Nakasone Yasuhiro and Japan’s European Diplomacy

While Prime Minister Nakasone frequently showed his cordial personal friendship with US President Ronald Reagan, he was successful in creating new Japan-Europe relations based on his close ties with European leaders such as UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand. Nakasone felt that the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” was not enough and focused more on “culture and politics.” This article reveals that this originated in his high school days when he learned French and the importance of the philosophy of liberalism.     

The Making of Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Diplomacy

The upbringing and early life experiences of a political leader strongly influence development of the policy framework implemented when in office. In the case of Nakasone Yasuhiro, his experiences during the Pacific War would later be reflected in both domestic policy and international affairs. In terms of international relations, Nakasone formed relationships of trust with international leaders in both East and West that engendered respect and that contributed to his exceptional leadership in Japan’s diplomacy.     

The Trump Administration and Japan: Challenges and Visions for Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era

It is possible that Donald Trump’s success in the US presidential election of November 2016 will touch off the greatest transformation in world politics since World War Two. This is because, for the first time, the presidency of the United States—a country that since World War Two has consistently upheld the liberal world order—has been won by a man who asserts that the US national interests will take precedence over international cooperation.

If so, Japan could be one of the most profoundly affected countries. Japan has thus far accepted its status as a junior partner within the US security framework and—without any significant military power of its own—has devoted itself to economic development.

Although it is difficult to predict what Mr. Trump’s policies will be, there is a possibility, based on the statements he has made to date, that he will be calling for Japan to become more self-reliant. Although his comprehension of the Japan-US security arrangements is fraught with misconceptions, there is ample possibility that he will ultimately opt to maintain the current Japan-US security framework. However, given that the average defense expenditure of NATO countries is 2% of their GDPs, and that the average expenditure of OECD countries on official development assistance (ODA) is 0.7% of their GDPs, it is highly questionable whether Mr. Trump will approve of Japan’s level of defense spending (less than 1% of its GDP) or of its level of spending on ODA (approximately 0.2% of its GDP).

It would not be such a bad thing for Japan to become more self-reliant in terms of security. It is almost unnatural for Japan to maintain this relationship as it is, in the form that it has taken since before Japan’s postwar reconstruction. However, in the context of international relations in East Asia, it has long been taken for granted that this is Japan’s basic stance. Changing this will be no easy task—either domestically or in terms of Japan’s relations with neighboring countries.

In these respects, the authors of this paper decided to consider the question of how Japan should develop its foreign and security policy, and to offer some proposals in this regard.     

North Korea’s Resurgence and China’s Rise: Implications for the Future of Northeast Asian Security

Today, Northeast Asia’s security situation is changing rapidly. North Korea is reviving and China’s power is growing at an alarming rate. While the U.S. continues to suffer diplomatically and militarily in the Middle East and from international terrorism, China’s and North Korea’s power is likely to futher increase, polarizing the Northeast Asian security structure, with South Korea, Japan (and Taiwan) all allied with the U.S. versus North Korea allied with China. The liberal democracies should pursue peace with North Korea and China to preclude the situation from aggravating, but should be ready in the longer term to meet, in diverse ways including strengthening their alliances, the challenges posed by rising powers.

Japan’s Political Economy and Koizumi’s Structural Reform: A Rise and Fall of Neoclassical Economic Reform in Japan

For five years of his premiership, Jun’ichiro Koizumi bravely fought against politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups to promote his structural economic reform. Fortunately, by the time he retired, Japanese economy got out of the depression. But the tide changed. In the July 2007 Upper House elections, the public was opposed to structural reform that Koizumi and Abe had advocated. Now it is not clear where Japanese political economy is likely to go. This paper will take a long-term view on the evolution of Japan’s political economy, and try to understand Jun’ichiro Koizumi’s structural reform in that long-term context.

‘Surrounding Areas’ and The Recalibration of Japan’s Threat Perception

The official narratives of Surrounding Areas in the 1997 New Guidelines are a curiosity: on the one hand, they signify Japan??s readiness to increase its international involvement, while on the other hand, the geographical designation remains vague despite Japan??s preoccupation with Asia. This suggests that Asia as Japan??s neighbourhood is considered along with international developments to facilitate the emergence of an ambiguous language for Japanese policy makers as they seek to adapt to changes in the international environment. As such, the term ??Surrounding Areas?? signifies Tokyo??s anxieties in facing up to new challenges, as well as the willingness of the government to enhance Japan??s international role while maintaining its status as a pacifist state.     

