the characteristics of initial income distributions that make just and stable redistributions identical. In an example we show how a certain tax schedule on productive work implies certain income redistributions. This work was completed when I, as a research fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, was a guest of the Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Universität Mannheim. I would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Fakultät, and the Sonderforschungsbereich 5, Universität Mannheim, for their support.     

On Sen on comparative justice

Against scepticism from thinkers including John Rawls and Thomas Nagel about the appropriateness of justice as the concept through which global ethical concerns should be approached, Amartya Sen argues that the problem lies not with the idea of justice, but with a particular approach to thinking of justice, namely a transcendental approach. In its stead Sen is determined to offer an alternative systematic theory of justice, namely a comparative approach, as a more promising foundation for a theory of ‘global justice.’ But in the end Sen offers no such thing. He does not develop a theory of justice and this is all to the good; for if values are plural in the way Sen suggests, then justice is not a master idea but one value among many, and it should be neither the first virtue of social institutions, nor the notion that frames all our reflections on ethical and political life.     

正义的社会:是现实的批判还是理想的建构——从马克思和罗尔斯的自由平等的正义观谈起

马克思与罗尔斯对正义社会的要求是自由平等的,但是二人对于自由平等观的正义社会是不同的,马克思是从现实社会出发,是一种批判的正义观,而罗尔斯是根据一种社会契约来建构正义的社会,建构的是理想社会的正义观,通过对二人正义观的比较,我们能够得出对于现行社会的启示。     

Republican justice

I raise three objections to Philip Pettit's republican account of justice: (a) that it fails to account adequately for the role of certain values such as substantive fairness; (b) that it represents an uncomfortable hybrid of egalitarianism and sufficientarianism; and (c) that it fails Pettit’s own ‘eyeball test’. I then conclude in a more constructive vein, speculating about the kind of account of justice it is supposed to be and suggesting that, construed a certain way, it may have resources for answering the three objections.     

Mandated justice: The potential promise and possible pitfalls of mandating procedural justice in the workplace

This study addresses the question of whether and how legal authorities ought to intervene in work organizations in order to most effectively regulate the behavior of employees. This question is examined empirically, by exploring whether the association between the level of fairness employees experience in procedures regarding pay and benefits, and their adherence to workplace rules, differs depending upon whether those procedures are enacted by companies voluntarily or mandated by law. This question was addressed using both a survey of a representative sample of employees in Israel, as well as their reactions to an experimental vignette. The results generally suggest that evaluations of the procedural justice of performance appraisal hearings more strongly influenced judgments of overall workplace fairness, perceptions of management legitimacy, and employee rule‐adherence behavior when employees believed fairer workplace procedures were required by law.     

Quantifying distributive justice: An approach to environmental and risk-related public policy

The most fundamental philosophical objection to cost-benefit analysis is that it fails to account for the distinction between more-necessary and less-necessary benefits. For example, it provides no way to avoid trading off a few cancer deaths in exchange for a more cost-effective but also more hazardous technology which provides cheaper paper or plastic products for the many. Since unjust distribution of benefits and burdens results primarily from the failure to prefer more-necessary goods (such as health and safety) over less-necessary ones (such as cheaper plastic razors), we shall see that a correct calculation of the rate at which marginal utilities diminish in value (as they become less necessary to their users) can determine degrees of necessity and thus the most just possible distribution of benefits and burdens. One way to measure the rate of diminishing marginal utility is provided by the wealth effect in occupational risk studies. Wealthier workers will not assume the same risk in exchange for a given salary increment (which to them is not very necessary) as poorer workers would assume for that same salary increment (which to them is more necessary). It is therefore possible to construct a mathematical model for the effect of necessity/non-necessity on quantitative decision principles for environmental and risk-related public policy, thus making such decisions more distributively just than traditional cost-benefit analysis would allow.     