Japan’s Quest for “Soft Power”: Attraction and Limitation

Japan is seeking to project its “soft power” through the allure of manga and anime in its public diplomacy. The production, diffusion and global consumption of manga and anime are driven by market forces and consumer tastes and not by the Japanese state. However, the latter is seeking to harness this popular culture to burnish Tokyo’s international image. Despite the attractiveness of Japanese pop culture and other more traditional forms of public diplomacy, Tokyo’s pursuit of “soft power” and a good international image is undermined by its failure to overcome its burden of history.

Asian Security without the United States? Examining China’s Security Strategy in Maritime and Continental Asia

Chinese President Xi Jinping has touted an Asian security architecture in which “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.” But does China really want to exclude the United States from the regional order? This article argues that previous answers are often insufficient because they do not account for sub-regional variation in China’s strategy. In maritime Asia, China seeks a significantly reduced role for the US and its alliances though major constraints limit the prospects for success. In continental Asia, however, the situation is more nuanced, with Beijing alternately ignoring, supporting, or hedging against US presence. The policy implication is that Washington should not overstate Beijing’s role as either a regional adversary or a regional partner. Rather, the United States needs to approach China on its own terms across sub-regions.     

The biopolitics of China’s “war on terror” and the exclusion of the Uyghurs

This article provides an overview of People’s Republic of China (PRC) counter-terrorism policies targeting Uyghurs since 2001 when the state first asserted that it faced a terrorist threat from this population. In reviewing these policies and their impact, it suggests that the state has gradually isolated and excluded Uyghurs from PRC society. Drawing on the writings of Michael Foucault, it articulates this gradual exclusion of Uyghurs as an expression of biopolitics where the Uyghur people as a whole have come to symbolize an almost biological threat to society that must be quarantined through surveillance, punishment, and detention. Rather than suggesting that these impacts of China’s “war on terror” coincide with the intent of state policy, the article argues that they are inevitable outcomes of labeling a given ethnic population as a terrorist threat in the age of the Global War on Terror.     

Understanding Japan’s Peacebuilding in Concept and Practice

In the post–Cold War era, Japan has developed its own version of peacebuilding in concept and practice and has taken a non-coercive approach to peacebuilding. It has been underpinned by domestic norms of pacifism. This article elaborates on the underexplored theme of Japan’s peacebuilding by focussing on its conceptual basis and three key dimensions of practice. It aims at providing a refined understanding of the Japanese version of peacebuilding, which encompasses highly comprehensive activities in and beyond troubled regions, while carefully excluding the role of military coercion. This article first presents a brief overview of the term ‘peacebuilding’ understood internationally. It then examines Japan’s understanding of the concept of peacebuilding. It consists of the ‘consolidation of peace’ as an immediate contribution to peace and human security, and ‘state-building’ as establishing and enhancing political, economic and social frameworks for durable peace in the long run. The third section of this article investigates three important dimensions of Japan’s peacebuilding practice: (1) the on-the-ground effort in troubled regions consisting of non-military peacekeeping and the provision of foreign aid; (2) taking leadership in developing principles of, and approaches to, peacebuilding in international forums; and (3) human resource development for fostering civilian peacebuilders at home. Finally, this article concludes that Japan is carving out its niche in the field of peacebuilding, suggesting that it is constructing an identity as a peacebuilder.     

Examining the Micro-level Foundations of Japan’s Two-party System Following Government Alternation

A consensus exists among political scientists and the media that a two party system has become firmly established in Japan, and power alternation following the 2009 House of Representatives election seemed to confirm this trend. In contrast, in this study I draw on both election and public opinion data to illustrate that Japan's two-party system rests on fragile micro foundations, particularly since the change of government, and may therefore not constitute a stable equilibrium. Specifically, the two-party system is sustained by the logic of competition in single member districts, but lacks strong backing among a large proportion of the public. Evidence in support of this argument include 1) decreasing vote shares for both the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan in the 2010 House of Councillors election, and 2) a weakening relationship between support for these two parties in monthly polls, in contrast to previous years when LDP and DPJ ratings mirrored one another. I discuss some potential implications of these developments, such as the growing prominence of regional parties and prospects for electoral rule changes.     

Hiding in Plain Sight? Japan’s Militarization of Space and Challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine

ABSTRACT

Japan’s security discourse – despite accelerating shifts in its security stance over the last two decades, and more recently, under the Abe administration – remains dominated by views of essential continuity and maintenance of the “Yoshida Doctrine.” The case of Japan’s militarization of space is used to create a framework for systematically dismantling default assumptions about the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine. The militarization of space serves as a driver of broader trends in Japan’s security policy manifested in the procurement of dual-use assets in launch systems, communications and intelligence satellites, and counterspace capabilities necessary for active internal and external balancing with the US–Japan alliance; the strengthening domestically of security policymaking institutions; and the jettisoning of anti-militaristic norms. Japan’s increasingly assertive military stance, bolstering of the US–Japan alliance and cessation of hedging, facing down of China’s rise, and departure from the Yoshida Doctrine as grand strategy are thus revealed as hiding in plain sight.     

China's Maritime Security and the “Malacca Dilemma”

Abstract

As maritime trading becomes an increasingly important element of the modern Chinese economy, concerns in Beijing are being raised about the safety of vital sea lanes. Central to this thinking has been Hu Jintao's explanation of the “Malacca Dilemma” in late 2003, which describes the problem of sea routes crucial to China's trade, especially the Malacca Straits, being subject to interdiction from another state. At the same time, the international war on terror has also raised the specter of economic terrorism aimed at disrupting commerce via the Straits. Due to the complex nature of these potential threats, there is the temptation for China to address the “Dilemma” unilaterally as the country modernizes its naval forces. However, it remains in Beijing's interests to work both with littoral states and other great powers in ensuring greater security in the Malacca region.     

Japan’s Pivotal Role in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order

The imperative in the Indo-Pacific region is to build a new strategic equilibrium pivoted on a stable balance of power. A constellation of likeminded states linked by interlocking strategic cooperation has become critical to help build such equilibrium. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is the author of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept that the US is now pushing. But Japan faces important strategic challenges. To secure itself against dangers that did not exist when its current national-security policies and laws were framed, Japan must bolster its security or risk coming under siege. US security interests will be better served by a more confident and secure Japan that assumes greater responsibility for its own defense and for regional security. The US must encourage Japan, which has not fired a single shot against an outside party since World War II, to undertake greater national-security reforms. Peace in Asia demands a proactive Japan.     

Japan as an Active Agent for Global Norms: The Political Dynamism Behind the Acceptance and Promotion of “Human Security”

Japan has shaped a distinct human security policy based on evolving policy preferences of successive domestic political leaders and the gradual assimilation of external norms into its own foreign policy. Independent experts have played a particularly significant role in advising Japanese policy elites on how human security could be used by Japan to become an “intellectual leader” within the United Nations and other relevant institutions. This article explores those processes that occurred in the early phase of norm acceptance on the part of key Japanese policy actors and change agents in Japan from the late 1990s through 2003. It argues that human security has served as an effective approach for Japan to establish itself as a more independent foreign policy actor in contemporary international politics.     

Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace Institute—Looking Back Over Our Past and Looking Ahead to Our Future—

The Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), an independent, non-profit research institute founded in 1998 by former prime minister of Japan Yasuhiro Nakasone, has pursued an ambitious research program that covers the fields of international politics, economics, security, energy, and the environment for 30 years. The Institute also convenes international symposia and seminars on important political and economic issues and conducts joint projects with other research institutes in Japan and internationally. Research findings and policy proposals are published in print and on the website.

On the occasion of the 30^th anniversary of the Institute’s founding, and to commemorate the 99^th birthday of Founder and Chairman Yasuhiro Nakasone, as well as recognize the background and purpose of the research work and further clarify the mission for future research endeavors, as of January 1, 2018, the Institute has been renamed Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace Institute (NPI).     

Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific

Since the early years of the twenty-first century, a number of key regional governments have consciously chosen to alter the way they talk about the region, and have now largely shifted from using the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct. But after three decades of utilising the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept, why has this been the case and how might this shift in geographical conceptualisation alter the strategic framework of the region? This paper argues that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a regional reconceptualisation utilised by Japan, Australia, India and the USA to address deficiencies in Asia’s maritime security and institutional architecture, which are being simultaneously influenced by a more assertive Chinese posture and waning U.S. influence. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific concept has developed in tandem with a transformation in the regional security architecture. The utilisation of maritime minilateralism between Japan, India, Australia and the USA supplements Asia’s bilateral American alliances, with an array of trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’. The Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift is really an instance of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that have dominated Asia in recent decades.     

FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the US, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. This article regards the latter diplomatic strategic as the “FOIP 2.0” and that there emerges a possible harmony between Japan’s FOIP and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).