Ideals of justice: goals vs. constraints

Amartya Sen describes John Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ as ‘transcendental institutionalism’ and develops his realization-focused approach in contrast. But Rawls is no transcendental institutionalist, and Sen’s construal of their opposition occludes a third, relation-based position and a valuable and practical form of ideal theory. What Sen calls transcendental institutionalism and realization-focused comparative theory each treat justice as something to bring about, a problem for experts. A third position treats justice in terms of how we relate to one another rather than of achievement. This position, called ‘justice as reciprocity,’ is consistent with Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ and Sen’s normative aspirations, and might form the basis of new and fruitful dialogue between them. By treating justice as a question of how we relate to one another, and treating relation-based ideals as the basis of respectful behavioral constraints (rather than of ends to pursue), ‘justice as reciprocity’ grounds an everyday form of just democratic citizenship.     

Relational representation: an agency-based approach to global justice

This paper argues that Amartya Sen’s comparative approach to justice requires a politics that is attentive to the agency of the other. Rethinking representation as a relational, rather than a sovereign, concept captures the relationship between agency and justice that is emerging in global politics today. It is increasingly common that non-governmental actors engage with communities through practices of trust and responsibility without appeal to political authority. Relational representation helps clarify the dynamics of these relationships and provides a way to think about their purpose. That purpose is to effect changes that ameliorate suffering and injustice, working to re-present the represented persons as more capable persons, more free to use their agency.     

Managing dissonance: Bureaucratic justice and public procurement

This article puts forward an analytical framework for understanding administrative justice. It does so by reading a leading approach, Jerry Mashaw's administrative justice models, in conjunction with the pragmatic sociology of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, and their orders of worth framework. This provides an enhanced framework, which, while remaining consistent with Mashaw, offers additional insights and is particularly suitable for analyzing decisionmaking environments in the modern contracting state. The article illustrates the workings of the new framework by looking at a controversy under UK and EU law concerning the inclusion of labor objectives in public procurement. The discussion reveals a decisionmaking environment characterized by system dissonance. Actors must navigate different sets of tensions and tradeoffs between competing normative and ethical visions for procurement decisionmaking.     

Transcendental institutionalism and global justice

In The Idea of Justice (2009 Sen, A. 2009. The idea of justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), Amartya Sen distinguishes between ‘transcendental institutional’ approaches to justice and ‘realization-focused comparisons,’ rejecting the former and recommending the latter as a normative approach to global justice. I argue that Sen’s project fails for three principal reasons. First, he misdiagnoses the problem with accounts that he refers to as transcendental-institutionalist. The problem is not with these kinds of accounts per se, but with particular features of prominent approaches. Second, Sen’s realization-focus does not account well for the value of institutions of global justice. And even Sen agrees that reforms to institutions are urgently needed. And third, the distinction between transcendentalism and comparative approaches is implausible. I close by suggesting a strategy for an alternative institutionalist approach that can offer the kind of guidance for reforming the global order that Sen rightly takes as urgent.     

BEPS,tax sovereignty and global justice

The base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and G20 countries marks an important development in the reform of the international taxation regime. In this paper I argue that the initiative nevertheless fails to provide a coherent account of what global justice requires in the realm of fiscal policy. While the OECD’s ostensible aim to increase and protect the tax sovereignty of states is commendable, there is insufficient attention for the distribution of relative tax sovereignty. I show that current global income inequality is correlated with significant inequality of tax sovereignty, that this inequality is unjust on a plausible conception of what global justice requires, and that the BEPS initiative is unlikely to meaningfully address this injustice. I close by suggesting that an internationalist conception of justice concerned with securing the tax sovereignty of independent polities may need to prescribe the creation of globally redistributive institutions.     

Consensus,compromise, justice and legitimacy

Could the notion of compromise help us overcoming – or at least negotiating – the frequent tension, in normative political theory, between the realistic desideratum of peaceful coexistence and the idealistic desideratum of justice? That is to say, an analysis of compromise may help us move beyond the contrast between two widespread contrasting attitudes in contemporary political philosophy: ‘fiat iustitia, pereat mundus’, on the one side, and ‘salus populi suprema lex’, on the other side. More specifically, compromise may provide the backbone of a conception of legitimacy that mediates between idealistic (or moralistic) and realistic (or pragmatic) desiderata of political theory, i.e. between the aspiration to peace and the aspiration to justice. In other words, this paper considers whether an account of compromise could feature in a viable realistic conception of political legitimacy, in much the same way in which consensus features in more idealistic conceptions of legitimacy (a move that may be attributed to some realist theorists, especially Bernard Williams). My conclusions, however, are largely sceptical: I argue that grounding legitimacy in any kind of normatively salient agreement does require the trappings of idealistic political philosophy, for better or – in my view – worse.     

Equality,responsibility, and justice*

Abstract

In this introduction, we underline the theoretical connection between responsibility, luck, and equality upon which luck egalitarianism rests, and we consider the social and political relevance of the approach. We then situate Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s version of the view as proposed in his book, Luck Egalitarianism, in the egalitarian landscape. Lastly, we introduce the six papers that make up this symposium: some are critiques from within or outside luck egalitarianism, while others engage with the theory by expanding the scope of luck egalitarianism.     

State borders as defining lines of justice: why the right to exclude cannot be justified

This paper seeks to answer the question of what we, according to justice, owe to immigrants. The answer to this normative question is extracted by providing an analysis of Michael Blake’s jurisdictional theory presented in Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion and elaborated upon in other articles in which he argues for states’ right to exclude immigrants based on states’ jurisdictional nature. I regard this theory as unjustified since it rests on a weak basis, which is further problematised by weighing the moral claims of residents above those of immigrants. In this way, my criticism serves to provide argumentative support in a negative manner for weighing the moral claims of immigrants on an equal footing with those of residents.     

Turning defiance into compliance with procedural justice: Understanding reactions to regulatory encounters through motivational posturing

This paper uses Braithwaite's motivational posturing framework to explain how individuals react to encounters with regulatory authorities. Of interest is whether procedural justice can reduce defiance and improve self‐reported compliance among individuals who are either resistant or dismissive of regulatory authority. Using longitudinal survey data collected from tax offenders (Study 1), and individuals who had a recent police‐citizen interaction (Study 2), it will be shown that procedural justice can promote compliance behavior. Procedural justice is also found to be effective for reducing resistant forms of defiance over time, but not dismissive defiance. Further, the results reveal that neither resistant defiance nor dismissive defiance moderate the effect of procedural justice on compliance, suggesting procedural justice works equally well for both low and high resisters and low and high disengagers. Finally, an unexpected result reveals that resistance, but not dismissive defiance, mediates the effect of procedural justice on self‐reported compliance behavior. The findings have implications for procedural justice research and for the regulation of defiance.     

Why societies need public goods

The most distinctive features of public goods are usually understood to be the difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries and the fact that one appropriator’s benefits do not diminish the amount of benefits left for others. Yet, because of these properties (non-excludability and non-rivalry), public goods cause market failures and contribute to problems of collective action. This article aims to portray public goods in a different light. Following a recent reassessment of public goods in political philosophy, this contribution argues that public goods are particularly suitable for sustaining a well-ordered society. Public goods contribute to social inclusion, they support the generation of the public, and they strengthen a shared sense of citizenship. This article scrutinizes these functions of public goods and offers a discussion of the interventionist thesis which states that governments should sustain public goods.     

Why the media matter after all: A response to Pauwels

This is a response to Pauwels’ critique of our 2007 Electoral Studies article about the relationship between media content and anti-immigrant party support. We argue here, that Pauwels’ criticism falls short in three respects: (1) it is based on a selective presentation of our and others’ arguments; (2) it fails to distinguish between cross-sectional and longitudinal explanations of anti-immigrant party support; and (3) it presents an overly simplified re-analysis which fails to take into account the dynamic properties of the time-series. Certainly, Pauwels’ article contains some interesting suggestions for future research, but his assessment offers no strong evidence for a different interpretation of the relationship between media and anti-immigrant party support than the one given in our original article.